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Summary 
Whether Aristotle wrote the treatises of Metaphysics with different conceptions 
of the science of Being in mind has long puzzled scholars. The particular 
question that causes them unease is whether Aristotle’s enterprise in 
establishing the science of Being through the several treatises of Metaphysics is 
marked by a general science of Being, studying all departments of Being 
whatsoever (metaphysica generalis), or whether his investigation of this science 
reflects an attitude towards a special metaphysics (metaphysica specialis) seeking 
knowledge of a special department of Being, in this case, God, and therefore 
should be regarded as a science that is eminently theological. In this thesis, I 
aim to show that Aristotle’s enterprise in Metaphysics does not necessarily 
hinder reconciliation between the universal and the theological dimensions of 
the science of Being and that although Aristotle's conception of the science of 
Being is eminently theological it does not conflict with its also being universal. 
Furthermore, I aim to show that had the conception of the science of Being in 
Aristotle’s mind not been theological, it would not be universal either.  
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1 
Introduction 
 
‘What is the relation between the ontological question asked by the philosopher 
and the ontological question asked by the theologian?’ 
Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology. I, p. 22. 
 
What can be said with respect to the relation between theological and 
ontological inquiry into Being? The question inevitably turns out to be a basic 
inquiry into the relation of the study of God and Being. Can we find such a 
close relation between the inquiry into God and Being, whereby they may turn 
out to be the same inquiry, or must we necessarily distinguish them? If we can 
indeed distinguish them, to what degree is this possible? One of the texts 
containing possible answers to such questions is Aristotle’s Metaphysics, which 
stands at the foundations of almost all speculations with respect to God that we 
encounter in the history of philosophy.  
 
The conception of the science of Being as it appears in Metaphysics reflects the 
tension between the study of God and the study of Being. The conception of the 
science of Being Aristotle has in mind may be puzzling in the face of the 
remaining textual evidence. Indeed, in some of the passages Aristotle seems to 
describe the science of Being in a purely non-theological manner: 
 
There is a science [ἐπιστήµη] which investigates [θεωρεῖ] being as being [ὂν ᾗ 
ὄν] and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature [καὶ τὰ 
τούτῳ ὑπάρχοντα καθ᾿ αὑτό]. Now this is not the same as any of the so-called 
special sciences; for none of these others deals generally with being as being 
[καθόλου περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὄν]. They cut off [ἀποτεµόµεναι] a part of being 
and investigate the attributes [τὸ συµβεβηκός] of this part - this is what the 
mathematical sciences for instance do.1  
The science of Being, as Aristotle describes it in this passage, must not deal with 
a specific part of Being; rather, it must deal with Beings without qualification, 
taken universally. This, as a matter of fact, is what distinguishes the science of 
Being from the other so-called special sciences that ‘cut off’ (ἀποτεµόµεναι) a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Met. Γ, 1, 1003a20-26. Unless otherwise noted, quotations of Aristotle are taken from The 
Revised Oxford Translations of the Completed Works of Aristotle. 
	  	  
2 
part of Being and execute their inquiry into the limits of that part of Being with 
which they have to deal. Similar descriptions of the science of Being can be 
encountered throughout the Metaphysics. In Book K, for instance, Aristotle 
states that ‘since the science of the philosopher [ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ἐπιστήµη] 
treats of being qua being [τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὂν] universally [καθόλου], and not of 
some part [µέρος] of it…’,2 and a little later Aristotle adds ‘philosophy does not 
inquire about particular subjects in so far as each of them has such and such 
attributes [ᾗ τούτων ἑκάστῳ τι συµβέβηκεν], but considers [σκοπεῖ] each subject 
in relation to being qua being [περὶ τὸ ὂν δέ, ᾗ ὂν τῶν τοιούτων ἕκαστον]’.3 In 
Book E, again he states that ‘we are seeking the principles [Αἱ ἀρχαὶ]4 and the 
causes [τὰ αἴτια] of the things that are [τῶν ὄντων], and obviously of things qua 
being [ᾗ ὄντα]’.5 All of these passages more or less emphasise the same 
characteristic of the science of Being, namely that it should be a universal 
inquiry into Being without any limitation whatsoever. 
 
In a number of other passages, however, Aristotle describes the science of Being 
as if it deals with a particular part of Being, that is, with God. In Book K, for 
instance, Aristotle describes the science of Being thus:  
 
Evidently, then, there are three kinds of theoretical sciences [τῶν θεωρητικῶν 
ἐπιστηµῶν] - natural science [φυσική], mathematics and theology [θεολογική]. 
The class of theoretical sciences is the best [βέλτιστον], and of these 
themselves the last named is best [ἡ τελευταία λεχθεῖσα]; for it deals with the 
highest of existing things [περὶ τὸ τιµιώτατον γάρ ἐστι τῶν ὄντων]6  
The science of Being in this passage is described as dealing with the highest 
instance of Being, namely God, for which reason it can rightly be regarded as a 
‘theological science’. Similarly, in Book E, Aristotle describes the same science 
thus:  
 
But if there is something which is eternal [ὰΐδιον] and immovable [ἀκίνητον] 
and separate [χωριστόν], clearly the knowledge of it belongs to a theoretical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Met. K, 3, 1060b31-32 
3 Met. K, 4, 161b25-27. 
4 Throughout this thesis I will use the word ‘principle’ to render ‘ἀρχη’.   
5 Met. E, 1, 1025b3-4. 
6 Met. K, 7, 1064b1-5. 
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science [θεωπητικῆς] – not, however, to natural science [φυσικῆς] (for natural 
science deals with certain movable things [κινητῶν]) nor to mathematics, but 
to a science prior [προτέρας] to both. For natural science deals with things 
which are inseparable from matter [ἡ µὲν γὰρ φυσικὴ περὶ χωριστὰ]7 but not 
immovable [οὐκ ἀκίνητα], and some parts of mathematics deal with things 
which are immovable [ἀκίνητα], but probably not separate [οὐ χωριστὰ], but 
embodied in matter; while the first science [πρώτη] deals with things which 
are both separate [χωριστὰ] and immovable [ἀκίνητα].8 
The criterion used to differentiate the science of Being from the other so-called 
special sciences in this passage is not the extent of universality that the special 
sciences and the science of Being enjoy, as it is in the previously cited passage 
from Book Γ; rather, it is exactly the scope of their investigation that 
distinguishes these sciences from each other. Accordingly, rather than dealing 
with the whole parts of Being, the science of Being must deal with what is 
separate and immovable. From this passage, one might reasonably conclude 
that what Aristotle has in mind in terms of the outlook of the science of Being is 
not so different from the other special sciences, as just like the others the science 
of Being investigates a part of Being, namely God. Similarly, having 
enumerated three types of substances, namely the non-eternal sensible 
substances, the eternal sensible substances and the Immobile Substance, 
Aristotle, in Book Λ of Metaphysics, goes on to say that ‘the former two kinds of 
substance are the subject of natural science [φυσικῆς] (as they imply movement 
[µετὰ κινήσεως γάρ]); but the third kind belongs to another science’.9 
Accordingly, the science of Being deals with a part of Being, namely the 
Immobile Substance, rather than Being as a whole.10 
 
These passages show that the tension between the investigation of Being and 
the investigation of God is acutely reflected in Aristotle’s Metaphysics. The 
problem is not overlooked by scholars; on the contrary, it occupied many of 
them in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Given the different descriptions 
of the science of Being in Metaphysics, many have tried to discover whether 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The translation would be more accurate if Ross had rendered this phrase as ‘but physics deals 
with things which are separate…’.   
8 Met. E, 1, 1026a10-16. I have slightly modified the translation and rendered ‘χωριστόν’ as 
‘separate’ rather than ‘separable’ as Ross suggested for reasons that will become clear in the 
third chapter of this thesis. 
9 Met. Λ, 1, 1069a36-b1. 
10 See, Phys. I, 9, 192a34 and II, 2, 194b14 for similar descriptions of the science of Being. 
	  	  
4 
Aristotle wrote the treatises of Metaphysics with different conceptions of the 
science of Being. The particular question that vexes them is whether Aristotle’s 
enterprise in establishing the science of Being through the several treatises of 
Metaphysics is marked by a general science of Being, studying all departments 
of Being whatsoever (metaphysica generalis), or whether his investigation of this 
science reflects an attitude towards a special metaphysics (metaphysica specialis) 
seeking knowledge of a special department of Being, in this case God, and 
therefore should be regarded as a science that is eminently theological.  
 
Among modern scholars, Natorp was the first to recognise this puzzle, which 
he finds insoluble:   
 
That this ambiguous conception of the theme of the πρώτη φιλοσοφία 
contains an insufferable contradiction (...) it is impossible to have as a result 
that the πρώτη φιλοσοφία should in fact on the one hand be the universal 
science, the science that is basic for all, but on the other hand be one and the 
same as the science of immaterial, unchangeable Being, as of the most 
excellent class of Being.11 
According to Natorp, the two conceptions of the science of Being in the treatises 
of Metaphysics are contradictory and the riddle of the science of Being as to 
whether it is a universal study of Beings or a special science of God is insoluble.  
 
Whereas in the face of this seemingly insoluble contradiction, Natorp chose to 
omit the theological component from the realm of the science of Being,12 Jaeger 
attempted to solve the problem by referring to Aristotle’s philosophical 
development. Jaeger saw an evolution in Aristotle’s thoughts. In the first stage 
of his philosophical development, Aristotle’s approach to the science of Being is 
marked by Platonism and tends towards theological science: 
 
At first he proceeded strictly in the direction indicated by Plato, that is, he 
retained the supersensible world as the object of first philosophy, as we learn 
from the manifesto On Philosophy, and merely replaced the transcendental 
Ideas with the first mover, which, being unmoved, eternal, and transcendent, 
possessed the properties that being must have according to Plato. This, his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Natorp, P. ‘Thema und Disposition der aristotelishen Metaphysic’ Philos. Monastsh., XXIV 
(1888), 37-65; pp. 49-50, trans. J. Owens (1951), p. 19. 
12 See Owens (1951), p. 20. 
	  	  
5 
earliest, metaphysics was exclusively a science of the being that is moved and 
transcendent, i.e. theology. It was not the science of being as such.13 
This ‘Platonic’ and ‘theological’ stage, however, develops towards a more 
‘ontological’ stage, especially by the effect of some positive investigations14 that 
Aristotle has engaged in. This resulted in a more ‘Aristotelian’ conception of the 
science of Being, e.g. the conception of the science of Being that we encounter in 
Book Γ. This new conception of the science of Being, contrary to that in Book A 
and Book Λ, is marked by a universal investigation into Being qua Being. In 
other words, the evolution of Aristotle’s thought is a retrogressive theology 
affecting large chunks of Metaphysics and marked by contradictory passages 
therein. 
 
Jaeger’s developmentalist ideas spread rapidly among Aristotelian scholars.15 
Owen was the first to emphasise, perhaps more than the others who followed, 
the importance of the role of Aristotle’s notion of pros hen, what he calls ‘focal 
meaning’, in Aristotle’s philosophical development. Owen has noted that Book 
Γ goes far beyond Book A and Book Λ in its conception of the universal science 
of Being.16 The basic motivation for Aristotle’s philosophical development, as 
Owen observes, is to be found in the notion of pros hen. In developing the 
doctrine of ordered homonymy that can be used as a means to unify the science 
of Being, Aristotle must have changed the theological view he had of the 
science of Being, converting it to the universal science of Being.  
 
Leo Elders also saw a development in Aristotle’s thoughts, unlike Jaeger, but he 
thinks that the Platonic era can be linked to the notion of the ‘universal science’ 
of Being found in Book Γ, whereas the ‘theological science’ appears to be more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Jaeger (1962), p. 219. 
14 According to Jaeger, we owe Problems and History of Animals to such interests.  
15 For the effect of Jaeger’s views on Aristotelian scholarship see Chroust (1996). See also Witt 
(1996) for a very helpful classification of the developmentalist theories. Encouraged by Jaeger’s 
views many scholars attempted to provide their own developmentalist scenarios of the 
evolution of Aristotle’s philosophy. Some of these scholars have converted Jaeger’s proposal 
(e.g. Wundt and Gohlke; for a general discussion of these latter scholars see Owens (1951), pp. 
39-40), attempting to show that Aristotle has moved backwards from a universal science of 
Being towards a theological science. 
16 Owen (1979), pp. 24-5. 
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‘Aristotelian’. This development, in his view, is not a ‘progress backwards’ 
theology, as Jaeger suggested; rather, it is a forward moving theology:  
 
There is every reason to assume that Aristotle at first tried to establish a 
general science of being along the lines of Academic thought. This first 
philosophy dealt with the essence of things, their concatenation and 
dependence on ultimate principles. It is possible, or perhaps even likely, that 
in this general science of being, that part of it which was devoted to the study 
of these first principles was somewhat singled off and was on the way of 
becoming a theology.17 
Three years after the publication of Elders’s Commentary, Walter Leszl claimed 
in 1975 that the conception of the science of Being that appears in Book Γ, which 
is to be identified with ontology, should be regarded as a separate science that 
can in no way be identified as theology. These two sciences, as Leszl notes, ‘are 
sufficiently sui generis’.18 Similar views continued to be expressed by scholars 
who observed a clear contradiction between the two conceptions of the science 
of Being in Aristotle. More recently, for instance, Hintikka noted in support of 
Jaeger that ‘the degree of systematicity of Aristotle’s thought at any stage of his 
development is much lower than is usually assumed’ and ‘It seems to me that 
Jaeger really should have pushed his point further’.19   
 
In contrast to scholars who are all too ready to find contradictions in different 
conceptions of the science of Being, a more ‘unitarian’ and ‘traditional’ view 
continues to be advocated by many, who aver that it is indeed possible to 
reconcile what one could call the universal metaphysics of Book Γ and the 
theological conception of the same science expressed in Book E and Book Λ. 
One of the pre-eminent advocates of this view is Sir David Ross. He stressed the 
reconcilability of the two conceptions of the science of Being in his Aristotle: 
 
But the two views are reconcilable; if there is any unchangeable substance, the 
study of it will be first philosophy and universal just because it is first. In 
studying the primary kind of being, metaphysics studies being as such. The 
true nature of being is exhibited not in that which can exist only as an element 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Elders (1972), p. 72. 
18 Leszl (1975), p. 32. 
19 Hintikka (1996), p. 83.  
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in a concrete whole, nor in that which is infected by potentiality and change, 
but only in that which is both substantial and unchangeable.20     
A similar line of thought can be observed in von Arnim as well: 
 
I do not, in fact, admit that in K (and in Γ and E) any contamination of two 
contradictory conceptions regarding the object of metaphysics, which must 
arise out of two different sources of thought, is to be seen.21  
Arnim hints, however, that the solution to this problem lies in the homonymy 
of Being:  
 
It in no way excludes the other and secondary types of Being - insofar as they 
stand in relation to this primary Being through which they are called Beings - 
from treatment in this science. Only the first Being, the godhead, joins in itself 
the Eleatic characteristics of true Being-independent self-subsistence, eternity, 
and immobility.22  
Von Arnim observes that things in the Universe are called Beings in reference to 
the highest instance of Being, namely God. In other words, he sees no 
contradiction in Aristotle’s conception of the science of Being as he places God 
at the centre of the pros hen relation explicated in Book Γ, and manages to 
combine the two seemingly contradictory treatises of Metaphysics.  
 
Quite distinct from these views, Owens suggested that there is no ontological 
component in the science of Being: 
 
The ‘ontological’ conception of the science, accordingly, is nowhere to be 
found in the Metaphysics. A science treating universally of Beings that is not 
identified with the science of a definite type of Being, the primary type, is 
foreign to the Stagirite’s procedure. The object of such a science would be the 
concept of ‘Being.’ Aristotle is well aware of the presence of such a concept. 
He expressly teaches that it is not Entity. Entity - Being qua Being -, however, 
is what the Primary Philosophy treats. The concept ‘Being’, therefore, cannot 
be its object.23 
The science of Being cannot accordingly treat the concept ‘Being’, since this 
term by itself does not have an ontological status in Aristotle’s philosophy. The 
only thing that can be studied by the science of Being, therefore, is substance, 
what Owens calls ‘entity’, and in the case of the science of Being, it must be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Ross, D.  Aristotle. (1996, first published in 1923), p. 163. 
21 Arnim, H.  ‘Zu W. Jaegers Grundlegung der Entwicklungsgeschichte des Aristoteles’ Wien. 
Stud., XLVI (1928), 1-48; p. 20, trans. J. Owens (1951), p. 27. 
22 Ibid., p. 32, trans. J. Owens (1951), p. 27. 
23 Owens (1951), p. 471.   
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nothing other than the highest substance. Consequently, the science of Being is 
reduced to theology. Since there is no ontological component in the science of 
Being, there cannot be contradiction in the overall conception of the science of 
Being either. 
 
Patzig, perhaps more effectively than the other scholars enumerated so far, 
attempted to show the unity of ontological and theological conceptions of the 
science of Being: 
 
It is clear from these remarks that the embarrassing contradiction between a 
‘first philosophy’ which is universal ontology and a ‘first philosophy’ which, 
as theology, investigates only the substance of God simply did not exist for 
Aristotle. First philosophy is more philosophically reflective than either of 
these simplifications; it is theology of so special a kind that it is as such at the 
same time ontology. Aristotle is envisaging here a philosophical discipline that 
is both a first and a general philosophy, and a substance that is so superior to 
all other substances that it can at the same time be called in a certain sense 
substance in general.24 
Through dealing with the highest substance, the science of Being at the same 
time deals with ‘substance in general’. Again, the basis for such a claim lies in 
Aristotle’s establishment of pros hen, what Patzig calls ‘paronymy’. The science 
of Being therefore deals with the highest substance, which, as it were, reflects a 
typological case, the study of which turns out to be a universal ontology.  
 
Giovanni Reale rejected totally the developmentalist view and tried to show the 
unity of the several conceptions of the science of Being by differentiating four 
‘perspectives’ (prospettive) of this science that simultaneously exist in every level 
of Aristotle’s treatment of the science of Being. These are the aetiological, 
ousiological, ontological and theological perspectives. Examining all the 
treatises of Metaphysics, Reale attempted to show that all have the same 
conception of the science of Being, since one can observe all four components of 
the science of Being in every treatise in which Aristotle attempts to establish the 
science of Being. Finally, he noted that, among these perspectives, the 
theological component constitutes the focal point for the other components, 
without which the science of Being could not be established: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Patzig (1979), p. 38. 
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Thus the horizon of Aristotelian metaphysics is given by the dynamic or 
dialectical unity of the ontological, aetiological, and theory of substance 
perspectives centred in the theological component.25  
More recently, Michael Frede has attempted to show the unity of the two 
conceptions of the science of Being. Frede claims that his reason for writing on 
this subject is to show that the answer given by Patzig to the riddle of the unity 
of the conceptions of the science of Being was correct. Nevertheless, he claims 
that, to win acceptance, Patzig’s ideas need to be revised and elaborated in 
various respects.26 Frede indeed elaborates Patzig’s view by virtue of 
introducing some basic claims about the unity of the conceptions of the science 
of Being: 
 
(i) theology deals with beings of a certain kind, namely, separate substances. 
But in doing so, it also deals with a particular kind or way of being, a way of 
being peculiar to divine substances. (ii) It turns out that this way of being is 
the one in terms of which all other ways of being have to be explained, i.e., it 
turns out that a study of being as such resolves itself in three steps into a 
study of how all the different ways of being that characterize the different 
kinds of beings ultimately have to be explained in terms of the way of being 
that is characteristic of divine substances. (iii) since theology studies this focal 
way or sense of being, it also provides the natural point to discuss how all 
other ways of being depend on this primary way of being, especially since 
this primacy would seem to reflect the very nature of divine substances. In 
developing this explanation, theology does carry out at least the substantial 
core of the program of general metaphysics and to that extent can be 
identified with general metaphysics. This is one way in which theology, 
because of the primacy of its objects, will be universal. For, in taking into 
account the primacy of the being of its objects, it will also deal with the ways 
of being that are dependent on it. (iv) but general metaphysics involves more 
than this kind of ontology. It also discusses certain universal principles, like 
the principle of non-contradiction, and certain notions of universal 
applicability like the notions of unity and identity. Again, this can be 
explained in terms of the primacy of theology… (v) Admittedly, this will have 
the result that theology, or general metaphysics, has less internal unity than 
we might have expected.27 
In Frede’s view, the science of Being studies the ‘way of Being’ of certain 
substances. This ‘way of Being’ turns out to be the one on which the other ways 
of Being depend. The dependency relations pave the way for a universal study 
of Being through the study of a determined way of Being. In Frede’s view, the 
science of Being does not need to study any particular Being. The science of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Reale (1980), p. 360. 
26 Frede (1987b), p. 83. 
27 Ibid. pp. 84-85.  
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Being addresses ways of Being that are peculiar to divine substances but it does 
not necessarily study any particular divine substances. Therefore, we have a 
universal science of Being dealing with a way of Being of divine substances, 
nevertheless it does not necessarily deal with God. What it deals with, in other 
words, is the peculiar way of Being shared by several Beings, namely the divine 
substances upon which all the other ways of Being depend; the study turns out 
to be a universal study of other ways of Being shared by other subordinating 
substances, e.g. non-eternal sensible substances. 
 
Much of modern Aristotelian scholarship has clearly been devoted to 
determining whether it is possible to reconcile the two seemingly contradictory 
conceptions of the science of Being. The developmentalists attempted to solve 
the problem by admitting a shift in Aristotle’s position. They identified 
different motivations as well as different paths for this development. 
Sometimes, for instance, as per Owen, the fundamental motivation for 
Aristotle’s philosophical development is seen in his construction of the pros hen 
relation in Book Γ that distanced him from his description of the science of 
Being as theology, for instance in Book E and in Book Λ; sometimes, it is 
fundamentally psychological reasons,28 as in the case of Jaeger, that 
accommodate a retrograde movement away from Platonism. What is 
interesting in this perspective is that the path of Aristotle’s development 
sometimes veers towards a universal science of Being, sometimes towards a 
theological science. The developmentalists, therefore, do not arrive at a 
consensus and so the result is an unsatisfactorily complex picture of diversified 
views that raise more questions than they seek to solve.29  
 
The view that we can reconcile the conceptions of the science of Being in 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics also seems unsatisfactory for several reasons. Although 
its proponents more or less claimed that the pros hen relation is the key to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 I owe this terminology to Charlotte Witt, who distinguished three types of developmentalist 
views, one of which is psychological developmentalism. Witt describes this thus: ‘I call them 
“psychological” because typically they contain psychological conjectures or assertions about 
Aristotle’s mind and his relationship to others, primarily Plato’ (Witt (1996), p. 70).  
29 For a good criticism of the developmentalist theory, see Graham (1987), pp. 6-7. 
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problem of the unity of the conceptions of the science of Being, they 
nevertheless do not satisfactorily present the peculiar features of this relation in 
the way that one might expect. Perhaps this is why they do not give explicit 
answers to how in reality one is to place God at the centre of the pros hen 
relation so that the study of God would turn out to be a universal study of 
Being. In other words, they do not articulate the details of Aristotle’s 
construction of Being in the pros hen way intended to pave the way for a 
particular Being, namely God, to be placed at the centre of all the 
manifestations of Being. Nor do they provide sufficient explanation for the 
relation of the characteristics of God in Book Λ to His being the central item in 
the pros hen of Being. This leads one to think these characteristics have nothing 
to do with God’s being the focal subject matter of the science of Being and even 
that God has been given an accidental role in the science of Being, as we saw, 
for instance, in Frede’s view.  
 
This insufficient picture might not please the developmentalists as they, after 
all, are unsatisfied because of the difficulties in placing God at the centre of the 
pros hen structure of Being. Unless we can find a satisfactory answer to how in 
reality God might be placed at the centre of the pros hen relation, it seems 
impossible to compensate the essence of developmentalist critiques and this, I 
think, cannot be done without a thorough examination of the pros hen relation 
as well as the characteristics of God, so that one can show the characteristics 
given to God are exactly those required in order for Him to be regarded as the 
central instance of the pros hen structure of Being.  
 
The lack of consensus on the unity of the conceptions of the science of Being led 
me to write this thesis in order to show effectively that Aristotle’s enterprise in 
Metaphysics does not hinder reconciliation between the universal and the 
theological dimensions of the science of Being. Aristotle himself seems to be 
well aware of the problem:  
 
One might indeed raise the question whether first philosophy [πρώτη 
φιλοσοφία] is universal [καθόλου], or deals with one genus [περί τι γένος], i.e. 
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some one kind of being [φύσιν τινὰ µίαν]; for not even the mathematical 
sciences are all alike in this respect; geometry and astronomy deal with a 
certain kind of thing [περί τινα φύσιν εἰσίν], while universal [καθόλου] 
mathematics applies alike to all. We answer that if there is no substance other 
than those which are formed by nature [φύσει συνεστηκυίνας], natural 
science [ἡ φυσικὴ] will be the first science [πρώτη ἐπιστήµη]; but if there is an 
immovable substance [οὐσία ἀκίνητος], the science of this must be prior 
[προτέρα] and must be first philosophy [φιλοσοφία πρώτη], and universal in 
this way, because it is first [καθόλου οὕτως ὅτι πρώτη]. And it will belong to 
this to consider being qua being – both what it is [τί ἐστι] and the attributes 
which belong to it qua being [τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ᾗ ὄν].30 
This passage shows how, to Aristotle’s mind, the problem of the unity of 
general and special metaphysics is averted. The universality of the science of 
Being is attained through the homonymous structure of Being in which the 
study of the primary instance paves the way for the study of the secondary 
instances through the necessary connections found between these items of pros 
hen of Being. According to what we have been told in this passage, I will argue, 
if the science of Being were not to be theological, that is, if it were not to deal 
with the highest kind of substance, it would not be universal either. 
 
Accordingly, I will argue by focusing on the pros hen relation in close detail that 
Aristotle’s construction of this structure necessitates that we place God at the 
centre of this relation; through studying God, we arrive at the other 
manifestations of Being that are still connected in a pros hen way to God by 
virtue of certain dependency relations. I will articulate these dependency 
relations and show that they necessarily confirm that we regard God as the 
primary subject matter of the science of Being. Furthermore, I argue that God is 
given the very characteristics He needs if He is to be the primary element in the 
pros hen structure of Being. In other words, Aristotle’s thoughts in Book Λ with 
respect to the characteristics of God are exactly what is needed if he is to 
establish the relations of the pros hen structure of Being adequately. This will not 
only show that Book Γ and Book Λ belong to the same philosophical enterprise, 
but also that the discussion in Book Λ with respect to the attributes of God 
develops against the backdrop established in Book Γ, without which his 
enterprise in Book Λ would be unmotivated and otiose. Hence, the underlying 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Met. E, 1, 1026a23-32.  
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framework offered in Book Γ, namely the pros hen structure of Being, paves the 
way for a unified universal science of Being through God. God stands at the 
nexus of all the possible manifestations of Being, the study of whom would lead 
to universal knowledge of Being, that is, study of Being in the unqualified way 
or Being qua Being. Any successful development in this direction will I think, 
not only provide the most complete and forceful picture of the science of Being 
so far attempted while distancing us from the unsatisfactorily complex picture 
of developmentalist doctrines about the unity of the conception of the science of 
Being, but also make the text of Metaphysics highly readable.31 
 
The thesis has five chapters. The first chapter treats the first two sections of 
Book A of Metaphysics, in which I show that the conception of the science of 
Being that we encounter in Book A is theological and that the reason for this is 
not its being Platonic or even early Aristotle but a doctrine that will be 
sharpened up in later stages of Metaphysics, which, as it were, is unquestionably 
Aristotelian. 
 
The second chapter deals with Book Γ, in which I show that nothing that we 
encounter in this treatise with respect to the science of Being is incompatible 
with the later conceptions in Book E and Book Λ that are generally regarded as 
theological. I first analyse the reasons for Aristotle’s establishing a special kind 
of relation between the instances of Being, namely the core-dependent 
homonymy (CDH - pros hen) upon which Aristotle establishes the science of 
Being. I then derive three basic criteria necessary for establishing CDH, after 
which I derive three types of substances by looking at the Aristotelian corpus. I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Terence Irwin (2002) focuses on the methodology of the science of Being. To me, his position 
with respect to the two seemingly contradictory conceptions of the science of Being is very 
obscure as he seems to be taking for granted that the science of Being focuses solely on first 
principles such as the principle of non-contradiction and does not mention the theological 
dimension of this science. Now it may be that there are some philosophical purposes in which 
such a stance would not yield immediate adverse results and we might suppose Irwin’s 
examination of first principles is one of those, but nevertheless such a stance, I think, is a 
representative take on the science of Being that is radically in error, since we might quite 
naturally think that one of the concerns of a metaphysician must be God. I think, therefore, it is 
not that Irwin is taking a firm position which is wrong but rather that he cannot really be 
describing what the science of Being is like if there is no theological component involved in the 
discussion.  
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will test these substances against the criteria developed hitherto. Through this 
assessment I hope to show that the best candidate for standing as the core item 
in the CDH of Being among the several types of substances is God. 
 
In chapter three, I first examine Aristotle’s introduction of the two tasks of the 
science of Being, namely ‘what it is’ and ‘if it is’, and show that these are fully 
compatible with what Aristotle maintains with respect to the science of Being in 
Book Γ. Later I examine the division of sciences and the criteria upon which this 
division is established, namely separation and immobility. I show that these 
criteria, which fully establish the grounds for a theological science, are 
compatible with the criteria described in Book Γ. 
 
In chapter four, I examine the middle books of Metaphysics and show that the 
conception of the science of Being that is implicitly espoused by Aristotle in 
these treatises and his remarks on the definition of substances are compatible 
with the stated doctrine in Book Γ and Book E.  
 
Finally, in chapter five, I deal with Book Λ and attempt to show the necessary 
place it has in the treatises of Metaphysics. I claim that Aristotle’s inquiry into 
the nature of God in Book Λ constitutes the summit of his enterprise in 
establishing the science of Being. In this chapter, I will show that God is given 
the very characteristics He has to be given if He is to be regarded as the core 
instance of the CDH of Being and so attempt to show the necessary connections 
between Book Λ and the rest of the treatises of Metaphysics in which Aristotle 
establishes the science of Being. 
 
My greatest debt is to my supervisor, Professor Michael Morris, for keeping me 
on track, posing intriguing questions which often lead to new avenues of 
inquiry and helping me to always keep the thesis as a whole in mind. Were it 
not for his kindly attention, superior knowledge, pedagogical patience, and 
marvellous generosity of mind, I would never have been directed down the 
path leading towards the eventual production of my thesis. I must acknowledge 
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CHAPTER I 
 
The first traces of Aristotle’s examination of Wisdom (σοφία), later named First 
Philosophy (πρώτη φιλοσοφία), which confirms the priority of this science 
amongst the other sciences,1 are visible in Book A, in which Aristotle introduces 
Wisdom first by inquiring into the major concepts that will be used to establish 
the science and later by investigating its defining characteristics. This chapter 
follows Aristotle in determining the main characteristics of Wisdom and picks 
up the traces of a more complete picture, which Aristotle had in mind when he 
composed Book A and which are actually established in later parts of the 
treatise. 
 
Book A is generally acknowledged to be an early work written by Aristotle just 
after he left the academy. That amounts to saying that Book A corresponds to 
an earlier stage in Aristotle’s philosophical development for which reason it 
should be regarded as eminently Platonic in spirit. This stance, popularised by 
Jaeger,2 has more or less become the orthodox view of contemporary 
scholarship. Chroust, for instance, notes: 
 
Today, no one will seriously question Jaeger’s main thesis that Aristotle 
started out as an adherent of Plato’s metaphysics, ethics, and politics, and 
ended by setting up what must be called his own system.3  
On this view, Book A is considered to reflect an early ‘Platonic stage’ in 
Aristotle’s philosophical development. Significantly, once Book A is agreed to 
be an early work, scholars attribute its theological character to its stage in 
Aristotle’s development and to the Platonic stance, which they attribute to him 
at that stage. The early stage of Aristotle’s philosophical development is 
accordingly associated with the theological stance, when Aristotle’s concerns 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Throughout Book A, Aristotle does not use the term ‘First Philosophy’ (πρώτη φιλοσοφία). The 
term initially emerges in Book Γ, in which Aristotle begins his first systematic efforts to 
establish this science by averting possible problems with respect to its unity.  
2 Jaeger (1962), p. 173ff. 
3 Chroust (1996), p. 64. Even more, ‘unitarian’ scholars, such as Reale, accept that Book A is 
Platonic in spirit. Cf. Reale (1980) p. 37, where he says ‘Thus Aristotle, at the time of Book A, 
would not have been fully conscious of the distance that divided him from Plato and therefore 
continued to consider himself his disciple’. 
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for the science of Being concentrated on developing a theory of God or, if you 
will, a metaphysica specialis. According to this interpretation, since, as expressed 
in the passage I cited from Chroust, Aristotle later departed from Plato, he 
abandoned the theological stance adopted initially that was genuinely rooted in 
a Platonic perspective. As a result of this ‘development’ in Aristotle’s views, in 
later stages the theological characteristic of the science of Being is discarded and 
his attention turns to terms such as Being qua Being. On this view, the 
characteristic of the science of Being he has in mind in this second stage 
reformed into a general science of Being, i.e. metaphysica generalis. One can see 
this outlook, for instance, in Walter Leszl: 
 
…we must ask how representative are the views expressed in these two 
chapters [A 1-2] (esp. in the second) of Aristotle’s final position on the nature 
of ontology and that of theology. It would seem to me that there are two 
reasons why these chapters cannot be taken as expressing Aristotle’s 
definitive position on the subject, one of them being that they are likely to 
have been written rather early in his career, and the other being that they do 
not aim at providing a rigorous and thoroughgoing treatment of the 
argument.4 
It seems that for Leszl, not only its being a treatise of an early stage but also its 
introductory character, namely being sometimes dogmatic and not being 
rigorous, make Book A rather unreliable in terms of its doctrinal statements. 
Although the introductory character of Book A itself may be employed to 
provide some explanation of its not being rigorous at times, this treatise is 
proposed to be discarded also on the basis of its having been written in a rather 
early stage in Aristotle’s career. 
 
Now, I admit that one can find obvious traces of Platonism in Book A and that 
it is also a theological treatise. In fact, part of what I do in this chapter is to 
confirm that the conception of the science of Being in Aristotle’s mind in Book 
A is indeed eminently theological. What I do not want to agree with in the 
orthodox view, on the other hand, is that the reason underlying Book A’s being 
theological is because it is an early work and is Platonic. I believe, however, that 
the theological appearance of Book A does not follow from its being an early 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Leszl (1975), p. 107. 
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work and Platonic but derives from the doctrine that will be sharpened up in 
later stages of Metaphysics, which, is unquestionably Aristotelian. In other 
words, it is Aristotle’s own convictions and his own position with respect to the 
science of Being that will be developed in the later stages of Metaphysics that 
validate Book A’s theological stance rather than some external factor such as 
Platonism. That amounts to saying that Aristotle’s position with respect to the 
science of Being does not undergo serious change after Book A and that what he 
maintains here in Book A is in line with what he espouses in the later, more 
developed, doctrine of the science of Being in further treatises of Metaphysics.  
 
Part of the justification for this claim cannot be supplied without a thorough 
comparison between the conception of the science of Being in Book A and in the 
other treatises of Metaphysics, especially those where Aristotle makes some 
effort to establish the science of Being (e.g. Book Γ and Book E). My 
examination of the conception of the science of Being in Metaphysics provides 
such an assessment. This chapter will primarily be concerned with Book A and 
of course the theological conception of Book A can only be shown to be 
reconcilable with the rest of Metaphysics once other treatises of Metaphysics have 
also been examined. Hence, my conclusions in this chapter can only be 
provisional. This makes my argument seem tentative at times simply because I 
cannot treat all the possible articulations of the doctrines of Book A in later 
treatises of Metaphysics. However that may be, in this chapter, I will attempt to 
defend my position as far as possible, i.e. that the reason underlying Book A’s 
being theological is not to be sought in its being Platonic and that the 
characteristics evident in Aristotle’s examination of the science of Being in Book 
A can indeed be regarded as being in line with what he maintains later in the 
further treatises of Metaphysics. Hence, in my discussion, I shall emphasise the 
introductory character of Book A and its doctrinal guidance throughout 
Aristotle’s attempt to establish the science of Being, since I believe the 
characteristics derived in this introductory stage are not ignored by Aristotle at 
any later stage of the establishment of the science of Being.  
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The plan of the first section of Book A might not be immediately apparent to the 
first-time reader. Aristotle's aim is not stated until approximately the middle of 
the chapter: ‘…but the point of our present discussion is this, that all men 
suppose [ὑπολαµβάνουσι] what is called Wisdom [σοφία] to deal with the first 
causes [περὶ τὰ πρῶτα αἴτια] and the principles [τὰς ἀρχὰς] of things’.5 His 
chief aim, as indicated by this statement, is to settle the basic subject matter of 
Wisdom, which is described as ‘the first causes (πρώται αἰτίαι) and the 
principles (ἀρχαί) of things’. Right from the beginning of the chapter, Aristotle 
emphasises the priority of the genuine knowledge of things by articulating 
men’s desire to know. As proof of this desire, Aristotle points to the senses: 
most of all, the sense of sight. A short examination of the intellectual states of 
animals assists him in deriving some of the major concepts that will be used in 
the establishment of Wisdom.6 With the help of these concepts, Aristotle 
formulates a hierarchy of knowledge, which helps him to find the precise place 
of the science he investigates, i.e. Wisdom amongst the other sciences. 
 
The central theme of the first two sections of Book A is that man’s perfection 
and his happiness lie in the knowledge attained through successive stages. 
Pointing out that men naturally (φύσει) desire (ὀρέγονται) knowledge (εἰδέναι), 
Aristotle claims that the basic motivation of man’s progress towards knowledge 
lies in his nature.7 Hence, men, by their nature, are directed towards the end 
(τέλος) through some knowledge of things. The end corresponds both to the 
highest level of knowledge and to the happiness and perfection of the human 
soul. In the course of Book A, Aristotle’s presentation of the hierarchy of 
knowledge pays particular attention to this highest stage of knowledge. 
Aristotle mentions ‘nature’ as the main motivator for seeking this highest form 
of knowledge and this ‘nature’ becomes apparent in both man’s desire and the 
organisation and structure of his organism, i.e. his sense organs, his memory 
(µνήµη) and his intellect (νοῦς). The structure of man’s organism is unique in 
the sense that it is differentiated from other animals, mostly by its complex 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Met. A, 1, 981b27. 
6 Met. A, 1, 980a27–980b25; 980b25–981a12. 
7 πάντες ἄνθροποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὸρέγονται φύσει. Met. A, 1, 980a20.  
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faculty of intellect.8 This constitutes the majority of what Aristotle means when 
he says ‘nature’ in the context of the introductory sentence of Book A. All men 
therefore desire to know because of their intellectual nature, which is unique 
and which directs them through the stages of knowledge to Wisdom and 
happiness as the highest status that can be attained. Animals other than men 
neither desire nor can attain such knowledge and happiness.9 The basic 
motivation for man’s desire does not depend on some practical end but on the 
very nature of man, which makes him proceed even if he does not derive any 
practical benefit. Hence, men desire Wisdom not for any practical end but for its 
own sake.10 The basic motivation, then, is not self-interest or the attainment of 
some necessities in life; rather, it is the nature that has to be fulfilled and that 
directs man to the highest form of knowledge.11  
 
1.1. The Hierarchy of Knowledge 
 
In the first section of Book A, Aristotle presents a hierarchy of knowledge. The 
hierarchy we encounter in this part of Metaphysics is not in itself an inquiry into 
epistemology; rather, in establishing this hierarchy, Aristotle has a definite 
purpose in situating the science of Wisdom amongst the epistemic levels that 
are ranked, as we shall see, by virtue of a definite criterion. What I aim to show 
in this part, accordingly, is that in presenting the hierarchy of knowledge, 
Aristotle aims at a certain terminus marked by the highest science of Wisdom 
without which the enterprise would not make sense at all.  
 
In the first section of Book A, one gets the feeling that the criterion that makes 
any kind of knowledge higher than another is increasing knowledge of the 
causes. Accordingly, as one attains higher knowledge of the causes of things, 
one attains a higher status in the hierarchy of knowledge. A particular kind of 
knowledge escapes from the fetters of ordinary experience as it investigates the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Met. A, 1, 980b25. 
9 Met. A, 1, 980b26. 
10 Met. A, 2, 982a15; 982a31; 982b20. 
11 Met. A, 1, 981b20; 2, 982b20. 
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higher causes and principles of things. The inquiry eventually yields to the 
ideal of absolute science, namely Wisdom, whose precise subject matter is the 
highest and the ultimate cause of things. 
 
Now, let us examine the details of this hierarchy of knowledge starting with the 
first stage, where one finds the origins of any knowledge with respect to things 
and wherein the hierarchy proceeds all the way through to the last stage, that is, 
the terminus, towards which all knowledge is directed and where it is fulfilled. 
 
1.1.1. Sense Perception (Αἴσθησις) 
 
Perception was the cause of numerous debates in ancient Greek philosophy. 
Discussion of sense perception sprouts from the fundamental question, which 
addresses the epistemological status of the knowledge one might gain through 
one’s sense organs. Numerous other questions surrounding this fundamental 
question produced one of the most important and fertile debates amongst the 
ancient Greek philosophers.12 I shall not go into the details of the discussion per 
se, since many of the questions concerning this theme do not have a bearing on 
the main points that this essay is intended to articulate. In fact, this is in 
accordance with Aristotle’s presentation of perception in the first section of 
Book A, since he too inquires into perception with the aim of presenting the 
foundations of Wisdom rather than to engage in a discussion that considers 
perception per se, which is actually examined in other parts of his corpus. 
Correspondingly, my sole aim in this part of my essay is to locate the role of 
perception in Aristotle’s initial establishment of Wisdom in the first section of 
Book A.  
 
I should record straightaway that Aristotle’s position on the epistemic status of 
the knowledge we gain from sense organs seems to be rather different from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 For instance, whereas one of these questions asks whether perception arises from similarities 
or from opposition between the object that is perceived and the sense organ, the other asks 
whether there should be a ‘medium’ between our sense organs and the object perceived. One 
can find a comprehensive exposition of these ancient debates on perception in Theophrastus’s 
De Sensu. 
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what I would call the conventional approach of the time, which marks all the 
Greek philosophers. The status of the knowledge gained through senses is 
demoted first by the doubts of Eleatic philosophers and later by Plato’s 
systematic criticisms that resulted in the entire exclusion of senses from the 
realm of knowledge. The traces of this negative attitude start with the pre-
Socratic philosophers who, though not as systematic as Plato, diminished the 
status of the knowledge we gain through our sense organs.13 The conventional 
approach, established mostly by Parmenides, is adopted by all the pre-Socratic 
philosophers. One may be inclined to think that Empedocles and the atomists 
are indeed on the side of perceptual knowledge and so they cannot be involved 
in the conventional approach of the time. Aristotle himself has criticized 
Empedocles and the atomists for supposing that all knowledge is sensation.14 If 
we examine this in detail, however, the fragments prove that they too do not 
support the view that a genuine knowledge of things can be attained through 
the sense organs. Hence I venture to claim that even if these philosophers do 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The first traces of this approach can be observed in Parmenides, who rejects senses as reliable 
sources of our knowledge of the Universe (fr. 7). Parmenides makes a significant connection 
between the status of perceptual knowledge and the dichotomy between truth (ἀλήθεια) and 
opinion (δόξα) by correlating perception with opinion and reason with truth (Simplicius, Fr. 8, 
in Phys. 30, 14.30, 14). By virtue of this claim, Parmenides establishes the main attitude of the 
conventional approach of the time, that the knowledge gained through our sense organs is 
neither accurate nor can be employed to reach further epistemological levels. The truth, in other 
words, can be attained through reason, rather than through the senses that can only shape our 
opinions about things. The conventional approach is further supported by Heraclitus as well, 
though not as plainly as in Parmenides. In fragment 54, for instance, Heraclitus states, ‘An 
invisible harmony is stronger than a visible one’ (ἁρµονίη ἀφανὴς φανερῆς κρείττων – trans. 
mine), a sentiment which seems to distinguish the visible (φανερῆς) from the invisible (ἀφανὴς) 
and prefers the former to the latter. The overall conception of reality, the ‘invisible harmony’ 
(ἁρµονίη ἀφανὴς), cannot immediately be grasped by the sensory organs and hence perceptual 
knowledge is not the right tool for any inquiry into the hidden secrets of reality. On the other 
hand, fragments such as ‘I prefer the knowledge gained through seeing and hearing’ (ὅσων 
ὄψις ἀκοὴ µάθησις, ταῦτα ὲγὼ προτιµέω. (trans. mine) Fr. 55, Hippolytus Refutatio IX, 9, 5) and 
‘eyes and ears of men who have soul that is foreign to their evidences, are bad witnesses’ (κακοὶ 
µάρτυρες ἀνθρώποσιν ὀφθαλµοὶ καὶ ὦτα βαρβάρους ψυχὰς ἐχόντων. (trans mine) Fr. 107, 
Sextus, Adv. Math. VII, 126) seem to suggest that the sensory organs are indeed reliable sources 
of knowledge. Fragment 55 exalts perceptual knowledge, probably to contrast both knowledge 
gained through words and knowledge gained by inspiration, perhaps once used by Homer and 
Hesiod. It is, however, not yet clear whether this perceptual knowledge is sufficient to reach the 
ultimate reality. In fr. 107, Heraclitus does not blame the sensory organs but the people who 
have a ‘βαρβάρους’ soul for not grasping the reality. It is not, in other words, the sensory 
organs that are ‘bad witnesses’ but the ‘βαρβάρους ψυχὰς’ which are alien to reality itself. 
These fragments blurred Heraclitus’s position about the discussion on whether perceptual 
knowledge is reliable or not. 
14 Met. Γ, 5, 1009b13. 
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indeed trust sensation more than any other philosophers in the ancient era, they 
too are not so far removed from the conventional negative attitude of the time 
towards perceptual knowledge15 and the negative attitude upheld by all the 
Greek philosophers until Plato, who presents the most advanced form of this 
approach by excluding almost all the evidence grasped by senses from the 
realm of genuine knowledge. Plato continued the Parmenidian formula that 
correlates senses with opinion (δόξα) rather than truth (ἀλήθεια).16 Plato’s 
position, however, is more radical than that of his predecessors, as he not only 
states that we cannot reach the truth by perception, but he also defends the 
notion that the senses mislead us in our inquiry into truth.17 Hence, according 
to Plato, truth can only be attained through the intellect untroubled by senses.18 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 It is true that Empedocles defends senses, as he affirms that they can channel us to truth (Cf. 
frr. 2–3, Sextus Adv. Math.  VII, 123–125). Unlike Parmenides, he apparently claims that it is 
possible to reach further epistemic levels through senses. Even in these passages, however, in 
which Empedocles seems to defend senses, it is not clear whether he goes so far as to claim that 
we can reach the truth solely through our senses. It seems that another alternative is preferable, 
the faculty of understanding, as a tool to reach the genuine principles of things. As for these 
principles, he determined Love (Φιλότης) and Strife (Νεῖκος), which govern the basic 
conversion of four materials into each other by unifying and separating them. These, however, 
are metaphysical rather than empirical principles, since even if their effect can be observed 
empirically, they can ultimately be grasped by the understanding (Cf. frr. 22–23, Simplicius in 
Phys. 159, 13–27). Such doubts concerning the status of the knowledge we gain through our 
senses can be observed more clearly in Democritus. He has not only proclaimed as clearly as 
possible the unreliability of such knowledge (fr. 9, Sextus Adv. Math. VII, 135–136) but also 
upheld the Parmenidean attitude that combines senses with opinions rather than truth (frr. 6–8 
and 10, Sextus Adv. Math. VII, 136). According to Sextus, Democritus differentiates two types of 
knowing: one through the senses (διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων) and the other through intellect (διὰ τῆς 
διανοίας) (fr. 11, Sextus Adv. Math. VII, 138). Of these two types, he finds only the latter, 
knowing through intellect, ‘legitimate’. The former, however, is rejected and excluded from the 
realm of the genuine knowledge of things. These fragments show that even Democritus and 
Empedocles questioned the inerrancy of perceptual knowledge. 
16 Timaeus, 28a–c; Theaetetus, 179c; Sophist, 264b1; Philebus, 38b12. 
17 Phaedo, 65c; Timaeus, 43c7. 
18 If one considers Plato’s metaphysical doctrine, one can easily understand that such a 
conclusion is a natural result of his metaphysical standpoint, since all the forms that he set out 
as the ultimate metaphysical principles are far removed from perception. Since these 
metaphysical principles constitute the whole reality, and since they are non-spatial and non-
temporal principles, they are connected to intellect rather than the senses (Phaedo, 65d–66a). The 
attempt to reach these principles should employ the intellect alone rather than the senses. In 
fact, this process involves the gradual exclusion of the senses, a type of purification, in which 
the soul is separated from the body so that the senses do not interrupt the intellect in its journey 
to the reality (Phaedo, 66d–67e). Since the soul is together with the body in all phases of life, 
Plato doubts that we can reach the ultimate reality while we live. The examination of the 
ultimate principles should be carried out with the soul and the intellect alone. Senses, on the 
other hand, are seen as mere obstacles that interrupt the soul in its inquiry into truth. 
Correspondingly, Plato correlates the soul with what is divine and intelligible and the senses 
with what is mortal and unintelligible (Phaedo, 79c4–80c). 
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Perceptions, being inadequate and deceptive, summon understanding to carry 
out an investigation just to get rid of the inadequacies that these senses might 
produce. In other words, it is the improper data coming from sense organs that 
direct understanding to inquire into this evidence in more detail. Whereas 
perceptions produce a mixture of opposites, and therefore confuse us in our 
inquiry into truth, understanding separates what should be separated and 
reaches certain results that produce some reliable knowledge.19 Hence, Plato 
separates what is visible and is naturally combined with senses from what is 
intelligible.  Without the faculty of understanding, perceptions are not capable 
of producing any knowledge that can direct us to truth; on the contrary, in such 
a case, senses could only lead us to confusion.20 
 
These remarks imply that Plato’s words do not permit an unequivocal 
interpretation and only in this way will his theory of knowledge be in 
accordance with his metaphysical theory. Obviously, this understanding of 
Plato’s doctrine demands a defence I cannot on this occasion provide but it is 
enough to conclude that Plato has systematised the conventional approach of 
the time that was established by his predecessors. This approach, however, is 
challenged by Aristotle, who is not too ready to share what his predecessors 
think of the status of perceptual knowledge. 
 
In what follows, I will show that Aristotle converts the conventional approach 
by taking a positive attitude towards sense perception. Perception is no longer 
seen as a negative tool whose evidence should be doubted, as stated by 
Democritus; neither should it be associated with opinion rather than truth, as in 
the case of Parmenides, nor be taken as a deceptive element that precludes the 
soul in its inquiry into truth, as stated by Plato. It is rather a useful tool that 
should be employed if one is to reach the truth. In fact, the senses can be seen as 
part of our soul,21 an inseparable constituent of our nature, thanks to which we 
attain the first stages of our knowledge. The passages regarding senses that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Republic, VII, 524b–e. 
20 Epinomis, 977c; Letters, VII 343c. 
21 De An. II, 2, 413b9; 414a12; III, 9, 432a16; SS. 1, 436a8; 436b6. 
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permeate his corpus support this thesis, as they are all written in a positive 
manner and do not contain the pejorative attitude towards senses that one can 
encounter in his predecessors.22 It is this positive attitude that continues in the 
opening sentences of Book A, in which Aristotle starts his inquiry into Wisdom: 
All men by nature [φύσει] desire [ὀρέγονται] to know [εἰδέναι]. An indication 
of this is the delight we take in our senses [τῶν αἰσθήσεων]; for even apart 
from their usefulness [χωρίς τῆς χρείας] they are loved for themselves 
[ἀγαπῶνται δι’ αὑτάς]; and above all others [µάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων] the sense of 
sight [ὀµµάων]. For not only with a view to action [ἵνα πράττωµεν], but even 
when we are not going to do anything, we prefer [αἱρούµεθα] sight [τὸ ὁπᾶν] 
to almost everything else. The reason is that the senses, most of all, makes us 
know [γνωρίζειν] and brings to light many differences between things 
[πολλὰς δηλοῖ διαφοράς].23 
According to Aristotle, our knowledge depends upon the necessary 
classifications, that is, ‘the differences [διαφοράς] between things,’ and it can be 
attained by the precise evidence presented by the sensory organs. Contrary to 
his predecessors, Aristotle thinks that this evidence is a reliable source of our 
knowledge.24 Hence, contrary to Plato's understanding, for Aristotle, perception 
is indeed a kind of knowledge.25 The starting-point of all knowledge is located 
in the sensory organs, providing an initial knowledge that can be treated by 
higher faculties such as understanding (νοῦς), thanks to which it is converted 
into a higher knowledge.26 Therefore, the higher knowledge of things, whether 
practical or theoretical, is initially gathered through the senses. This conversion 
of the conventional approach of the time should be justified to the full, 
especially in the face of the conventional systematic approach, and this requires 
more than just a new theory of perception. Accordingly, this approach entails 
the defence of precise epistemic and ontic grounds against the preceding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Obviously, in this positive approach, one should not arrive too hastily at the conclusion that 
we live or gain knowledge solely on the basis of our senses. On the contrary, a person who lives 
only through their senses should be regarded as ‘brutish’ (θηριώδεις). Cf. EN. VII, 5, 1149a10. 
Furthermore, one must note that according to perception is a kind of ‘γνῶσίς’ rather than 
‘ἐπιστήµη’. 
23 Met. A, 1, 980a21-27.  
24 See, for instance, De An. III, 3, 427b10, in which Aristotle affirms that perception of special 
objects is free from error while it is possible for ‘thinking’ to be mistaken. 
25 See GA. I, 23, 731a33, where Aristotle says that perception is a kind of ‘γνῶσίς’ (note, 
however, that he regards perception as ‘γνῶσίς’ rather than ‘ἐπιστήµη’). 
26 Cf. SS. 1, 436b18ff. 
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theories, and this is one of the major projects pursued by Aristotle throughout 
his corpus.27  
 
Perception is where we start investigations that are intended to carry us 
through the first principles. The path to the highest principles, however, is not 
as clearly defined as one might think in the first instance. There are many other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Owing to space limitations, I cannot present here all the details of this justification beyond 
saying that the possibility of attaining knowledge through sense organs depends primarily on 
Aristotle’s theory of perception. According to this theory, every sense is designed for a special 
type of perceptible object (De An. III, 2, 425a20; PA. II, 1, 647a5). It is possible to explain this 
phenomenon from two parallel perspectives that are actually identical. From the perspective of 
a sense organ, it is possible to affirm that it can fundamentally perceive two things: first, the 
special object for which it is designed, and, second, the common facts that are perceived by all 
the senses (Top. I, 15, 106a30; SS. 4, 442b4; OS. 2, 455a13; OD. 1, 458b5). From the perspective of 
the object perceived, it is possible to observe three major groups of sensibles: first are the special 
objects whose perception is the most accurate of all, second are the accidental attributes (e.g. 
green) that may be mistakenly perceived at some level, and lastly come the common attributes, 
such as movement and magnitude, whose perception may involve the greatest amount of sense 
illusion (De An. II, 6, 418a11; III, 3, 428b18–25). The last two groups correspond to the ‘common 
facts’ that are perceived by all senses. If sensible is a special object of sense, the sense is most 
accurate simply because the sense organ is particularly designed to fit that special object. On the 
other hand, the reason that perception errs in the common attributes is that we do not have a 
special sense particularly designed to perceive these attributes. In order to raise the accuracy of 
the perception of these accidental and common attributes, we need more than one sense organ, 
and this is the underlying reason for our possession of five senses (De An. III, 1, 424b20; 425b4–
11). Hence, there is a reciprocal relation between the senses and the sensibles. In order for a 
perception to be accurate, the two poles of this reciprocal relation should fit each other 
properly. When the sensible is a special object of sense, which is designed to fit that particular 
sensible, sensation will not err and will give accurate data. 
Aristotle’s theory of perception is established upon his doctrine of actuality and potentiality. He 
describes sense organs as mere potentialities of what they are designed to perceive (De An. II, 5, 
416b33; III, 2, 426a23; 8, 432a2; 11, 424a4; Met. IX, 5, 1047b32; EN. II, 1, 1103a28, 29). To put it 
briefly, perception is a process in which potentialities turn into actualities. It has two 
dimensions: one is the sensible object that actually exists outside and the other is the sense 
organ that is an innate potentiality. Before perception, we have a potentiality that is capable of 
being affected by what it is designed for; after perception, this potentiality is the form of the 
actual independent object. Hence, when the actual external perceptible object is perceived, what 
potentially exists turns into an actual being in the soul (De An. III, 12, 424a18) and so the sense 
organ is in a way unified with its object. What is perceived by the sense organ is the form 
(εἴδος) of the sensible object and this is what the soul, which is itself a kind of form, is actually 
unified with (De An. II, 12, 424a18ff.; III, 2, 425b25; 8, 431b29; OD. 2, 459a24). (Scholars have 
discussed whether this unification should be regarded as literal or not. For this discussion see, 
for instance, Sorabji (1992), pp. 209 ff.; Freeland (1992), pp. 231 ff.) The fact that Aristotle 
employs actuality and potentiality shows that he conceives of perception as a dynamic process. 
According to his theory, perception is a certain type of movement in which some constituent 
parts of an animal undergo a change. Sensation, therefore, can be understood as an alteration 
(ἀλλοίωσις) in the soul through which we attain knowledge (Phys. VII, 2, 244b11; De An. II, 4, 
415b24; 5, 417b3; OS. 1, 454a9; MA. 7, 701a17). This is a real alteration leading to the knowledge 
of things. A soul, therefore, is not something that has knowledge, but rather a dynamic 
constituent of an animal that is unified with what it knows by taking the form of that object. 
Hence, it can be regarded as everything that it knows: almost everything that can be told of an 
animal (De An. III, 8, 431b20). 
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steps that have to be taken in the hierarchy of knowledge before one reaches the 
highest causes and principles of things.  
 
1.1.2. Memory (µνήµη), Imagination (φαντασία) and Recollection (ἀνάµνησις) 
 
Memory can be regarded as the second step in Aristotle’s hierarchy of 
knowledge. Indeed, it plays a role that although significant might be 
overlooked in the first instance. Amongst animals, it is a sign of intelligence to 
have a memory, as it enables higher kinds of knowledge beyond the knowledge 
gained though sense perception. In other words, without memory, animals 
would only live by means of some kind of knowledge gained through sense 
perception that would in no way proceed to higher kinds of knowledge. 
 
But what is the actual role played by memory in the attainment of higher kinds 
of knowledge? 
 
In order to answer this question, one needs first to determine an important 
feature of sense perception. I have previously noted that Aristotle’s positive 
attitude towards sense perception differentiates him from his predecessors. It 
should not be understood from this initial fixing of the subject, however, that 
Aristotle binds all knowledge to sense perception; on the contrary, though sense 
perception nourishes the higher faculties, allowing for the production of higher 
kinds of knowledge by the data it gives through the sense organs, the role of 
this faculty is quite limited in the sense that it is, by itself, not sufficient for 
higher kinds of knowledge. The epistemic restriction of the faculty of sense 
perception to relatively narrow boundaries arises from the fact that perception 
is necessarily linked to particulars; the limits of sense perception are 
determined by the limits of the particular. Knowledge, on the other hand, 
should be correlated with universals: 
 
What actual sensation [ἐνέργειαν αἴσθησις] apprehends is individuals [καθ’ 
ἕκαστον], while what knowledge [ἐπιστήµη] apprehends is universals [τῶν 
καθόλου], and these are in a sense within the soul itself. That is why a man 
can think [νοῆσαι] when he wants to but his sensation [αἰσθάνεσθαι] does not 
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depend upon himself – a sensible object [τὸ αἰσθητόν] must be there 
[ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ὑπάρχειν]. A similar statement must be made about our 
knowledge of what is sensible [τῶν αἰσθητῶν] – on the same ground, viz. that 
the sensible objects are individual [καθ’ ἕκαστα] and external [ἔξωθεν].28  
Accordingly, one might well see that there is an apparent gap between 
perception (αἴσθησις) and knowledge (ἐπιστήµη) and the gap is as wide as the 
difference between individual (καθ’ ἕκαστον) and universal (καθόλου). Since 
Aristotle affirmed that perceptions are the true origins of our knowledge, he 
must show how these perceptions yield the proper knowledge of things by 
filling the cognitive gap between the individuals and universals.29 In particular, 
this line of thought necessitates that Aristotle should show how ‘individual’ 
(καθ’ ἕκαστα) and ‘external’ (ἔξωθεν) objects of perception are converted into 
‘universal’ (καθόλου) and ‘internal’ objects of knowledge. I am inclined to think 
that the exact cognitive function of memory springs from this apparent gap 
between individuals and universals and, correspondingly, between perception 
and knowledge. Hence, memory, thanks to which the perceptual data are 
somehow converted into universal objects of knowledge, is necessary for the 
attainment of higher epistemic levels.30 In what follows, I will attempt to 
present, at least in rough terms, how memory might in reality be regarded as a 
cognitive bridge between perception and knowledge. 
 
Aristotle’s central discussion in De Memoria focuses on memory and 
recollection.31 These two elements, as I will show, play a significant role in the 
transformation of perceptual data into universal knowledge. One additional 
feature should be added as an essential link in this bridge, that is, imagination. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 De An. II, 5, 417b22–28. The fact that sense perception is connected to individuals and 
knowledge to universals is confirmed in many places in the Aristotelian corpus. See, for 
example, An. Post. I, 18, 81b6; 31, 87b29; 24, 86a29; Phys. I, 5, 189a6; Met. B, 4, 999b3; Δ, 11, 
1018b32; EN VI, 8, 1142a27. 
29 The problem concerning the gap between particulars and universals in Aristotle’s philosophy 
is a significant one that should be dealt with in its own right. This part is simply intended to 
show how Aristotle breaches the gap between the perceptual knowledge of the particulars and 
the scientific knowledge of the universals in terms of cognitive faculties such as memory and 
imagination.  
30 Cf.  An. Post. II, 19, 99b36; VV, 4, 1250a35. 
31 I agree with Julia Annas when she says that memory and recollection are not two different 
faculties but that they are two different kinds of memory (1992, p. 298). In terms of my aims in 
this part, however, it would not make any difference if I had chosen the opposite, i.e. if I had 
chosen to believe that memory and recollection are two different faculties. 
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Together with memory and recollection, imagination completes the structure 
needed for Aristotle to establish the essential cognitive link between perception 
and knowledge. Memory can be regarded as the first step in the conversion of 
perceptual data into knowledge.32   
 
Aristotle insists that memory is always related to the past.33 Correspondingly, 
we neither have a memory of the present nor do we have a memory of the 
future.34 Hence, memory can be contrasted with perception since perception is 
always related to the present whereas memory is always related to some past 
experience.35 Additionally, it can also be contrasted with opinion (δόξα) or 
expectation (ἐλπιζόν) since memory is not open to some future expectation.  
 
Now, what can be said about the importance of this feature of memory in the 
role it plays in the hierarchy of knowledge?  
 
When we think that we know something, we do not necessarily remember the 
past experience that is associated with this knowledge.36 It seems that, 
according to Aristotle, there cannot be memory of some knowledge without the 
experience of the learning process itself that accompanies it. For instance, I may 
know that a triangle has 2Rs, but I can have a memory only of my learning that 
a triangle has 2Rs. The timeless knowledge, that the triangle has 2Rs, however, 
does not belong to the memory. Memory itself, then, seems not to be sufficient 
to build the linkage between perception and knowledge. Apart from this, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 My aim in this part is not to engage in discussions springing from Aristotle’s conception of 
memory, recollection and imagination. Such discussions, though I find them quite essential, 
would exceed the limits of this essay. Hence, one may find this part of the piece fairly shallow 
and excessively constructive. I believe, however, that the overall picture that I present is 
accurate and can be defended on the basis of textual evidence.     
33 De Mem. 1, 449b15; 449b24–30; 450a19; 2, 451a29.  
34 De Mem. 1, 449b10. 
35 De Mem. 1, 449b13. 
36 According to Annas (1992, p. 299 ff.), this is the crucial point that divides what she calls 
personal and non-personal memory. According to this division, personal memory is always of a 
past experience, but non-personal memory is not necessarily so. Hence, in Annas’s example, 
personal memory corresponds to my knowledge of my learning that Caesar invaded Britain; 
non-personal memory, on the other hand, corresponds to the knowledge that Caesar invaded 
Britain without the remembrance of my learning this fact. I shall follow her interpretation in 
general terms in my presentation of memory and recollection.  
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however, it still plays a significant role in the path towards genuine knowledge 
of things. One might grasp the specific role of memory in the hierarchy of 
knowledge if one articulates the precise relation between this faculty and 
perception. Indeed, Aristotle affirms that memory is essentially related to 
perception.37 Memory, according to this conception, is where some images 
(φαντάσµατα) are stored. These images, as I will explain, play a crucial role in 
the transition from perception to thought and correspondingly from perception 
to knowledge. 
 
Accordingly, if asked, of which among the parts of the soul [τῆς ψυχῆς] 
memory [µνήµη] is a function, we reply: manifestly of that part to which 
imagination [φαντασία] also appertains; and all objects of which there is 
imagination are in themselves [καθ’ αὑτὰ] objects of memory, while those 
which do not exist without imagination are objects of memory incidentally 
[κατὰ συµβεβηκὸς].38 
One might proceed along these lines by arguing that the essential objects of 
memory are images that are connected to perception.39 Hence, though memory 
is not sufficient to establish the cognitive connection between perception and 
knowledge, it can establish a linkage between perception and some other 
faculty, which in turn may fill the remaining gap between perception and 
knowledge. Since there should be an intervening faculty building up the basis 
for the first departure from rough perceptual data towards knowledge, and 
since this is the role of memory, we may reasonably claim that memory is 
essential in the attainment of proper knowledge of things; the perceptual data, 
therefore, are stored in the memory in terms of images and this takes us to our 
next step, namely imagination (φαντασία),40 which plays the most significant 
role in the conversion of perceptual data into knowledge.  
 
Though memory provides the basis for imagination, it is actually the 
imagination that is responsible for the transition from what is perceptible to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 De Mem. 1, 450a12. 
38 De Mem. 1, 450a22-25. Cf. De Mem. 1, 450a10; 451a15. 
39 De Mem. 1, 450a22. 
40 Many scholars reasonably doubted that φαντασία should be translated as ‘imagination’. For a 
good discussion of this topic, see Schofield (1992), pp. 249–252 and Dorothea Frede (1992), pp. 
279–280. 
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what is intelligible. Since the precise role of imagination is to promote the 
transition from perception to thought and knowledge, it has both similarities 
with and differences from the faculties of perception and thought. These 
differences and similarities allow imagination to help in bridging the gap 
between perception and thought. 
      
The ability of imagination to convert the sensible data into base structures of 
knowledge is one of its major differences from memory. It would be apt, at this 
point to recall that memory is always of a past experience and this is what 
detaches it from timeless truths, such as a triangle having 2Rs. Roughly, this 
barrier, namely the essential connection with what is past, is averted in the case 
of imagination. I may imagine something even if I do not remember my 
particular experience of it. Hence, contrary to memory, imagination is not time-
dependent. Although this feature of imagination averts a significant obstacle to 
the contemplation of timeless truths, it is not the one that makes imagination 
the major linkage between perception and knowledge. In order to find the 
reason why imagination plays this role, let me, at least in general terms, 
articulate its differences from perception.  
 
Both memory and imagination are essentially connected to perception, for they 
are both promoted by perception. Though they have many similarities, one 
must differentiate perception from imagination on two accounts.41 First, 
imagination may take place even when its object is not present; for instance, in 
dreams we ‘see’ many images even if they do not exist at present;42 perception 
is always of the present, however, and ceases when its object ceases.43 Second, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 De An. III, 3, 428a5–16. 
42 Apart from the passage cited, this is confirmed in De An. III, 2, 425b25; OD 1, 458b30; 459a16; 
Met. A, 9, 990b14; M, 4, 1079a11. 
43 Dorothea Frede (1992, pp. 282 ff.) insists that imagination continues with perception, actively 
serving as a synthesiser in the piecemeal perception of things. Schofield (1992, p. 258) affirms 
that one of the most important differences between imagination and perception is that the 
former involves some interpretation, and the latter does not. He denies that imagination is 
present in all sense perception, and divines that (1992, p. 260) ‘men exercise phantasia precisely 
where sense-perception fails them’. Kenneth Turnbull, on the other hand, denies imagination is 
active (1994, p. 95) and he states both that imagination is a non-interpretative faculty and that it 
is the common sensation that is responsible for the unifying and interpretative role. Whether 
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we may experience false imagination whereas perception of proper objects is 
always true.44  
 
Imagination is different not only from perception but also from thinking, since 
although they have imagination, animals other than man lack thinking.45 Now, 
if there were no imagination, it would be impossible for us to think, which 
really amounts to saying that all human thinking depends on imagination.46  
 
The possibility for imagination to serve as a bridge between perception and 
thought lies in its two-pronged structure. On the one hand, one may, as 
Aristotle himself did, connect imagination to the sensory faculty on the basis of 
its similarities with perception. I have, however, already observed the 
significant differences between perception and imagination. Given these 
differences, it would be perverse to read Aristotle as tacitly allowing that 
imagination has an identical structure to that of perception. On the other hand, 
Aristotle approximates imagination, as far as possible, to thinking. From this 
perspective, it is even possible to conceive of imagination as a type of 
thinking.47 This will hardly do either, however, since I have also explained that 
it should be differentiated from thinking. Hence, according to Aristotle’s 
conceptualisation, imagination has two aspects, one of which is connected to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
imagination is active or passive does not immediately relate to my presentation here since my 
chief purpose is to determine, in general terms, the role of imagination in the hierarchy of 
knowledge and to show how in reality Aristotle might claim that imagination can be regarded 
as the bond between what is perceptible and what is  intelligible.   
44 De An. III, 3, 428a12–15. Cf. Met. Γ, 5, 1010b1–14. We may add another difference between 
imagination and perception if we want to apply a statement from a passage in which Aristotle 
differentiates opinion and imagination (De An. III, 3, 427b16): we can ‘imagine’ whenever we 
wish, whereas this is not possible for perception. 
45 De An. III, 10, 433a12; EN VII, 3, 1147b5. 
46 De An. I, 1, 403a8; III, 7, 431a17; 431b2; 8, 432a9; De Mem. 1, 450a1. 
47 See, for instance, MA 6, 700b17. One may be inclined to blame Aristotle for not establishing 
imagination as a unified faculty. Given the backdrop against which the role of imagination in 
the hierarchy of knowledge and Aristotle’s epistemic motives in establishing hierarchy of 
knowledge develop, however, it is now plain that such suspicions may not necessarily be well 
founded. Besides, Aristotle himself is well aware of the fact that he conceptualises imagination 
in a two-pronged structure. Indeed, he explicitly divides imagination into two parts, and 
identifies the part, which appertains to perception as ‘sensitive imagination’ (φαντασία 
αἰσθητική) and the part, which belongs to thinking as ‘deliberative imagination’ (φαντασία 
λογιστική). This is confirmed most clearly in De An. III, 10, 433b29 and echoed in 434a5. 
Contrary to sensitive imagination, deliberative imagination is not found in all animals, but only 
the ones that are calculative (De An. III, 10, 433b29; 11, 434a6). 
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perception and the other to thinking. Since Aristotle’s actual purpose is to 
establish the connection between what is perceptible and what is intelligible, I 
believe that Aristotle intentionally established imagination in such a two-
pronged structure.  
 
In De Memoria, Aristotle seems to be differentiating recollection (ἀνάµνησις) 
from memory.48 When one recollects, what one does is to recover a perception 
that has previously been acquired.49 I have previously noted that imagination 
depends on memory as memory establishes the grounds for imagination. 
Similarly, memory also promotes recollection by presenting its objects, i.e. 
images. Hence, when one recollects, one recovers the objects of memory.50 
Recollection, however, is fundamentally different from memory since, unlike 
memory, which belongs to perception, recollection belongs to the faculty of 
thinking.51 Accordingly, although many animals have memory, only the 
animals that have the faculty of thinking, that is, only men, can recollect.52 Since 
the activity of recollection is very similar to thinking, Aristotle even affirms that 
it is a mode of inference (συλλογισµός).53 Recollection, therefore, can be 
regarded as the last constituent of the triple bond between perception and 
thinking. In this structure, memory is as approximate to perception as 
recollection is to thinking. Imagination, however, has two structures, one of 
which is connected to perception and the other to thinking. By virtue of this 
triple structure, we are almost ready for the universal knowledge of things.  
 
1.1.3. Experience (Ἐµπειρία) and Art (Τέχνη) 
 
Having mentioned memory Aristotle swiftly moves towards his aim that can be 
marked by the genuine knowledge of things in his establishment of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Annas, however, does not believe that recollection is a separate faculty. See note 32. 
49 De Mem. 2, 451b2–5. 
50 De Mem. 2, 453a10–12. The role played by images in memory is quite different from their role 
in recollection; for this  point, see Annas (1992, pp. 308–309).  
51 This is a very general statement of the difference between memory and recollection. For a 
more detailed discussion, see De Mem. 2. 
52 HA I, 1, 488b25. 
53 De Mem. 2, 453a9–14. 
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hierarchy of knowledge. The next step that comes after memory in the 
hierarchy of knowledge is experience (ἐµπειρία), which can be regarded as the 
bridge between memory and art (τέχνη): 
And from memory [ἐκ τῆς µνήµης] experience is produced [γίγνεται] in men; 
for many memories of the same thing [πολλαὶ µνῆµαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγµατος] 
produce finally the capacity [δύναµιν] for a single experience. Experience 
seems to be very similar [ὅµοιον] to science and art, but really science and art 
come to men through [διά] experience; for ‘experience made art’, as Polus says, 
‘but inexperience luck [τύχην]’. And art arises [γίγνεται], when from many 
notions [ἐννοηµάτον] gained by experience one universal judgement 
[ὑπόληψις] about similar [ὁµοίων] objects is produced.54 
When many memories of the same thing (πολλαὶ µνῆµαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγµατος) 
come together, experience is produced. This definition plainly approximates 
experience to memory as far as possible. In the first instance, one may even 
regard these two as the same thing;55 however, we should not forget that 
experience is the bridge between memory and art and for this reason it should 
naturally have some affinities with not only memory but also art. Therefore, it 
would not be appropriate to identify experience solely with either of these 
faculties. Actually, the prima facie similarity between memory and experience 
is annihilated when one investigates the function of experience in the light of 
the whole Aristotelian corpus. There, one can plainly notice that many 
functions that are allocated to experience are lacking in memory. Indeed, 
experience plays a quite significant role in the functioning of Aristotelian 
science. It can function as the basic tool to filter the theories and distinguish the 
right theories from the ones that are erroneous.56 Accordingly, experience plays 
a constructive role by supplying ‘a comprehensive view of the admitted facts’ 
and disciplines abstract discussions by virtue of repeated observations so that it 
becomes possible to build up more plausible theories.57 Furthermore, 
experience helps us to find the proper principles of any particular science.58 As 
a result, lack of experience will cause serious problems, not only in determining 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Met. A, 1, 980b28–981a7. 
55 As Ross (1924, I, p. 116) claims: ‘in principle it [experience] seems not to differ from memory’. 
56 Aristotle himself uses experience either to reject some of the theories that do not ‘fit the facts’ 
or to affirm some of them if they are ‘confirmed by the phenomena’ (µαρτυρεῖν φαινόµενα). 
This sense of experience, I believe, is quite close to what we call ‘observation’. See Cael. I, 3, 
270b4–20; 8, 290a13–18; GC I, 2, 316a5–14; GA III, 757b35–758a7.  
57 For this constructive role of experience, see: An. Pr. I, 30, 46a17–22; GC I, 2, 316a5–14; LD 7, 
470b6–12; GA II, 6, 742a16–18; 8, 748a13–17. 
58 An. Pr. I, 30, 46a17; GC I, 2, 316a5–8.  
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the right theories or overall construction of a theory but also in preventing one 
from finding the proper principles of a science and therefore preventing the 
investigation from reaching coherent development. Since none of these features 
are appointed to memory, though Aristotle initially describes it as repeated 
memories, it seems upon reflection that experience has to be differentiated from 
memory.  
 
In the same manner, experience differs from art as well. Though it is a 
significant step towards art, it differs from art in many respects. Before 
articulating these differences, let me explain a significant characteristic of 
experience that emerges from Aristotle’s several discussions throughout his 
corpus, since this feature, as we shall see, is the basis of almost all the 
differences between experience and art. In many places in his corpus, Aristotle 
states that experience is concerned with particulars and connects it to the 
practices of life.59 Hence, contrary to the universal knowledge of causes, the 
knowledge gained through experience is concerned more with particulars. 
Although experience, in this respect, has a considerable difference from art (art, 
as we shall see, is connected to universal knowledge of things), it plays a 
significant role in the attainment of art, since many experiences give rise to art 
by formulating some kind of ‘universal judgement’ (ὑπόληψις), which can be 
regarded as a general belief or opinion with a universal character.60 Since it is 
primarily an opinion, it should be differentiated from scientific knowledge. 
Although scientific knowledge that is based on demonstration has a certain 
exactness, ὑπόληψις is open to mistakes and may even concern the things about 
which we cannot have any scientific knowledge.61 Thus, the reliability of 
ὑπόληψις is relatively low when it is compared with scientific knowledge. 
Despite this deficiency, ὑπόληψις gives rise to the generation of art by unifying 
several experiences into a single universal judgement. Henceforth, men are 
alone in their epistemological journey towards higher knowledge, since animals 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 See, for instance, EN III, 8, 1116b3–22; VI, 7, 1141b18; 8, 1142a16; Pol. I, 11, 1258b11.  
60 Some of the passages in which Aristotle uses ὑπόληψις as a general belief or opinion are thus: 
An. Post. I, 16, 79b27; Top. IV, 5, 126b15; Meteor. I, 8, 345b10; DS 1, 462b14–16; Met. A, 2, 982a6; 3, 
983b22–25; 9, 990b23; K, 6, 1062b21; Λ, 8, 1073a17; M, 4, 1079a19; Rhet. III, 16, 1417b10. 
61 De An. III, 3, 427b17; 25; 28; EN VI, 3, 1139b17; VII, 2, 1145b36; 3, 1146b28; Rhet. III, 16, 1417b9. 
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other than men cannot reach this level of universality.62 Accordingly, ὑπόληψις 
can be seen as the point of extremity, which no other animal’s cognitive power 
can surpass.  
 
By virtue of ὑπόληψις, then, experiences of particular instances are converted 
into the kind of universal knowledge, which characterizes art.63 Again, the 
underlying differences between experience and art spring from the differences 
between particulars and universals. In order to understand the underlying 
reasons for the differences between art and experience, an examination, at least 
in general terms, of what Aristotle meant by art would be sufficient.  
 
The genuine distinguishing marks of art, according to Aristotle, lie in its 
peculiar character, which is marked by its tendency to production. Accordingly, 
art can be regarded as the knowledge of production; a capacity to produce an 
external item.64 Hence, all art is concerned with coming into being. 
Correspondingly, according to Aristotle, all things come into being from art or 
from nature or from spontaneity.65  
 
In many places in his corpus, Aristotle states that art and πρᾶξις differ from 
each other in terms of their aims.66 Whereas the ultimate aim of art is an 
external production, the aim of πρᾶξις is the action itself, which is not external 
to the agent. In this way, one may emphatically conclude that experience is 
more useful and suitable for πρᾶξις rather than art (ποίησις). This is because of 
the fact that both experience and actions are related more to particulars. Since it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Cf. EN VII, 3, 1147b5. 
63 It is interesting here to note Ritter’s article, in which he examines science in Babylon. By 
examining several Babylonian texts, Ritter finds that the ‘universal judgement’ which is formed 
by an experiment of particular instances is lacking in Babylon: ‘The Babylonian approach to the 
question of generalization is not, as with us, in the discovery and application of a “general rule” 
in which each case may be enveloped, but rather through interpolation in a pattern of known 
results’ (Ritter (1995), p. 32). Though the reasons why Babylonians undertake such a ‘science’ 
may vary, it is clear that they lack ὑπόληψις as presented in Aristotelian texts. Thus, one may be 
inclined to think – given that ‘science’ in Egypt also lacks such a ‘universal judgement’ – that it 
is a Greek achievement to reach such a stage in science.   
64 Cf. GA II, 1, 735a2; 4, 740b28; Met. ϑ, 2, 1046b3; EN VI, 4, 1140a6–23; MM I, 34, 1197a12. 
65 PA I, 1, 640a28; GA III, 11, 762a16; Met. Z, 7, 1032a13; 9,  1034a9; 24; cf. Met. Z, 3, 1070a6. 
66 This is most clearly confirmed in EN I, 1, 1094a1–18; 7, 1097a16. 
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is the particular that is in force in actual life, experience, being the knowledge of 
particulars, suits the practices of life better. That is why Aristotle states: 
 
With a view to action [τὸ πράττειν] experience [ἐµπειρία] seems in no respect 
inferior to art [τέχνη], and we even see men of experience succeeding 
[ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν] more than those who have theory [λόγον] without 
experience. The reason is that experience is knowledge of individuals [καθ’ 
ἕκαστον], art of universals [καθόλου]67 
We are told in this passage that, owing to his knowledge of particulars, a man 
of experience is more successful than an artist, i.e. craftsman in practical life. 
Perhaps more significantly, Aristotle implicitly admits that it is possible to have 
knowledge of the universal without having some experience of particular 
instances.68 In other words, one may know the universal (e.g. the art of healing) 
without the associated experience (i.e. without actually healing [Socrates]). The 
one who knows the healing itself, the experience, is more successful in actual 
life, however, ‘for it is the individual that is to be cured’ (θεραπευτὸν γὰρ τὸ 
καθ’ ἕκαστον).69 Despite its superiority in practical life, Aristotle confidently 
affirms that ‘we suppose artists to be wiser than men of experience.’70  
 
Aristotle gives three underlying reasons for regarding art as superior to 
experience. Accordingly, we suppose artists to be wiser than men of experience 
firstly because, whereas artists know the cause, the men of experience do not.71 
Correspondingly, men of experience who know solely the fact (ὅτι) while not 
knowing the cause (διότι) perform their action habitually without knowing 
what they do;72 on the other hand, artists who know the cause hinges on a 
reliable knowledge of things and act by virtue of this knowledge.73 The 
knowledge of the cause, therefore, deservedly puts the artist in a superior 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Met. A, 1, 981a13–16. 
68 This is also explicitly confirmed in An. Post. I, 13, 79a5. 
69 Met. A, 1, 981a23–24. 
70 Met. A, 1, 981a24–25. 
71 According to Aristotle’s conception of science, the gap between knowing the fact (ὅτι) and 
knowing the cause (διότι) is as wide as the difference between mere knowledge and the 
scientific knowledge of things (see, An. Post. I, 13). 
72 Met. A, 1, 981a26. 
73 Certainly, the fact that artists rely upon a more credible knowledge than men of experience 
does not mean that their knowledge is always true. This is not what Aristotle wants to suggest 
here. 
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position to men of experience. Thus, the knowledge of causes can be regarded 
as the most reliable criterion thanks to which we can determine the status of 
any kind of knowledge. Accordingly, the degree of a particular knowledge can 
be determined by the degree of the causes that the knowledge in question 
concerns. Men of experience, however, do not even know the cause and 
consequently they should be placed at the lowest possible level in the hierarchy 
of knowledge. This is doubly confirmed if we take into account the status of the 
perceptual knowledge of things to which the knowledge of the experienced is 
connected. While men of experience solely possess knowledge coming from 
perception and from individuals, which places them at the bottom of the 
hierarchy, artists have the knowledge of causes and universals.  
 
The second reason for regarding artists as superior to men of experience relies 
upon the ability to teach (δύνασθαι διδάσκειν) the knowledge that one enjoys.74 
According to this conception, since artists can teach (διδάσκειν) what they 
know, and since men of experience cannot, we should regard the former as 
wiser than the latter. The ability to teach, as we shall see in the second chapter 
of Book A, is regarded as a significant characteristic of a wise man and this 
initial difference between men of experience and artists evokes that 
discussion.75 When considering that passage, we come to understand that this 
feature of art is connected to the first that I mentioned hitherto since the one 
who knows the causes can teach because ‘the people who teach are those who 
tell the causes of each thing [τὰς αἰτίας λέγοντες περὶ ἑκάστου]’.76 Men of 
experience, however, do not know the causes and, for this reason, they cannot 
teach. Since we regard those who can teach as wiser than those who cannot 
teach, we regard artists as wiser than men of experience.  
 
I have already implied the third reason why one should regard experience as 
inferior to art. Experience is connected to the senses, and the senses, as I have 
previously noted, are connected to particulars. Though the senses give us quite 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Met. A, 1, 981b6. 
75 See Met. A, 2, 982a13; 982a27. 
76 Met. A, 2, 982a29–30. 
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an accurate knowledge of particulars, ‘they do not tell us the “why” of anything 
[οὐ λέγουσι τὸ διὰ τί περὶ οὐδενός]’.77 This implies that Aristotle envisages a 
connection between the cause and the universal. The perceptual knowledge of 
individuals, on the other hand, is excluded from this connection. Hence, senses 
connected to individuals give us the fact without the cause that is still 
connected to universals. That is why experience should be regarded as inferior 
to art for, since whereas the former is linked to individuals, the latter concerns 
universals associated with the causal knowledge of things. These three reasons, 
therefore, make us think that art is superior to experience even though the latter 
is apparently superior in practical life. 
 
But what are the basic motives that lead Aristotle to invoke such a discussion? 
What is the point that he is trying to make by virtue of presenting such a 
hierarchy of knowledge? There is no doubt that any answer to such questions 
should draw our attention in one way or another to the importance that 
Aristotle gives to the determining of the precise place of Wisdom78 in the 
hierarchy of knowledge. Before committing to a fuller discussion of the subject, 
Aristotle points out the exact place of Wisdom and forestalls anyone who might 
have a tendency to confuse it with the kind of science that Aristotle will 
envisage in the later discussions of the treatise. Hence, the steps in the hierarchy 
of knowledge are not investigated for their own sake but rather for that of the 
terminus, i.e. Wisdom. By virtue of this introduction, Aristotle derives the basic 
concepts that he frequently uses in the latter parts of the discussion and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Met. A, 1, 981b12. 
78 It is appropriate to note at this point that Aristotle uses Wisdom (σοφία) in two different ways 
in Metaphysics. In a group of passages (Met. A, 1, 981a27; Γ, 3, 1005b1; K, 4, 1061b32), it generally 
means science and philosophy. Wisdom, in this sense, corresponds to the totality of theoretical 
sciences: ‘both natural science and mathematics must be regarded as parts of Wisdom’ (Met. K, 
4, 1061b32). On the other hand, Wisdom is used in another sense, signifying the science of the 
first principles. This can be regarded as the term’s proper usage (ἁπλῶς σοφίαν. See Alexandros, 
8, 2) and occurs more often in Metaphysics (Met. A, 2, 982a5; α, 1, 995b12; 2, 996b9; K, 1, 1059a18–
32; 2, 1060a10; Λ, 10, 1075b20). Since it is directed towards the first principles, it constitutes the 
highest activity and state of the human mind (see MM I, 34, 1197a15). For this reason, as Bonitz 
states, it is not necessary to use the adjective ‘πρώτη’ (first) with it (Index Aristotelicus, 688b55). 
The first chapter of Book A involves exactly this sense of Wisdom. It is this chapter that proves 
the superiority of Wisdom to other types of knowledge. If the superiority of any science 
depends on its knowledge about causes, Wisdom should be the highest of all simply because it 
deals with the highest principles (πρώται αἰτίαι). 
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determines their precise status with respect to the main subject of his discourse, 
i.e. Wisdom. 
 
What we can safely extract from this first part of Metaphysics is that human 
knowledge has some major components, perception, memory and imagination, 
experience, art, science and Wisdom, and Wisdom is the highest amongst them. 
A higher level in this hierarchy is differentiated from a lower level on the basis 
of knowledge of causes; the more you know the causes the higher level you are 
on the hierarchy of knowledge. Accordingly, Wisdom, by virtue of being the 
highest possible level in the hierarchy, should be regarded as the science of the 
ultimate principles.79  
 
The hierarchy of knowledge gives some hints, which are quite significant in 
terms of the aims of this thesis. I believe that Aristotle’s presentation of the 
hierarchy of knowledge and the basic message of this discussion that comes just 
at the end of the chapter, in which Aristotle plainly observes that Wisdom is the 
science of highest principles and causes, tells us something about the 
theological aspect of Wisdom. In order to shed light on what all these 
discussions tell us about the theological aspect of Wisdom, one might recall one 
of Aristotle’s most famous epistemological distinctions: the distinction between 
what is knowable to us (πρὸς ἡµᾶς) and what is knowable in nature (φύσει) and 
in itself (καθ’ αὑτό).80 According to this distinction, whereas some things are 
more knowable to us, others are more knowable in nature. Whereas in the order 
of knowing what is knowable to us comes before what is knowable by nature 
and in itself, the latter is always prior in another way and superior to the 
former. It is, then, natural for us to advance from what is more obscure by 
nature, but clearer to us, towards what is clearer to and more knowable by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 It is important to note that, in this section, Aristotle does not prove that Wisdom deals with 
first principles and causes. This will be shown in the next section. The fact that Wisdom deals 
with primary causes and principles is only stated as a common opinion: ‘all men suppose 
(ὑπολαµβάνουσι) what is called Wisdom to deal with the first causes (τὰ πρῶτα αἴτια) and the 
principles (ἀρχάς) of things’ (Met. A, 1, 981b28). 
80 For some of the passages in which Aristotle presents this distinction, see: An. Pr. II, 23, 68b35; 
An. Post. I, 2, 72a3; Top. VI, 4, 141b4; 141b25; Phys. I, 1, 184a16–21; 5, 188b32–189a5; II, 1, 193a5; 
Met. Z, 3, 1029b8; EN I, 4, 1095b2–3; 7, 1098b3–8.    
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nature. Now, the hierarchy of knowledge of Book A that I have been discussing 
squares well with this distinction because it starts with what is perceptible, that 
is, more knowable to us, and proceeds to higher kinds of knowledge – the 
knowledge of the causes – that is, knowable in nature. In this way, Wisdom, 
which stands at the highest point of this hierarchy, corresponds to what is 
knowable in nature and in itself. 
 
We could proceed now by further articulating the distinguishing characteristics 
of what is knowable by us and what is knowable in nature, by way of which we 
might reasonably attain a better articulation of what Wisdom is supposed to be 
dealing with. A passage from Posterior Analytics may be employed to shed light 
on the characteristics of Aristotle’s epistemological distinction: 
Things are prior (πρότερα) and more knowable (γνωριµώτερα)81 in two ways; 
for it is not the same to be prior by nature (πρότερον τῇ φύσει) and prior in 
relation to us (πρὸς ἡµᾶς πρότερον), nor to be more knowable 
(γνωριµώτερον) and more knowable to us (ἡµῖν γνωριµώτερον). I call prior 
and more knowable in relation to us what is nearer to perception (ἐγγύτερον 
τῆς αἰσθήσεως), prior and more knowable simpliciter (ἁπλῶς) what is further 
away (πορρώτερον). What is most universal (καθόλου µάλιστα) is furthest 
away (πορρωτάτω), and the particulars (καθ’ ἕκαστα) are nearest (ἐγγυτάτω); 
and these are opposite (ἀντίκειται) to each other.82     
With respect to what is knowable to us and what is knowable in nature, one 
might accordingly postulate two main characteristics. What is knowable in 
nature and in itself should be (1) further away from perception (πορρώτερον 
τῆς αἰσθήσεως) and (2) universal (καθόλου); conversely, what is more 
knowable to us should be (1) nearer to perception (ἐγγύτερον τῆς αἰσθήσεως) 
and (2) particular (καθ’ ἕκαστον). If we simply apply these findings to Wisdom, 
we may easily conclude that Wisdom is the knowledge that is (1) concerned 
with thing(s) furthest away from perception and (2) universal.  
 
This view squares very well with the hierarchy of knowledge that originates 
from perceptual knowledge of the particulars that can be correlated with what 
is knowable by us. As we move towards the upper end of the hierarchy, 
gradually we move further away from senses and therefore move towards 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 γνωριµώτερα may well be rendered as ‘more knowable’ (rather than ‘more familiar’) and I 
have slightly modified the translation accordingly. See Top. VI, 4, 141b29–34. 
82 An. Post. I, 2, 71b33-72a5. 
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things that are knowable in nature. Accordingly, the summit of the hierarchy 
can be correlated with things that are furthest away from senses and knowable 
in nature. This is exactly the point at which Wisdom stands. Correspondingly, 
the subject matter of this science is marked by things or a thing furthest away 
from perception. 
 
One might indeed find connections with what Aristotle states with respect to 
hierarchy of knowledge and what Plato maintains, since they both identify the 
genuine knowledge of things with what is universal in contrast to the 
knowledge of particulars. The distinction between what is knowable by us and 
what is knowable in nature squares well with the hierarchy of knowledge; 
however, there are clues that Aristotle is pointing to another distinction, which 
is unquestionably Aristotelian, namely, the form and matter distinction. After 
all, one could make some sense of the distinction between what is knowable by 
us and what is knowable in nature by virtue of correlating it with the 
hylomorphic analysis. When asked what are the things that are more knowable 
in nature, one is inevitably directed towards the very nature of the things in 
question. If this nature consists of form then it means that the thing is less 
perceptible.83 The more formal it is, the less perceptual it is and therefore 
further away from the perceptions. Such a thing would be knowable in nature. 
On the other hand, the more material it is, the more perceptual and nearer to 
senses it  is. Such a thing would be more knowable by us whereas it would be 
less knowable in nature.  
 
If we consider the whole doctrine that Aristotle espouses in his Metaphysics, we 
can reasonably contend that God is to be counted as the thing that is furthest 
away from perception because God has no material parts at all.84 This squares 
well also with the statement that Wisdom is the science of causes and 
principles, as God should be regarded as one of the causes.85 This shows us that 
the distinction what is knowable by us and what is knowable in nature is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 I deal with this point in more detail in Chapter IV. 
84 Met. Λ, 6, 1071b21. I reflect on the formal nature of God in chapter V, where I discuss Book Λ. 
85 See Met. A, 2, 982b10. More details on this subject will be given in Chapter V. 
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compatible with conceptualising Wisdom as theological. This, as I have 
mentioned, squares perfectly well with God, who, among the other things in the 
Universe, can be regarded as the most knowable in nature.  
 
We may add, however, that although this epistemological distinction between 
what is knowable by us and what is knowable in nature shows that Wisdom is 
conceptualised as a theological science it also represents an understanding that 
is absolutely in line with what is maintained in the later stages of Aristotle’s 
analysis, namely the hylomorphic analysis that stands at the heart of Aristotle’s 
mature doctrine of Being. This suggests that the theological angle of what 
Aristotle maintains in the first section of Book A is not necessarily motivated by 
his Platonic stance as it seems to be in line with what he later establishes as his 
own doctrine. The distinction between what is knowable by us and what is 
knowable in nature squares perfectly on the one hand with the hierarchy of 
knowledge established in Book A and on the other hand with the hylomorphic 
analysis presented in later stages of Metaphysics. Hence, the way in which Book 
A is theological does not necessarily depend on its being an early work or 
Platonic but may well depend on unquestionably Aristotelian positions that 
will be brought to the fore in later stages of Metaphysics.  
 
The second criterion of being knowable in nature, namely, the criterion of 
universality, however, is not at all as immediately and plainly connected to God 
as the first criterion. How Wisdom will turn out to be a universal study of Being 
cannot ultimately be understood without the developments that we encounter 
in Book Γ. There, we will see that Aristotle is mostly concerned to fulfil this 
requirement of universality as he establishes a special kind of relation between 
the instances of Being whereby he can establish the grounds for a universal 
science of Being. Accordingly, I leave this discussion to the next chapter, where 
I discuss Book Γ. Leaving the justification to the later stages of my analysis and 
appealing to the reader’s tolerance, let me state my view that the universality 
feature is in no way contradictory to the theological outlook of Wisdom; on the 
contrary, as we shall see throughout the course of this thesis, these two 
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elements go hand in hand. We at least know for certain that what is more 
universal in the hierarchy of knowledge corresponds to what is higher in terms 
of causes. The higher the cause, the more universal it is, as we have already 
seen in Aristotle’s discussion of the hierarchy of knowledge, and God can be 
regarded as the highest of all principles.  
 
These considerations show that the hierarchy of knowledge we encounter in the 
first chapter of Book A makes no sense without the terminus to which it is 
eminently directed and which, as has been shown, can be correlated with God. 
Now one might reasonably subscribe to the view that not every hierarchy 
requires a terminus but the hierarchy of knowledge, precisely because it is 
genuinely a hierarchy of causes, requires a terminus. The explanatory chains 
cannot go on ad infinitum, in which case we do not have a genuine explanation. 
The highest cause in a way covers all the subordinating causes. Wisdom, 
according to what we are informed in the first section of Book A, studies 
precisely this highest cause, which in turn may well be correlated with God. 
Hence, Aristotle’s establishment of the hierarchy of knowledge is not without 
purpose and is intended to determine the precise place of Wisdom in the 
epistemological hierarchy by virtue of determining its most fundamental 
subject matter. This amounts to saying that the basic reason why this hierarchy 
is established in the way it is may well be to emphasise the dominant role of the 
highest cause, namely, God, in Wisdom. I believe this outcome is further 
confirmed in the second section of Book A, which will enable me to present 
more satisfactory evidence for my hypothesis.  
 
1.2. The Characteristics of Wisdom 
 
In the second chapter of Book A, Aristotle takes a major step towards 
establishing the subject matter of Wisdom by declaring that it is the highest 
principles and causes of things that denote the basic inquiry of this science.86 In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Met. A, 1, 981b27–29: ‘οὗ δ’ ἕνεκα νῦν ποιούµεθα τὸν λὸγον τοῦτ’ ἐστίν, ὅτι τὴν 
ὀνοµαζοµένην σοφίαν περὶ τὰ πρῶτα αἴτια καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ὑπολαµβάνουσι πάντες’. 
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a dialectical manner he also seeks to determine the main characteristics of 
Wisdom by taking the lead from common opinions (ὑπόληψις) shared by 
almost everyone with respect to the wise man. The question that which interests 
me most in this part concerns these characteristics of Wisdom. What, indeed, do 
they tell us, if anything, about the theological aspect of Wisdom and if they do 
tell us something with respect to the theological character of Wisdom, might we 
conclude that this theological stance is in line with unquestionably Aristotelian 
doctrines that one might encounter in later stages of Metaphysics? In this section 
I will conduct a discussion concerning the characteristics of Wisdom with the 
aim of clarifying how far these characteristics show that Wisdom is a 
theological science and as far as this is possible, present an assessment of to 
what degree this theological stance is in line with what Aristotle later maintains 
in the other treatises of Metaphysics.  
 
1.2.1. Wisdom: The Universal Science 
 
At the beginning of the second section of Book A, when Aristotle proceeds to 
inquire into the kinds of causes and principles with which Wisdom is supposed 
to deal, he has already succeeded in showing that (1) knowing by causes is 
superior to all other types of knowledge and (2) one who knows the universal 
though he does not know the particular is superior to one whose knowledge is 
limited to the particular. In the second section of Book A, Aristotle aims to find 
out what kind of causes and principles Wisdom is seeking. He follows a 
dialectical path by way of which he derives the characteristics of Wisdom. Some 
of these characteristics seem to be more important than others, especially those 
that determine directly the scope of Wisdom as a universal science. The 
emphasis on the universality of Wisdom is unavoidable for at least two reasons. 
First, the universal character of Wisdom is an essential feature by means of 
which one can understand Aristotle’s conception of his later determination of 
the science of Being. Second, it is this universality feature of Wisdom that 
produces many of the disagreements among scholars about the conception of 
the science of Being. After all, one could plausibly claim that in setting out such 
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a characteristic of Wisdom Aristotle intends to introduce a general metaphysics, 
a non-theological science, in which all substances are studied one way or 
another, and which will be developed in the later stages of his investigation, 
especially in Book Γ. The question of how far this universality should be 
carried, and what Aristotle’s actual intentions in establishing this feature of 
Wisdom is, are therefore extremely significant. These questions and correlated 
ones cannot, however, be ultimately resolved at the level of Book A, where 
Aristotle seems to be providing a general introduction to what he will later call 
‘First Philosophy’, without engaging in detail in doctrinal questions on the 
scope of the science in question.  
 
Enumerating the characteristics of the wise man, Aristotle initially observes, 
‘We suppose (ὑπολαµβάνοµεν) first, then, that the wise man knows 
(ἐπίστασθαι) all things (πάντα), as far as possible, although he has no 
knowledge of each of them individually (µὴ καθ’ ἕκαστον ἔχοντα ἐπιστήµην 
αὐτῶν)’.87 Since we call wise the one who has Wisdom, Wisdom should be the 
science that deals with ‘all things as far as possible’. This, at least in the first 
instance, is rather confusing, as no science can investigate all parts of Being. If it 
were so, then the other sciences would dissolve into a single gigantic science of 
Being, which would study all things that are.88 This puzzle, as we shall see in 
the next chapter, is what motivates Aristotle later in Book Γ to introduce a 
special kind of relation in the instances of Being, namely, core-dependent 
homonymy (CDH) (πρὸς ἕν), without which the scope of the universality of 
Wisdom cannot easily be decided. Yet I think there is evidence in Book A which 
clarifies the content of the phrase ‘all things as far as possible’ if, especially, we 
take into consideration the first section of Book A that I have already discussed, 
where Aristotle presents a hierarchy of knowledge which begins with 
perceptual knowledge of the particular and ends with the universal knowledge 
of causes. While presenting this hierarchy, Aristotle hinted that it is possible to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Met. A, 2, 982a8. 
88 This is very like the conclusion at which Plato arrives. I will reflect on this point in the next 
chapter.  
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have universal knowledge without having knowledge of the particular.89 This is 
especially reflected in Aristotle’s comparison between men of experience and an 
artist, as he states that the latter is superior to the former on the basis of the fact 
that the artist knows the universal (καθόλου) but men of experience do not. I 
suggest that it is this line of thought, in which the superiority of the universal 
knowledge over the knowledge of the individuals is emphasised, that continues 
when Aristotle claims that Wisdom deals with ‘all things as far as possible’. 
Read in this light, the statement affirms a previously stated fact that one who 
knows the universal is superior and should be called wiser (σοφωτέρους) than 
one who lacks such knowledge (e.g. a man of experience whose knowledge is 
limited to particular instances).90 The wise man, accordingly, knows the most 
universal knowledge though he does not know all the individual cases. Some 
lines below this Aristotle explicitly states: 
 
Now of these characteristics that of knowing all things [τὸ µὲν πάντα 
ἐπίστασθαι] must belong to him who has in the highest degree universal 
knowledge [τῷ µάλιστα ἔχοντι τὴν καθόλου ἐπιστηµην]; for he knows in a 
sense all the subordinate objects [πάντα τὰ ὑποκείµενα].91 
If we combine this passage with the previous discussion in the first section of 
Book A, we can obtain some understanding of the phrase ‘all things as far as 
possible’, i.e. that which is supposed to be known by the wise man. No doubt 
this phrase corresponds to the ‘universal knowledge of the causes of things that 
are’. This follows from what we have been told in the first section of Book A, 
namely that the level of universality goes hand in hand with the knowledge of 
causes. As a man gets to know the causes of things, what he attains is some 
kind of universal knowledge; the higher his knowledge of causes, the higher the 
level of the universality of his knowledge. That is why artists are wiser than 
men of experience; in contrast to the latter, the former know the causes and 
principles of things.92 The parallelism between the universal knowledge of 
things and the knowledge of causes helps Aristotle to attain a clear result with 
respect to the subject of Wisdom. Since Wisdom is to be regarded as the most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Met. A, 1, 981a13–16. This is explicitly confirmed in An. Post. I, 13, 79a5 as well. 
90 Met. A, 1, 981a24–5: ‘We suppose artists to be wiser [σοφωτέρους] than men of experience’. 
91 Met. A, 2, 982a21-23. 
92 Met. A, 1, 981a26.  
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universal knowledge, it must deal with the highest causes and principles. 
Therefore, by virtue of being the most universal knowledge of things, Wisdom 
should study the highest causes and principles of things, which in turn, will 
cover the knowledge of subordinating causes. This will allow Wisdom to be 
regarded as the knowledge of all things as far as possible.  
 
What, then, can be said about the relation between universality and the 
theological conception of Wisdom? 
 
It would not conflict with Aristotle’s general doctrine to suppose God to be one 
of the principles, since Aristotle himself explicitly states as early as this first 
book of Metaphysics that God should be regarded as one of the causes.93 Not 
only is He to be considered a principle, but He should also, as Aristotle 
explicitly observes, be regarded as the first principle among the causes of all 
things (ὁ τε γὰρ θεὸς δοκεῖ τῶν αἰτίων πᾶσῖν εἶναι καὶ ἀρχή τις). The 
justification for how God should be regarded as a first principle is far beyond 
the aims of the first book of Metaphysics; for only through clarifying the nature 
of God can one satisfactorily explain God’s being the first principle of things.94  
 
The fact that God should indeed be among the first causes is, however, doubly 
established in this first book, since Aristotle not only divines that He is the first 
cause among others but also explicitly states that God is the subject of 
Wisdom.95 If this is the case, that is, if God is the subject of Wisdom, then even 
though we do not have explicit justification based on the nature of God, we 
may conclude that God is one of the highest principles of all things, since 
amongst the range of all sciences only Wisdom undertakes the responsibility of 
studying the highest principles and causes. Although it is beyond Aristotle’s 
aims in Book A to justify how the universality of Wisdom can be attained 
through God, one can infer from all that has been claimed that the study of God 
is a universal study based on the idea that God is among the principles and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Met. A, 2, 983a8. 
94 I will accordingly deal with this issue in chapter V. 
95 Met. A, 2, 983a5–10. 
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should be regarded as the highest principle, knowledge of whom will be the 
most universal, because in studying the highest principles one has to study all 
the subordinating principles as well.  
 
1.2.2. Wisdom: The Science of the Most Difficult Things 
 
Having stated that Wisdom should be regarded as the most universal science, 
Aristotle continues to enumerate the characteristics of this science by stating 
that the wise man knows things that are difficult and Wisdom is the science of 
the most difficult things: 
   
Secondly, that he who can learn [γνῶναι] things that are difficult [τὰ χαλεπὰ], 
and not easy [µὴ ῥᾴδια] for man to know [γιγνώσκειν], is wise [σοφόν] (sense 
perception [αἰσθάνεσθαι] is common to all [πάντων κοινόν], and therefore 
easy [ῥᾴδιον] and no mark of wisdom)96  
Aristotle himself explains what he means by ‘things that are difficult to learn’ a 
little further by stating ‘And these things, the most universal [τὰ µάλιστα 
καθόλου], are on the whole the hardest [χαλεπώτατα] for men to know 
[γνωρίζειν]; for they are furthest [πορρωτάτω] from the senses [τῶν 
αἰσθησεών].’97 In order to understand the scheme Aristotle has in mind here, it 
is helpful to recall the hierarchy of knowledge revealed in the first chapter of 
Book A. There, the hierarchy starts with the perceptual knowledge of the 
particular. This is the first step in the hierarchy, representing the things that are 
‘more knowable to us’. What Aristotle explicitly refers to by saying ‘sense 
perception is common to all, and therefore easy and no mark of Wisdom’ is this 
first step in the hierarchy. The ability to perceive is a common attribute of all 
animals,98 which differentiates animals from plants,99 and as we have seen in 
the first chapter, perception is linked to particulars.100 Since perception is 
common to all animals and is linked to the things that are ‘more knowable to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Met. A, 2, 982a10–12. 
97 Met. A, 2, 982a24-25. 
98 De An. II, 2, 413b9; III, 9, 432a16; SS 1, 436a8; b9.  
99 An. Post. II, 19, 99b35; De An. II, 2, 413b4; III, 13, 435b20; SS 1, 436b11; PA II, 1, 647a21; 10, 
656a3; III, 4, 666a34; GA I, 23, 731a33; III, 7, 757b16; V, 1, 778b32; EN IX, 9, 1170a16.  
100 See, also, An. Post. I, 18, 81b6; 24, 86a29; 31, 87b29; Phys. I, 5, 189a6; De An. II, 5, 417b22–8; 
Met. B, 4, 999b3; Δ, 11, 1018b32; EN VI, 8, 1142a27. 
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us’ rather than those that are ‘more knowable in nature’, this kind of knowledge 
cannot be regarded as Wisdom, which is still regarded as the highest 
knowledge that a man can attain. All animals can achieve some knowledge 
concerning particulars and all men can effortlessly learn things commonly 
knowable by animals, that is, the perceptual knowledge of particulars. What we 
seek, however, is a unique kind of knowledge, a type of knowledge so hard to 
attain that only a very limited number of animals can possess it. In terms of the 
same hierarchy, this kind of knowledge should evidently signify the opposite 
pole. This is confirmed by Aristotle’s statement that the most universal things 
and those furthest away from perception are the hardest to attain. These are the 
things that are ‘knowable in nature’. The wise man is the one who attains such 
knowledge; his knowledge is not limited to the things that are ‘knowable to us’, 
that is, the perceptual knowledge of the particular, but spreads to the ‘things 
that are knowable in nature’, that is, the universal knowledge of the causes and 
principles of things. Accordingly, Wisdom is the science of the things that are 
hardest to reach and these are the things that are most universal (τὰ µάλιστα 
καθόλου) and furthest away from perception (πορρωτάτω τῶν αἰσθησεών). 
 
What can be said with respect to the implication of this characteristic for the 
theological interpretation of Wisdom? To what degree does the subject of 
Wisdom, determined by virtue of this characteristic as the science of the most 
difficult things, fit the theological interpretation of Wisdom? 
 
We might affirm at the outset that this characteristic of Wisdom not only suits 
but also requires that it be a theological science if there is any place of God in 
the Aristotelian doctrine at all. Since studying the most difficult things, as I 
have stated, means nothing except investigating things that are knowable in 
nature, which corresponds to things that are furthest away from perception and 
since in accordance with Aristotle’s general doctrine, it is perfectly apt to regard 
God as pure actuality, having no material part, God should well be what is 
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meant as Aristotle phrases what is ‘furthest away from perceptible things’.101 
For this very same reason, that is, because God is conceived as pure actuality 
and form, and if we are to accept matter as a principle of indeterminacy, He 
should be regarded as most knowable in nature. If, then, Wisdom is the science 
of the things that are most difficult to learn, God should be its precise subject 
matter since only in this way can the content of ‘things difficult to learn’ be 
satisfactorily understood. Wisdom, in this context, is palpably envisaged as a 
theological science.  
 
1.2.3. Wisdom: The Most Exact Science  
 
Aristotle stated that the third characteristic of Wisdom is exactness; he who is 
more exact (ἀκριβής) deserves to be called wise; correspondingly, Wisdom 
enjoys the merit of exactness more than any other science.  
 
But what is the criterion by which we call a science more exact? Aristotle gives 
explicit clues throughout his corpus. Following these clues one can safely argue 
that the exactness of a science depends on its subject matter. It is not the method 
or the approach that can make a science more exact but rather the object of 
enquiry that is capable of determining the level of exactness that a science 
enjoys. Aristotle himself states the conditions for an exact science in Book Λ of 
Metaphysics: 
 
And in proportion as we are dealing with things which are prior in formula 
[περὶ προτέρων τῷ λόγῳ] and simpler [ἁπλουστέρων], our knowledge will 
have more accuracy [µᾶλλον ἔχει τὸ ἀκριβές], i.e. simplicity [τὸ ἁπλοῦν]. Thus 
a science which abstracts from the magnitude [ἄνευ τε µεγέθους] of things is 
more precise than one which takes it into account; and a science is most 
precise if it abstracts from movement [ἄνευ κινήσεως], but if it takes into 
account movement, it is most precise if it deals with the primary movement 
[πρώτην], for this is the simplest [ἁπλουστάτη]; and of this again uniform 
movement [ἡ ὁµαλή] is the simplest form.102 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 For Aristotle’s proof concerning the formal nature of Immobile Substance see Met. Λ, 6, 
1071b12–22 as well as the whole of the seventh part of Book Λ, where Aristotle investigates 
divine nature. I will discuss this characteristic of God in the fifth chapter.  
102 Met. Λ, 3, 1078a9-13. 
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Although several interrelated conditions for the exactness of a science are stated 
in this passage, it is possible to reduce them to a single condition: a science is 
more exact if it deals with things whose formal elements are more separable 
from their material elements. In other words, as the formal object of a science 
becomes purer, the level of exactness that it enjoys becomes higher. For 
instance, physics deals with things that are naturally connected to matter. What 
is meant by ‘naturally’ is that it is almost impossible to separate the formal 
element of the objects of physics from their material parts since the essence of 
things that are dealt with by physics is always related to matter (ἀεὶ ἔχει 
ὕλην).103 In other words, the essences of animals, plants and suchlike involve a 
necessary connection with a certain kind of matter,104 preventing physics from 
being the most exact science amongst others. In contrast, mathematical sciences 
are the most exact amongst others,105 since before conducting his enquiry the 
mathematician applies some kind of abstraction by virtue of which he filters the 
material elements from his object of enquiry.106 Since material parts that 
constitute the principle of change and indeterminacy in the object of enquiry are 
filtered through a kind of abstraction, mathematical sciences deserve to be 
called more exact than the other sciences. It is not wise to expect a science other 
than mathematics to have this minute accuracy as no other science can abstract 
the material parts from their object of enquiry as much as mathematics.107  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Cf. Met. E, 1, 1026a3. I will discuss this issue in detail in ch. III. 
104 In the present discussion, I do not want to inquire into the details of Aristotle’s theory of 
definition since this is beyond the aims of this part of my essay. To clarify what I mean by ‘a 
necessary connection to a matter, I would like to recall the example of a ‘snub nose’ (τὸ σιµόν: 
see Met. E, 1, 1025b31; Z, 5, 1030b15–26), where ‘snubness’ (σιµότης) can be defined as 
‘concavity in the nose’. Here, ‘concavity’ (ἡ κοιλότης) corresponds to the formal element 
without perceptible matter (ἄνευ ὕλης αἰσθητῆς) and ‘nose’ (ῥίς) to the material element (as it is 
always made of flesh and bone). Now, roughly, a science which deals with a physical form such 
as ‘snubness’ should deal to a certain degree with some material element, as ‘snubness’ has a 
necessary connection to the material element reflected in its definition. Since physics deals with 
the things that have such reference to matter, it cannot have the highest level of exactness.  
105 Cael. III, 7, 306a27. 
106 I will discuss the details of this argument in ch. III. 
107 Met. α, 3, 995a14-17: ‘The minute accuracy of mathematics [ἀκριβολογίαν τὴν µαθηµατικήν] is 
not to be demanded in all cases, but only in the case of things which have no matter [µὴ ἔχουσιν 
ὕλην]. Therefore its method is not that of natural science, for presumably all nature [ἡ φύσις] 
has matter.’ See also EN, I, 3, 1094b24; II, 2, 1104a2. 
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It is, however, possible for a science to be even more exact than mathematics. 
Let us consider a science that has subject matter without any material parts at 
all. Such a science does not need to abstract the material parts from its object of 
enquiry as its subject matter already consists purely of the formal elements. 
Indeed, there exists such a science, which we call Wisdom and which is 
explicitly stated to be the most exact amongst other sciences.108 Certainly, these 
observations tell us something about the theological aspect of Wisdom and I 
will deal with this subject after examining the other condition for the exactness 
of a science that is stated in the first book of Metaphysics and in other parts of 
the Aristotelian corpus. 
  
A science is more exact if it deals with fewer principles: 
 
And the most exact [ἀκπιβέσταται] of the sciences [τῶν ἐπιστηµῶν] are those 
which deal most with first principles [αἳ µάλιστα τῶν πρώτων εἰσίν]; for those 
which involve fewer principles are more exact than those which involve 
additional principles, e.g. arithmetic than geometry.109 
We are told above that a science should deal with fewer (ἐξ ἐλαττόνων) 
principles if it is to be more exact (ἀκριβέστερα). This may seem confusing in 
the first instance but even a rough enquiry into the structure of Aristotelian 
science will explain why Aristotle stated such a condition for the exactness of a 
science. According to Aristotle, every science relies on principles. These are the 
basic propositions (e.g. definitions) that a science assumes. These basic 
propositions cannot be known through demonstration, that is, they are 
immediately true, uncaused and necessary. Starting from such principles, every 
science builds up demonstrative syllogisms that can be regarded as the main 
body of that science. Through these demonstrative syllogisms that rely upon 
basic principles it is possible to attain non-basic or derived truths. These non-
basic or derived truths may in turn be employed by a subordinating science as 
its own principles. In other words, the non-basic principles derived from the 
basic principles of a superior science may work as the principles of a 
subordinating science. Hence, the subordinating science adds the principles of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Met. A, 2, 982a25. 
109 Met. A, 2, 982a25-28. See also An. Post. I, 27, 87a34. 
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the superior science to its own non-basic, derived principles. This cumulative 
addition of principles establishes the main body of hierarchies of sciences under 
which different sciences operate. As we move towards the end of the hierarchy, 
we face more principles since as I have mentioned, the subordinating sciences 
cumulatively add the principles of superior sciences to their proper principles. 
This is exactly what happens in the example of arithmetic and geometry. 
Geometry should be regarded as less exact than arithmetic, as while arithmetic 
works only with principles of numbers, geometry cumulatively adds the 
principles of numbers to its own proper principles, namely, the principles of 
space. It is in this sense that arithmetic is closer to basic principles and derives 
its truths from superior, more basic, principles than geometry. Geometry, in 
turn, adds the principles of numbers to the principles of space and builds up its 
own demonstrations from these principles. Consequently, it works with 
principles that are further away from basic principles and that are secondary in 
the sense that they are caused by other principles (i.e. the principles of 
numbers) dealt with by another, superior, science (i.e. arithmetic). That is why 
the level of exactness of geometry cannot be as much as that of arithmetic.  
 
It is, however, possible for a science to be even more exact than arithmetic and 
similar sciences. For consider the following: the upshot of my discussion is that 
the exactness of a science depends on two conditions: first, a science is exact if it 
deals with things that can be abstracted from their material parts and can be 
regarded as more exact if it deals with things that do not involve any material 
parts at all so that no abstraction is needed; second, a science is more exact if it 
deals with fewer principles. Now, these conditions are met by Wisdom more 
than any other science and they in turn show precisely how Aristotle perceives 
Wisdom as a theological science simply because, among things, only God has 
no material part at all and can be regarded as the ultimate principle of all 
Being.110 Wisdom, indeed, is more exact than both physics, whose subject 
matter consists of things inseparable from matter, and mathematics, in which 
some abstraction should be applied before any investigation proceeds. This 
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characteristic of Wisdom as the most exact science, then, shows that it is 
perceived as a theological science. 
 
The characteristic of exactness, as we have seen, is in line with the hylomorphic 
analysis that Aristotle articulates in the other treatises of Metaphysics. As I have 
mentioned, hylomorphic analysis stands at the heart of Aristotle’s doctrine and 
the criterion of exactness, which is developed alongside this doctrine, seems to 
be genuinely Aristotelian as well. If the exactness of Wisdom implies that it is 
eminently a theological science and if exactness develops alongside 
unquestionably Aristotelian doctrines such as hylomorphic analysis, why not 
accept that the theological appearance of Wisdom in Book A depends on 
internal factors that are unquestionably Aristotelian rather than some external 
factor such as the influence of Plato on Aristotle?  
 
Additionally, the conception of science against which the criterion of exactness 
is measured here is also genuinely Aristotelian. The claim that a science 
becomes more exact if it deals with fewer principles can be regarded as being in 
perfect harmony with Aristotle’s general doctrine of science. Hence, these are 
the two conditions that constitute the backdrop against which the discussion of 
the exactness of a science develops and they are conditions that Aristotle has no 
trouble accepting at any level of his philosophical development.       
 
1.2.4. Wisdom: The Most Teachable Science (δύνασθαι διδάσκειν) 
 
In the second chapter of Book A Aristotle claims that he who is ‘more capable of 
teaching [διδασκαλικώτερον] the causes [τῶν αἰτιῶν] is wiser [σοφώτερον]’.111 
He justifies his position by arguing thus: ‘But the science which investigates 
causes [ἡ τῶν αἰτιῶν θεωρητική] is also more [µᾶλλον] capable of teaching 
[διδασκαλική], as the people who teach [διδάσκουσιν] are those who tell 
[λέγοντες] the causes of each thing [περὶ ἑκάστου].’112 One might trace the root 
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112 Met. A, 2, 982a28-30. 
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of this characteristic of Wisdom to the first part of Book A, where Aristotle 
emphasises the superiority of the knowledge of causes and differentiates 
knowing the fact from knowing the cause, which is the underlying factor that 
distinguishes experience and art and gives the latter a higher status in the 
hierarchy of knowledge.113 This avenue of approach necessitates that a man 
becomes wise as he gets to know the causes and deserves to be called wiser as 
he knows higher causes. The one who knows the highest principles and causes, 
therefore, should be regarded as the wisest among others. Along with this 
Aristotle attaches another feature to the superiority of knowing by causes in the 
first part of Book A, according to which knowledge of the causes yields the 
capability to teach (δύνασθαι διδάσκειν).114 Hence, we might reasonably affirm 
that, when discussing the fourth characteristic of Wisdom in the second chapter 
of Book A, Aristotle completes the line of argument started in the first chapter 
of Book A by describing teaching as ‘telling the causes of each thing’ (τὰς αἰτίας 
λέγοντες περὶ ἑκάστου). Hence, the more one knows the causes, the more he 
can tell about them, that is, the more he can teach. Accordingly, one who knows 
the highest causes is able to teach more than one who knows merely the 
subordinating causes, since through knowing the highest causes the wise man 
knows in a way all the subordinating causes. This is also perfectly in line with 
the universality of Wisdom, which I have previously discussed, which is 
encapsulated thus: ‘The wise man knows all things as far as possible’.115 Thus, 
since teaching is described as telling the cause of a thing and since Wisdom 
deals with the highest principles and causes, Wisdom should be regarded as the 
most teachable science amongst others. 
 
In terms of what this characteristic says with respect to the theological 
conception of Wisdom, we can say this. Since Aristotle explicitly states that God 
should be regarded as the highest principle of all things,116 the one who has 
knowledge of God will be the most capable of teaching. Wisdom, then, can be 
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regarded as the most teachable science amongst others if it deals with the 
highest principle of all things, that is, if it deals with God. As with the previous 
characteristics of Wisdom, it is beyond Aristotle’s aim in this introductory part 
to reveal and justify God’s functioning as an ultimate principle. He does not 
even explicitly mention God when he discusses this characteristic,117 but given 
what we have been told with respect to teaching we might justifiably affirm 
that this interpretation is fully apt and that Wisdom is envisaged eminently as a 
theological science.  
   
It is important, here, to be clear about what it is for a science to be most 
teachable otherwise one might have some confusion as to whether this feature 
of Wisdom is reconcilable with its second characteristic, according to which 
Wisdom is the knowledge of things that are hardest to know. In other words, 
one might be inclined to question whether Wisdom is at the same time the 
science of the things that are most teachable and the things that are hardest to 
learn. It is, however, important to record straightaway that Aristotle does not 
say that the most teachable things are the things that are most easy to learn.  
 
Now, I think, this may be brought to the fore if one considers the distinction 
between things ‘more knowable to us’ and those ‘knowable in nature’ that I 
have previously discussed, according to which the most knowable things are 
furthest away from sensation and for that reason are hardest to learn, whereas 
the things about which one can easily attain knowledge are the least knowable 
as they are nearer to perception. Therefore, these two characteristics of Wisdom, 
namely that it entails the knowledge of things that are hardest to learn and is 
the most instructive science, square well with each other once we introduce the 
Aristotelian distinction between ‘knowable in nature’ and ‘knowable by us’ to 
the discussion.  
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The upshot of this discussion is that precisely because Wisdom deals with 
things that are knowable in nature it is dealing with most teachable things. As 
we shall see later in the middle books of Metaphysics, the form that constitutes 
the very nature of things ‘knowable in nature’ makes them perfectly intelligible. 
These things, however, are not the easiest to learn; on the contrary, the things 
that are knowable by us whose natures consist more of matter than form are 
easiest to learn since they are nearer to perception. We shall see later that this 
line of thought is not abandoned in the further stages of Metaphysics. The 
intelligibility of form over matter, as evident throughout the treatises of 
Metaphysics, is a constant theme to which Aristotle continually returns in order 
to articulate the point to the full. Hence, Wisdom’s being the science of the most 
teachable things and against which this discussion supposedly propels, namely 
that the distinction between what is knowable by us and knowable in nature, 
and for that matter, the distinction between matter and form, does not 
constitute a stance that Aristotle has trouble in accepting at any level of his 
analysis. 
 
1.2.5. Wisdom: the Science Desired for its own Sake  
 
Having stated that Wisdom is the most teachable science, Aristotle proceeds to 
describe the fifth characteristic of Wisdom: 
 
In every branch of knowledge; and of the sciences, also, that which is 
desirable on its own account [τὴν αύτῆς ἕνεκεν] and for the sake of knowing 
[εἰδέναι] it is more of the nature of wisdom than that which is desirable on 
account of its results [τῶν ἀποβαινόντων] (...)118   
While providing an explanation for this characteristic Aristotle uses the idea 
that Wisdom is the science of the most knowable things: 
 
And understanding and knowledge pursued for their own sake [αὐτῶν 
ἕνεκα] are found most in the knowledge of that which is most knowable [τοῦ 
µάλιστα ἐπιστητοῦ]; for he who chooses to know for the sake of knowing [τὸ 
ἐπίστασθαι δι’αύτὸ αἱρούµενος] will choose [αἰρήσεται] most readily that 
which is most truly knowledge [τὴν µάλιστα ἐπιστήµην], and such is the 
knowledge of that which is most knowable [ἡ τοῦ µάλιστα ἐπιστητοῦ]; and 
the first principles and the causes are most knowable [µάλιστα δ’ἐπιστητά]; 
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for by reason of these, and from these [ἐκ τούτων], all other things are known 
[γνωρίζεται], but these are not known by means of the things subordinate to 
them [διὰ τῶν ὑποκειµένων].119 
Wisdom, according to these passages, is the science that is desirable purely on 
its own account. The possibility for Wisdom to be desired on its own account 
lies in the kind of knowledge that it seeks, which is previously implied by 
Aristotle in the hierarchy of knowledge presented in the preceding section of 
Book A. The hierarchy of knowledge, as I have mentioned, starts with the 
things that are most knowable for us and terminates in the highest knowledge 
reflected as the things that are knowable in nature, and Wisdom corresponds to 
the highest point of this hierarchy. The fifth characteristic of Wisdom is a result 
of the continuation of this line of thought, as Aristotle states that the condition 
for being desired on its own account can only be attainable for a science that 
deals with the things that are most knowable. Now, surely, most knowable 
things are those that are knowable in nature rather than the things that are 
knowable according to us. Hence, the kind of knowledge that Wisdom seeks is 
doubly established as the things that are knowable in nature. 
 
Aristotle continues to determine the content of things knowable in nature by 
stating that they are the first principles and causes through which we learn 
other things. The motive for this further determination is to show that such 
knowledge should be regarded as a genuine instance of knowledge and only 
such knowledge deserves to be desired on its own account. Indeed, Aristotle is 
right in implying that the knowledge of principles is a genuine instance of 
knowledge, as we learn other things through knowing the principles. 
According to Posterior Analytics, all knowledge must proceed from pre-existent 
knowledge,120 which is later explicated as basic propositions and definitions.121 
These can be regarded as the first principles, without which it is impossible to 
learn anything at all.122 Since their priority over conclusions, i.e. the secondary 
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120 An. Post. I, 1, 71a1. 
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(πρώτων), immediate (ἀµέσων), more knowable than (γνωριµωτέρων) and prior (προτέρων) to 
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instances of knowledge, is obvious, cognition these principles should be 
regarded as the genuine instances of knowledge, and for this reason such 
knowledge deserves to be desired on its own account.  
 
Neither the wise man nor Wisdom aims at any utility in life; rather, the wise 
man aims to attain the highest knowledge reflected as the knowledge of things 
that are most knowable in nature. This can only be attained through the science 
of Wisdom. By virtue of having a reflexive character, Wisdom is differentiated 
from other types of knowledge that aim at external utility. I should record that 
it is not Aristotle’s intention to state that we do not gain any utility from 
Wisdom; rather, what he says is that we do not gain merely a practical utility 
from the science of Wisdom, as according to him it is a merit of excellence of 
any kind of knowledge to have reflexive character and the activity with which 
Wisdom is associated is accordingly connected with excellence (ἀρετή)123 and 
self-sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια).124 When this activity, described as the activity of 
the contemplation (Θεωρεῖν) of truth is put into practice, as maintained in the 
ethical works, it produces the complete happiness (εὐδαιµονία)125 that can be 
regarded as the ultimate aim (τέλος) of humankind. Wisdom denotes the kind 
of knowledge that carries us to this aim, for which reason it is loved for its own 
sake and its utility overflows beyond the limits of other types of knowledge that 
aim to gain some practical utility in life.  
 
This characteristic is in agreement not only with what Aristotle maintains in his 
ethical works but also with what he maintains in Book E, where he shows that 
‘First Philosophy’ is a theoretical science.126 In agreement with what he claims 
in that part of Metaphysics, Aristotle claims in Book A that Wisdom cannot be a 
science of production (ποιητική) precisely because of its self-reflexive 
character.127 He proceeds by stating that ‘wonder’ is the basic source of our 
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126 Met. E, 1, 1026a10-16. 
127 Met. A, 2, 982b11 ff. I will deal with the threefold division of sciences and the place of 
Wisdom in this division later in the third chapter. 
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philosophical motivations. He shows that man begins to philosophise 
(φιλοσοφεῖν) by wondering (θαυµάζειν) about things surrounding him. By way 
of these wonderful things, man comes to understand that he is ignorant 
(ἀγνοεῖν) of many things. The basic motive that impels man to philosophise 
(φιλοσοφεῖν) is therefore to ‘escape from ignorance [διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν 
ἄγνοιαν]’. Since ignorance is the basic motive for man’s philosophical 
preparations, he should be pursuing this science simply ‘in order to know [διὰ 
τὸ εἰδέναι]’ rather than for any practical or productive end.  
 
Again, among the other sciences only Wisdom can be regarded as a free 
(ἐλεύθερος) science.128 Since we call free those, who exists for themselves 
(αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα)129 Wisdom should be regarded as the only free science among 
others. Wisdom, in other words, is the only science that is self-reflexive. In 
contrast with productive sciences whose major aim is the formation of an 
external product, Wisdom aims at nothing other than itself. This, as I have 
mentioned is in perfect harmony with what he maintains in Book E.  
 
It is a very complicated idea that a science is to be desired for its own sake, since 
Aristotle denies that it is pursued for any practical value or any utility; nor can 
we say that we pursue Wisdom for pleasure, although certainly we take 
pleasure in it. If we cannot pursue Wisdom for any practical value or for any 
pleasure, then it seems obvious that such a science must have a subject matter, 
which in a certain sense demands attention to no practical end; there is 
therefore nothing to do but try to understand it. That seems to be perfectly in 
line with what Aristotle maintains in Book Λ with respect to the nature of God, 
where Aristotle will prove that God, and only God, deserves to be the most 
desirable thing in the Universe.130 This stance is similar to the religious idea of 
reverence. Given the textual evidence, God is among the principles and is the 
first principle of things, and is most knowable and most desirable. The 
knowledge that occupies itself with God should be regarded as the only one, 
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which amounts to being desired on its own account precisely because God is 
the most desirable thing in the Universe. Aristotle’s declarations in Book A are 
evidently in perfect accordance with the general schema provided in Book Λ 
inasmuch as God is the most desirable amongst things in the Universe. The 
conclusion is that Aristotle must have a conception of a theological science 
when he enumerates the characteristics of Wisdom, which is in line with the 
doctrine of God presented in Book Λ.  
 
1.2.6. Wisdom: the most Authoritative Science 
 
Aristotle proceeds to describe the sixth characteristic of Wisdom, stating that it 
is the most authoritative science: 
 
And the superior science is more of the nature of wisdom than the ancillary; 
as the wise man must not be ordered [ἐπιτάττεσθαι] but must order, and he 
must not obey [πείθεσθαι] another, but the less wise [τὸν ἧττον σοφόν] must 
obey him.131 
A little later he states: 
 
And the science which knows [ἡ γνωρίζουσα] to what end each thing must be 
done [τίνος ἕνεκέν ἐστι πρακτέον ἕκαστον] is the most authoritative 
[ἀρχικωτάτη] of the sciences, and more authoritative [µᾶλλον ἀρχική] than 
any ancillary science; and this end is the good in each class [τὰγαθὸν 
ἑκάστου], and in general the supreme good [τὸ ἄριστον] in the whole of 
nature [ἐν τῇ φύσει πάσῃ].132 
Wisdom should be regarded as the most authoritative of the sciences in that it is 
the supreme science that should rule the others and is not to be ruled by any 
ancillary science. Aristotle’s justification is more important than it may seem in 
the first instance because it explicitly states that the fundamental subject matter 
of Wisdom deals with is the ‘supreme good in the whole of nature [τὸ ἄριστον 
ἐν τῇ φύσει πάσῃ]’. A component of this justification might be found in 
Aristotle’s previous discussion that started in the first chapter of Book A, where 
Aristotle emphasised the superiority of the knowledge of the universal over the 
knowledge of particulars. One who knows the superior knowledge knows all 
the subordinate knowledge, albeit he might lack the knowledge of it 
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individually,133 which amounts to saying that he knows what all knowledge 
inclines towards.134 The epistemological requirement, which says that Wisdom 
deals with the most universal knowledge, is reflected in the text as the ‘supreme 
good in the whole of nature’. Only through studying this i.e. the supreme good, 
does Wisdom deserve to be the highest and most authoritative science. 
  
This characteristic, perhaps more than the others, implies that Wisdom is by its 
nature a theological science. If Wisdom deals with the supreme good then, 
given Aristotle’s general metaphysical doctrine, it should also deal with God.135 
It naturally aims to know ‘to what end each thing must be done’, i.e. the final 
principle of all that are that is correlated with God, as we shall see in the 
following chapters of this thesis. Through knowing this principle, namely God, 
Wisdom in a way knows all the subordinate principles for which reason in turn 
it ought to be regarded as the science that should rule rather than be ruled and 
therefore as the most authoritative of all. It is, as it were, impossible at this point 
to show how in actuality the universality of Wisdom through the study of God 
would be possible and I shall deal with this issue throughout this thesis. We 
may, however, state that along with this characteristic we are fully to be guided 
towards a theological elucidation of Wisdom in Book A. 
  
1.3. Conclusion: The Divinity of Wisdom 
 
From all that has been discussed we might affirm that Wisdom draws many 
peculiar characteristics to itself all of which show that it is, on this introductory 
level, eminently conceptualised as a theological science in Aristotle’s mind. It is 
the science of the most universal, most exact and most difficult that should not 
only be regarded as the most teachable and authoritative science but also as the 
only free science, which is desired for its own sake. All of these characteristics, 
as I have observed, have distinctive relations with the theological conception of 
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135 See Met. Book Λ, 7. 
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Wisdom. It would not, then, be surprising if Aristotle were to investigate the 
theological character of Wisdom in this section of Metaphysics on its own behalf. 
Indeed, this is what Aristotle intends to do in the last section of the second 
chapter of Book A as if this is a natural outcome of what he has been previously 
claiming with respect to the peculiar characteristics of this science.  
 
Aristotle starts his discussion by questioning whether the activity of Wisdom is 
beyond human powers. He takes up the idea that it is only God, who has this 
science.136 Accordingly, if Wisdom were reserved to God alone, then it would 
not be appropriate for humans to seek the knowledge that is beyond their 
power. After all, such a person may evoke God’s jealousy and His anger. This 
idea is, however, immediately discarded on the grounds that, as Aristotle 
confidently concludes, it is impossible for God to be jealous.137 Wisdom 
therefore endures as the most honourable activity for humans. Indeed, 
Aristotle’s general attitude to this topic is encapsulated in a beautiful passage 
from Nicomachean Ethics, where he not only abandons the notion that what is 
divine is beyond human powers but also encourages us to pursue and live 
according to this perception.  
 
But such a life would be too high [κρείττων] for man; for it is not insofar as he 
is man [ᾗ ἄνθρωπός] that he will live so, but insofar as something divine [ᾗ 
θεῖόν] is present in him; and by so much as this is superior to our composite 
[συνθέτου] nature is its activity superior to that which is the exercise of the 
other kind of excellence. If intellect is divine [εἰ δὴ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς], then, in 
comparison with man, the life according to it [ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος] is divine 
[θεῖος] in comparison with human life. But we must not [οὐ χρὴ] follow those 
who advise us, being men, to think of human things, and being mortal, of 
mortal things, but must, so far as we can, make ourselves immortal [ὄντα 
οὐδὲ θνητὰ], and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing 
[τὸ κράτιστον] in us; for even if it be small [µικρόν] in bulk, much more does 
it in power and worth surpass everything [δυνάµει καὶ τιµιότητι πολὺ µᾶλλον 
πάντων ὑπερέχει].138 
Wisdom, therefore, is not to be excluded from the realm of human intellectual 
power; instead, it remains the most honourable, and the most desirable, activity 
that a man can undertake. Later in Book Λ we shall see that both God and 
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humans, though in different respects, enjoy the activity of Wisdom.139 Leaving 
this discussion for now, I will now reveal why Aristotle regards Wisdom as a 
divine science. 
 
According to Aristotle, two distinctive conditions should be met if a science is 
to be regarded as divine. First, in order to be called divine, a science should be 
possessed by God Himself.140 In other words, divine science is the one that is 
covered by God’s knowledge. Second, if a science is to be called divine then it 
should deal with divine things. Now, according to Aristotle, both of these 
conditions are met by Wisdom. Naturally, at this stage it is almost impossible 
for Aristotle to justify his position to the full since this requires a grand doctrine 
concerning the nature of God, and this will be established later in Book Λ. 
Aristotle is therefore content to state that God is among the causes and is a first 
principle, and that it is most convenient to think that this science is possessed 
by God alone. It is indeed true that God should be regarded as the ultimate aim 
(τέλος) of the Universe and so He should be regarded as one of the highest 
causes of things. One might, however, be inclined to question whether this 
conclusion is in line with Aristotle’s declarations in Book Λ, where he 
establishes that God’s knowledge is limited to the knowledge of Himself.141 
Hence, rather than possessing knowledge of the highest principles and causes, 
God’s knowledge is limited to Himself, namely, the theological cause. It seems 
that the prima facie inconsistency between Book A and Book Λ can be discarded 
if we can either limit the principles and causes that Wisdom attributes to the 
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theological cause or expand God’s knowledge to the other principles and 
causes. 
 
Without trying to exonerate Aristotle completely, I hold that such suspicions 
are not always well founded. We should not reach a conclusive judgement as 
regards this puzzle without taking into consideration what Aristotle reveals 
throughout his discussion of the science of first principles and causes. Now, 
although this is not to place to do this I suggest examining the first aporia of 
Book B, for instance, where Aristotle asks whether the investigation of the 
causes belongs to one or more sciences,142 before judging whether Aristotle’s 
remarks in Book A are inconsistent with his doctrine in Book Λ. Without going 
into detail, we can record at the outset that the reduction of the causes to a 
single cause would be sufficient to solve this puzzle.143 If, in other words, 
Aristotle manages to show that the highest principles and causes of things can 
be reflected in a single cause, then the riddle of the unity of the highest science, 
that is, whether it deals with one or many causes, will be resolved.144 This, in 
turn, would imply that there is a possibility that Aristotle could reduce the 
several principles and causes to a single cause. The science, therefore, that 
busies itself with this single cause would also be dealing with the other causes. 
There is therefore a possibility that the scope of Wisdom can extend to other 
principles through the knowledge of a single principle, which, in turn, may well 
be at one and the same time the cause, which God knows, and God Himself. In 
such circumstances, then, it would be possible for Wisdom to cover both God’s 
knowledge of Himself and the knowledge of the remaining highest causes and 
principles. Such a scenario, though not yet justified, would solve the prima facie 
inconsistency between the two treatises of Metaphysics. What we have, then, is 
not an inconsistency but a deficiency that may be satisfactorily resolved in the 
later stages of the treatise.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Met. B, 1, 995b10; 2, 996a18ff.  
143 I will deal with the puzzle in detail when I discuss Book Λ; see 5.5.3.  
144 I will deal whether it is possible to reduce the causes into one more elaborately in chapter V. 
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Having examined the first two chapters of Book A, we can assert that what 
Aristotle has said with respect to Wisdom reasonably allows us to affirm that 
what he has in mind in this introductory analysis is a theological science. Both 
the hierarchy of knowledge that is established in the first chapter and the 
characteristics of Wisdom stated in the second chapter imply that Wisdom 
should essentially be regarded as theology. The question, then, is to what extent 
Aristotle is faithful in the later stages of his analysis to the characteristics of 
Wisdom that he establishes in this introductory part. One must consider 
therefore whether Aristotle continues to hold the theological tendency of Book 
A with respect to Wisdom in the later stages of Metaphysics as well, where we 
encounter more advanced elucidations of the science in question. Although this 
is exactly what I aim to examine in what follows, where I test the doctrines in 
Book Γ that treat the science of Being, which will from now on be presented as 
the ‘First Philosophy’, against the theological backdrop of Aristotle’s initial 
investigations in Book A, one might affirm, at least provisionally anyway, that 
the hierarchy of knowledge, that starts from perception and continues all the 
way through the highest principles and causes of things, and that squares very 
well with the what is knowable by us and what is knowable in nature 
distinction, reflects an unquestionably Aristotelian thought. This appearance is 
also in harmony with what Aristotle maintains with respect to the 
characteristics of Wisdom in the second section of Book A, which, I think, is not 
abandoned in more elaborate later stages of Aristotelian doctrine.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
An inquiry into what kind of science Aristotle advances in his Metaphysics 
undeniably requires a close examination of Book Γ, since it is there that 
Aristotle seems to be making his first systematic efforts to construct the science 
of Being. Given what he says about the science of Being in Book Γ and in the 
light of what he also says about it in other treatises of Metaphysics, especially in 
Book E and Book Λ, one might reasonably be confused, at least initially, by the 
complex picture of the doctrine of the science of Being that he seems to be 
suggesting.  
 
The text of Book Γ forcefully asserts that the science of Being should be a 
universal inquiry into Being qua Being: 
 
There is a science [ἐπιστήµη] which investigates [θεωρεῖ] being as being [ὂν ᾗ 
ὄν] and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature [καὶ τὰ 
τούτῳ ὑπάρχοντα καθ᾿ αὑτό]. Now this is not the same as any of the so-called 
special sciences; for none of these others deals generally with being as being 
[καθόλου περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὄν]. They cut off [ἀποτεµόµεναι] a part of being 
and investigate the attributes [τὸ συµβεβηκός] of this part - this is what the 
mathematical sciences for instance do.1  
In accordance with these opening sentences of Book Γ, one might reasonably 
feel obliged to contrast the science of Being with the other so-called special 
sciences (e.g. physics) in terms of their level of universality. The other so-called 
special sciences cut off (ἀποτεµόµεναι) a part of Being and investigate that part, 
whereas the science of Being inquires into Being qua Being in a universal way. 
Judging from these lines, therefore, one gets the strong feeling that in Book Γ 
Aristotle is suggesting a universal science (metaphysica generalis) which does not 
limit its inquiry to a part of Being – that is, what the so-called special sciences 
do – while studying all types of Beings in so far as they are Beings. However 
that may be, in other passages that we encounter in the other treatises of 
                                                
1 Met. Γ, 1, 1003a20-26. 
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Metaphysics – and, for that matter, in other Aristotelian writings – Aristotle 
seems to be suggesting a different kind of conception of the science of Being, 
which is supposed to be dealing with an instance of Being (metaphysica specialis), 
that is, the highest instance of Being. In these passages, Aristotle seems, at least 
in the first instance, not to refer to a universal study of Being: 
 
There must, then, be three theoretical philosophies [φιλοσοφίαι 
θεωρητικαί], mathematics [µαθηµατική], natural science [φυσική], and 
theology [θεολογική], since it is obvious that if the divine [τὸ θεῖον] is 
present anywhere [ὑπάρχει], it is present in things of this sort. And the 
highest science [τὴν τιµιωτάτην] must deal with the highest genus [δεῖ περὶ τὸ 
τιµιώτατον γένος], so that the theoretical sciences [θεωρητικαὶ] are superior to 
the other sciences [τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστηµῶν], and this [theology] to the other 
theoretical sciences [τῶν θεωρητικῶν].2  
The science of Being, according to this passage, turns out to be a theological 
science, dealing with the first instance of Being and so it seems to be a special 
science that concerns itself with some determined part of Being, namely, the 
divine, rather than with all things in so far as they are Beings, as has been 
claimed in Book Γ. Understood thus, this and similar remarks pack quite a 
punch, and, in context, this is jarring, for such assertions collide head-on with 
the non-theological conception of the science of Being that one encounters in 
Book Γ. 
 
Modern scholars are understandably puzzled by this seemingly contradictory 
appearance of the conception of the science of Being that Aristotle seems to 
espouse in different treatises of Metaphysics. Some philosophers find 
irreconcilable contradictions between these two determinations of the science of 
Being and have attempted to solve the problem by appealing to Aristotle’s 
philosophical development, a stance that appears in its most developed form in 
Jaeger, who stated firmly that ‘the contradiction is undeniable’.3 More recently 
Leszl claimed that the conception of the science of Being that appears in Book Γ, 
                                                
2 Met. E, 1, 1026a18-23. One can find similar theological assertions of the science of Being in 
Phys. I, 9, 192a34; II, 2, 194b14; Met. K, 7, 1064b4; Λ, 1, 1069b1.   
3 Jaeger (1962), p. 217. Zeller can be regarded as an exception to these scholars as he also finds in 
Aristotle conflicting conceptions of the science of Being but sees the origin of this contradictory 
appearance in two incompatible conceptions of reality rather than in Aristotle’s philosophical 
development (see (1897), p. 339). 
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which is to be identified with ontology, should be regarded as a separate 
science that can in no way be identified by theology. These two sciences, as 
Leszl notes, ‘are sufficiently sui generis’.4 Similarly, Owen has noted that Book Γ 
goes far beyond Book A and Book Λ in its conception of the universal science of 
Being.5 What I find very significant, however, is that Owen stresses, perhaps far 
better than other scholars, the importance of the pros hen relation (what he calls 
‘focal meaning’) in Aristotle’s conception of the science of Being. The basic 
motivation for Aristotle’s philosophical development, as Owen observes, is to 
be found in the notion of pros hen. I think that Owen is absolutely right in 
situating the problem of the unity of the seemingly diversified conceptions of 
the science of Being in Aristotle’s conceptualisation of the pros hen relation in 
Book Γ and we will see why in this chapter. 
 
In contrast to scholars who are so ready to find contradictions in different 
conceptions of the science of Being, a more ‘unitarian’ and ‘traditional’ view 
continues to be advocated by many, who aver that it is indeed possible to find 
reconcilability between what one could call the universal metaphysics of Book Γ 
and the theological conception of the same science expressed in Book E and 
Book Λ. Preeminent advocates of the latter view include Owens, Patzig and 
Reale.6 Although all of the unitarians more or less accept that the possible 
solution to the problem of the unity of the conceptions of the science of Being 
must rely upon the pros hen relation of Book Γ, I believe they do not articulate 
this relation as it ought to be articulated, so consensus cannot be achieved.  
 
One’s first reaction to this puzzle might be to ask whether there is a legitimate 
way for Aristotle to think at the same time that the science of Being is both a 
universal science and a special theological science. Unitarians thought that it 
was indeed possible for a science to be the science of the highest instance of 
Being, namely, God, and a universal science simultaneously. This stance is 
rejected by the developmentalists. Owen, indeed, made the bold claim that the 
                                                
4 Leszl (1975), p. 32. 
5 Owen (1979), pp. 24-5. 
6 See, Owens (1951); Patzig (1979); Reale (1980). 
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basic motivation of Aristotle’s philosophical development must be revealed 
through close articulation of the pros hen relation of Book Γ. In his view, pros hen 
is the basic motivator that paves the way for Aristotle to distance his conception 
of the science of Being from his previous theological stance. Now I believe, like 
the unitarians, that it is possible for metaphysics to be a science of the highest 
Being and at the same time a universal science. What is more, I believe that 
were it not the science of the highest instance of Being it would not be universal 
either. Along with Owen, I believe that the pros hen relation plays a crucial role 
in showing the unity of metaphysics. My uneasiness with the scholars who 
support the unity of metaphysics is that they do not give an account of pros hen 
as explicitly as one would wish.  
 
My aim in this chapter is to assess one side of these seemingly incompatible 
conceptions of the science of Being by a close examination of the pros hen 
relation that stands out in Book Γ, and to show that this relation, that paves the 
way for a universal science of Being, might not in fact be incompatible with the 
theological conception of the science of Being that stands out in other treatises 
of Metaphysics. In my view, what we have been told with respect to the science 
of Being in Book Γ does not necessarily mean that what we have is a non-
theological science of Being. To this end, I will first examine in detail Aristotle's 
basic motives in establishing the doctrine of the science of Being as it appears in 
Book Γ, particularly the basis of this doctrine, that is, core-dependent 
homonymy (CDH).7 These motives, I believe, play a crucial role in solving the 
problem of the unity of metaphysics. I will then look at CDH and attempt to 
derive the basic criteria upon which such a relation is established. Subsequently 
I will attempt to square this conception with Aristotle’s general doctrine of 
Being, whereby I aim to show that the resulting portrait of the science of Being 
that springs from the conception of the CDH is not incompatible with the 
theological conception of the science of Being.  
 
                                                
7 Throughout this thesis I will not resist the temptation to use the terminology with respect to 
homonymy introduced by Christopher Shields in his Order in Multiplicity. Homonymy in the 
Philosophy of Aristotle (Shields, 1999).  
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2.2. Core-Dependent Homonymy 
 
A distinguished work written recently by Christopher Shields on Aristotle’s 
conception of pros hen defined the relation quite accurately as follows: 
 
CDH4:8 a and b are homonymously F in a core-dependent way iff: (i) they 
have their name in common, (ii) their definitions do not completely overlap, 
(iii) necessarily, if a is a core instance of F-ness, then b’s being F stands in one 
of the four causal relations to a’s being F, and (iv) a’s being F is 
asymmetrically responsible for the existence of b’s being F.9   
I largely agree with this description but have reservations about some 
peripheral but nonetheless quite important issues that will be explored later in 
this chapter. The first two requirements are quite straightforward and stated 
explicitly by Aristotle himself in Categories.10 I have no difficulty in subscribing 
to the third requirement, which is examined by Shields after his discussion of 
Cardinal Cajetan’s proposal on CDH.11 This addresses the causal relations 
between the instances of CDH, labelled by Shields as four-causal core primacy 
(FCCP) and what I will call ‘causal connectedness’ in this thesis. The fourth 
requirement addresses some kind of ontological dependence. I agree with 
Shields that there must be an ontological relation between the instances of 
CDH. This description, however, does not explicitly involve what I wish to call 
‘logical dependence’, which I think should be explicitly acknowledged if the 
requirements of CDH are to be reflected adequately.12 
 
It is not necessarily the conceptual framework of CDH reflected as CDH4 that 
Shields describes that concerns me. My uneasiness with his proposal lies in his 
application of this conceptual framework of CDH to the case of Being. His 
                                                
8 In Shields's work, CDH is defined in stages. What I present here is the final version of CDH, 
which follows three earlier versions believed by Shields to be inadequate to explain this 
peculiar relation.  
9 Shields (1999), pp. 124-125. 
10 ‘When things have only a name in common [ὄνοµα µόνον κοινόν] and the definition of being 
[λόγος τῆς οὐσίας] which corresponds to the name is different [ἕτερος], they are called 
homonymous [Ὁµώνυµα].’ Cat. 1, 1a1-2. 
11 Shields (1999), pp. 110ff. 
12 This, however, does not mean that Shields does not recognise logical dependency relations – 
what he calls definitional priority - in CDH; on the contrary, he explicitly discusses this point (p. 
123). Accordingly, the fourth characteristic (iv), as it were, may be employed to fulfil the 
requirements of logical dependence and ontological dependence simultaneously.  
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assessment of the CDH of Being, I believe, is misguided for two interconnected 
reasons. First of all, Shields seems to overlook the genuine reason that leads 
Aristotle to introduce CDH in Book Γ of Metaphysics, which, in a nutshell, is to 
establish a unified science of Being. Second, Shields’s argument seems to 
introduce a rather artificial requirement in the case of the CDH of Being. This is 
only a procedural reservation, however, and leads Shields to think that 
Aristotle is not successful in establishing the CDH of Being. According to him, 
the procedure in showing that a term is a CDH involves stages: 
 
As we have seen, establishing core-dependent homonymy involves a three-
stage process: (i) one must demonstrate non-univocity; (ii) one must then 
establish association; and finally (iii) one must establish core-dependence in 
line with CDH4. Most commentators, fastening on the intuitively compelling 
idea that substance, ousia, is a primary form of being, assume non-univocity 
and move directly to the core-dependence of non-substantial being on 
substantial being. In proceeding this way, they assume something false. The 
arguments of Aristotle’s commentators consequently fail to establish non-
univocity; and Aristotle’s own arguments lapse into internal inconsistency. 
Hence, since establishing non-univocity is a necessary condition of 
establishing core-dependent homonymy, no defensible account of the 
homonymy of being emerges from Aristotle’s writings.13 
Because Shields believes that Aristotle fails to meet the first requirement (i), 
namely that he fails to show non-synonymy, he is not successful in establishing 
the CDH of Being. I believe, however, that this requirement is artificial and 
cannot be grounded by textual evidence. I believe, on the contrary, that once a 
term fulfils the requirements of CDH, there is no need for a further 
demonstration that it is not synonymous. It is perfectly true that a CDH term 
cannot be synonymous; although it cannot be a requirement for a CDH term to 
prove at the outset that it is not synonymous. In accordance with this view, 
Aristotle is not so determined to show that Being is not synonymous in his 
Metaphysics although his general tendency shows most certainly that he believes 
it to be so. The artificiality of Shields’s proposal, I think, derives from the fact 
that he does not come to grips with understanding the basic motivation that 
leads Aristotle to establish such a relation in Book Γ, which, as I have 
mentioned, is to establish the unity of the science of Being rather than to engage 
in a discussion that will show that Being is not synonymous. The key point, 
                                                
13 Shields (1999), pp. 219-220. 
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therefore, in Aristotle’s establishment of the CDH of Being is marked by a 
problem with respect to the unity of the science of Being rather than a linguistic 
discussion whether Being, as a term, is synonymous or not. I will accordingly 
look at the phases of Aristotle’s thinking that cause this problem and later show 
how he manages to solve it by introducing the CDH of Being. 
 
2.2.1. Aporia 
 
One of the fundamental aims of Book Γ is to establish the grounds for the 
science of Being. Aristotle’s construction of CDH, as we shall see through the 
course of this thesis, serves this end in full. The determination of the basic 
motives behind Aristotle’s establishing of CDH in Metaphysics can be 
enlightened by an initial brief exposition of what he understands by the term 
Being. As we shall see, it is fundamental to any understanding of Aristotle’s 
theory of CDH that it is intended to have a severe anti-Platonic purport. This is 
more clearly revealed especially when one attempts to discover the difference in 
what these two philosophers understand by the term Being. 
 
Indeed, what Aristotle understands by the term Being is quite different from his 
predecessor Plato. The latter thought that if something deserves to be called 
Being it has such and such qualities (e.g. non-spatial, non-temporal etc.) that are 
constant in all of the instances to which they are applied. This amounts to 
saying that Being has a single synonymous sense that persists in all of its 
manifestations. This single sense of Being can be revealed by a philosopher at 
once and the science dealing with this sense will deal with all that deserves to be 
called Being. In such a conception, a single science (i.e., the science of Being) 
was sufficient to cover all parts of Being while, in its vast comprehensiveness, it 
would make other sciences unnecessary.14  
 
This conception of Being and the science attributed to it, however, does not fit 
Aristotle’s epistemological intentions. Aristotle attempts to differentiate several 
                                                
14 Cf. Republic VI, 510b-511d. 
  
 
75 
epistemological realms, dividing them into further piles that constitute the 
subject matters of several different sciences, every one of which has a different 
scope reflected precisely in the different objects of their inquiry. If, in this 
conception, Being had a single sense, then the science dealing with this sense 
would be dealing with all things that deserve to be called Being. Since a science 
cannot deal with non-Being, if we were to accept that Being has a single sense, a 
single science would suffice to cover everything that is and we would not need 
to differentiate several special sciences. Since Aristotle gives much of his 
attention to the establishment of these special sciences, this conclusion seems to 
lead one to quite an unhappy result with respect to what Aristotle actually 
intends to attain with his arguments to establish the so-called special sciences. 
Thus, if Aristotle intends to establish several special sciences dealing with 
different parts of Being, he should abandon the idea that Being has a single 
sense. 
 
Indeed, Aristotle’s position about the nature of Being is quite the opposite of 
Plato’s. According to Aristotle, Being is a πολλαχῶς λεγόµενον, i.e., it is said in 
many ways. In multiple places in his corpus, Aristotle indeed enumerates the 
‘several manifestations of Being’, showing that these manifestations cannot be 
reduced to a single one. Hence, in Aristotle’s conception, Being, as a 
homonymous term, loses the priority that it has in Plato and stands as a mere 
name that can be applicable to things that have immensely diverse qualities.15  
 
The motive behind the shift of what is to be understood by the term Being in 
Aristotle thus lies in his attempt to differentiate several sciences from each 
other, that is, to prevent a line of thought yielding a single gigantic science 
covering everything that is. Hence, in this new formulation of Being, the 
universal science of Being will not absorb all the other so-called special sciences 
by its vast comprehensiveness. By declaring that Being has several senses, 
Aristotle guarantees the existence of the universal science of Being along with 
                                                
15 See Phys. I, 2, 185a21; De An. I, 5, 410a13; Met. Γ, 2, 1003b5; Δ, 1017a22-27; E, 2, 1026a33-b2; Z, 
1030a21; EN I, 6, 1096a24. 
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the other special sciences. Hence, the puzzle concerning the over-
comprehensiveness of the science of Being has been settled. The scope of each 
special science is determined by the relative manifestation of Being that is 
proper to that science and that cannot be covered by any other science, not even 
the science of Being.    
 
While Aristotle overcomes the problem of the over-comprehensiveness of the 
science of Being by denying the idea that Being is synonymous, he faces further 
puzzles emerging from his own conception of Being. Indeed, the new 
conception of Being, with its several manifestations, produces the problem of 
how these manifestations senses of Being are to be unified to make way for a 
single science of Being. Hence, the denial of a synonymous conception of Being 
yields the problem of the unity of the science of Being, which lies in the fact that 
it is quite difficult to unify the manifestations of Being with which the science of 
Being is supposed to deal. We now know that, according to Aristotle, Being is a 
homonymous term that manifests itself in different instances. The difficulties 
arise because it is hard to decide, first, which of these manifestations will be 
dealt with by the science of Being, and second, how these manifestations are to 
be unified so as to give way to a single unified science. In the course of this 
thesis, I will have the chance to answer the first puzzle, but let me start with the 
second puzzle, namely, the problem of the unity of the science of Being, since 
this is directly related to my intention to find the basic motive for the 
establishment of CDH. 
 
The problem about the unity of the science of Being depends on the important 
claim made by Aristotle himself in the Posterior Analytics that every science 
deals with a single genus.16 According to this conception, the scope of any 
science is limited by the scope of the proper genus addressed by a specific 
science. Genus, by determining the basic constituents of a science, that is, by 
determining the subject, principles, parts and attributes of a science, draws the 
                                                
16 An. Post. I, 28, 87a38 ff. Cf. An. Post. I, 10, 75b37-38. 
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limits of sciences.17 In this conception, a science, say, arithmetic, will deal with 
numbers, while the arithmetician will not go beyond the limits of inquiry 
provided by the proper genus he studies. In the same way, the astronomer will 
deal with a single genus and the species proper to that genus without exceeding 
the natural limits of the hierarchies of genera and species established in the 
highest genus he/she studies, namely, the celestial bodies. 
 
One might prefer to call this ‘the single genus principle’, which might initially 
seem an artificial epistemic requirement if we were not to inquire into the 
reasons why Aristotle needed to introduce this requirement. Sciences, in the 
Aristotelian conception, proceed by demonstrations that are founded upon 
what Aristotle calls syllogisms. These syllogisms can only be constructed by the 
necessary relations among the constituent elements of demonstration, namely, 
the middle and the extreme terms. Now, the necessary relations required 
between the elements of syllogisms can be found only within a single genus. 
This amounts to saying that we can only construct syllogisms within a single 
genus. These syllogisms in turn constitute the main body of any scientific 
knowledge. Therefore, the explanatory chains cannot pass from one genus to 
another, since this impedes the requirement of a necessary relation between the 
elements of syllogisms, yielding a clash in the logical structure as a result of 
which no conclusion can be drawn from the premises. Accordingly, passing 
from one genus to another while constructing a syllogism would yield what 
Aristotle calls the problem of µετάβασις: 
 
Hence the kind [γένος] must be the same, either simpliciter [ἁπλῶς] or in some 
respect, if a demonstration [ἡ ἀπόδειξις] is to cross [µεταβαίνειν]. That it is 
impossible otherwise is plain; for the extremes [τὰ ἄκρα] and the middle 
terms [τὰ µέσα] must come from the same kind [ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους], 
since if they do not hold in themselves [µὴ καθ᾿ αὑτά], they will be 
incidentals [συµβεβηκότα].18 
The elements of a syllogism according to this passage, namely, the extremes 
and middle terms, should be in the same genus, otherwise it is impossible to 
fulfil the required necessary relations between these elements. The basic 
                                                
17 An. Post. I, 28. 
18 An. Post. I, 7, 75b8-16. This is confirmed also in An. Post. I, 9, 75b37-38; 76a22. 
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explanatory element, the middle term, which constitutes the cause of what has 
been explained and upon which a syllogism is constructed, is ultimately the 
proper genus of what is to be explained. The genus, therefore, formulates the 
basic nature (φύσις) by which and in which explanatory chains are constructed. 
Therefore, it would not be perverse to think of a genus as the proper cause of its 
subordinating species. Since everything should be explained in terms of its 
proper necessary causes, rather than in terms of its accidental causes,19 sciences 
should proceed in their proper genera. 
 
This relation found between the genera and their related species is a kata hen 
type, in which genus plays the role of being a common nature reflected equally 
by all the subordinating instances to which it is predicated. This paves the way 
for a community of species to be gathered together under the umbrella of a 
single genus that can be predicated on these species synonymously. Indeed, the 
ordinary kata hen structures, in which several species are structured beneath a 
single genus, is based upon the synonymous references found between genus 
and species.20 The grounds for the synonymous predications found in kata hen 
relations lie in the fact that all the species share exactly the same common 
nature reflected in their respective genus. Hence, the synonymous reference 
and necessary relations mark the basic characteristic of these kata hen 
constructions, through which, according to Aristotle, every so-called special 
science proceeds.  
 
Now, recall that Aristotle has already declared that Being is a πολλαχῶς 
λεγόµενον. This amounts to saying that Being has many manifestations that 
cannot be reduced to a single one and cannot be reduced to a single genus. 
Indeed in several places in his corpus, Aristotle explicitly claims that Being is 
                                                
19 See, An. Post. I, 6. 
20 See Top. IV, 6, 127b6-7: ‘For the genus is always predicated of its species synonymously [κατὰ 
πάντων γὰρ τῶν εἰδῶν συνωνύµως τὸ γένος κατηγορεῖται].’ Additionally, in Top. II, 2, 109b4: 
‘For a predicate drawn from the genus is never ascribed to the species in a derived form 
[παρωνύµως], but always the genera are predicated of their species synonymously [πάντα 
συνωνύµως τὰ γένη τῶν εἰδῶν κατηγορεῖται]; for the species take on both the name [τοὔνοµα] 
and the account [τὸν λόγον] of their genera.’ Cf. also Cat. 5. 3a34-3b9; Top. IV, 3, 123a27; VII, 4, 
154a18. 
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not a genus.21 This explains why the problem of the unity of the science of Being 
emerges. Since Being is not a genus and since, as I have explained, every science 
deals with a single genus, it is obvious that there cannot be a science of Being 
that is based on ordinary kata hen relations. The so-called special sciences are 
unified by virtue of dealing with a single genus, whereas it is impossible for the 
science of Being to be unified by a single genus, simply because Being is not a 
genus. Being, in this context, is a πολλαχῶς λεγόµενον, that is, it is a homonym 
and does not constitute a common nature that can be reflected in all of its 
instances. It is in no way predicated synonymously of all of its instances, as we 
encounter in ordinary kata hen relations found between genera and their 
respective species. In the latter structure, synonymy is the dominant link 
between not only the genus and its respective species but also between the 
species and its respective individuals.22 While genus is always predicated of its 
species synonymously, as we have seen, this is not to be the case with Being. 
According to Aristotle, therefore, there must be a major difference between the 
relation in the hierarchies of kinds where genera and species are synonymously 
linked to each other and the case of Being, which is a homonymous one.  
 
Now, when Aristotle declares that Being is a πολλαχῶς λεγόµενον, as we have 
seen, he immediately comes up against the problem of the unity of the science 
of Being. Aristotle’s motivation in Book Γ is just to get out of this problem, and 
thereby to show that a science of Being is still possible even if its subject matter, 
namely, Being, does not constitute a single genus while in the other sciences we 
always have a single genus. In other words, the basic motivation for Aristotle’s 
establishment of the CDH of Being lies in the fact that Being is a πολλαχῶς 
λεγόµενον and that it is not a genus. Shields's argument, on the other hand, 
seems to deviate somewhat. Although he acknowledges the problem of the 
unity of the science of Being, he thinks that the key point in the CDH of Being is 
to show that Being is non-synonymous, which is not the essential point that 
Aristotle is making. Aristotle’s enterprise is not to engage in a linguistic 
                                                
21 See An. Post. II, 7, 92b14; Top. 5, 6, 127a26ff; 7, 144a31-b1; Soph. El. 11, 172a14; Met. B, 3, 998b22; 
H, 6, 1045b5; K, 1, 1059b31; EN I, 6, 1096a23; EE I, 8, 1217b35. 
22 See Cat. 5. 3a34-3b9; Top. II, 2, 109b5; IV, 3, 123a27; 6, 127b5ff.; VII, 4, 154a18. 
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discussion whereby he shows that Being is non-synonymous; rather, it seems to 
me that his basic rationale in applying CDH to the case of Being is that Being is 
not a genus and therefore cannot be studied through the lens of ordinary kata 
hen relations. This gives Aristotle the problem of the unity of the science of 
Being and he can only find his way out through a single science of Being by 
CDH. Hence, the key point, the motivation and the outcome of Book Γ are not 
fundamentally linguistic, as Shields seems to suppose. 
 
One may question, at this point, how Aristotle might succeed with the claim 
that Being is a πολλαχῶς λεγόµενον and that it is not a genus. His justification 
is grounded upon the fact that, while genus can only be predicated of its species, 
Being can be predicated of both species and differentia. Accordingly, if Being 
were a genus, then it would not be possible for it to be predicated of its 
differentiae. Aristotle’s denial that genus cannot be predicated of its differentiae 
is the most fragile point of this argument and for this reason, one may rightfully 
require further support for this position. It is not, indeed, immediately plain 
why genus cannot be predicated of its differentiae, and I will now very briefly 
discuss how Aristotle grounds his position. If Aristotle is successful in proving 
that genus cannot be predicated of its differentiae, then this will immediately 
yield the result that Being cannot be genus because Being can indeed be 
predicated of its differentiae. If this is the case, then we understand that the 
puzzle concerning the unity of the science of Being is not an artificial one; 
rather, it is a real puzzle that must be resolved if a unified science of Being is to 
be established.  
 
One can trace two justifications in Aristotle for the statement that genus cannot 
be predicated of its differentiae.23 First, according to Aristotle, what is 
predicated by a genus becomes the species of that genus. In other words, if 
genus y is predicated of x, then x becomes a species of the genus y. For instance, 
if we predicate the genus ‘animal’ of ‘men’, then ‘men’ becomes a species of the 
                                                
23 See Top. VI, 6, 144a36-b3. Aristotle’s justification of the fact that Being cannot be regarded as a 
genus is well explored by several commentators. See, for instance, Ross (1924, I, 235) and 
Wilson (2000, pp. 136-140).   
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genus ‘animal’. Now, if genus were predicated of its differentia, then, according 
to this line of thought, differentia would become the species of the relevant 
genus. Obviously, this is impossible. For example, if we predicate ‘animal’ of 
the differentia ‘biped’, then ‘biped’ should become a species of ‘animal’, but 
clearly it is not a species of the genus ‘animal’. The grounds for the 
impossibility that any differentia can be species of a genus lie in the fact that 
these elements, that is, the genus, differentia and species, play different roles in 
a given classification. Accordingly, the role of differentia is necessarily 
distinguished from the role played by species. In such a structure, if a 
differentia becomes the species in virtue of the fact that it is predicated by 
genus, then the differentia cannot fulfil its proper function of differentiating the 
genus into species. Hence, if, ‘biped’ becomes the differentia of ‘animal’, it can 
no longer function as a differentiating tool, that is, it cannot divide the genus 
‘animal’ into species, say ‘men’, for it becomes itself a species, and a species 
cannot divide a genus into other subordinating species. In such a case ‘biped’ 
would have no difference from another species of ‘animal’ (e.g. ‘men’), for 
which reason it could no longer fulfil its function in differentiating genus into 
species. 
 
Genus, in this structure, is seen as a pile, grouping several species beneath 
itself.24 In this structure, differentia plays the role of differentiating this pile into 
sub-groups of species. If we were to convert a differentia to a species by 
predicating a genus of that differentia, it could no longer divide the pile into 
sub-groups for it becomes itself a member of that pile. In other words, if we 
want any differentia to function properly, we should not make that differentia a 
member of the pile that it is supposed to divide. For this reason, it is impossible 
for any differentia to be predicated by genus. 
 
The second reason why genus cannot be predicated of its differentiae is based 
on what Aristotle calls babbling (ἀδολέσχειν). Babbling occurs when someone 
                                                
24 I owe the idea that genus can be regarded as a ‘pile’ to Wilson (2000, p. 138).  
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repeats him- or herself a number of times.25 If someone gives the same 
information more than once, then she or he is committing this logical fallacy of 
babbling. It is not, as Aristotle notes, absurd merely to repeat the words; rather, 
what is absurd is to predicate the same thing many times of something.26 
Aristotle has noted that babbling is not always plainly detected for the reason 
that the repeated predications are usually implicit and can easily be overlooked. 
Aristotle insists, however, that it is a fallacy that should be detected and 
avoided for a healthy statement of the facts and argumentation.27  
 
The relation between the reason why genus cannot be predicated of differentiae 
and babbling lies in the predication relations between the genera, species and 
differentiae. In Aristotle’s conception, not only is every genus predicated of its 
species, but every differentia is also predicated of the species. Therefore, if 
genus were also predicated of differentia, then the species would be doubly 
predicated, which would result in what Aristotle calls the problem of babbling. 
For instance, the genus ‘animal’ and the differentia ‘biped’ are both predicated 
of the species ‘men’. Now, if genus were predicated of the differentia as well, 
that is, if ‘animal’ were predicated of ‘biped’, then, since the differentia ‘biped’ 
and genus ‘animal’ are both predicated of the species ‘men’, the species ‘men’ 
would be predicated twice as ‘men is biped animal animal’. The first ‘animal’ in 
this case comes from the differentia and the second comes directly from genus. 
In such a case, we are in a position to predicate the same thing more than once 
and this is what is meant by the problem of babbling. 
 
These two arguments prove that genus cannot be predicated of its differentiae. 
This in turn justifies the claim that Being cannot be a genus for it can, as 
mentioned, indeed be predicated of species as well as differentiae. If, in other 
words, Being could be regarded as a genus, it would be possible to predicate 
genera of differentiae. Two arguments are enough to show that this possibility 
should be ruled out.  
                                                
25 Soph. El. 3, 165b12-17. 
26 Top. VI, 3, 140b31- 4, 142a2. 
27 Met. Z, 5, 1030b35-1031a1. 
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The puzzle concerning the unity of the science of Being, therefore, is not an 
artificial one; since every science deals with a single genus, and since Being is 
not a genus, as has been proved by two arguments, in the limits of ordinary kata 
hen structures there cannot be a unified science of Being. In so-called special 
sciences, necessary relations between genus, differentiae and species guarantee 
the possibility of constructing syllogisms that formulate the main body of the 
science in question. This ordinary kata hen structure, however, cannot operate in 
the case of Being, simply because the most basic constituent of such structures is 
missing in the case of Being, namely, the genus.28  
  
This discussion shows that the problem of the unity of the science of Being 
cannot be resolved by the ordinary kata hen relation found between genera and 
their respective species; rather, what we need is a new relation that can be 
grounded on a certain order found in homonymous relations. Indeed, resolving 
this puzzle through constructing a new relation beyond the synonymous kata 
hen relation is one of the central themes of Book Γ and this is what I shall be 
discussing in the next section.  
 
2.2.2. Euphoria 
 
In the second chapter of Book Γ, Aristotle’s chief aim is to overcome the puzzle 
concerning the unity of the science of Being: 
 
For not only in the case of things which have one common notion [τῶν καθ᾿ 
ἓν λεγοµένων] does the investigation [θεωρῆσαι] belong to one science, but 
also in the case of things which are related to one common nature [τῶν πρὸς 
                                                
28 One of the natural outcomes of this is that, since the science of Being cannot be grounded 
upon the synonymous kata hen relation between genus and species (for Being, as we have seen, 
cannot be regarded as a genus), it cannot be a demonstrative science. This point concerning the 
methodology of the science of Being is very well discussed by Fraser in his ‘Demonstrative 
Science and the Science of Being Qua Being’ (2002). Fraser has tried to show that even though 
the science of Being is not established upon a kata hen relation, it can still be a demonstrative 
science by virtue of the necessary relations that can be found between several instances of 
Being. On the methodology of the science of Being see, also, Terence Irwin (2002).   
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µίαν λεγοµένων]; for even these in a sense have one common notion [λέγεται 
καθ᾿ ἓν].29 
We are told in this passage that it is possible to construct a science beyond the 
unity of the kata hen relation through the unity of things related to one common 
nature. In this new structure, even though we do not have a genus with which 
the subordinating species and individuals are bound up in synonymous 
predications, it becomes possible to unify an investigation of things by virtue of 
the fact that they are necessarily related to one common nature. This new 
structure is called core-dependent homonymy (CDH-pros hen), which allows 
several peripheral instances of a homonymous entity or term to be investigated 
in a unified inquiry.  
 
The most significant aspect of this new structure lies in the details of necessary 
relations between the core and the peripherals that are supposed to pave the 
way for a unified inquiry of clusters of instances that are not tied to a genus in 
the way we encounter in ordinary kata hen structures. I shall be dealing with the 
constituent characteristics of such relations shortly. For now, I record that in 
CDH, even though we do not have synonymous predications between the 
several elements of the structure, it is still possible to investigate these non-
synonymous instances by means of an order that can be found in the 
homonymous relation between peripherals and the core. This order is based 
upon the necessary relations characteristic of CDH. In virtue of the core, then, it 
is possible that a pile can be formulated. This pile is so similar to the pile 
created by the genus in the kata hen relation that it can fulfil the requirements 
for a unified investigation. Therefore, by virtue of CDH, even though there is no 
single genus, it becomes possible to find a common nature through a central 
term, which builds up the possibility for a unified investigation of instances that 
are not synonymously predicated by a single genus but have some kind of 
ordered homonymous structure.  
 
                                                
29 Met. Γ, 2, 1003b12-15. 
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In order to settle the question whether a theological conception of the science of 
Being is consistent with what we have been told in Book Γ, I should further 
explicate the details of CDH, which I shall do in the next section.  
  
2.2.3. Synonymy and Homonymy 
 
Having determined the puzzle that provides the backdrop against which the 
import of Aristotle’s conception of CDH is gauged, I have managed to establish 
one side of the basic framework grounding Aristotle’s discussion of CDH. This, 
however, can be supplemented by another discussion, which will help me to 
circumscribe the CDH in a better way. In order to explicate CDH further, in this 
section I will relate it to two proximate terms. These are synonymy and 
homonymy, which may said to be closely connected to Aristotle’s discussion of 
CDH. Consequently, in this section, I will present a very brief discussion of 
these terms (i.e., synonymy and homonymy), which will help me to complete 
the framework for the background against which the discussion of CDH 
proceeds in Metaphysics. This will also help me to derive some tools that may be 
employed to differentiate CDH, upon which the science of Being is said to be 
constructed, from the ordinary kata hen relations that ground the so-called 
special sciences.   
 
Aristotle defines synonymy in the first section of Categories:   
 
When things have the name in common [τό τε ὄνοµα κοινὸν] and the 
definition of being [λόγος τῆς οὐσίας] which corresponds to the name is the 
same [κοινόν], they are called synonymous. Thus, for example, both a man 
[ἄνθρωπος] and an ox [ὁ βοῦς] are animals [ζῷον]. Each of these is called, by 
a common name, an animal, and the definition of being [ὁ λόγος δὲ τῆς 
οὐσίας] is also the same [ὁ αὐτός]; for if one is to give the definition of each – 
what being an animal is for each of them – one will give the same definition 
[τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον].30  
When two things have a common name and the definition corresponding to this 
common name is identical for these two things, then these things are said to be 
synonymous. For instance, we say ‘animal’ both for ‘man’ and for ‘ox’. The 
                                                
30 Cat. I, 1a6-12. This definition is confirmed in several other passages. See, for instance, Cat. I, 
3b6; Top. VI, 10, 148a23.  
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definition of ‘animal’ in both cases is identical; accordingly, if one is to give a 
definition of what it is to be an animal in the cases of ‘ox’ and ‘man’, this 
definition will be identical in both cases. Therefore, the definition of ‘animal’ in 
‘man is a rational animal’ and in ‘ox is a four-footed animal’ is identical. In such 
a case, ‘animal’ is used synonymously, as it attracts exactly the same meaning in 
both cases. 
 
I have already mentioned that synonymy mostly takes place between genera 
and their respective species.31 Genus, therefore, is predicated of all its species in 
a synonymous way. The synonymous predications in the hierarchies of kinds 
can be found between species and their proper individuals as well.32 The genus 
‘animal’ is synonymously predicated of both the species ‘men’ and the 
individuals under that species, say, Callias. In this structure, not only the genus 
(e.g. animal) is predicated of its entire species (e.g. men, birds, dogs, etc.) but 
also species (e.g. men) is synonymously predicated of all of the subordinating 
individuals (e.g. Callias, Socrates, etc.). There is, therefore, a certain kind of 
transitivity of synonymous predications between hierarchies of genera, wherein 
genus is predicated of both many of its species and of individuals situated 
beneath species. The transitivity of synonymous predications between several 
stages of hierarchies of kinds is an important feature of synonymy, especially in 
building up kata hen relations between genera and species by virtue of which 
the so-called demonstrative special sciences proceed. The transitivity enables 
one to build up syllogisms based on the necessary synonymous relations found 
in between these hierarchies. As I have mentioned, Being does not suit this kata 
hen scheme since it cannot be regarded as a genus. Being, in other words, is not 
predicated of its instances synonymously as genus is in kata hen relations; 
                                                
31 See 2.2.1. above. This is confirmed most clearly in Top. IV, 6, 127b5-7: ‘Look and see also if the 
genus [τὸ γένος] fails to be synonymous [µὴ συνώνυµον] with its species [τῷ εἴδει]. For the 
genus is always predicated of its species synonymously [κατὰ πάντων γὰρ τῶν εἰδῶν 
συνωνύµως τὸ γένος κατηγορεῖται].’ Additionally in Top. II, 2, 109b4: ‘For a predicate drawn 
from the genus is never ascribed to the species in a derived form [παρωνύµως], but always the 
genera are predicated of their species synonymously [πάντα συνωνύµως τὰ γένη τῶν εἰδῶν 
κατηγορεῖται]; for the species take on both the name [τοὔνοµα] and the account [τὸν λόγον] of 
their genera.’ Cf. also Top. IV, 123a29; VII, 4, 154a16.   
32 Topics, VII, 4, 154a18: ‘For the species is synonymous with its individuals.’ 
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rather, it attracts different meanings in its different applications. Hence, though 
synonymous predication found between the genera and their respective species 
is sufficient for constructing so-called special sciences, it is insufficient as it 
stands for the science of Being. 
 
Another feature of synonymy is that it is commensurable. The 
commensurability of synonyms holds that two things are comparable by means 
of ‘more’ and ‘less’ phrases if these two things are predicated synonymously. 
Aristotle explains this feature of synonymy in Topics: 
  
Moreover, see if the terms cannot be compared [συµβλητά] as more or less 
[µᾶλλον] or as in like degree [ὁµοίως], as in the case (e.g.) with a clear sound 
and a clear argument, and a sharp flavour and a sharp sound. For neither are 
these things said to be clear or sharp in a like degree [ὁµοίως], nor yet is the 
one said to be clearer or sharper than the other. Clear, then, and sharp are 
homonymous. For synonyms are always comparable [τὸ γάρ συνώνυµον πᾶν 
συµβλητόν]; for they will always hold either in like manner [ὁµοίως], or else 
in a greater degree [µᾶλλον] in one case.33 
According to Aristotle, contrary to homonymous terms, synonyms are 
commensurable (συµβλητόν). Two terms – say, ‘clear’ (λευκός) in ‘clear sound’ 
(λευκὴ φωνὴ) and ‘clear argument’ (λευκὸν ἱµάτιον) – are used homonymously 
when they have the same name but different definitions. Since these two ‘clears’ 
(i.e., ‘clear’ in ‘clear sound’ and ‘clear argument’) have different senses, it is 
impossible to make a comparison between them. To put it in another way, it is 
impossible to say that the ‘clear’ in ‘clear sound’ is ‘more clear’ than the ‘clear’ 
in ‘clear argument’, as these two ‘clears’ have different definitions and senses. 
If, however, these terms were synonyms, then it would be possible to compare 
them: for instance, ‘clean’ in ‘clean hospital’ and ‘clean kitchen’ is used 
synonymously. In such a case, it is possible to compare ‘kitchen’ and ‘hospital’ 
in terms of being clear, and affirm that, say, a kitchen is ‘more clear’ than the 
hospital, or the hospital is ‘less clear’ than the kitchen. 
 
The import of this claim is that in an intra-categorical relation, in which the 
genus is predicated of its species synonymously, it is possible that we construct 
                                                
33 Top. I, 15, 107b13-18. 
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comparisons in terms of ‘more’ and ‘less’ phrases according to the common 
genus to which the species are synonymously predicated. In ordinary kata hen 
relations, where a genus is predicated of its species synonymously, this seems 
to be the only possibility. However, as I have mentioned, Being does not suit 
this schema for most of the time it is homonymously predicated of its instances. 
One might find the underlying reason for this affirmation in how in reality 
Aristotle conceptualizes the categories of Being. According to this line of 
thought, categories can be seen as the highest genera of Being.34 Being, as 
Aristotle states, falls immediately into genera.35 These genera are the highest 
amongst others and these are what Aristotle calls categories. Hence, in terms of 
commensurability, according to this schema one can observe two levels where 
Being as a predicate can operate. First, the predication can operate inter-
categorically, that is, between several categories. Since in such cases Being is 
predicated of its instances homonymously, it is impossible for us to construct 
comparisons. For instance, we cannot say that a quality, say ‘white’, is more 
Being than a quantity like ‘number’, for Being does not constitute the same 
meaning of these two occurrences, that is predicated homonymously. Despite 
the fact that Being is not commensurable in the cases where it is predicated 
homonymously of its several instances, it is indeed possible that, in some cases, 
we can still affirm that it is commensurable, that is, when it is predicated 
synonymously to intra-categorical instances of the same category. Within 
instances of a single category, then, it is still possible to make comparisons by 
‘more’ and ‘less’ phrases. We might turn to a passage from Categories in order to 
illustrate the point:  
 
Of the secondary substances [δευτέρων οὐσίων] the species is more a 
substance [µᾶλλον οὐσία] than the genus, since it is nearer [ἔγγιον] to the 
primary substance [πρώτης οὐσίας]. For if one is to say of the primary 
substance what it is [τί εστι], it will be more informative [γνωριµώτερον] and 
apt [οὶκειότερον] to give the species than the genus. For example, it would be 
                                                
34 Aristotle explicitly affirms that things belonging to different categories cannot have a 
common genus in Met. Δ, 28, 1024b12. Again, he affirms that things in the same category belong 
to the same genus in Met. Δ, 6, 1016b31, which is echoed in Met. I, 3, 1054b35. Categories are 
conceptualized as the highest genus of predication in De An. II, 1, 402a22. See also An. Post. I, 22 
83b16; Top. I, 9, 103b20, 15, 107a3; VII, 1, 152a38; Soph. El. 22, 178a5.  
35 Met. Γ, 2, 1004a5. 
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more informative to say of the primary substance what it is, it will be more 
informative to say of the individual man that he is a man than that he is an 
animal (since the one is more distinctive [ἴδιον] of the individual man while 
the other is more general [κοινότερον]); and more informative 
[γνωριµώτερον] to say of the individual tree that it is a tree than that it is a 
plant. Further, it is because the primary substances are subjects [ὑποκεῖσθαι] 
of all the other things and all other things are predicated [κατηγορεῖσθαι] of 
them or are in them, that they are called substances most of all [µάλιστα 
οὐσίαι λέγονται]. But as the primary substances [αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι] stand to 
the other things, so the species stand to the genus (for the genera are 
predicated of the species but the species are not predicated reciprocally 
[ἀντιστρέφει] of the genera). Therefore for this reason too the species is more 
a substance [µᾶλλον οὐσία] than the genus.36 
This passage is challenging in several ways, as it causes a great deal of debate 
among scholars on such issues as the difference between secondary and 
primary substances and issues concerning Aristotle’s doctrine of predication. 
Obviously, these issues demand a separate discussion, which I cannot on this 
occasion provide. My sole aim in examining this passage is to elucidate an 
example that illustrates how Being can be predicated synonymously in intra-
categorical relations and thus is commensurable. 
 
Aristotle’s chief aim in the above passage is to show that species is more a 
substance (µᾶλλον οὐσία) than a genus. While doing this, he offers two 
arguments; the first argument is presented in lines 2b9–15 (‘For if one...’) and 
the second is presented in lines 2b15–22 (‘Further, it is because...’), both of 
which show that species deserves to be called more a substance than a genus.  
 
Now, we know that an emphasized feature of synonymy is that it mostly occurs 
between intra-categorical relations, such as the relation between ‘animal’ and 
‘man’, and it is natural for Aristotle to affirm that a man is more a substance 
than an animal for it is more proximate to the primary substance, e.g. Callias. 
We can observe a hierarchy in this structure in which several instances are 
connected in a kata hen way. In our example, the hierarchy is roughly 
established upon the highest genus (animal) and the lowest species (man), with 
the individual underneath that species (Callias). The hierarchy is already 
established under a single genus, which in our example is ‘animal’. That genus 
                                                
36 Cat. 5, 2b7-22. 
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is predicated of all of its subordinating species and individuals 
synonymously.37 These species, in turn, are predicated to the subordinating 
substantial individuals synonymously as well.38 We have, therefore, a 
synonymous relation in this hierarchy in which commensurable individuals 
and species are ordered under the umbrella of a single genus. In such cases, 
since we have synonymous predications, it is possible to make comparisons by 
using the ‘more’ or ‘less’ phrases as Aristotle did in the above passage. 
Therefore, Aristotle is not wrong to claim that species are more substance than 
genera;39 the senses of Being that correspond to genera and species are identical, 
that is, the accounts of Being for these terms are synonymous. 
 
On the basis of the passages where Aristotle seems to establish degrees in 
Being, Shields argues that despite his declarations that Being is a CDH, at least 
in these passages, Being is conceptualized by Aristotle as a synonym.40 In fact, 
Aristotle seems to present comparisons between different instances of Being in 
many places of his corpus.41 I believe, however, that such doubts are not always 
well founded and, contrary to the proposal of Shields, the several occurrences 
of degrees of Being in Aristotle’s philosophy do not at all imply that Being is 
synonymous. While this is not the place to argue the point, we can still forestall 
such an approach by bringing forth what has been actually intended in these 
passages. First, as I have already shown, it seems perfectly legitimate for 
Aristotle to establish hierarchies of Beings in passages where we encounter 
intra-categorical relations. Second, in some of the passages, where we encounter 
Aristotle constructing degrees of Being, an interpretative pattern can be 
constructed which enables us to deal with otherwise insoluble difficulties. 
                                                
37 This is confirmed most clearly in Top. IV, 6, 127b5. Cf. IV, 123a29; VII, 4, 154a16.   
38 Top. VII, 4, 154a18. 
39 On the other hand, the species themselves are not more substantial than one another. This 
applies to substantial individuals as well: ‘But of the species themselves - those which are not 
genera - one is no more a substance than another [οὐδὲν µᾶλλον ἕτερον ἑτερου οὐσία ἐστίν]: it 
is no more apt to say of the individual man that he is a man than to say of the individual horse 
that it is a horse. And similarly of the primary substances one is no more a substance than 
another [οὐδὲν µᾶλλον ἕτερον ἑτερου οὐσία ἐστίν]: the individual man is no more a substance 
than the individual ox.’(Cat. 5, 2b22). Cf. also Cat. 5, 3b33. 
40 Shields (1999), pp. 264-266. 
41 For which, see, Cat. 5, 2b7-19; 2b22; 3b35-4a9; 13, 15a4-7; Met. B, 5, 1002a4-8; 1002a15-18; Z, 2, 
1029a6, 1029a29-30; 1030a21-22; 16, 1040b22-24; M, 2, 1077b12; N, 1, 1088a29. 
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Accordingly, one might argue that in these passages, Aristotle’s aim is not 
merely to present degrees in Being but to show that there is some kind of 
priority in the instances of Being and that we can establish a hierarchy among 
these Beings in terms of these priorities. Indeed the dependency relations are 
capable of establishing degrees in Being in a way but this conception is unique 
to the case of Being and it does not demand or imply a synonymy. In these 
passages, therefore, Aristotle merely seeks to show that some Beings are prior 
to others in which it would be perverse to read these passages as tacitly 
allowing that Being is commensurable and therefore, conceptualized as a 
synonym. This interpretation is applicable to passages from Book Z (4, 1030a21) 
and Book N (Met. N, 1, 1088a24-1088b5) where Aristotle discusses the priority 
of substance over other categories. The priority in question does not necessitate 
that Aristotle should envisage a synonymous conception of Being. Similarly, in 
Book B Aristotle compares the ontological status of ‘body’, ‘surface’, ‘line’ and 
‘unit’, which also fits the interpretation I have suggested as well, that the 
degrees in Being that we encounter is constructed upon the priority relations 
rather than the synonymous conception of Being.  
 
It can also be claimed that Aristotle is establishing degrees in Being when he 
presents the priority of form over matter in Book Z.42 Again, in this passage, 
Aristotle’s aim is to establish the priority of form over matter, but not to 
maintain that matter exists less than form. Matter, in this line of argument, is 
posterior to form because of its indeterminate and dependent nature. It can be 
regarded as a mere indeterminate substratum that does not have a self-
subsistent existence.  
 
One may, however, claim that Aristotle in fact envisages a hierarchy between 
several instances of Being in a passage from Book M of Metaphysics.43 This 
passage can be seen as the terminus of a series of analyses concerning the mode 
of Being of mathematical objects. These analyses are conducted in order to solve 
                                                
42 Met. Z, 3, 1029a5-30. 
43 Met. M, 2, 1077b12-18 
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a puzzle that originated in Book B, which focuses on whether numbers, lines, 
figures, and points are a kind of substance or not and asks whether such things 
are separate from sensible things or present in them.44 The passage presents the 
results of Aristotle’s examination of mathematical objects. It involves four 
significant declarations concerning mathematical objects. First (1) he declares 
that mathematical objects are ‘not substances as bodies are’. Second (2) he 
maintains that mathematical objects are posterior to the sensible objects. Third, 
Aristotle states that (3) mathematical objects are logically prior to sensible 
objects. In such a conception, then, while sensible things are prior to 
mathematical objects ontologically, they are posterior logically.45 Finally, (4) 
Aristotle asserts that mathematical objects do not have a separate existence 
beyond sensible objects. These four concluding remarks are the result of a series 
of arguments starting in the opening chapter of Book M. The first declaration (1) 
is particularly important in terms of the commensurability problem. Bearing in 
mind the indefiniteness of ‘body’ used in this passage, I can safely argue that 
this comparison does not lead to an overall synonymous conception of Being in 
Aristotle. To say that the objects of mathematics are not separable from 
sensibles may well be interpreted as affirming something about the ‘mode of 
Being’ of these objects rather than asserting something regarding their 
‘ontological status’. Hence, I believe Aristotle’s aim in making a comparison 
between bodies and mathematical objects is rather to determine the ontological 
mode to which mathematical objects appertain rather than to establish a 
hierarchy in Being depending on the ontological statuses of these objects. 
Therefore, I believe that Aristotle’s declarations in this passage do not show that 
he actually envisages a structure of Being that is synonymous.46 Upon 
reflection, therefore, Shields seems not to be fair to Aristotle when he employs 
                                                
44 Met. B, 1, 996a14 
45 I shall present an explanation for these two types of priorities shortly in this chapter. 
46 Lewis (2004, pp. 22-24) attempted to solve the problem of commensurability of Being by 
emphasizing the ‘priority’ relations found between the instances discussed in these passages as 
well. His interpretation, however, is not sufficient to solve the problem of commensurability of 
Being, for, as we have seen, the priority argument is neither sufficient nor needed for all the 
passages where one may find degrees of Being simply because, as mentioned, in some of these 
passages the hierarchy is already established between intra-categorical relations. 
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the commensurability argument in order to reject the homonymy of Being in 
Aristotle.  
 
This brief analysis of synonymy seems to be sufficient to establish the 
framework for my upcoming discussion of CDH of Being and so, I will now 
proceed to explicate, very briefly, what Aristotle understands by homonymy. 
 
Aristotle describes homonymy in the first section of Categories: ‘When things 
have only a name in common [ὅνοµα µόνον κοινόν] and the definition of being 
[λόγος τῆς οὐσίας] which corresponds to the name is different [ἕτερος], they 
are called homonymous’.47 Homonymy occurs when things share the same name. 
That same name, however, has different definitions in its various occurrences.  
 
In contrast with the case of synonyms, one can observe several types of 
homonymy, for sometimes it is possible to find some kind of association 
between the definitions of homonymous terms. These several types of 
homonymy are determined by the level of the association between the 
definitions of homonymous terms. Sometimes the definitions of homonymous 
terms have nothing in common, while sometimes it is possible to find some 
kind of association between the definitions of homonymous usages of a term. In 
the latter cases, the definitions of homonymous terms may intersect although 
they do not completely overlap. If these definitions were to overlap entirely, as I 
have mentioned, we would have synonymy rather than homonymy.  
 
In some homonyms, in which it is possible to find some kind of association 
between the definitions of homonymous terms, it is possible to observe further 
some kind of order in the association of the terms. Several definitions of a 
homonymous term, in such structures, may be ordered in terms of the 
referential connections found between these definitions. When, for instance, one 
meaning of the homonymous term is prior to the others by virtue of the fact 
that the other meanings are necessarily linked to that primary instance if they 
                                                
47 Cat. 1, 1a1. 
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are to be meaningful at all, we have an ordered associated homonym. In such 
structures, mostly we have a primary term to which all the other peripheral 
terms are necessarily linked. Homonyms with such ordered relations are called 
core-dependent homonyms (CDH). Such homonyms have several defining 
requirements, concerning mostly the relations between the core and the 
peripherals and they are the most complicated instances among all the other 
types of homonyms, in which several necessary conditions have to be met if the 
required relation is to be constructed. In terms of the aims of this thesis, these 
conditions must be explained in full, since Being, as we are told by Aristotle, is 
an instance of such homonyms, that is, it is a CDH and since, as we shall see, 
the problem of unity of the science of Being can only be averted by virtue of 
such an ordered relation that can be observed between several instances of 
Being. Hence, we should know initially what exactly is required in such 
homonyms and see if Being meets these requirements. If Being proves to be a 
CDH, it will then be important to determine in what conditions Being fulfils 
these requirements. These conditions will tell us if a theological conception of 
the science of Being is inconsistent with what we are told in Book Γ with respect 
to CDH. Hence, what I shall do first is to derive the requirements of a CDH and 
apply my findings to the CDH of Being, whereby I hope to show that there is 
nothing in such a structure that is incompatible with a theological conception of 
the science of Being.   
 
2.2.4. Two Examples of CDH  
 
In this part, I will examine two examples of CDH provided in several places of 
the Aristotelian corpus (i.e. health and medicine), subsequently checking their 
requirements as far as possible. Some scholars take these examples quite 
seriously, on the ground that they necessarily reveal the final thoughts of 
Aristotle on CDH. To this end they sometimes reconstruct the examples to 
make them fit Aristotle’s conception of the CDH of Being.48 I think, however, 
that these examples are merely rough doctrinal guides and they mostly lack the 
                                                
48 See, for instance, Shields (1999) pp. 117-118 and to a limited degree Ward (2008), pp. 91-99. 
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required theoretical clarity. I will not reconstruct them since I see no reason for 
doing this, and will content myself with what they say with respect to the CDH 
of Being. After all, Being is a unique case that cannot be exemplified in the 
fullest sense. In my opinion, therefore, what these examples say is not to be 
taken as a definitive description of every aspect of the CDH of Being. Rather, as 
I have mentioned, they were meant to introduce the reader or listener to the 
special case of Being but they cannot be expected to be exactly like the case of 
Being because the case of Being is unique. 
 
‘Health’ is an instance of CDH, for it is possible to observe an order in several 
usages of this term. In the CDH of ‘health’ the term has several secondary 
instances, all of which are tied to a single ‘core’ item that is prior to all the other 
usages of the term:  
 
There are many senses in which a thing may said to ‘be’ [τὸ δὲ λέγεται µὲν 
πολλαχῶς], but they are related to one central point [πρὸς ἕν], one definite 
kind of thing, and are not homonymous. Everything which is healthy 
[ὑγιεινὸν] is related to health [πρὸς ὑγίειαν], one thing in the sense that it 
preserves [φυλάττειν] health, another in the sense that it produces [ποιεῖν] it, 
another in the sense that it is a symptom [σηµεῖον] of health, another because 
it is capable [δεκτικὸν] of it…49      
The passage tells us that several secondary instances are linked to the primary 
instance of health in several ways. Over against the homonymous terms that 
have no order in their several usages and the homonyms in which several 
meanings of a term intersect but nevertheless have no order in the organization 
of these meanings, one can observe a certain order in several usages of the term 
‘health’, in which some non-core instances are tied to a core instance in several 
ways. This shows that the term ‘health’ is a CDH for several senses of this term 
have a definite organization in the way that all of the secondary instances are 
linked to one definite primary ‘core’, namely, ‘health’, around which they are 
clustered.  
 
                                                
49 Met. Γ, 2, 1003a33. The example of health presented in Book Γ is in its most complete form. 
The other occurrences lack some of the secondary instances enumerated in the text of Book Γ. 
The text of Topics (I, 15, 106b34), for instance, involves only ‘productive of health’ (ποιεῖν), 
‘preservation of health’ (φυλάττειν) and ‘indicative of health’ (σηµεῖον) whereas Book K 
(1061a5) involves solely ‘productive of health’ (ποιεῖν) and ‘indicative of health’ (σηµεῖον).  
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In the above passage, four peripheral elements are listed. The first of these 
instances is the preservation (φυλάττειν) of health; a thing can be called 
‘healthy’ because it ‘preserves’ health. For instance, exercising, avoiding stress, 
quitting smoking, or moderate drinking and eating, can all be called ‘healthy’, 
since these activities ‘preserve’ health. They are called ‘healthy’ in virtue of their 
connection with ‘health’, without which they do not have any meaning at all. 
The second peripheral instance listed in the passage is ‘production’ (ποιεῖν). 
Several peripheral instances, for instance, diet or medical treatment, are called 
‘healthy’ for they all ‘produce’ health. Thirdly, we call a ‘symptom’ (σηµεῖον) 
‘healthy’ by referring to the term ‘health’. For instance, we call some state of a 
body; say strength, ‘healthy’ by virtue of the fact that it is a symptom of health. 
Finally, a thing can be called healthy by virtue of being capable (δεκτικὸν) of it. 
A physical part of a body, say muscles, can be called ‘healthy’, for the reason 
that they are capable of receiving health.  
 
Let me now turn to the second example, namely, the example of ‘medical’ 
(ἰατρικὸν). Similarly to ‘health’, the term ‘medical’ is an ordered homonym, the 
senses of which can be organized by virtue of their reference to a primary sense 
of the term. The example of medical art occurs in several places in the 
Aristotelian corpus.50 In Book Γ Aristotle presents it as: 
 
And that which is medical [ἰατρικὸν] is relative to medical art [πρὸς ἰατρικήν], 
one thing in the sense that it possesses [ἔχειν] it, another in the sense that it is 
naturally adapted [εὐφυὲς] to it, another in the sense that it is a function 
[ἔργον] of the medical art. And we shall find other words used similarly to 
these.51 
We are informed of three secondary instances of medical art in this passage, 
with a note that it is possible to add more instances into the example. One may 
trace these other instances in several other passages where this example occurs. 
Book Z, for instance, pronounces three instances; ‘body’ (σῶµα)52, ‘operation’ 
                                                
50 See Met. Γ, 2, 1003b1; Z, 4, 1030a34; K, 3, 1060b37-1061a5; EE VII, 2, 1236a19. 
51 Met. Γ, 2, 1003b1. 
52 Ross renders ‘σῶµα’ quite inaccurately as ‘patient’, which involves a hidden interpretation 
that limits the reader into the scope of a single candidate with respect to the possible additional 
nominees for what is meant by this ambiguous term. Body, announced in this text, may well be 
the body of the physician or the body of the patient.  
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(or ‘function’) (ἔργον) and ‘instrument’ (σκεῦος),53 where ‘instrument’ and 
‘operation’ intersect with the above list from Book Γ. The other instance, 
namely, body, is unique in this list. The two examples in Book K54 are 
‘prescription’ (λόγος) and ‘scalpel’ (µαχαίριον), which can be covered by the 
cumulative result that we may gain from the passage of Book Γ and Book Z, 
since ‘prescription’ (λόγος) can be regarded as a function (ἔργον) of medical art 
(pronounced in Book Γ) and ‘scalpel’ (µαχαίριον) can be regarded as an 
instrument (σκεῦος) of medical art (pronounced in Book Z). In Eudemian Ethics, 
Aristotle pronounces on ‘soul’ (ψυχή), ‘body’ (σῶµα) and ‘instrument’ 
(ὄργανον).55 ‘Soul’ is particularly important in this enumeration and we shall 
soon see why. The ‘body’ and ‘instrument’ can be regarded as a repetition since 
they are involved in the previous examples. ‘Soul’ can also be involved in the 
above examples but with an interpretative reservation, as we shall see. 
Therefore, the cumulative result with respect to secondary instances of medical 
art is as follows: 
 
 1. that which ‘possesses’ (ἔχειν) (Book Γ) or ‘soul’ (ψυχή) (Eudemian 
Ethics)56 
 2. that which is ‘naturally adapted to’ (εὐφυές) (Book Γ) 
 3. ‘function’ or ‘operation’ (ἔργον) (Book Γ & Z), and ‘prescription’ 
(λόγος) (Book K) 
 4. ‘body’ (σῶµα) (Book Z & Eudemian Ethics) 
 5. ‘instrument’ (ὄργανον or σκεῦος) (Book Z & Eudemian Ethics) and 
‘scalpel’ (µαχαίριον) (Book K).57  
 
                                                
53 Met. Z, 4, 1030b2. 
54 See Met. K, 3, 1060b37-1061a5. 
55 EE VII, 2, 1236a19. I believe there is no obstacle to rendering both ‘σκεῦος’ (of Book Z) and 
‘ὄργανον’ (of Eudemian Ethics) as ‘instrument’ (though the former is used mostly in the context 
of military equipment).   
56 I will explain why ‘soul’ should be correlated to ‘possession’ shortly. 
57 One may regard ‘instrument’ (ὄργανον or σκεῦος) and ‘scalpel’ (µαχαίριον) as special cases of 
‘naturally adapted to’ (εὐφυὲς), but, I believe, since these are not ‘natural’ products (rather they 
are artificial products designed by the necessities of medical art) they should be listed in a 
separate classification. 
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The example shows that ‘medical art’ is a CDH because several senses of this 
term can be organized in virtue of referring to a primary term. ‘Physician’, for 
instance, can be regarded as ‘medical’ because he who ‘possesses’ (ἔχειν) the 
requirements of medical art is called a physician. The knowledge of ‘medical 
art’ is possessed by his/her ‘soul’ by virtue of which he operates and acts 
medically. Notably, what possesses ‘medical art’, in this conception, is the ‘soul’ 
of the physician. This interpretation seems to be the most accurate one, not only 
because it is coherent with Aristotle’s general conception of soul as the 
possessor of a kind of knowledge that is medical, but also because ‘soul’ (ψυχή) 
is explicitly pronounced as one of the secondary instances of medical art in 
Eudemian Ethics as well.  
 
Likewise, we call things ‘medical’ that are ‘naturally adapted to’ (εὐφυὲς) 
medical art. What is in fact intended by ‘naturally adapted to’ is not 
immediately plain, however, we may take it to mean ‘the body of a patient’. In 
the testimony of Book Z and Eudemian Ethics, this seems to be fair enough, since 
these texts enumerate ‘body’ (σῶµα) as one of the secondary instances of 
medical art.   
 
Additionally, we use ‘medical’ to refer to operations and prescriptions, for they 
are all means by which medical art functions. Similarly, ‘body’ (σῶµα), and 
‘instrument’ (ὄργανον or σκεῦος) such as ‘scalpel’ (µαχαίριον) may well be 
called ‘medical’ in virtue of their reference to medical art.   
 
These two examples show that it is possible to observe a certain order in some 
of the homonyms. In such cases, one can observe ordered relations between 
peripheral terms and a primary instance. I will now further expose these 
ordered relations reflected between secondary instances of a homonymous term 
and its primary instance. 
 
2.2.5. Requirements of CDH 
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So far we have seen that CDH is supposed to solve the problem of the unity of 
the science of Being by virtue of providing an alternative for a kata hen relation. 
Being does not constitute a genus, for which reason it is impossible to observe 
the necessary relations in the kata hen relations found between genera and their 
respective species in Being. The necessary relations must be established, 
however, if a science is to operate properly. Hence, CDH must provide these 
necessary relations in one way or another so the science of Being can be 
established.   
 
In every CDH, we normally have a paradigm case, a ‘core’ item to which 
several peripheral items are connected. The most important aspect of such 
constructions is the actual relation between the core and the peripherals. The 
relation between core and peripherals must prove to be necessary so that an 
explanatory pattern can be structured, which paves the way for a study of 
peripherals through the investigation of the core item. 
 
I believe it is possible to approach the nature of the relations found between the 
instances of CDH (i.e. the core and the peripherals) in two ways. One of these 
ways, which is more orthodox among contemporary scholars such as Owen, is 
to investigate the reasons why the peripheral instances are called medical or 
healthy by virtue of their connection to the core item. This linguistic 
constitution of CDH, however, seems to me to be totally un-Aristotelian, as 
Aristotle is not particularly interested in the reasons for calling peripheral 
instances healthy, medical or Beings; what he is interested in is why all these 
peripheral instances are medical or healthy or Beings. The Aristotelian question, 
therefore, concentrates on the reasons why the peripheral instances are in reality 
healthy, medical or Beings rather than the reasons for these peripherals to be 
called healthy, medical or Being. Hence, what we need is an explanation 
provided by CDH with regard to the peripherals being healthy, medical or 
Beings.  
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If the question is why these peripherals are healthy or medical or what makes 
them Beings then the Aristotelian answer is that they stand in a certain relation 
to the core item. It seems to me that the question that attracts Aristotle’s 
attention is very similar to that of Plato, but for good reason the Platonic answer 
does not seem to satisfy Aristotle. According to Plato, the reason for several 
things being healthy, medical or Beings must be searched for in their 
participation in forms. This explanation, however, cannot satisfy Aristotle, as in 
Plato’s theory health attracts exactly the same meaning in all of its occurrences, 
that is, it is synonymous with all of its manifestations. This, however, is exactly 
the position that Aristotle wants to distance himself from for certain 
epistemological reasons explained earlier, namely that in such a construction 
the meaning of the core item can be studied at once, which would yield a single 
gigantic science of Being, leaving no room for the other sciences because of its 
vastness. Aristotle, on the contrary, thinks Being is homonymous and 
emphasises the necessary relations between the core and the peripherals to 
establish a unitary science through CDH even though there is no genus and 
species whereby one can establish necessary relations between them as in 
ordinary kata hen relations. 
 
Aristotle’s aim, therefore, is marked by his enterprise in finding an alternative 
for kata hen relations to arrive at a unified science of Being even though Being is 
πολλαχῶς λεγόµενον and is not a genus. This requires establishment of the 
necessary relations between the core item and peripheral instances in the CDH 
of Being. One might naturally expect to find some explanatory patterns in a 
given CDH. Since, as we are told in Book A,58 the explanatory patterns are 
established through certain causal relations, we expect to find some causal 
relations between the instances of CDH, as otherwise no knowledge would 
accrue from the peculiar relations between the instances of CDH. This amounts 
to saying that there must be causal connections between the instances of CDH. 
This same explanatory pattern also requires that we find epistemological 
priority relations in a CDH, whereby some element of a CDH is authorised to 
                                                
58 Met. A, 1, 981a26. See also An. Post. I, 13. 
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explain the other instances. We will see that the paradigm case or the core item 
is most suitable for such a role and that through knowing this item one comes 
to know the peripheral instances of CDH. Finally, given Aristotle’s general 
inclinations,59 we may expect that what is prior in knowledge should be prior in 
existence as well and so we may expect, in a given CDH, to find ontological 
dependency relations.   
 
In sum, in a given CDH, we may expect to find three fundamental relations, 
upon which such a relation is constructed. First, there must be causal 
connections whereby an explanation becomes possible. I will call these relations 
‘causal connectedness’. Second, there must be explanatory priority between the 
instances of a CDH. We might call this ‘logical dependence’. Finally, there must 
be existential priority relations between the instances of CDH, or ‘ontological 
dependence’. Upon these necessary relations a CDH is formed whereby the 
study of a core item leads to knowledge of the peripheral items. These 
necessary relations are capable of building up sufficient means for a single 
inquiry into an homonymous item to become possible beyond the ordinary kata 
hen relations. 
 
2.2.6. Causal Connectedness 
 
In a CDH, it is possible to observe causal relations between the instances. In the 
examples of health and medicine, as we will see, there are diffused sets of 
causes inasmuch that sometimes one kind of cause (e.g. final cause) operates 
between the instances and sometimes another (e.g. efficient cause). In the light 
of the required explanatory patterns, we may reasonably expect that the core 
item should be the cause of the peripherals, but, as we will see from the 
examples, this is not always the case. The examples, although lacking the 
required theoretical clarity, are still helpful in detecting the causal relations. 
                                                
59 This utterance is extremely ambiguous but we will have the chance to observe in close detail 
the traces of such an inclination.  
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They are chosen as general doctrinal guides to the CDH of Being rather than to 
designate strictly what ought to be the case in the CDH of Being. 
 
In the context of Aristotle’s general understanding of causality, it would be 
reasonable to ask whether the causal relations in CDH, what I wish to call the 
requirement of causal connectedness, fits with Aristotle’s four-cause theory in 
which formal, final, efficient and material causes are articulated.  
 
It is indeed possible that, one may distinguish some of the standard modes of 
causation in a CDH by examining the examples given to illustrate this kind of 
relation. In such a structure, the peripheral instances of a CDH are connected to 
the primary instance in one of the four standard modes of causation. To 
illustrate the point, let me now turn to Aristotle’s two examples, namely, health 
and medicine, in order to clarify how the standard modes of causation can be 
employed in a CDH.  
 
A rough examination of the peripheral instances in the two examples may be of 
help to take some steps towards solving the puzzles I have raised so far. Recall 
that there were four non-core elements listed in the example of health. We have 
seen that one of these instances was the preservation (φυλάττειν) of health, 
examples of which are exercising, avoiding stress, quitting smoking, or 
moderate drinking. It is possible to find one of the standard modes of causation 
between these non-core items and health. Indeed, they can all be regarded as 
the efficient60 causes of health. There is a certain asymmetry in the causal 
relation between these non-core items and health. The causal direction in this 
exemplary case is directed from a peripheral element (e.g. moderate drinking) 
to the primary instance, since the former is the efficient cause of the latter 
(health) and not vice versa. In the ‘production (ποιεῖν) of health’ (e.g. diet or 
medical treatment) one can observe similar causal relations. These instances 
that produce health can be regarded as the efficient causes of health as well. 
Once again, the causal direction is asymmetrical, where non-core items are the 
                                                
60 Though many of them are not sufficient causes.  
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efficient causes of the core item and not vice versa. The third non-core instance 
enumerated in the example of health was that a ‘symptom’ (σηµεῖον), such as a 
state of a body, say strength, is ‘healthy’ by virtue of the necessary reference it 
makes to the core item of health. This case is particularly interesting, not 
because of the mode of causation it involves, which is not different from the 
aforementioned non-core items, i.e., the efficient cause, but because the causal 
direction in this case is reversed. It is the health that is responsible for the 
symptom of health, say, strength of a body, but not vice versa.  
 
One may find the fourth non-core item in the example of health particularly 
interesting for it involves a mode of causation different from the above 
instances. In this case, a thing is called healthy by virtue of being capable 
(δεκτικὸν) of it. A physical part of a body, say muscles, can be called healthy, 
for the reason that they are capable of receiving health. Contrary to the above 
cases, where the efficient cause is implied, in this case the material cause is 
pronounced, for what is capable of receiving health can be seen as the basic 
substratum of health corresponding to the material cause. The causal direction, 
however, is similar to the first and second instances where the peripheral 
element is the material cause of the core item.  
 
There are several conclusions that can be drawn from this brief examination of 
the example of health. First, we have understood that Aristotle indeed 
envisages a kind of causal relation between the instances of CDH and that this 
relation is in harmony with his four-cause theory. The example yields, however, 
an unsatisfactory picture for it implicitly implies solely two of the four standard 
modes of causation, namely, the efficient and the material causes, leaving no 
room for positive grounds of interpretation whether or not we are permitted to 
include the two other causes, namely, the final and formal cause, in the 
ambiguous picture it draws. The non-core instances involved in this example 
seem to be arbitrarily chosen61 in terms of their causal links to the primary 
                                                
61 This may be prejudicially confirmed by the fact that Aristotle does not enumerate every 
secondary instance listed in the text of Γ in other passages.  
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instance, and it looks as though we could attach additional secondary instances, 
and might complete what is missing in the general scheme, through some kind 
of construction of more exemplary cases so as to include the two other causes 
(i.e., formal and final causes) into the structure. It is still possible, however, to 
make some progress, for the example of health most certainly shows us the fact 
that one can observe standard modes of causation in a given CDH.  
 
Additionally, the example has a further shortcoming, for the reason that it does 
not shed light on the direction of the causal link between non-core items and 
the core item. In three of the four cases, the causal direction is from the non-core 
instances to the core instance, whereas in one instance it is reversed. This 
hinders any precise conclusion with respect to the causal direction in a given 
CDH, which will be of cardinal significance in the case of Being. 
 
The shortcomings of the example of health might be averted to a degree if we 
are to examine Aristotle’s second example, namely, the example of medicine. 
Let us start with the first non-core instance enumerated in this example, 
namely, the ‘possession’ (ἔχειν) of medical art. I have already mentioned that a 
‘physician’ can be regarded as an example for this category. After all we might 
call a ‘physician’ one who possesses the knowledge of medical art. In 
accordance with Aristotle’s epistemological claims, this knowledge should rest 
in a physician’s soul,62 whereby he or she operates and acts medically. A soul 
that possesses the knowledge of medical art is the actual formal reason that lies 
behind the physician’s activities. The latter, however, can be regarded as the 
efficient cause of medical art. The external product coming out of the 
knowledge of medical art is health, which is attained by the implantation of the 
form resting in the physician’s soul. Hence, the knowledge itself, resting in the 
physician’s soul, can be regarded as the form of the medical art simply because 
medical art may be seen as a set of procedures and knowledge that can be 
                                                
62 See De An. III, 4. 
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actualized by the physician through his soul, which possesses this knowledge.63 
The example somehow seems to involve both of the causes and precisely which 
of these causes is indeed meant by Aristotle is a matter of speculation. The 
causal direction in the case of ‘possession’ operates from the non-core item to 
the core item, as the ‘soul’ of a physician can be regarded as the formal cause of 
medical art.64     
 
Another instance of medical art, namely that a thing is ‘medical’ by virtue of 
being ‘naturally adapted to it’ (εὐφυὲς), can also be linked to the primary 
instance in one of the four standard modes of causation, but, as I have 
mentioned, what is meant by ‘naturally adapted to’ is not at all plain in the first 
instance. I have implied that this utterance might be interpreted to denote a 
body that is suitable for accepting the act of medical art, that is, the body of a 
                                                
63 I do not believe that Julie Ward has got to grips with all the points that propelled Aristotle’s 
thinking. She is of the opinion that the ‘medical mind’ or ‘soul’ is linked to the primary instance 
of medical art by virtue of being the efficient cause of it (Ward (2008), p. 93). She opposes the 
view that CDH involves formal causal links, as this will cause synonymy (ibid., pp. 81-86). 
Despite the fact that there is a point to this objection, I think that in this form it goes too far. 
Although this is not the place to argue the point, I think one may reply to this objection by 
referring to a similar case of sculpture and sculptor. What the sculptor does is to implant a 
previously held knowledge (i.e., form), residing in his or her soul, in a stone, which is capable of 
receiving that form. The knowledge of a sculptor is what makes the sculpture possible and for 
this reason one may indeed argue that it is the efficient cause of sculpture. In fact, only the 
sculptor is the efficient cause of the sculpture, and the knowledge of the art of sculpture is not 
the efficient cause but the formal cause residing in the sculptor’s soul, which actually makes it 
possible to generate a sculpture by implantation of the form in a material body. When a 
sculpture is made, the form of the sculpture and form of the sculptor are differentiated and 
cannot be regarded as synonymous elements. The reason I offer the interpretation I propose is 
that it enables me to unify the passages of Book Γ and Eudemian Ethics. Since the physician is not 
explicitly cited in Book Γ – rather, the term ‘possession’ (ἔχειν) is used – and since Eudemian 
Ethics explicitly cites ‘soul’ as one of the secondary instances of the medical art, it would not be 
perverse to combine these passages and interpret ‘possession’ as what possesses the knowledge 
of medical art, which, based on the epistemological reasons I have proposed, can be nothing but 
a physician’s soul. Therefore, in this interpretation, it is highly possible that instead of the 
physician, the soul is intended as regards to the possession of medical art. If, indeed, soul is 
meant in this passage, then the causal linkage between the primary instance of medical art and 
‘possession’ is formal in nature. If, however, this interpretation is not accepted, this will not 
show that formal cause is to be excluded from the realm of CDH since, in the testimony of 
Eudemian Ethics, one can insist that ‘soul’ as a secondary instance of medical art should be 
regarded as the formal cause of medical art. In this case, ‘possession’ can be regarded as the 
efficient cause of medical art, as Ward suggests but, again, the formal cause is not excluded 
from CDH on the basis of the text of Eudemian Ethics, which cites ‘soul’ as one of the secondary 
instances of medical art. In any case, whether we combine or differentiate the passages of Book 
Γ and Eudemian Ethics, it will not affect my overall argument in terms of the causal structure of 
CDH. (For the inclusion of formal cause in CDH, see also Shields (1999), pp. 114-118.)      
64 The causal direction would not change if ‘possession’ were regarded as the efficient cause of 
the medical art. 
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patient. A body that is capable of receiving medical art can be regarded as the 
material cause, just as, in the case of sculpture and art of sculpting, where a 
stone is the matter of the art of sculpting performed by the sculptor, who is the 
efficient cause, it is his knowledge of the art of sculpture residing in his soul 
that acts as the formal cause.         
 
Quite straightforwardly, one can admit that the third instance of medical art, 
where ‘function’, ‘operation’ (ἔργον) and ‘prescription’ (λόγος) are mentioned, 
the efficient cause is implied, for all of these instances can be regarded as means 
used by medical art in its operations. Similarly to other cases, the causal 
direction in these instances is directed towards medical art from the peripheral 
instance. 
 
Another secondary instance of medical art was ‘body’ (σῶµα). As mentioned 
earlier, this can be regarded as the material cause of medical art, since a ‘body’ 
can be counted as a substratum on which medical art operates. The process of 
healing operates through the physician focusing on the body of a patient that 
has the capability to receive what the physician implants by virtue of his 
knowledge of medical art.  
 
Finally, an ‘instrument’ (ὄργανον or σκεῦος), such as a ‘scalpel’ (µαχαίριον), is 
called ‘medical’ and the relation between a medical instrument and medical art 
matches one of the four standard modes of causation as well, namely, the 
efficient cause. An instrument is related to the operational processes of medical 
art that can be regarded as the proper function of medical art and therefore can 
be counted as the efficient cause of medical art. The causal direction in this 
instance is towards the core item, as it is in the previous instances. 
 
The example of medical art paves the way for an assessment through which one 
can place causal analysis in CDH, yet, I believe, as in the example of health, it is 
insufficient for a conclusive statement on which of the causes should be 
involved in the relation between primary and secondary instances, nor does it 
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decisively inform us about the causal direction of the relation found in between 
these instances. Nevertheless, the example has revealed an important step in 
terms of the causes involved in the schema of CDH by virtue of engaging the 
formal cause into the picture.  
 
Although the two examples are insufficient to present a detailed picture of 
CDH, they do establish the basic structural framework necessary for the CDH 
of Being. These examples involve three of the four standard modes of causation, 
namely, formal, efficient and material causes. Both of these examples advise us 
to trace causal relations in a given CDH. 
 
These examples, although they seem to lack the required theoretical clarity, 
constitute significant progress on Aristotle’s part, especially in terms of the 
aporia I presented at the beginning of this chapter concerning the unity of the 
science of Being. Taking the lead from these examples, we have understood that 
some homonyms are ordered in such a way that they involve necessary causal 
relations on the basis of which one can carry out an inquiry into several 
instances of an homonymous term through a central item, which in turn paves 
the way for a unified investigation of things that nevertheless initially seem to 
be barely grasped by a single inquiry. Hence, beyond ordinary kata hen relations 
we now have another framework of relations that involves necessary 
connections paving the way for a science that can operate through these 
necessary relations just like the sciences based on ordinary kata hen relations. 
 
Causal connectedness, however, is not the only relation that can be encountered 
between the instances of CDH. We have yet another relation that concentrates 
on the definitional ties between the instances of CDH and I will now proceed to 
explain such relations.  
   
2.2.7. Logical Dependence 
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I have already mentioned that for the required explanatory patterns, there must 
not only be causal relations in a given CDH but also epistemological priority 
relations. These relations pave the way for establishing an explanatory pattern 
whereby several peripheral homonymous instances can be studied through a 
core item that is epistemologically prior. One might observe such relations in 
the instances of CDH by looking closely to the examples of health and 
medicine. These examples show that Aristotle presumes a form of priority, in 
which the definitional relations between the instances of CDH can be brought 
to the fore. If one examines the examples closely, one will find that there seems 
to be an essential reference between the secondary instances and the primary 
instance. Indeed, the accounts of all of the derived forms of health can only be 
constructed by means of a necessary reference to the core item – i.e., health. If, 
for instance, we were to describe any means by which we preserve health, such 
as exercising, avoiding stress, quitting smoking, or drinking in moderation, we 
would immediately be referring to health.65 Similarly, diet, medical treatment or 
any sort of action that aims to produce health can be defined by virtue of a 
necessary reference to the core item – i.e., health. In these cases, therefore, the 
definitions of peripheral instances involve an essential reference to the core item 
without which they could not be defined. The core item, accordingly, is 
logically prior to the non-core peripheral instances.  
 
The same relation can be observed in the example of medicine. If, for instance, 
we were to define ‘physician’, our formula would involve a reference to 
medical art. Indeed, a ‘physician’ can properly be defined as one who possesses 
medical art. In the example of medicine, one can observe similar references to 
the core item in the definitions of other non-core items as well. An ‘operation’ 
and an ‘instrument’, such as ‘scalpel’, can only be defined by virtue of a 
necessary reference to medical art. The core item in the example of medical (i.e., 
medical art), therefore is logically prior to all the other non-core instances.   
                                                
65 One might in fact find a way to define these instances without referring to the core instance of 
health. Aristotle, however, seems to find necessary relations between the peripheral instances 
and the core instance of health. His sole aim, in this example, is to prepare the readers or 
listeners to the distinctive case of Being, in which the requirement of logical dependence can 
clearly be observed.    
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In logical dependence one concentrates on the definitions of the secondary 
instances and affirms that these definitions can be formed only if their essences 
contain the necessary reference to primary instance. The referential relation 
between non-core items and the core item is varied, preventing the definitions 
of peripherals being the same. In other words, there cannot be a meaning 
common to all of the peripherals because they have different relations to the 
core.  
 
In this conception, the core item acts in the same way as the basic genus of the 
standard definition. This amounts to saying that the role of the core item in a 
logical dependence is very similar to that of the role of genus in the formation 
of regular definitions. As with genus, the core item in logical dependence 
produces a common nature to which all other derived instances must refer in 
building up their essences. Accordingly, it is possible to affirm that Aristotle’s 
philosophy allows two basic ways of building up definitions. One is 
constructed upon the relations between genera and their respective species. The 
other is established by virtue of a necessary reference to a common principal 
term, as in the above case of ‘health’. In both cases, there is a common nature by 
virtue of which several instances are defined; in a regular definition, the 
possibility of constructing the formula lies in the kata hen relation found 
between genera and their respective species, whereas in logical dependence a 
definition is produced upon the necessary referential relations in a pros hen way, 
where non-core items are linked to a primary core item. In ordinary definitions, 
the relation between genera and their respective species is built upon the close 
system of synonymous predications found between hierarchies of kinds, in 
which differentia play the crucial role in the formation of classifications upon 
which one arrives at a proper definition of each species. In logical dependence, 
however, the common nature with which all other derived forms are connected 
in order to establish their essences is predicated homonymously. Logical 
dependence, therefore, establishes the grounds for a certain type of association 
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between homonymous uses of a term by way of clarifying the common 
referential point to which all other homonymous uses of a term refer.  
 
2.2.8. Ontological Dependence 
 
Now, I would like to turn my attention to another relation found between the 
core and the peripheral terms of a CDH. This is what I wish to call ontological 
dependence. 
 
Ontological dependence rests upon the priority relations between instances of a 
CDH where several peripheral manifestations of a homonymous term are 
ontologically dependent on a primary instance, without which the peripherals 
cannot exist. Before proceeding further into the details of such dependence, I 
find it helpful to examine what is meant by the term ‘prior’ in Aristotelian 
doctrine since this term is itself homonymous and therefore has many senses.  
 
One thing can be prior to another in different ways and it is important to 
determine which of these priorities is meant in ontological dependence. If we 
investigate closely the passages where Aristotle enumerates several senses of 
priority, we can detect four basic senses in which this term may be utilized.66 
These four senses are as follows.  The first is priority in time, whereby 
something happens before another thing, i.e., when one thing is older. For 
example, the Trojan war is prior to the Persian war in the sense that the former 
happened before the latter.67 Second, things may be prior in existence,68 which 
is the case when things can be without other things, whereas the other things 
cannot be without them. Aristotle refers to numbers while illustrating this kind 
                                                
66 It is not possible to go into all the possible aspects of Aristotle’s discussion of priority in the 
limits of this text (on forms of priority, see Cleary 1988). In the present discussion, questions 
such as whether all the enumerations of several senses of priority are in harmony with each 
other and whether these priorities can be reduced to a single sense of priority will remain 
unresolved. It should be noted, however, that all of the passages reflect more or less the same 
conception of ontological priority, which is the basic target of my present discussion. 
67 Met. Δ, 11, 1018b15. 
68 This priority is also called priority in nature or substance; see Cat. 12, 14b13; Met. Δ, 11, 
1019a2. 
  
 
111 
of priority;69 ‘one’ is prior to ‘two’ in the sense that if there are two it follows at 
once that there is one, whereas if there is one there are not necessarily two. 
Third, one thing can be prior to another in knowledge. This sense of priority 
emerges when knowledge of a thing comes before and has certain dominance 
over another thing. For instance, the knowledge of any subject, say mankind, is 
prior to the knowledge of the attributes predicated on that subject (e.g. quality, 
quantity, etc.) since only the knowledge of the subject itself, rather than its 
attributes, deserves to be called genuine knowledge of that subject.70 Finally, 
one thing can be called prior to another in definition. Accordingly, x may be 
called prior to y if the definition of y is conditional upon the definition of x. 
Substance is prior to its attributes in this sense, since the definition of each 
attribute necessarily refers to substance. This sense of priority, as one might 
observe, corresponds to logical dependence, which I have already discussed. 
We will later see in chapter IV that it is possible to identify definitional priority 
with priority in knowledge. These two priorities are the same as what I have 
called logical priority. But let me now turn to the second kind of the priorities 
enumerated so far for this reflects in the fullest sense what I wish to call 
ontological dependence. 
 
Of these priorities, the second one, namely, priority in existence, can be used in 
order to characterize ontological dependence. Accordingly, if x is ontologically 
prior to y, then y exists only if x exists but not vice versa. In such a structure, y 
is ontologically dependent on x since y cannot exist without x, whereas x can 
exist without y. Hence, ontological priority is an asymmetric relation working 
only in one direction, in which the sequence of the existence of x and y cannot 
be reversed. In the first analysis, then, ontological dependence is structured 
upon the independency of x since the existence of x is independent of the 
existence of y but not vice versa. 
 
                                                
69 Cat. 12, 14a30; cf. Phys. III, 7, 207b8-10 
70 Met. Z, 1, 1028b1. 
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Two formulations of ontological dependence on the basis of the Aristotelian 
texts are possible. They are distinguished by virtue of the causal relations found 
between the core item and the peripherals. In what follows, I will inquire into 
these two types of ontological dependence and attempt to reach legitimate 
formulations. 
 
I have already mentioned that among the senses of priority the second one 
captures a kind of ontological dependence. We may utilise this to achieve a first 
kind of ontological dependence that can be found between the core and the 
peripheral instances of a CDH. We might simply call this ‘ontological 
dependence’ (OD), which, based on what Aristotle states as the second form of 
priority, can be formulated thus:  
 
OD: y is ontologically dependent on x iff x can exist without y but not vice 
versa. 
 
What OD tells us is that it is simply not possible to postulate the existence of y 
without the existence of x. Let me note at the outset that OD can work only if 
we have efficient causality operating between the instances of CDH. We may 
illustrate this with an example from the natural development of animals. For 
instance, the final cause of ‘this infant’ can rightly be affirmed as ‘this adult’ 
simply because this infant is for the sake of this adult. Accordingly, becoming an 
adult can be seen as the ultimate terminus – for that matter the final cause - of 
an infant. Now, the actual adult that results from an infant’s proper natural 
development does not exist before the infant. It is the goal to be achieved and 
actualised by the infant. In this case, we do not have an OD, as we cannot affirm 
that the actual adult exists without the infant.  
 
Now, let us modify the example in such a way that we have an efficient cause. 
This particular adult (i.e. the father) can be seen as the efficient cause of this 
particular infant. We should therefore first affirm the existence of the father to 
have an infant. In such a case, that is, in cases where efficient causality is on the 
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agenda, we have an OD simply because it would be impossible to have this 
child if we did not have primarily the existence of the father. Hence, we may 
say that the infant is ontologically dependent on the father, as the infant cannot 
exist without the father but not vice versa. 
 
Whenever we have an efficient causality between the instances of CDH we have 
the chance to observe OD. For instance, in the example of health, the third non-
core instance enumerated was that a ‘symptom’ (σηµεῖον), such as a state of the 
body, say strength, is ‘healthy’ by virtue of the necessary reference it makes to 
the core item of health. In this case, ‘health’ is responsible for the symptom of 
health, e.g. strength of a body. In such a case, we can observe OD between the 
core, i.e. ‘health’ and the peripheral ‘symptom of health’ since it is impossible 
for strength of a body to exist without the initial existence of health.  
 
OD, however, reflects only one aspect of ontological dependence since it barely 
indicates the relation between the ontologically independent x and the 
ontologically dependent y, as it fails to give information concerning the nature 
of the relation between the instances of ontological dependence.  
 
On the basis of the passages, another version of ontological dependence can in 
fact be constructed to shed light on the nature of the relation between instances 
of ontological dependence so an explanatory pattern can be established among 
the instances of CDH. In Categories, after announcing that there are only four 
ways in which one thing is called prior to another,71 Aristotle adds another 
sense of ‘prior’: 
 
There are, then, this many ways of speaking of the prior. There would seem, 
however, to be another manner of priority besides those mentioned [παρὰ 
τοὺς εἰρηµένους]. For of things which reciprocate [ἀντιστρεφόντων] as to 
implication of existence [κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι], that which is some way the 
                                                
71 ‘Πρότερον ἕτερον ἑτέρου λέγεται τετραχῶς’ Cat. 12, 14a26.  
  
 
114 
cause [τὸ αἴτιον] of the other’s existence [εἶναι] might reasonably be called 
prior by nature [πρότερον εἰκότως φύσει].72  
On the basis of this passage, besides ontological dependence we can construct 
another formulation. We might straightforwardly call this ‘causal dependence’ 
(CD), which can be formulated thus:     
 
CD: y is ontologically dependent on x iff x is the cause of the existence of y but 
not vice versa. 
 
CD gives clues to the nature of the existential ties by affirming that x is the 
cause of the existence of y. The relation in CD, therefore, is existentially causal, 
where the independent instance is causally responsible for the existence of the 
ontologically dependent instance. Therefore, contrary to what we encountered 
in the presentation of OD, the relation between the instances of ontological 
dependence no longer remains unarticulated in this version of ontological 
dependence. Henceforth, the existential causal relation in CD allows for an 
explanatory pattern in which the existence of ontologically dependent instances 
can be explained by virtue of the existence of the primary instance.  
 
CD is not limited to efficient causality as OD was, since it is possible to affirm 
that one thing is responsible for the existence of another by being the final cause 
of it. In the example of health, for instance, a peripheral instance, say, ‘medical 
treatment’ is called ‘healthy’ by virtue of ‘health’ as the core item to which it is 
connected. In this case, although ‘health’ can be seen as the final cause of the 
‘medical treatment’, it is still possible to affirm that the reason for the existence 
of a ‘medical treatment’ is ‘health’. Likewise, health can be seen as the efficient 
cause of the ‘symptom of health’. Now, what is actually responsible for the 
existence of symptom of health is the health itself. It is, therefore, possible to 
observe an ontological dependence relation between these instances. CD, 
therefore, gives a satisfactory explanation of how ontologically dependent 
                                                
72 Cat. 12, 14b10-12. Note that, in Book Δ of Metaphysics (1019a2-3), where Aristotle examines the 
senses of priority, he only states what I have called OD without, however, articulating this new 
version.  
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instances exist by virtue of establishing a causal relation between these 
instances and ontologically independent instances.  
 
While discussing causal connectedness I mentioned that in a CDH there must 
be causal relations leading to the establishment of an explanatory pattern. This 
amounts to saying that there must be causal relation between the core and the 
peripherals in such a way that the core – acting as one of the standard modes of 
causation - explains the peripherals. Against this backdrop, we may then shape 
the general outlook of ontological dependence that can be found between the 
instances of CDH. Whenever we can postulate the core item as the proper 
reason for the existence of the peripheral instances we have causal dependence 
(CD). In addition to this, however, only in the cases in which we can formulate 
the core as the efficient cause of the peripherals, then, besides CD we have 
ontological dependence (OD).  
 
We have seen that in CDH, we have causal, ontological and definitional ties 
between instances of a homonymous term. CDH is constructed upon all of 
these ties, employing all of them simultaneously in order to establish the 
grounds for unity between clusters of homonymous meanings through the 
necessary relations between central and peripheral terms. If, however, Aristotle 
argues for the unity of the science of Being through CDH – and we already 
know he should, for the very fact that he has shown that Being is not a genus 
and therefore the science that concerns itself primarily with Being cannot 
operate upon the ordinary kata hen relations – these features should be fulfilled 
by the conception of Being Aristotle has in mind. In the next part, I will 
accordingly examine how the schema of CDH pictured so far fits the case of 
Being. While doing this, more significantly, I will examine whether this 
conception of CDH that stands out in Book Γ with its three features is said to be 
compatible with the theological conception of the science of Being. 
 
2.3. Being and Core-Dependent Homonymy  
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The theoretical outlook of Aristotle’s declarations on science and knowledge 
provides a clear backdrop against which the import of Aristotle’s conception of 
CDH may be gauged. Having presented sufficient evidence to show that Being 
does not constitute a genus, Aristotle falls into an aporia concerning the unity of 
the science of Being, from which he cannot escape by the ordinary kata hen 
relations upon which the so-called special sciences are constructed. The aporia 
into which Aristotle falls requires that he finds another way beyond the 
ordinary kata hen relations to provide unity for the science of Being. This 
constitutes the motivation behind Aristotle’s presentation of Being as a CDH. 
Aristotle, therefore, evidently has a definite purpose when he declares in the 
second chapter of Book Γ that, just like the terms ‘health’ and ‘medical’, Being is 
a pros hen homonym, namely that the several manifestations of Being constitute 
a CDH:  
 
So, too, there are many senses in which a thing is said to be, but all refer to 
one starting-point (πρὸς µίαν ἀρχήν); some things are said to be (ὄντα 
λέγεται) because they are substances (οὐσίαι), others because they are 
affections of substance (πάθη οὐσίας), others because they are process 
towards substance (ὁδὸς εἰς οὐσίαν), or destructions (φθοραὶ) or privations 
(στερήσεις) or qualities (ποιότητες) of substance, or productive (ποιητικὰ) or 
generative (γεννητικὰ) of substance, or of things which are relative to 
substance, or negations (ἀποφάσεις) of some of these things or of substance 
itself. It is for this reason that we say even of non-being that it is non-being 
(διὸ καὶ ὂν εἶναι µὴ ὂν φαµεν).73 
We may readily admit that if Being constitutes a CDH, then the problems with 
respect to the unity of the science of Being are averted. In this conception, 
although Being does not constitute a genus, a universal study of it turns out to 
be possible through the study of a primary principle (ἀρχή), i.e., substance 
(οὐσία), because of the necessary relations found between this primary principle 
and its non-core instances. While being universal, this science would preserve a 
place for the other so-called special sciences. By virtue of CDH, then, Aristotle 
kills two birds with one stone, namely, while constructing the foundations of a 
unified investigation, at the same time he averts any problems that may emerge 
with respect to over-comprehensiveness. If Being constitutes a CDH, then it 
should fulfil three requirements that I have hitherto mentioned.  
                                                
73 Met. Γ, 2, 1003b5-10.  
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There are many questions; however, we would like to have an answer 
concerning the details of Aristotle’s conception of Being as a CDH. One of these 
questions is extremely important in terms of the aims of this thesis, questioning 
whether this conception of Being as a CDH is compatible with a theological 
conception of the science of Being that stands out in other treatises of 
Metaphysics, especially in Book E and Book Λ, or does it necessarily yield a non-
theological conception of the science of Being? CDH indeed paves the way for a 
universal science of Being, yet, we might ask, is it the case that such a 
universality rules out a theological conception of the science of Being, which is, 
as it were, concerned with a particular part of Being, namely, the God? 
 
These questions prompt us to examine the structure and elements of the CDH 
of Being in close detail. The above passage tells us that several non-core 
instances are Beings by virtue of their reference to substance. Substance, then, is 
said to be the core item in the CDH of Being. Now, if we were to know, for 
instance, the kind of substance that stands out as the core item in the CDH of 
Being this would certainly help us to make some progress with respect to the 
conception of the science of Being envisaged by Aristotle, simply because that 
substance would be the primary subject matter of the science of Being. In the 
level of Book Γ, Aristotle does not explicitly tell what kind of substance that 
might be the most suitable for the core item of the CDH of Being. Our 
knowledge in the level of Book Γ, therefore, is limited to the three criteria that I 
have previously explained and that, to a limited degree, observed in the two 
examples given by Aristotle, namely the example of ‘health’ and ‘medicine’. 
However scarce this may be, we might still have some opportunity to go on by 
taking the lead from what we have so far so as to determine the possible best 
candidate among the types of substances for standing as the core of the CDH of 
Being. 
 
2.3.1. Two Dimensions of Ontological Dependence in the CDH of Being 
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Since Aristotle declares that Being is a CDH, we should be able to detect 
ontological dependency relations in several instances of Being. Indeed, the 
peripheral non-core instances of Being cannot exist without the initial existence 
of the core item, which, in this case is substance. This is not only confirmed in 
the above passage I have cited but also in Physics as well: 
 
If on the other hand it is asserted that all things are quality [ποιὸν] or quantity 
[ποσόν], then, whether substance exists [εἴτ' οὔσης οὐσίας] or not, an 
absurdity [ἄτοπον] results, if indeed the impossible [τὸ ἀδύνατον] can 
properly be called absurd. For, none of the others can exist independently 
[χωριστόν], except substance [παρὰ τὴν οὐσίαν], for everything is predicated 
of substance as subject [καθ᾿ ὑποκειµένου τῆς οὐσίας λέγεται].74  
Aristotle indeed finds it ‘absurd’ (ἄτοπον) and ‘impossible’ (ἀδύνατον) that the 
instances of Being other than substance of which the other secondary categories 
are mentioned in this list, exist without the existence of substance. As noted, we 
shall have the chance to detect in more detail the existential dependency 
relations in several instances of Being later in this thesis. What I want to draw 
attention to this time, however, is a feature that I find important to note in 
ontological dependency relations in the CDH of Being.  
 
Indeed, it is important to note at this point that although one may find it not to 
be fairly reflected in Book Γ, one can observe two levels in the ontological 
dependence of CDH of Being.75  
 
I argue, at least provisionally anyway, that ontological dependence in the 
Aristotelian conception of Being works on two levels. This conception indeed 
necessitates that we distinguish two dimensions in which ontological 
dependence functions. A rough picture of Aristotle’s conception of Being 
suffices to show what I understand these levels to be. One can distinguish two 
                                                
74 Phys. I, 2, 185a29-32. See also, Cat. 2b5-6. 
75 One may find the description I am about to propose highly speculative at this stage, but there 
is at least some evidence to go on, as we shall see, in Book Γ, and the matter is too important, 
because of its implications, just to leave aside. However that may be, in the course of this thesis, 
we will have a chance to detect two levels of ontological dependence in Aristotle’s doctrine of 
Being. The levels of ontological dependence, as we shall soon see, will supply a certain basis for 
a discussion of the core element in the CDH of Being. Hence, in this part, I find it important to 
emphasize the levels of ontological dependence that one can encounter in CDH of Being.  
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fundamental constituents in Aristotle’s conception of Being, one of which is 
substance and the other is the so-called secondary categories. Hence, it is 
possible to observe ontological dependency relations between substance and 
the other so-called secondary categories. This amounts to saying that the other 
so-called secondary categories cannot exist in the absence of the first category of 
substance, as it has already been implied in two of the passages cited so far. In 
the course of the treatises of Metaphysics, however, we will have the chance to 
observe another level at which ontological dependence operates. On this level, 
we are not concerned with the relations between the so-called secondary 
categories and substance, but with the relations found between several 
substances. Unlike the former level in which ontological dependence works in 
inter-categorical relations, this new dimension implies that there are existential 
dependency relations between intra-categorical relations, namely between 
several instances within a category, this time, within the category of substance. 
Hence, one may observe a hierarchy of substances in Aristotle’s system where 
some substances are ontologically prior to others. 
 
If Aristotle is to succeed with his argument, besides inter-categorical relations, 
the CDH of Being must operate between intra-categorical relations as well. This 
is for two reasons. First, if, as we shall soon see in this chapter, we had only 
inter-categorical relations in CDH of Being operating between secondary 
categories and the category of substance, then the science of Being would not be 
a universal inquiry into Being simply because it would not be able to study 
God. If God has any place in Aristotle’s metaphysical doctrine, and we shall see 
that He has a very significant role in the system, besides inter-categorical 
relations, the CDH of Being must also be operating between intra-categorical 
relations. But there is another reason why one must include intra-categorical 
relations into the analysis of the CDH of Being and it follows thus: we shall see 
that there are three types of substances in Aristotle, namely, non-eternal 
sensible substances, eternal sensible substances and Immobile Substance. Now, 
since these three substances cannot form a single genus, and since a science can 
be unified either through a single genus or through the ordered homonymous 
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relations, the science of Being needs to be unified through CDH. This amounts 
to saying that by virtue of studying one of these substances, the science of Being 
turns out to be a universal study of Being. For this reason, also, besides inter-
categorical relations, the CDH of Being must operate between intra-categorical 
relations as well. Before getting into the details of these two reasons why there 
must be intra-categorical relations in the CDH of Being, I will first try to detect 
the inter-categorical and intra-categorical relations in Aristotle’s general 
conception of Being.    
 
I have explained that, according to Aristotle, Being has several manifestations 
and is a πολλαχῶς λεγόµενον, i.e., it is said in many ways. These 
manifestations of Being are enumerated in Book Γ and we may expect to 
observe, at least to a certain degree, the two dimensions of ontological 
dependence in this listing. The analysis of the enumeration of several 
manifestations of Being in Book Γ, however, is not an easy task for, as we shall 
see, this listing is a highly peculiar one and has to be read in the context of 
Aristotle’s several other enumerations of manifestations of Being that we 
encounter in his corpus. At this point, I will elucidate what is meant by ‘several 
manifestations of Being’ by looking at the whole Aristotelian corpus, which 
would establish a framework for an interpretation to present a satisfactory 
interpretation of the starting lines of Book Γ, in which a version of the 
enumeration of the ‘several manifestations of Being’ emerges.76 Later, I attempt 
to detect any reflections of the levels of ontological dependence implied hitherto 
in the listings of several manifestations of Being that we encounter in Book Γ.   
 
Regrettably, Aristotle’s declarations regarding ‘several manifestations of Being’ 
prevent one from reaching an immediate understanding of what this term 
stands for. Thus, there may be uncertainty as to whether there exists a unified 
version of these enumerations in the Aristotelian corpus. In Book E, for 
instance, Aristotle elucidates a list of these several manifestations, where one 
                                                
76 Instead of using ‘several senses of Being’ I use ‘several manifestations of Being’ just to 
distance myself from the merely linguistic interpretations of the term πολλαχῶς λεγόµενον.  
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may find four basic manifestations of Being.77 The first of these is accidental 
Being (κατὰ συµβεβηκός).78 Secondly, there is Being in the sense of true 
(ὰληθές), which is mostly connected with propositions.79 Being is used, thirdly 
as ‘the figures of predication’ (τὰ σχήµατα τῆς κατηγορίας), namely the 
categories. Finally, there comes Being in the sense of potentiality and actuality 
(τὸ δυνάµει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ). These are the four manifestations of Being that are 
enumerated in this passage. Aristotle echoes this elucidation in Book Δ as 
well,80 while in Book ϑ, he expounds the same list, with the exception of 
accidental Being.81 However, in Book Z he seems to spell out a considerably 
narrower list.82 Quite interestingly, in terms of several manifestations of Being, 
Aristotle lists only some of the categories83 of Being in this passage while he 
excludes three of the manifestations enumerated in the passages I have 
previously mentioned. Now, one might be puzzled as to whether it is the 
categories of Being or the other three manifestations that should be regarded as 
the actual referent of the ‘several manifestations of Being’. I believe, however, 
                                                
77 ‘But since the unqualified term ‘being’ [τὸ ὂν τὸ ἁπλῶς] has several meanings [λεγόµενον 
λέγεται πολλαχῶς], of which one was seen to be accidental [κατὰ συµβεβηκός], and another the 
true [ὰληθές] (non-being being [τὸ µὴ ὸν] the false [τὸ ψεῦδος]), while besides these there are 
the figures of predication [τὰ σχήµατα τῆς κατηγορίας], e.g., the ‘what’ [τὸ µὲν τί], quality 
[ποιόν], quantity [ποσόν], place [πού], time [ποτέ], and any similar meanings which ‘being’ may 
have; and again besides all these there is that which is potentially and actually [τὸ δυνάµει καὶ 
ἐνεργείᾳ]’ (Met. E, 2, 1026a33-b2).  
78 This itself indicates a significant point of departure from Plato’s understanding of Being, for 
in no way can accidents be regarded as Being in Plato.  
79 Aristotle investigates this sense of Being in Book E and in Book Θ and I will deal with this in 
the next chapter, where I inquire into Book E. My aim in the present discussion is not to conduct 
a detailed exposition of what Aristotle understands from every particular manifestation of 
Being, but rather to understand if there is any possibility of reaching a unified conception of 
several manifestations of Being in its multiple enumerations in the Aristotelian corpus.  
80 Met. Δ, 7, 1017a8-b9. 
81 Met. ϑ, 10, 1051a34-b2: ‘The terms “being” and “non-being” are employed [λέγεται] firstly 
with reference to the categories [κατὰ τὰ σχήµατα τῶν κατηγοριῶν], and secondly with 
reference to the potentiality or actuality [τὸ δὲ κατὰ δύναµιν ἢ ἐνέργειαν] of these or their 
opposites, while being and non-being in the strictest sense are truth and falsity [ἀληθὲς ἢ 
ψεῦδος].’ 
82 ‘There are several senses in which a thing may be said to be [Τὸ ὂν λέγεται πολλαχῶς], as we 
pointed out previously in our book on the various senses of words; for in one sense it means 
what a thing is [τί ἐστι] or a ‘this’ [τόδε τι], and in another sense it means that a thing is of a 
certain quality [ποιόν] and quantity [ποσόν] or has some such predicate asserted of it [τῶν 
ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῶν οὕτω κατηγορουµένων]’ (Met. Z, 1, 1028a10-13). 
83 The verb ‘κατηγορεῖν’ means to predicate an attribute to a subject, rendered in Latin as 
‘praedica mentum’ (Boethius); ‘τὸ κατηγορούµενον’, exceptionally ‘κατηγόρηµα’ (e.g. Phys. III, 
1, 201a1; Met. Γ, 1, 1028a33) and even ‘κατηγορία’ means predicate and predication (for a 
helpful discussion on whether ‘κατηγορία’ means predicate or predication, consult Yu [(2003), 
pp.3-7]). 
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that one can forestall this puzzle when one considers the general outlook of 
Aristotle’s presentation of these listings of several manifestations of Being that 
emerge in the Aristotelian corpus. I should immediately record that it is 
possible to observe two types of listings in the passages where Aristotle spells 
out the ‘several manifestations of Being’. The first type of these listings is what I 
like to call the ‘broader list’, which is reflected in the former listing of Book E 
mentioned above, according to which there are four manifestations of Being.84 
Apart from this, there is the restricted use of the term or the ‘narrower list’ of 
the ‘several manifestations of Being’, already reflected in the passage from Book 
Z.85 This narrow version of the ‘several manifestations of Being’ involves only 
the categories of Being.86 Hence, Aristotle accepts either a broader usage of the 
‘several manifestations of Being’, referring to the four-fold division of Being (as 
truth, potential and actual Being, accidental Being and Being according to the 
figures of predication, i.e., the categories), or alternatively a narrower usage 
restricted solely to the categories of Being. The wider meaning of the term, in 
other words, encompasses the narrower usage.  
 
Though we find an order in Aristotle’s numerous usages of the term ‘several 
manifestations of Being’ such that these usages can be collected mainly in two 
listings, we cannot decide without complication which of these manifestations 
are used in the passage for which I have been conducting this discussion, 
namely the enumeration of the ‘several manifestations of Being’ in Book Γ, 
which fits exactly neither the wider nor the narrower list.  
 
                                                
84 Apart from the passage in Book E, this broader list appears in Met. Δ, 7, 1017a8-b9; E, 2, 
1026a33; ϑ, 1, 1045b28; 10, 1051a34-b6. 
85 Along with the passage quoted above, this restricted sense of ‘several manifestations of being’ 
appears in Phys. I, 2, 185a21; De An. I, 5, 410a13; Met. Δ, 7, 1017a22; ϑ, 1, 1045b28; N, 2, 1089a7; 
EN I, 6, 1096a24; EE I, 8, 1217b26-34. 
86 I have found 63 places in the work of Aristotle where two or more categories are mentioned. 
Although it is very significant to know the exact number of these categories, it seems almost 
impossible to determine this in the face of numerous passages that involve the enumerations of 
categories. Aristotle affirms in Topics (I, 9, 103b20-23; supported also in Cat. 4, 1b25-27) that 
there are 10 categories but usually not all of them are enumerated in texts. See, for example, An. 
Post. I, 22, 83b15-17, where the category of possession or ‘having’ is missing; in Phys. V, 1, 225b5, 
eight of them are enumerated excluding ‘possession’ and ‘position’; Met. K, 12, 1068a8, on the 
other hand, enumerates seven of them excluding ‘time’, ‘position’ and ‘possession’. 
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In this section, I shall allow myself the latitude of a certain speculation that I 
think provides a compelling interpretation of Aristotle’s peculiar listing of the 
‘several manifestations of Being’ in Book Γ. By articulating the reasons why 
Aristotle does not follow his usual routine in listing the ‘several manifestations 
of Being’ in either a wider or a narrower way, I will be undertaking a defence of 
Aristotle’s position against any accusations of ambiguity. I hope my 
interpretation shows that Aristotle has good reasons for this unusual way of 
listing the ‘several manifestations of Being’ in this part of Metaphysics. 
 
Let us recall the passage where Aristotle enumerates the ‘several manifestations 
of Being’ in Book Γ: 
 
So, too, there are many senses in which a thing is said to be [τὸ ὂν λέγεται 
πολλαχῶς], but all refer to one starting-point [πρὸς µίαν ἀρχήν]; some things 
are said to be [ὄντα λέγεται] because they are substances [οὐσίαι], others 
because they are affections of substance [πάθη οὐσίας], others because they 
are process towards substance [ὁδὸς εἰς οὐσίαν], or destructions [φθοραὶ] or 
privations [στερήσεις] or qualities [ποιότητες] of substance, or productive 
[ποιητικὰ] or generative [γεννητικὰ] of substance, or of things which are 
relative to substance, or negations [ἀποφάσεις] of some of these things or of 
substance itself. It is for this reason that we say even of non-being that it is 
non-being [διὸ καὶ ὂν εἶναι µὴ ὂν φαµεν].87 
At least initially, one may be confused by the manifestations of Being 
enumerated in this list for it is difficult to see how one can relate this passage to 
the previously presented framework of the ‘several manifestations of Being’. 
None of the passages previously quoted involves manifestations of Being such 
as privations, destructions or generations. It seems that we are in need of a new 
framework of interpretation, which should explain the reasons for Aristotle’s 
inclusion of these different manifestations of Being in this listing, while at the 
same time explaining its relation to the other listings. 
  
What I want to draw attention to is that in this passage one can observe 
precisely the fundamental role played by substance, to which all the other 
manifestations of Being are connected. Taking the lead from the dominance of 
substance in this listing, one might suggest an initial two-fold differentiation 
                                                
87 Met. Γ, 2, 1003b5-10. 
  
 
124 
between the manifestations of Being; ‘substance’ standing at the one side of the 
equilibrium and ‘others’ on the other side. Certainly, at least in the first 
instance, what makes this passage rather puzzling is that it is very difficult to 
clarify what is meant by ‘others’, since this involves variant manifestations of 
Being that seem not to be involved in other places in which Aristotle 
enumerates the ‘several manifestations of Being’. Hence, that which is to be 
understood by ‘others’ should be determined precisely in order to come up 
with a satisfactory interpretation of the passage. So, what should we 
understand from these manifestations of Being that I have named as ‘others’? 
 
Let me start with the instances that are relatively easy to interpret, such as 
‘affections’, ‘qualities’ and ‘relations’. These at least seem to fit one of the two 
previous listings of the ‘several manifestations of Being’, namely the narrower 
one, since these instances might be included in the listing of the categories, 
which, as it were, shows that the passage is not absolutely without relation to 
Aristotle’s discussion of manifestations of Being elsewhere in his corpus. This 
prompts us to bear in mind the other discussions of the several manifestations 
while commenting on this passage.  
 
Indeed, the listing of Book Γ is also not without relation to the broader 
enumeration of the ‘several manifestations of Being’, in which we have four 
basic manifestations of Being. Recall that one of these manifestations was the 
potential and the actual Being. This instance of Being is grounded on one of the 
most original aspects of Aristotelian philosophy; this originality proceeds from 
his courageous defence of a position which enabled an explanation of the 
processes of becoming, which contrasted with the preceding theories that 
focused decisively on Being rather than on ‘becoming’. This instance of Being 
shows Aristotle’s concern with explaining change (a step that had never before 
been taken in the way it was in Aristotelian philosophy) and his interest in the 
processes and the relation of these processes and their direction and perfection. 
This, I believe, is reflected in the above listing of Book Γ as well, and so they 
should be interpreted in accordance with what this connection requires. The 
  
 
125 
‘processes’, ‘productions’ and ‘generations’ all imply the same line of thought; 
that is, they are all related to change and becoming. In other words, they are 
grounded on an idea that implies the actualization of what previously had only 
a potential character, for all processes require some kind of base structure, and 
similarly all productions and generations entail a basis for their actualizations. 
This shows that the processes, productions and generations can be explained in 
terms of Aristotle’s doctrine of actuality and potentiality. In this way, they may 
well be regarded as the articulated versions of what Aristotle calls ‘actual and 
potential Being’ in his broader listings of the ‘several manifestations of Being’. 
This shows that in the listing in Book Γ, both the broader and the narrower 
enumerations of the ‘several manifestations of Being’ are reflected.  
 
So far, we have found that it is possible to make an initial two-fold division of 
the ‘several manifestations of Being’ into ‘substance’ and ‘others’. The ‘other’ 
senses are divided into a further two, one of which reflects the narrower list, 
i.e., the categories, involving ‘affections’, ‘qualities’ and ‘relations’, and the 
other can be linked to the ‘actual and potential Being’ of the broader list, 
including ‘processes’, ‘productions’ and ‘generations’:  
 
 
The Several Manifestations of Being 
 
Substance        Others 
 
    Categories   Potentiality and Actuality 
         -affections of substance         - process towards substance
             - qualities of substance         - productions of substance 
         - relations to substance         - generations of substance 
 
Although the above diagram reflects most of the instances enumerated in the 
passage of Book Γ, as it stands it is incomplete, for it disregards what I wish to 
call ‘negatives’ in the listing that Aristotle provides. Hence, where should 
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‘destructions’, ‘privations’ and ‘negations’ be placed in this schema? After all, it 
is very unusual for Aristotle to regard these ‘negatives’ as Beings, for they are 
never included in the other listings of the ‘several manifestations of Being’. This 
shows that, although this listing can be related to other listings of the ‘several 
manifestations of Being’ found in the Aristotelian corpus, it is a unique instance 
of them and correspondingly it should be interpreted by taking into 
consideration this uniqueness. Why does Aristotle prefer to list the ‘several 
manifestations of Being’ in such a unique way rather than following his usual 
habits in listing these manifestations either in a narrow or in a broader way? 
What is the actual motive that lies behind the inclusion of the ‘negatives’ in the 
listing? 
  
I said that in the listing of Book Γ one immediately notices the emphasis on the 
core item, namely, the substance. This is closely linked to Aristotle’s actual 
intention in the passage, which is to establish the CDH of Being, in which the 
core item has certain dominance over the other non-core items in the way that 
the former is prior in several ways to the latter. What I want to draw attention 
to is that in accordance with his intentions in establishing CDH, Aristotle 
includes the ‘negatives’ into the several manifestations of Being by virtue of the 
fact that the core item has exceptional dominance in such structures. Aristotle 
might succeed with this peculiar claim that even negatives are Beings on the 
basis of the structure provided by CDH. In this structure, whether an element 
exists depends on its relation to the primary instance, which is the core, i.e., 
substance. I am inclined to think, then, that the ‘negatives’, namely, the 
‘destructions’, ‘privations’ and ‘negations’, are included in the passage just to 
emphasize this dominance of the core item in the CDH of Being. The 
dominance of the primary instance is such that we may claim that all the 
peripheral elements are Beings even if they are the negations and contraries of 
the core instance. In this conception, even the ‘negations’, ‘privations’ and 
‘destructions’ are Beings in virtue of the fact that they are not ‘negatives’ in 
their own right but connected to a central, dominant instance, which exists in 
the absolute sense. The dominance of the core is such that even ‘non-Being’ is 
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included as an instance of substance. We cannot think of a pure ‘non-Being’ just 
as we do not have any word for it; rather, in all cases we have to refer to 
substance, the primary instance, which is the core item in the CDH of Being. 
That is why Aristotle forcefully claims in the passage that ‘it is for this reason 
that we say even of non-Being that it is non-Being’.  
 
This discussion shows that Aristotle’s actual intention in the passage is to 
demonstrate the dominance of substance and this is reflected in the most 
extreme way, in that even ‘destructions’, ‘privations’ and ‘negations’ are 
included in the ‘several manifestations of Being’ on the basis of their relation to 
substance.88 I believe that Aristotle intentionally swerves from his usual way of 
presenting the ‘several manifestations of Being’ in this passage in order to 
emphasize the dominance of the core item in the CDH of Being, which, as we 
have seen, serves in attaining his aim of establishing the unity of the science of 
Being. I believe that this interpretation makes some sense of the otherwise 
puzzling structure of the text, for it presents a good reason for the puzzling 
inclusion of the ‘negatives’ in the enumeration of the ‘several manifestations of 
Being’.89  
                                                
88 This interpretation of the inclusion of ‘negatives’ in the enumeration of several manifestations 
of Being, at least in its essentials, found its champions in late Antiquity. For instance, Syrianus 
in a rather peculiar way states that ‘οὗ δὴ καὶ θαυµαζή τις καὶ δαιµονία τῷ ὄντι τῆς οὐσίας ἡ 
δύναµις ἀναφαίνει’ (57, 7-9). He is certainly following Alexander (IV, 243, 9-15) in his 
commentary concerning the inclusion of ‘negatives’ into the several manifestations of Being. 
Father Owens (1951, pp. 268-269) presents a similar interpretation on the inclusion of ‘negatives’ 
into the several manifestations of Being, though it is not as articulated as mine. 
89 Many of the commentators, I believe, present unsatisfactory interpretations of this unique 
enumeration of the several manifestations of Being in Book Γ. My uneasiness with respect to 
these commentaries is founded upon the fact that they do not clarify the peculiar enumeration 
of manifestations of Being in this passage, as a result of which they do not present any reasons 
why Aristotle abandoned his usual way of enumerating these manifestations. For instance, 
Brentano, while commenting on this passage in his work On the Several Senses of Being (1975, p. 
3) neither provides an explanation for the relation between this passage and the other 
itemisation of several manifestations of Being nor dwells upon the stress that has been put on 
substance in the passage. These questions remained unresolved, giving rise to a serious lacuna 
in Brentano’s interpretation of the passage. Yu, on the other hand, argues that there is a two-
fold division in the listing of Book Γ, one of which is categories and the other actual and 
potential Being (2003, pp. 18-19). Manifestations of Being that cannot be involved in categories, 
that is, those other than substance (i.e., affections, qualities and relations) are placed under 
actual and potential Being in Yu’s classification. Yu gives an oversimplified interpretation of the 
passage, placing what I called ‘negatives’ under the division of actual and potential Being on 
the basis of the possible relations of these instances to motion or change. However, it is not clear 
how ‘destructions’, ‘privations’ and ‘negations’ are to be included under actual and potential 
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I have mentioned that it is possible to observe ontological dependency 
operating in two levels in the Aristotelian conception of Being. Accordingly, I 
have explained that one can observe ontological dependence working in inter-
categorical relations, that is, between substance and the other so-called 
secondary categories as well as in intra-categorical relations, that is, in between 
several substances. Now, one might ask whether it is possible to observe these 
levels of ontological dependence in Aristotle’s enumeration of several 
manifestations of Being in Book Γ. I believe this is possible. Quite plainly, the 
first level in ontological dependence can be reflected in this list for, as I have 
mentioned, ‘affections’, ‘qualities’ and ‘relations’ can be regarded as the 
secondary categories of Being and, as we are told by Aristotle in the passage, 
they are ontologically dependent on substance. In the light of what we have 
been told by Aristotle, it even seems possible to expand the scope of the first 
level in ontological dependence to what I have called ‘negatives’ as well. For all 
‘destructions’, ‘privations’ and ‘negations’ are of substance, namely that they 
cannot exist in the absence of substance and so they are ontologically 
dependent on substance.90  
 
Though not as explicitly as the first level, one may observe the second level of 
ontological dependence in the enumeration of several manifestations of Being 
in Book Γ as well. We have been told by Aristotle that the processes, 
productions and generations are all dependent on substance. I am of the 
opinion that this reflects the ontological dependence between intra-categorical 
relations, that is, between several substances. We shall see through the central 
                                                                                                                                          
being on the basis of their relation to change. This, I believe, also conflicts with what Aristotle 
declares in Book Λ, that privation should be regarded as a separate principle in its own right 
(Met. Λ, 4, 1070b10-35). This at least shows that it would be perverse to read this text as tacitly 
allowing for privations to be placed under actual and potential Being. Other commentators, 
such as Ross (1924, p. 254) and Kirwan (1971, pp. 79-81) also do not seem to notice the 
uniqueness of the way Aristotle presents the several manifestations of Being in this passage. 
90 Though not included in the list of Book Γ, one may observe a similar relation that is found 
between the first category of substance and secondary categories, between substance and 
accidents, the latter of which is enumerated in the broader listings of the several manifestations 
of Being. We shall see how accidents are indeed ontologically dependent on substances in the 
next chapter. 
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books of Metaphysics that what is not generated is posterior to what already has 
been generated.91 That is, for instance, the father is prior to the son because the 
former has been actualized while the latter has not. This will be discussed in 
more detail later when I reflect upon the priority of actuality over potentiality, 
while discussing the central books of Metaphysics. Accordingly, what I suggest 
is that the manifestations of Being that are related to actuality and potentiality 
are connected to Aristotle’s discussion of the priority of actuality over 
potentiality, where one witnesses the ontological dependence working between 
several substances, that is, in intra-categorical relations.  
 
That much is enough for what I meant to expose with respect to the levels of 
ontological dependence in the CDH of Being. We shall see later in this thesis 
that these levels will supply a framework for my discussion of possible 
candidates for the core item in the CDH of Being and help me to determine the 
best candidate for this role.   
 
2.4. Types of Substances in the CDH of Being 
 
My aim in expanding the CDH of Being was to see whether this structure that 
constructs the basis for the science of Being and that is presented exclusively in 
Book Γ is incompatible with the theological conception of the science of Being. 
The criteria upon which the CDH of Being is structured were very important in 
constructing the basis for answering this question. Now we may advance to see 
if this construction necessarily yields a non-theological conception of the science 
of Being. What I aim to do in the following sections is to see whether indeed the 
kind of science in Aristotle’s mind is necessarily inconsistent with the 
theological conception of the science of Being that emerges later in some 
treatises of Metaphysics, especially in Book E and Book Λ.  
 
In Book Γ Aristotle explicitly tells us that it is substance that stands as the core 
item in the CDH of Being. We shall soon see that there are several types of 
                                                
91 See Met. Z, 8, 1033b32; 9, 1034b4; ϑ, 8. 
  
 
130 
substances in Aristotle’s doctrine of Being. Since these several types of 
substances cannot form a single genus, we must be able to detect CDH 
operating between these types of substances, that is, in intra-categorical 
relations, whereby the science of Being can be unified despite the fact that it 
does not deal with a single genus. Hence, we must be able to detect what kind 
of substance that a metaphysician must primarily be dealing with. To 
understand what kind of science Aristotle might be espousing in this level of 
his analysis, one might reasonably attempt to understand what kind of 
substance might be suitable to fulfil the requirements of the CDH of Being. 
Since the primary concern of the science of Being is substance, through which 
the investigation propagates other manifestations of Being on the basis of the 
structure provided by CDH, it is most important first to understand the kind of 
substance that stands as the core item in such a structure; that is, if we are to 
determine whether the kind of science we have in hand has some characteristic, 
for instance, whether it is theological or not. Unfortunately, Aristotle himself 
does not address this question explicitly at this level of his analysis. The key 
concern throughout Book Γ seems to be constructing the basis for a universal 
science of Being through CDH.  
 
As we are informed, the primary concern of the science of Being is substance. 
However, one might be tempted to wonder what the term ‘substance’ in fact 
stands for, as it were; the term ‘substance’ is ambiguous in a way one might not 
suspect. Indeed, throughout his corpus, Aristotle seems to use this term as the 
referent of several things; it may refer to material bodies such as earth, fire, 
water and air92 as well as to pure formal natures. It may also refer to composites 
that are constituted from matter and form93 such as ‘man’ and ‘horse’.94 These 
composites may involve artificial products as well, such as houses.95 In fact, 
Aristotle himself seems to be well aware about this ambiguity and addresses 
                                                
92 For the passages, where Aristotle discusses material substances, see, for instance, Phys. II, 1, 
193a9-20; Met. Z, 3, 1029a23; H, 2, 1042b9; 4, 1044a15; ϑ, 7, 1049a19. 
93 σύνθετος οὺσία: cf. Cael. III, 1, 298a29. 
94 Cat. 4, 1b27; De An. II, 1, 412a16. 
95 cf. Phys. II, 1, 192b34.  
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the problem in several places in his corpus.96 Hence, whether we should accept 
that the term refers to composites, such as table, horse etc., to form or to matter 
is not a clear issue that one might readily answer.  
 
Despite this ambiguity over the term substance, however, one might still make 
some progress from the outlook of Aristotle’s claims about substance 
throughout his corpus. This outlook necessitates that there are indeed several 
types of substances distinguished in the Aristotelian doctrine of Being. Once we 
have these types of substances, we may test which one of these types is suitable 
to stand as the core item in the structure established in Book Γ. By virtue of this, 
one might determine whether the structure of the science established in Book Γ 
is in fact inconsistent with the theological conception of the science of Being that 
we basically encounter in Book E and Book Λ.  
 
In Parts of Animals, Aristotle seems to employ a rough classification of the types 
of substances, which would enable him to advance his investigation: ‘Of 
substances constituted by nature [φύσει συνεστᾶσι] some are ungenerated [τὰς 
µὲν ἀγενήτους], imperishable [ἀφθάρτους], and eternal [τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα], 
while others are subject to generation [τὰς δὲ µετέχειν γενέσεως] and decay 
[φθορᾶς]’.97 The classification implies that there are two types of substances, 
one is eternal and the other is perishable, without however, informing us 
whether a further sub-division between these substances is possible based on 
the natures of these substances. The classification also excludes any artificial 
products (e.g. a table or a sculpture) and is content to deal with only natural 
substances, but perhaps this is in harmony with Aristotle’s aims in Parts of 
Animals, where he primarily focuses on natural substances.  
 
In Physics, Aristotle again presents a classification of substances, which is more 
detailed than that he suggests in Parts of Animals: 
                                                
96 See, for instance, De. An. II, 1, 412a6; Met. Z, 2, 1028b8; 10, 1035a2; 15, 1039b21; H, 1, 1042a6ff.; 
2, 1043a27; 3, 1043a30; Λ, 3, 1070a20. Cf., also, De An. II, 2, 414a15; PA I, 5, 644b22; Met. Λ, 3, 
1070a9. 
97 PA I, 5, 644b22-24. 
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Hence there are three branches of study, one of things which are incapable of 
motion [ἡ µὲν περὶ ἀκινήτων], the second of things in motion [ἡ δὲ περὶ 
κινουµένων], but indestructible [ἀφθάρτων], the third of destructible things [ἡ 
δὲ περὶ τὰ φθαρτά].98     
This seems to be a more comprehensive classification in which we have three 
substances to each of which is appointed a branch of study. Substances are 
divided into two by the criterion of whether they are movable or immovable. 
The movable substances further divided into two sub-categories based on the 
criterion of being destructible or not.  
 
A similar classification, now with the greatest possible precision, is presented in 
the first chapter of Book Λ: 
 
There are three kinds of substance [οὐσίαι δὲ τρεῖς] – one that is sensible 
[αἰσθητή] (of which one subdivision is eternal [ἀΐδιος] and another is 
perishable [φθαρτή], and which all recognize, as comprising e.g. plants and 
animals), – of this we must grasp the elements, whether one or many; and 
another that is immovable [ἀκίνητος] (...)99 
Just as in the case of the classification made in Physics, in the present passage 
Aristotle makes an initial division of substances into two types, namely, 
sensible and immovable substances. A further sub-division is made of sensible 
substances into eternal and perishable substances. We may affirm that this 
classification is identical with the one that we encounter in Physics, if only we 
can identify the referents of sensible and movable substances with each other. 
Later, when we examine what constitutes the content of movable substances, 
we will understand that it is indeed possible to identify these types of 
substances with that of sensible substances. On these grounds, then, two of the 
classifications do not involve a major difference. The difference, on the other 
hand, in the presentation of these two classifications may lie in the fact that 
Aristotle’s intention in presenting the passage in Physics, which is for the most 
part to examine the principles of movement, differs from his basic interest in 
                                                
98 Phys. II, 7, 198a29-31. 
99 Met. Λ, 1, 1069a30-33.  
  
 
133 
Book Λ, which is marked by a comprehensive study of substance.100 Not only is 
the classification of Book Λ in harmony with the classification we encounter in 
Physics, but also it is consistent with the one we come across in Parts of Animals. 
Perhaps one might suggest that the classification of Book Λ is an articulated 
version of the classification that we meet in Parts of Animals in which the 
substances are distinguished into eternal and perishable. Since, in harmony 
with Aristotle’s intentions in that part of his corpus, this classification in Parts of 
Animals is limited to ‘substances constituted by nature’ we may affirm that it 
covers only part of the story, leaving aside what Book Λ will recover later by 
articulating what has not been previously differentiated in between eternal 
substances, namely, the immovable substance. On this view, what is meant by 
eternal substances in Parts of Animals is distinguished further into immovable 
and movable substances in Book Λ.  
 
Hence, according to the cumulative result of Aristotle’s claims with respect to 
types of substances, one might conclude that his theory recognizes three 
fundamental types of substances. Based on Aristotle’s declarations, I prefer to 
identify these substances as such: non-eternal sensible substances (NSS), eternal 
sensible substances (ESS), and Immobile Substance(s) (IS).101  
 
My discussion concerning the types of substances constitutes sufficient grounds 
for what I aim to examine in this part of my thesis and to advance by 
elucidating what Book Γ quite ambiguously presented with respect to the CDH 
of Being. Hence, though the term ‘substance’ is not elucidated in Book Γ, we 
may take the lead from what we have been told with respect to several types of 
substances, whereby we might advance the investigation to see if the 
construction upon which the universal science of Being is established, namely 
CDH, is compatible with the theological conception of this science that we 
encounter in other treatises of Metaphysics. To this end, one may test the types 
                                                
100 This claim needs to be supported against some possible oppositions and I will reflect on this 
topic in the final chapter of this thesis, where I will discuss Book Λ. 
101 Whether this last type consists of one or many substances will have no effect on what I aim to 
argue in this part of my thesis. I reflect upon this subject while I discuss Book Λ.  
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of substances discussed hitherto against the criteria upon which the CDH of 
Being is structured by inserting these substances into the structure of the CDH 
of Being to see which of the several types of substances is most suitable in 
fulfilling these criteria. After all, the general features of CDH may be fulfilled by 
a certain single type of substance, rather than all the possible types of 
substances, whilst we affirm solely, though quite ambiguously, that ‘substance’ 
is the core of the CDH of Being. Besides, as I have mentioned, the three types of 
substance cannot form a single genus. The system, therefore, must employ CDH 
operating between several types of substances if it is to pave the way for a 
single universal science despite multiplicity. This amounts to saying that in 
studying one type of these substances as its primary subject matter, the science 
of Being will turn out to be a universal study into Being. In what follows, I will 
test three types of substances against the CDH of Being to unearth the type of 
substance that seems to be most suitable according to Aristotle’s declarations in 
Book Γ with respect to the CDH of Being. By that means, I aim to assess 
whether the theological conception of the science of Being is compatible with 
Aristotle’s declarations in Book Γ.   
 
2.4.1. Non-Eternal Sensible Substances (NSS) 
 
We might call substances with simple material bodies, such as fire and earth,102 
as well as substances that are composed of matter and form103 like plants and 
animals,104 such as man and horse,105 non-eternal sensible substances (NSS). We 
may add artificial products (e.g. houses)106 under this class of substances as 
well. Now, we might ask whether it is possible to consider NSS as the primary 
elements of CDH of Being. As I have mentioned, Aristotle neither distinguishes 
these types of substances in Book Γ nor does he face this question explicitly (or 
implicitly) in this part of Metaphysics. Nevertheless, I believe we have sufficient 
                                                
102 For material substances, see, Phys. II, 1, 193a9-20; Met. Z, 3, 1029a23; H, 2, 1042b9; 4, 1044a15; 
ϑ, 7, 1049a19. 
103 σύνθετος οὺσία: cf. Cael. III, 1, 298a29  
104 Met. Λ, 1, 1069a30-33.  
105 Cat. 4, 1b27; De An. II, 1, 412a16. 
106 Cf. Phys. II, 1, 192b34 
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evidence in Book Γ to progress in order to attain some sense of the possible 
answer by looking at the three features (i.e., causal connectedness, logical 
dependence, and ontological dependence) upon which the CDH of Being is 
established. 
 
It seems that the case is not so confused when it comes to whether we might 
affirm that NSS are ontologically prior to the other so-called secondary 
categories, for it seems obvious at once that a sensible substance can satisfy the 
requirements of ontological dependence (OD) that I have described hitherto.107 
None of the other categories exists without the existence of NSS, for NSS can 
well be regarded as the basic substratum of all the other so-called secondary 
categories. For instance, a quality, such as pale, finds its possibility to exist in 
one of the NSS (e.g. Callias) and this is so for the other categories as well. None 
of them can exist without the initial existence of substance.  
 
When we consider what I have called ‘causal dependence’ (CD), once again, the 
case is not complicated for this seems to be fulfilled by NSS as well. At the 
outset, CD seems to be satisfied by NSS, for the reason that NSS can be 
regarded as the basic causes of the existence of the other so-called secondary 
categories. A particular paleness, for instance, not only exists by virtue of a 
primary substance, such as Callias, but is also conditioned to that primary 
instance in its existence. By virtue of providing the basic substratum, then, NSS 
can also be regarded as the causes of the other categories’ existence. NSS, 
therefore, seem to be capable of meeting ontological dependence in both of its 
forms, whether OD or CD. This implies that they are strong candidates for 
being the core item in CDH of Being. 
 
Recall, however, that I have distinguished two levels in ontological dependence 
in the context of the CDH of Being, whereby this connection can be assessed to 
be operating between inter-categorical and intra-categorical relations. When 
one takes into account these levels in ontological dependence, one might notice 
                                                
107 See 2.2.8. 
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that the requirements of ontological dependence may not be as simple as they 
appear on first examination. This requires that the ontological priority of NSS 
should not only work between so-called secondary categories and NSS but also 
between several types of substances as well. NSS may be regarded as the causes 
of other primary substances (i.e., other NSS), though in a very limited sense. 
This particular tree, which is an NSS, may be regarded as the cause of another 
particular tree, which itself is an NSS, but cannot be the cause of all the other 
trees that exist. Furthermore, a tree cannot be the cause of the existence of other 
members of NSS (e.g. Callias) as well.108 In other words, man that is a certain 
species of the genus animal begets man but not any other species of NSS;109 and 
a particular tree cannot be the cause of another tree if the latter is not produced 
from the former. Hence, CD operates in quite a limited way between NSS for 
the simple reason that a particular NSS cannot be regarded as the principle of 
every other NSS and, therefore, cannot properly be regarded as the cause of the 
existence of these other NSS as CD requires.  
 
Furthermore, NSS cannot be regarded as the causes of the existence of the other 
types of substances that we encounter in the Aristotelian Universe and that are 
placed above them, namely the ESS and IS. On the contrary, as we shall see 
through the course of this study, the latter are principles of the former but not 
                                                
108 This, also, yields a famous principle in Aristotelian philosophy, which prohibits the 
transitivity between genera (for this principle, see An. Pr. I, 30, 46a17ff.; An. Post. I, 7; Top. VIII, 
12, 162b7; Cael. I, 1, 268a30-b3; Met. Δ, 28, 1024b15; I, 7, 1057a26-28; M, 9, 1085a16-19). According 
to this principle, one cannot transmit the investigation from one genus to another (I have 
previously discussed this principle while inquiring into how genus unifies a science and how 
this structure is threatened by the problem of µετάβασις, and for this reason, for example, it is 
impossible to transfer the arguments of arithmetic to geometry (for magnitudes are not 
numbers)). The roots of this principle, however, may rest on significant doctrinal differences 
between the conceptualizations of Being in Plato and Aristotle. Contrary to Plato’s system of 
Being, which allows for the existence of an ultimate genus under which other Beings are 
situated and partake of their existence, Aristotle’s doctrine of Being does not allow for an 
ultimate genus to which all other Beings are reducible. Aristotle, therefore, aspires to several 
ultimately irreducible and intransitive genera of Being, namely, the categories. In such a 
conceptualization, any Being under a certain genus cannot beget a Being under another genus 
and Being is in no way reducible to a single universal begetter. Therefore, the study of Being in 
such a conceptualization requires a different tool for unification, which, in Aristotelian 
terminology, is pros hen.      
109 This is explicitly confirmed in Phys. II, 1, 193b8; 2, 194b13; 7, 198a26; III, 2, 202a11; GC II, 6, 
333b7; PA I, 1, 640a25; II, 1, 646a33; GA II, 1, 735a21; Met. Z, 7, 1032a25; 8, 1033b32; ϑ, 8, 1049b25; 
Λ, 3, 1070a8, 28; 4, 1070b31-34; N, 5, 1092a16; EE II, 6, 1222b17. Apart from these passages, see 
also HA I, 5, 489b11; GA I, 9, 718b29; II, 1, 732a34.  
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vice versa. In the case of NSS, therefore, it seems that the ontological 
dependence cannot operate in a proper way so as the pave the way for a 
universal study of Being. Their examination will lead to the study of the so-
called secondary categories and some of the other NSS whilst this will not allow 
for any knowledge with respect to the other higher types of substances for the 
simple reason that these latter substances are not ontologically conditioned by 
NSS. Accordingly, the study of the former instances of Being through NSS is not 
possible. The necessary relations required in CDH through which a universal 
study is propelled, then, cannot be fully established in the case of NSS.110 
 
Recall that, according to the general schema of CDH provided earlier in this 
chapter, one expects to find causal connectedness between the instances of 
Being if the necessary relations are to be fully constructed for the case of the 
CDH of Being. Accordingly, the question that is to be gauged at this moment 
should address whether NSS are reliable candidates for fulfilling the causal 
relations in CDH of Being. 
 
The situation, however, is not as plain as it seems in the first instance for, 
similarly to the case of ontological dependence, one may find two levels in the 
causal relations between primary and secondary terms of CDH of Being. The 
first level addresses the causal links between NSS and the secondary categories, 
whereas the second level focuses on the causal relations between NSS and other 
substances, though not necessarily sensible substances. Hence, the first level in 
the causal relation in CDH of Being questions whether NSS fit at least one of the 
standard modes of causation in their relation to secondary categories. The 
second level, on the other hand, asks whether NSS are reliable candidates to 
stand as the cause of every possible type of substance. 
                                                
110 I will not, on this occasion, discuss whether NSS is capable of meeting the requirements of 
logical dependence, for this requires some knowledge of Aristotle’s examination of definition in 
Book Z, which will be provided in the fourth chapter. Without engaging in a detailed discussion 
of Aristotle’s theory of definition of substances, however, it is almost impossible to decide 
whether NSS are capable of fulfilling the requirement of logical dependence. The situation is no 
different for other types of substances that will be dealt with this part as well, namely, ESS and 
IS, since the definitions of these substances require a discussion of Book Z, which, on this 
occasion, it is impossible to provide. 
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I will start with the first level and inquire into whether NSS are capable of 
fulfilling the required causal relations in the CDH of Being. One might see that 
the answer is in the positive, given that NSS fit one of the four standard modes 
of causation in their relation to several categories. I have already noticed that a 
particular quality, say paleness, exists by virtue of a particular substance, say 
Callias. In such a relation, physical parts of Callias’ body can well be regarded 
as the material cause of paleness. To see whether other causal connections can 
be found between NSS and the secondary categories one might prefer to turn to 
the text of Categories, where Aristotle discusses affective qualities:             
 
Similarly, with regard to the soul also we speak of affective qualities 
(παθητικαὶ ποιότητες) and affections (πάθη). Those which are present right 
from birth as a result of certain affections are called qualities, for example, 
madness and irascibility and the like; for in virtue of these people are said to 
be qualified (ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας λέγονται), being called irascible and 
mad.111  
The passage confirms that qualities such as madness can be regarded as the 
affections of the soul. In such cases, one might assert that the soul is the formal 
cause of the quality of madness for the reason that such affective qualities are 
present right from birth in the soul of an individual substance such as Callias. 
Not only in the category of quality can one find such examples of causal 
relations. A further example, accordingly, can be taken from the category of 
quantity. Language, for instance, can be regarded as a discrete quantity112 
employed to illustrate the causal relations found between NSS and the other 
categories. What is meant by language in this case is the language that is 
spoken.113 Now language can be connected to a particular sensible substance, 
such as Callias, in standard modes of causation. Callias’ articulate tongue, his 
vocal cords and his lungs can be regarded as the material causes of language 
that is spoken, building up the material substratum for the existence of spoken 
language. Again, Callias’ soul can be regarded as the formal cause and Callias 
himself can be considered as the efficient cause of language. This shows that 
                                                
111 Cat. 8, 9b33-10a2. 
112 See Cat. 6, 4b24 for language as a discrete quantity.  
113 Cat. 6, 4b33. 
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one can find the required causal relations between NSS and the secondary 
categories, as I have illustrated. This means that NSS fulfil the necessary 
requirements of causal bounds that should be detected in a CDH. 
 
As I have mentioned, it is possible to find a further level in causal relations in 
the CDH of Being, in which, along with the secondary qualities, substances 
themselves are also involved in the picture as peripheral instances of the core 
item, connected to the core item by virtue of one of the four standard modes of 
causation. In this level, the question at issue addresses whether it is possible to 
find causal relations between NSS, standing as the primary term, and other 
types of substances as the peripherals. As one might notice that this 
requirement is more demanding compared with the first level simply because it 
requires the causal primary term to be one of the four causes of not only the 
other categories but also the other substances as well. If NSS is to be regarded as 
causally prior in the absolute sense, that is, if the knowledge of them is to 
provide knowledge not merely of a part of Being but of all things that are, one 
might reasonably expect that NSS should be regarded as causally connected not 
only to the other so-called secondary categories but also to the other types of 
substances as well. Otherwise, one might reasonably conclude on the basis of 
the fact that there can be other substances that are not causally connected to 
NSS that these other unconditioned substances might be regarded as better 
candidates for being the core item in the CDH of Being. After all, if causal 
connectedness cannot be established in the fullest sense, the study of NSS will 
not turn out to be a universal study of all things that are. 
 
Now it seems at once that NSS can indeed be regarded as the cause of other 
NSS. Callias, for instance, can be regarded as the efficient cause of a particular 
sculpture, which itself is one of the sensible substances. His soul can be 
regarded as the formal cause of the sculpture as well. Similarly, what is 
intended from a particular tree is the fruit, which itself is a sensible substance 
and which can be regarded as the final cause of the tree. Taking the lead from 
these examples one might not, however, conclude that NSS meet the 
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requirements of causal connectedness for these seem not to be sufficient on the 
grounds that such examples are limited to particular NSS that can in no way be 
interpreted as paving the way for one to affirm that NSS are the ultimate 
universal principles of all that are. It is possible to observe this in the examples I 
have given so far, for the reason that while that Callias is responsible for 
making a particular sculpture, he cannot be in any way be regarded as the 
proper cause of all the sculptures that happened to be made by any other 
sculptor. Callias, in this sense, cannot be regarded as the universal principle of 
all sculptures that exist. Similarly, a particular fruit cannot be regarded as the 
ultimate final cause of all trees that exist. 
 
This discussion shows that NSS have fulfilled some of the requirements of 
CDH, but only in a limited sense, and so they do not seem to be the most 
accurate or proper candidates to be the core item in the CDH of Being. These 
types of substances are insufficient for fulfilling ontological dependence and 
causal relations in the fullest sense. Let us proceed to examine the other types of 
substances, this time, eternal sensible substances, and see if these are capable of 
fulfilling the general requirements of the CDH of Being explained so far. 
 
2.4.2. Eternal Sensible Substances (ESS) 
 
In order to determine whether eternal sensible substances are capable of 
meeting the requirements of the CDH of Being, let me very briefly explain what 
kind of substances are to be regarded as ESS. These are the heavenly spheres, 
such as the planets and the stars situated above the Moon.114 The heavenly stars 
are divine,115 fiery,116 spherical bodies,117 that move with an eternal circular 
                                                
114 The planets are nearer to the Earth than the stars (Cael. II, 8, 290a19 cf. An. Post. I, 13, 78a30). 
Aristotle’s cosmology is entirely descriptive; it cannot be seen as a theory addressing the origins 
of the cosmos and hence cannot be regarded as a cosmogony. The necessary continuous circular 
movement of heaven is eternal and does not deserve any explanation concerning its origins. In 
this part, I will limit my inquiry with respect to Aristotle’s exploration of heavenly bodies by 
merely considering such bodies as substances to test them as primary instances of the CDH of 
Being against the background explained hitherto. 
115 NE VI, 7, 1141b1; OU 2, 391b17.  
116 Cael. II, 7, 289a19-35 cf. Meteor. I, 3, 340a28; GA II, 3, 737a1. 
117 Cael. II, 8, 290a7. 
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motion118 – the swiftest and most self-contained motion119 – and have nothing 
bad, nothing defective and nothing perverted in their natures120 and they are 
located in the upper portion of the Universe.121 These substances have no 
generation or corruption due to the simple fact that they are eternal.122  Since 
they are perceptible and since they engage in a certain type of movement, they 
involve matter in their natures.123 The perfect instance of such substances is the 
sphere of the fixed stars;124 in a descending order, we find several other planets 
(such as Jupiter (Φαέθων), Mars (Πυρόεις), Saturn (Φαίνων) and Venus 
(Φωσφόρος) etc.).125   
 
Now if such substances can be regarded as the proper candidates for fulfilling 
the role of the primary term in the CDH of Being, they must be ontologically 
prior in both levels mentioned earlier in this chapter, that is, they must be 
ontologically prior both to secondary categories and to the other types of 
substances as well. First, like NSS, these substances have qualities and 
quantities and they are in a certain place, etc. which means that the other 
categories reveal themselves in ESS by the way in which they exist. These 
substances, therefore, are ontologically prior to other categories in the way that 
OD requires for the other so-called secondary categories cannot exist in the 
absence of such substances.   
                                                
118 Cael. II, 3, 286a18; 10, 291b2; 12, 293a12; GC II, 11, 338a22; Meteor. I, 8, 346b12 cf. Phys. VIII, 8, 
263a3. 
119 Cael. II, 8, 290b2. 
120 Met. ϑ, 9, 1051a20. 
121 OU 2, 391b17 cf. Cael. I, 9, 278b18. 
122 Met. N, 2, 1088b24; 3, 1091a12; NE VI, 3, 1139b24; cf. GA II, 1, 731b24. 
123 Matter found in ESS is different in character from the matter encountered in non-eternal 
sensibles: the latter engage in several alterations; they, in other words, engage in 
quantificational, locational, qualificational, etc. movements, whereas the former engage only in 
locational movement, even the first type of such movements, which is the circular motion (for 
circular motion and its status in several types of movement, see Phys. VIII, 8; 9; Cael. I, 12, 
282a23; Met. Λ, 7, 1072b9. Cf. Meteor. I, 1, 338b22): ‘Now all things that change have matter 
[ὕλην ἔχει], but different matter [ἀλλ' ἑτέραν]; and of eternal things [τῶν ἀϊδίων] those which 
are not generable [µὴ γενητὰ] but are movable [κινητὰ] in space have matter – not matter for 
generation [οὐ γενητὴν], however, but for motion from one place to another’ (Met. Λ, 1, 
1069b24-26). Therefore, the matter involved in such substances is needed solely to endure an 
eternal movement and has a different character from the matter needed for other types of 
movement (see also Met. Λ, 7, 1072b7; 8, 1073a22-27).     
124 See Cael. II, 6, 288a15; Met. Λ, 6, 1072a10; 7, 1072a21; 8, 1073a24.  
125 Met. Λ, 8, 1073b31ff. See also Cael. II, 12, 292a24; Met. Λ, 8.  
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Recall that this criterion is also met by NSS and hence the question that interests 
me now is whether ESS is capable of fulfilling the requirements of CD on both 
levels, that is on the level addressing the ontological dependencies between the 
core item and the secondary categories as well as the level concerning 
ontological dependence that can be found between primary term and other 
types of substances, as this latter criterion cannot be fully met by NSS. We know 
that ESS are indeed prior to NSS.126 But having said this, we should not let 
ourselves believe that ESS is absolutely prior to all the other types of substances 
for the simple fact that these substances themselves are moved and conditioned 
by a still higher substance, situated above them, which does not contain any 
contingent material parts and which is not conditioned by any other 
substance.127 This shows that ESS fulfil the requirements of ontological 
dependence, however, in a limited sense, and they cannot be regarded as 
absolutely prior to everything else that we may encounter in the Aristotelian 
Universe. If we were to accept these substances as core items in the CDH of 
Being, the investigation would indeed propagate to NSS. Nevertheless, on the 
grounds that the necessary connections are not fully established, such a study 
would exclude the immaterial higher substance(s), namely, IS, to which these 
ESS are not ontologically prior. For that reason, although the inquiry would 
cover a considerable part of the Universe, it nevertheless would not cover every 
part of Being, that is, it would not be universal in the absolute sense. This 
prompts us to investigate a better candidate in Aristotle’s Universe, one that 
would fit better the conception presented in Book Γ with respect to the CDH of 
Being by virtue of satisfying all the possible requirements of ontological 
dependence. Before that examination, however, let us proceed to investigate 
whether ESS are capable of meeting the requirements of causal connectedness 
explained hitherto. 
 
                                                
126 ‘...for eternal things [ἀΐδια] are prior in substance [πρότερα τῇ οὐσίᾳ] to perishable things 
[τῶν φθαρτῶν]...’ Met. ϑ, 8, 1050b6-7. 
127 Met. Λ, 7.  
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Now it seems that ESS meet the requirements of both of the levels of inter-
categorical and intra-categorical relations in causal connectedness since they 
stand as one of the standard modes of causation not only of secondary 
categories but also of NSS. In order to illustrate this, it is helpful to investigate 
the case of the Sun, one of the several kinds of ESS, which by virtue of its 
movement stands as the common efficient cause of sensible substances. 
Aristotle explicitly affirms in De Generatione et Corruptione that coming-to-be 
occurs as the Sun comes near, whereas decay happens when it retreats.128 By 
virtue of approaching in summer and retreating in winter, the Sun causes the 
conversion of the seasons, which, in turn, causes the generation and corruption 
of many things on Earth – such as plants and animals – and with them, it causes 
the generation of many qualities. The movement of the Sun, then, is responsible 
for the generation and corruption on the Earth and therefore should be 
regarded as one of the ultimate efficient causes of NSS on Earth.129 Causal 
relations, therefore, can be observed not only between the ESS and the 
secondary categories but also between ESS and NSS. This is not sufficient to 
conclude, however, that ESS ultimately meet the requirements of causal 
connectedness. The basic reason for this insufficiency lies in the fact that ESS 
themselves are causally conditioned to a still higher substance. In other words, 
they are not the original reasons of all Being, but instead there is a higher 
substance in Aristotle’s system to which all other substances are linked, even 
ESS. Hence, if we were to place ESS as the core of the CDH of Being, the inquiry 
                                                
128 This is confirmed in GC, II, 10, 336b15; 11, 338b3; Met. Λ, 5, 1071a15ff. Cf. Meteor. I, 3, 341a20; 
II, 5, 363a14; 6, 364b15; HA VIII, 13, 598a3; Prob. XXV, 6, 938b3; XXVI, 34, 944a30; 52, 946a23 (in 
GA IV, 10, 777b26, however, Aristotle affirms that the Moon contributes to all generation and 
development because of its intimacy with and its participation in the Sun). See GA I, 2, 716a14 
for an analogy which links the Earth with mother and the Sun with father. (I find similarities 
between the role of the Sun in Plato and Aristotle. On to the role of the Sun, while he makes a 
comparison between the good and the Sun, Plato states: ‘You’ll be willing to say, I think, that 
the Sun not only provides visible things with the power to be seen but also with coming to be 
[τὴν γένεσιν], growth [αὔξην], and nourishment [τροφήν], although it is not itself coming to be.’ 
(Republic, VI, 509b2-4).)  
129 This mention of the movement of the Sun is necessarily brief and dogmatic, although the 
interpretations suggested are not idiosyncratic. One’s first reaction might be to wonder how this 
generation and corruption could actually be possible. A detailed exposition of this movement 
and its effects, however, would take us very far off the track, for which reason I do not intend to 
embark on a detailed discussion of the Sun and its possible effects. The movement of the Sun by 
which it causes the generation of things in Earth is neatly encapsulated by Thomas Aquinas (p. 
587 n. 2511).  
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would exclude what is independent of them and thus, it would be impossible to 
conclude that the study of Being through these substances is universal in the 
absolute sense.   
 
The general upshot of this discussion is that neither of the kinds of substances 
we have seen so far is sufficient to fulfil the requirements of the CDH of Being 
in the absolute sense. Is it, however, possible to find a substance that fulfils all 
the requirements of ontological dependence and causal connectedness in 
Aristotle’s system in the absolute sense? I have implied that without the 
evidence provided from the other treatises of Metaphysics it seems impossible to 
answer this question in full, though some progress may at least provisionally be 
made. We have at least seen that NSS and ESS cannot provide the sufficient 
means by way of which a science that is based on CDH operates, seeing that 
they are incapable of meeting the requirements of this special type of relation in 
the fullest sense. The discussion so far has shown that even though these 
substances were accepted to meet the requirements of logical dependence, 
discussion of which is postponed to later stages of this thesis, they nevertheless 
could not be regarded as the proper candidates for standing as the core item in 
the CDH of Being. 
  
We have yet another candidate, however, which is Immobile Substance(s). Let 
us now proceed to inquire into such type of substance(s) and see if this type is 
capable of meeting the two requirements of the CDH of Being.   
 
2.4.3. Immobile Substance(s) (IS)130 
 
                                                
130 I would like to note, at the outset that my presentation of Aristotle’s conception of IS(s) in 
this part will be highly descriptive and brief. Justifications of some of the claims found in this 
part of my text will be provided later when I reflect on Book Λ of Metaphysics. The present aim 
is to find out, at least provisionally, whether there exists an inconsistency between the special 
structure building up the basis for the science of Being (i.e., CDH) which stands out in Book Γ 
and the general conception of IS, namely God, that we encounter in other treatises of 
Metaphysics, especially in Book Λ. In the respective chapter in which I deal with that part of 
Metaphysics, that is, in chapter V, I will do my best to justify the claims that may seem 
unsubstantiated in this part. 
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The question at issue is this: is it possible to affirm that the peripheral instances 
of Being are combined with IS by virtue of one of the standard modes of 
causation? A brief examination of the fourth and fifth chapters of Book Λ may 
give us some clues as to whether IS can be regarded as a universal cause of all 
Beings in the Universe by virtue of fitting one of the standard modes of 
causation.131 
 
Aristotle seems to address this question explicitly and he starts his investigation 
by examining whether it is possible to affirm that the causes and principles of 
different things may be said to be the same:  
 
The causes [αἴτια] and the principles [ἀρχαὶ] of different things are in a sense 
different, but in a sense, if one speaks universally [καθόλου λέγῃ] and 
analogically [κατ’ ἀναλογίαν], they are the same for all [ταὐτὰ πάντων]. For 
we might raise the question whether the principles and elements [στοιχεῖα] 
are different or the same for substances and for relatives [πρός τι],132 and 
similarly in the case of each of the categories.133 
Aristotle’s carefully qualified remarks seem to suggest that though the 
principles and causes of things are different, a common reason can be 
postulated if one ‘speaks universally (καθόλου λέγῃ) and analogically (κατ’ 
ἀναλογίαν)’. Aristotle seems to be quite certain that, in a sense, it is not possible 
to postulate reasons common to all things because it is impossible to affirm that 
the secondary categories and substance originate from a common principle,134 
since if it were possible to assert this, we would be in a position to accept that 
the elements of all things are one and the same.135 Correspondingly, it is 
                                                
131 I shall not give a detailed discussion of these two chapters of Book Λ but rather construct a 
fairly rough framework to establish the background of the present discussion of CDH of Being 
and IS. This sketchy portrait, however, will be developed in the last chapter, where I comment 
on Book Λ of Metaphysics.  
132 One should not be confused by the mention of relatives in this passage. Aristotle’s sole aim 
in citing ‘relatives’ (πρός τι) might be to illustrate the categories of Being. The reason why he 
chooses ‘relatives’ as one of the examples of secondary categories might be that this category 
can be regarded as the farthest away from the primary category of substance. By way of this, 
Aristotle attracts attention to the contrast between the first category of substance and the 
secondary categories. For the category of relative and its position to primary category of 
substance, see Met. N, 1, 1088a23.   
133 Met. Λ, 4, 1070a31-35. 
134 ‘But it is paradoxical [ἄτοπον] that they should be the same for all [ταὐτὰ πάντων]. For then 
from the same elements will proceed relatives and substances.’ Met. Λ, 4, 1070a35. 
135 See Met. Λ, 4, 1070b1ff. for the details of this argument. 
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impossible to postulate a universal principle that can be applied to all things. 
The principles of individual things are individuals themselves: 
 
The universal [τὰ καθολου] causes, then, of which we spoke do not exist [οὐκ 
ἔστιν]. For the individual is the source of the individuals [ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ καθ’ 
ἕκαστον τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστον]. For while man [ἄνθρωπος] is the cause of man 
universally [ἀνθρώπου καθόλου], there is no universal man [οὐκ ἔστιν 
οὐδείς]; but Peleus is the cause of Achilles, and your father of you, and this 
particular b [τοδὶ τὸ Β] of this particular ba [τουδὶ τοῦ ΒΑ], though b in 
general is the cause of ba taken without qualification [ἁπλῶς].136 
Contrary to Plato’s theory of ideas, Aristotle’s doctrine does not allow for the 
existence of separate universals. According to this line of thought, all that exists 
in the Universe are individuals that originated from other individuals. Since 
non-existing universals cannot be the reasons for existing individuals, we 
cannot postulate universal principles and every individual has its own proper 
individual cause. This particular tree, for example, is the cause of this particular 
fruit and it is impossible to postulate a universal tree that can act as the cause of 
all individual fruits. 
 
Though it is impossible to postulate universal reasons in this context, Aristotle 
still believes that, in another sense, namely, analogically (κατ’ ἀναλογίαν), we 
can postulate universal reasons that can be applied to every individual 
substance.137 When Aristotle’s general description of analogy is considered, one 
might be confused as to how indeed Aristotle might succeed with his claim that 
favours the application of universal reasons to individuals in an analogical way. 
Indeed it is not clear at once how his description of analogy in Nicomachean 
Ethics, which is generally said to be proportional (or arithmetical proportion), in 
which four terms are linked together by virtue of the equality of ratios, paves 
the way for such a utilization: ‘As the term A, then, is to B, so will C be to D, 
and therefore, alternando, as A is to C, B will be to D.’138 It seems, however, that 
                                                
136 Met. Λ, 5, 1071a19. 
137 ‘And in yet another way, analogically [τῷ ἀνάλογον] identical things [αἱ αὐταί] are principles 
[ἀρχαὶ]...’ Met. Λ, 5, 1071a3-4. 
138 NE V, 3, 1131a31ff. This is echoed in Met. Δ, 6, 1016b34 (cf. 1018b13) and in Poet. 21, 1457b16. 
Some examples of this kind of analogy are as follows: ‘...as the bronze is to the statue, the wood 
to the bed...’ Phys. I, 7, 191a8; ‘Bird and fish only agree in having analogous organs; for what in 
the bird is feather, in the fish is scale.’ PA I, 4, 644a21 (this is echoed in HA I, 1, 486b19 as well) 
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to Aristotle’s mind, not all analogies should be in this form. In other words, the 
kind of analogy intended to be employed to postulate universal reasons seems 
to favour a more flexible type, in which terms such as ‘matter’ and ‘form’ are 
used as general typologies paving the way for one to apply these terms to 
numerous things in an analogical way. In this way, as Aristotle maintains, one 
can postulate universal reasons through analogy: 
 
And if we inquire what are the principles [ἀρχαὶ] or elements [στοιχεῖα] of 
substances [τῶν οὐσιῶν] and relations [πρός τι] and qualities [ποιῶν] – 
whether they are the same or different, [A] clearly when the terms ‘principle’ 
and ‘element’ are used in several senses [πολλαχῶς γε λεγοµένων] the 
principles and elements of all are the same, [B] but when the senses are 
distinguished the causes are not the same but different, [C] except in a special 
sense the causes of all are the same. [D] They are in a special sense the same, 
i.e., by analogy [τὸ ἀνάλογον], because matter, form, privation, and the 
moving cause are common to all things; [E] and the causes of substances may 
be treated as causes of all things [αἴτια πάντων] in this sense, that when they 
are removed all things are removed [ἀναιρεῖται ἀναιρουµένων]; further, [F] 
that which is first in respect of fulfilment [τὸ πρῶτον ἐντελεχείᾳ] is the cause 
of all things.139  
We are informed in the passage that one can postulate universal reasons 
through analogy. The passage tells us that it is possible to distinguish two cases 
regarding whether we can postulate common reasons for all things. In the first 
case [A], when the terms ‘principle’ and ‘element’ are used in several senses, 
that is, without taking into consideration particular principles and elements of 
things, we can legitimately speak of common principles and elements. In such a 
case, the elements, such as ‘matter’, ‘form’ and ‘privation’, and the ‘principles’, 
such as the efficient, the formal cause and the final cause, can be applied to 
every Being because we neither specify the particular element of a particular 
thing (e.g. the wood (i.e., the matter) of this particular table) nor do we identify 
the reasons proper to a particular thing (e.g. Peleus as the efficient cause of 
Achilles); rather, we only use these terms (i.e., ‘element’ and ‘principle’) as 
common notions that are applicable to every Being. In the second case [B], 
however, we distinguish the proper reasons and elements of things, in which 
case we cannot speak of universal principles and elements for special principles 
                                                                                                                                          
‘...the bone of man and the spine of fish...’ PA I, 4, 644ab12; ‘...as sight is in the body, so is reason 
in the soul...’ EN I, 6, 1096b25; ‘...as the stone is to Sisyphus, so is the shameless man to his 
victim.’ Rhet. III, 11, 1412a4. 
139 Met. Λ, 5, 1071a29-36. 
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and elements of particular things are proper to things to which these principles 
and elements are applied. For example, the matter of this table is different from 
the matter of this door, and whereas the efficient cause of Achilles is Peleus, the 
efficient cause of Telemachos is Odysseus. [C] and [D] repeat the first case [A] 
as they address the possibility of postulating common principles through 
analogy. Hence, Aristotle seems to assume that things in the Universe can be 
approached through some analogical terms that are applicable typologically to 
reality, by way of which one can attain an actual knowledge of individuals that, 
nevertheless, are potentially infinite. By way of analogy, then, we can postulate 
common principles applicable to all that are.  
 
The principles of substances are such common principles that one can apply to 
all things in the Universe. They are the ultimate principles of things and the 
highest of those principles is IS. [E] seems to be related to ontological 
dependence, as what it tells is that if such a principle is to be removed, all 
things are removed. I will be dealing with the ontological dependence after I 
finish with the causal connectedness so, let me proceed so as to explain [F], 
which, it seems to me, involve the clues for causal connectedness.  
 
Whereas [E] addresses the ontological dependencies between substances 
(mentioned as one of the features of CDH that is to be met by the core item in 
CDH), [F] addresses the causal relations between substances. [F], in other 
words, points to our primary focus of attention in this part since it confirms that 
it is possible to regard ‘that which is first in respect of fulfilment’ as the ultimate 
cause of other Beings. What is to be understood as ‘that which is first in respect 
of fulfilment’ should be the ultimate principle of all things whatsoever, which, I 
think squares well with respect to what Aristotle says about IS: 
 
Therefore the first heavens [πρῶτος οὐρανός] must be eternal [ἀΐδιος]. There 
is therefore also something [ἔστι τοίνυν τι] which moves [κινεῖ] them. And 
since that which is moved and moves is intermediate [µέσον], there is a 
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mover which moves without being moved [κινεῖ οὐ κινούµενα], being eternal 
[ἀΐδιον], substance [οὐσία] and actuality [ἐνέργεια].140 
According to Aristotle, we must postulate an ultimate reason, which stands at 
the top of the hierarchies of Beings and which moves the subordinating celestial 
bodies (ESS) through a special type of movement it originates. This is what 
Aristotle calls the ‘unmoved mover’ namely, the God, who is the ultimate 
originator of the movement in the Universe.141 God, in this conception, can be 
regarded as the efficient cause of almost everything else in the Universe because 
of the movement He originates: the eternal motion of the fixed stars propagates 
through the Universe and is actually responsible for all the generation in the 
Universe. Without this movement there would be no motion in the Universe 
and therefore no generation and corruption. Hence, the Sun, which is 
responsible for the changing of the seasons, is also moved by a still higher 
mover.142 The hierarchies of movements end in IS, the ultimate cause of the 
movement, which Himself is not moving but is responsible for the eternal 
circular motion of fixed stars through which the movement in the Universe 
spreads to subordinating bodies. Since, then, IS can be regarded as the ultimate 
efficient cause of the whole Being, such type of substance fulfils the causal 
requirements of CDH, that is, the peripheral instances of Being are tied to IS in 
one of the four standard modes of causation. 
 
Not only can IS be regarded as the ultimate efficient cause of the Universe, but 
also, by virtue of standing both as the ultimate object of desire143 and as the 
ultimate good in the Universe,144 it is a principle to which all other Beings are 
inclined and which they imitate, as far as their natures allow.145 Accordingly, 
one might suggest that IS not only is to be regarded as the efficient cause of the 
Universe but also as the final principle of all things, whether eternal (ESS) or 
                                                
140 Met. Λ, 7, 1072a23-26. 
141 I will not go into details on how Unmoved Mover originates a movement in the 
subordinating substances nor do I submit any justification for this claim. I postpone the 
justification of such a claim to chapter V, where I discuss in close detail the nature of God. 
142 See my discussion of the movement of the Sun and how this movement is responsible for 
generation on 2.4.2.  
143 Met. Λ, 7, 1072a26ff. 
144 Met. Λ, 7, 1072b19ff. 
145 De An. II, 4, 415a26. 
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not (NSS).146 We might, then, conclude that IS fulfils the requirement of causal 
relations in CDH on every possible level. IS can be regarded as the ultimate 
efficient and final principle of the Universe,147 which is ultimately responsible 
for the generation of Beings through the movement it originates and which is 
the final aim of all that are by virtue of His standing as the ultimate object of 
desire and love. This also sufficiently shows that we can trace causal 
connections between IS and the other instances of Being, which, in turn, proves 
that IS is indeed a suitable candidate to stand as the core item in the CDH of 
Being. 
 
But, what can be said with respect to the ontological dependence? Is it possible 
that we affirm all substances to be ontologically dependent on IS? 
 
Let us start with the intra-categorical level and investigate whether IS is capable 
of fulfilling CD that operates between substances.148 
 
We have already seen that IS can be regarded as the ultimate principle in the 
Universe. Aristotle’s description of the structure of Being that stands out in his 
corpus and the place of IS in this construction confirms this. This 
conceptualization necessitates IS being regarded as the ultimate reason for the 
permanency of the existence in the Universe.149 IS stands at the top of the 
hierarchy of Beings, constructed between mere matter and pure thought that 
                                                
146 Met. Λ, 7, 1072b1. I shall deal with the question whether it is possible to reduce the efficient, 
formal and final principles to a single principle later on, when I comment on Book Λ of 
Metaphysics. Only after that discussion, will we be in a position to clarify exactly which of the 
four standard modes of causation is at issue in the CDH of Being.   
147 As I have mentioned, full justification of this claim is provided the chapter where I discuss 
Book Λ.  
148 One should bear in mind that the discussion with respect to the ontological priority of IS 
cannot be fully justified on the level of Book Γ without going into details of the nature of IS, 
which is the subject of Book Λ, and is impossible. On the other hand, we should not avoid the 
present discussion because, although it may be impossible to justify all the claims made on 
behalf of IS, we can still make some progress to postulate the kind of substance that suits best in 
the CDH of Being by way of an initial sketchy conception of types of substances and by virtue 
of employing comparisons between them as the possible candidates for the primary term in the 
CDH of Being.  
149 Met. Λ, 7.  
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involves various natures composed of matter and form.150 Aristotle’s Universe 
is arranged so as to form a structure similar to that of a ladder, in which 
subordinating substances can be regarded as the substrata for higher substances 
that surpass and transcend these lower substances by virtue of having a higher 
level of actuality. In such a hierarchy, every substantial form finds the 
possibility of its actualization in a lower external material nature. For instance, a 
substance, man, for example, finds the possibility of its actualization in a 
mature body serving man as the material nature and the basic substratum for 
its higher existence. In these hierarchies of Beings, a higher form, because it has 
a higher actuality and richer designation, can be regarded as the rational 
principle, the cause of the existence of the lower form. At the ultimate end of 
this hierarchy, by virtue of a gradual rejection of matter and potentiality, one 
can arrive at a pure and simple formal substance, which is not in need of any 
material substratum as the basis for its existence and hence has no condition, 
other than itself, for the existence it enjoys.151 This formal substance can be 
regarded as the highest reality (ens realissimum) building up the basis for all the 
other subordinating forms of existence and this Aristotle calls, IS, namely the 
God. This substance, by way of the eternal movement it originates152 – without, 
however, ordinary direct contact153 and without itself moving –154 and by 
standing as the object of ultimate universal attraction and as the cosmic magnet, 
by virtue of the desire that it awakens in the subordinating substances, 
propagates itself through all the subordinating realities.155 This prompts us to 
                                                
150 Met. Λ, 7, 1072a26; 32. 
151 Met. Λ, 7, 1072a19-36. I will discuss the characteristics of IS somewhat haphazardly 
enumerated in this part, in chapter V while I discuss Book Λ. 
152 The movement of the stars and other planets must be caused by a substance unmovable in 
itself and eternal (Met. Λ, 8, 1073a34). 
153 For the operation of efficient cause by way of a direct contact, see Phys. III, 2, 202a3ff. This, 
however, will not do in the case of IS for certain reasons that will be cited in Book Λ, 7, 1072b1ff. 
(for a monumental exposition of these reasons one may consult Thomas Aquinas (714; n. 2529-
35): ‘Sed ex necessitate est, non sicut ea quae sunt per violentiam, sed necessitas eius est ipsum 
bene se habere, et eius movens est principium motus, scilicet ut desideratum et finis.’). For 
originating a movement by way of indirect means, see GC II, 6, 323a25; De An. II, 4, 415b2; 20. 
154 The activity of IS can be regarded as an activity of immobility (ἐνέργεια ἀκίνησίας). For this 
activity, see Cael. II, 3, 286a9; Met. Λ, 7, 1072b20ff.; EN VII, 14, 1154b27. This activity of IS should 
not be confused with ‘making’ (ποίησις); these two are articulately differentiated in EN VI, 4, 
1140a1-23; MM I, 35, 1197a3ff.  
155 Met. Λ, 7, 1072b13-14: ‘On such a principle, then, depend [ἤρτηται] the heavens [ὁ οὐρανὸς] 
and the world of nature [ἡ φύσις].’ Cf. De An. II, 4, 415a26ff. 
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think that everything that exists in the Universe inclines towards the perfect 
and everlasting existence of IS as far as its nature permits.156 In such a structure, 
if there were no IS, there would not be an ultimate principle on which all other 
Beings depend,157 nor would there be order, for ‘how is there to be order [τάξις] 
unless there is something eternal [ἀϊδίου] and independent [χοριστοῦ] and 
permanent [µένοντος]?’.158 There would be no becoming, since becoming 
depends on the motion that is originated from IS;159 nor would there be 
permanence of the existence in the Universe since ‘if they are all destructible, all 
things are destructible’.160 This structure shows sufficiently that IS is the 
ultimate reason for the existence of things in the Universe. The other types of 
substances, thus, are conditioned for the permanency of their existence to the 
ultimate everlasting substance, namely, the IS. This, in turn, shows us that IS is 
fully capable of meeting the requirements of CD in the second level, which 
addresses the intra-categorical dependency relations found in the category of 
substance. 
 
Furthermore, while discussing whether IS is capable of meeting the 
requirements of causal connectedness, I mentioned that IS can be regarded as 
the ultimate and efficient cause of the Universe. Now, because it is the ultimate 
efficient cause of the Universe, besides fulfilling the requirements of CD, such a 
substance is fully capable of meeting the requirements of ontological 
dependence (OD) as well, since none of the other substances can exist in the 
absence of IS.161 That means, because God’s nature consists of pure actuality 
and He can be regarded as the ultimate efficient cause of the Universe, one can 
conclude that He is fully capable of meeting the requirements of both OD and 
CD.    
 
                                                
156 De An. II, 4, 415a26. 
157 Met. Λ, 7, 1072b14. 
158 Met. K, 2, 1060a26. 
159 Met. Λ, 6, 1072a10. 
160 Met. Λ, 6, 1071b3. 
161 Cf. Met. Λ, 6, 1071b3-6. 
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So far, I have only inquired into the ontological dependence relations between 
IS and other substances, i.e. between intra-categorical relations. What can be 
said, however, about the first level in ontological dependence that addresses the 
inter-categorical dependency relations between substance and the other so-
called secondary categories?   
 
It is not immediately clear how IS will be the cause of the existence of so-called 
secondary categories. After all, it is not easy to affirm that IS has certain 
quantity, quality, relation etc., which implies that these secondary categories 
owe their Being not to IS but to NSS (or ESS), as they rightfully manifest 
themselves in such substances rather than IS. The framework I have presented 
so far, however, may assist us in making some progress on this question. So far, 
we have seen that IS meets the conditions requires for ontological dependence 
at the intra-categorical level. We have additionally seen that the inter-
categorical relations in ontological dependence are fully met by sensible 
substances whether eternal or not. Now, the problem seems to emerge only if 
we place IS in the former requirement, namely, the requirement of ontological 
dependence between so-called secondary categories and IS. Can we not, 
however, say that, in fulfilling the second level in ontological dependency, the 
IS also fulfils the first level in such relations, at least indirectly? Since the 
existence of NSS and ESS are conditioned to the existence of IS, and since the 
existence of secondary categories is conditioned to composite substances of all 
kinds (i.e., NSS and ESS), one can, I believe, rightly infer that IS is the actual 
reason for the existence of the secondary categories on the basis of the simple 
fact that all Beings are actually conditioned to IS. What I claim, therefore, is that 
the ontological dependence initially works between intra-categorical relations, 
that is, between IS and the other types of sensibles and by virtue of this it also 
works secondarily between inter-categorical relations between sensible 
substances and the other so-called secondary categories. In this interpretation, 
by virtue of standing as the ultimate reason for the existence in the Universe, IS 
can be regarded as the primary reason for the existence of the secondary 
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categories as well. This implies that IS fulfils the requirements of ontological 
dependence on the first level as well. 
 
My analysis so far has shown that nothing in Aristotle’s conceptualization of IS 
is incompatible with the ontological dependence and causal connectedness 
features that are required for constructing the CDH of Being. Rather, it seems 
that IS is the most suitable candidate to stand as the core item in the CDH of 
Being since such substance meets these requirements far better than the other 
types of substances.  
 
This argument shows us that if we had only inter-categorical relations in CDH 
of Being operating between secondary categories and the category of substance, 
then the science of Being would not be a universal inquiry into Being simply 
because it would not be able to study God. In order to attain the required unity 
of the science of Being despite the multiplicity of Being, we must have a unique 
structure that paves the way for unity through a core item. This is supplied in 
Book Γ and it works in two levels, that is, between inter-categorical and intra-
categorical relations. If we were not to accept the intra-categorical relations 
operating in the CDH of Being we would not be able to have a universal science 
of Being simply because in such circumstances, God, who is the most proper 
candidate for being the core item in the CDH of Being would be excluded from 
the system.  
 
2.5. Conclusions 
 
We have seen that Aristotle’s effort in establishing the CDH of Being proceeds 
against the background of Platonism, which would have prevented him 
establishing several special sciences along with the universal science of Being. 
Having rejected the view that Being has a single synonymous sense, as Plato 
had been espousing, Aristotle finds himself in an aporia with respect to the unity 
of the science of Being. Much of his effort in Book Γ can be gauged against this 
background, that is, to overcome simultaneously the problem of the over-
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comprehensiveness and the unity of the science of Being. He effectively 
constructs the foundations of the science of Being by virtue of a special kind of 
homonymy, namely, the CDH, which provides him with sufficient grounds to 
overcome the puzzles that he must resolve in any event in order that he can 
structure the science he seeks to establish in Metaphysics. Aristotle reaches his 
aim in establishing the science of Being by assigning substance as the primary 
concern of this science and by forming a framework that helps him to cluster 
the other instances of Being around the ‘core’, by virtue of which he manages to 
attain some kind of unity among several homonymous instances of Being. 
 
This much must have appeared to be sufficient for Aristotle’s aims in Book Γ to 
establish the grounds of the science of Being through the CDH, so that he does 
not seem to be willing to spend any effort to detail what kind of substance that 
has been said to be the primary concern of metaphysician, merits being the core 
item in the CDH of Being. Book Γ, therefore, solely seeks to establish the 
background against which the science of Being will later be established. Once, 
however, we have distinguished the types of substances according to what 
Aristotle has told us elsewhere in his corpus, we have the opportunity to 
commit a provisional assessment of the best referent of what Book Γ has quite 
ambiguously stated as ‘substance’ as the core item in the CDH of Being. That 
assessment, in turn, shows that we have good reason to suggest IS, namely, 
God, as the core item in the CDH of Being for this, as we have seen, is capable 
of meeting the requirements of CDH that stands out from the examples given in 
Book Γ better than the other possible candidates, namely, the NSS and ESS. 
Need there be any surprise, then, if we encounter a theological 
conceptualization of the science of Being in later stages of Aristotle’s inquiry? 
As we have seen so far, nothing in Book Γ seems to contradict such a theological 
conception, seeing that what we are told with respect to the CDH of Being in no 
way prevents us placing IS at the centre of the study of Being. 
 
According to Aristotle’s declarations in Book Γ, the prime subject matter of the 
science of Being is, therefore, substance, through which the several other 
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instances of Being are studied by virtue of the structural aid provided by CDH. 
This, study, as Aristotle records, is a genuine study into Being, marked by what 
Aristotle calls the study of ‘Being qua Being’:  
 
There is a science [ἐπιστήµη] which investigates [θεωρεῖ] being as being [ὂν ᾗ 
ὄν] and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature [καὶ τὰ 
τούτῳ ὑπάρχοντα καθ᾿ αὑτό].162 Now this is not the same as any of the so-
called special sciences; for none of these others deals generally with being as 
being [καθόλου περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὄν]. They cut off [ἀποτεµόµεναι] a part of 
being and investigate the attributes [τὸ συµβεβηκός] of this part- this is what 
the mathematical sciences for instance do.163  
Aristotle contrasts the science of Being with the so-called special sciences in 
terms of their subject matter; the former science of Being deals universally with 
Being, the latter so-called special sciences deal with a part of Being. We have 
already seen that the reason for this lies upon the grounding structures upon 
                                                
162 i.e. καθ᾿ αὑτό (per se) attributes of Being. Note that according to Aristotle there are several 
senses of ‘per se’ (See An. Post. I, 4; Met. Δ, 18) of which two are significant. An attribute is 
linked to a subject in per se-1 way if it is involved in the definition of that subject (An. Post. I, 4, 
73a34; Met. Δ, 18, 1022a25) e.g. ‘animal’ is a per se-1 attribute of Callias since it is present in the 
formula that defines him; that is, Callias is a particular animal. Again, plot (µῦθος) can be 
regarded as a per se-1 attribute of a tragedy (Poet. 6, 1449a24) since it can be regarded as an 
inseparable constituent element involved in the definition and nature of a tragedy. In per se-2 
one should focus on the definition of the attribute connected to the subject rather than the 
definition of the subject. In this case, the necessary reference to the subject makes it possible for 
the attributes to be defined. In other words, the attribute is no longer involved in the description 
of the subject; rather, the subject itself is involved in the definition of the attribute. Hence, an 
attribute y belongs to a subject x in per se-2 way, if the subject x is mentioned in the account of 
what y is (see An. Post. I, 4, 73a37). For instance, ‘odd’ and ‘even’ are per se-2 attributes of 
‘number’ as they refer to ‘number’, by way of which they are defined. Similarly, ‘straight’ and 
‘curved’ are per se-2 attributes of ‘line’ since their definition necessarily involves the utterance 
of ‘line’ (cf. De. An. I, 1, 402b20). In the same manner, ‘whiteness’ pertains to ‘surface’ in a per 
se-2 way (cf. Met. Z, 4, 1029b16). The most frequent example given by Aristotle to illustrate this 
sense of per se is a triangle whose interior angles are equal to two right angles (Top. II, 3, 110b22; 
De An. I, 1, 402b20; PA I, 3, 643a30; Met. Δ, 30, 1025a30). Per se-2, therefore, is very similar to 
propria (ἴδιον), which is defined thus: ‘A property [ἴδιον] is something which does not indicate 
the essence of a thing, but yet belongs to that thing alone, and is predicated convertively 
[ἀντικατηγορεῖται] of it’ (Top. I, 5, 102a17). (For the passages where Aristotle uses propria in a 
similar way to per se-2, see Phys. III, 1, 200b24; De An. I, 1, 402a9; SS 1, 436a4; OS 2, 455a13; OD 
1, 458b6.) The properties of a subject are those that are strictly peculiar to that subject; for 
instance, learning grammar is a property of man and to use the nostrils as a hand is a property 
of elephants (PA II, 16, 658b33). These can be contrasted with common attributes shared by 
many subjects. (For propria as the opposite of ‘common attributes’, see De An. II, 3, 414b24; SS 1, 
436a4; OS 2, 455a13; OD 1, 458b6; EN III, 11, 1118b9; Pol. III, 4, 1276b24; Econ. II, 1, 1345b18). It is 
noticeable that the relationship between the subject and per se-1 attributes is a more rigid type 
of relationship compared with that of per se-2, which is more general and flexible. 
There is a certain similarity between ‘qua’ phrases and per se. To study Being qua Being is to 
study Beings as far as they are necessarily and universally Beings, which in turn – according to 
Posterior Analytics (I, 4, 73b26-74a3) – amounts to saying that it is to study Being in itself and as 
such (i.e., per se). For this resemblance, see Owens (1951), pp. 260; Wilson, pp. 8-9; 17-18. 
163 Met. Γ, 1, 1003a20-26. 
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which these two types of sciences are established. We have seen that the so-
called special sciences are constructed upon ordinary kata hen structures, where 
the scope of science is limited to the genus it aims to reveal, whereas the science 
of Being is constructed upon a CDH, which allows for several genera to be 
studied by a single science, without thereby losing the unity required to be 
attained by any science. The necessary relations found between instances of 
CDH, therefore, pave the way for a study to spread beyond intra-categorical 
relations through an inter-categorical investigation. By virtue of the CDH, as we 
have seen, we do not need to limit our inquiry to the scope of a single genus in 
case we lose the unity of the scope of the science in question. This structure 
allows Aristotle to establish a universal science of Being that studies many 
manifestations of Being through a unified study. 
 
Though special sciences deal with Being, none of them deals with Being qua 
Being.164 For instance, physics deals with Beings, nevertheless it investigates 
those Beings inasmuch as they are moving, that is, qua moving or, again, 
biology deals with them qua living and mathematics qua some certain quantity. 
Similarly to these sciences, the science of Being also deals with Beings, but not 
inasmuch as they are moving or living or some other determination postulated 
by the genus in question, but inasmuch as they are Beings; that is, it deals with 
Being qua Being. That is why Aristotle affirms that ‘none of these others deals 
generally with being as being’. 
 
According to this conception, the science of Being will study Being qua Being, 
which is to study what it is for something to be. Book Γ has sufficiently shown 
that the only way to commit such an inquiry into Being qua Being is through 
the structure provided by CDH. In accordance with the necessary relations 
found between the instances of CDH, in studying the primary instance of Being 
                                                
164 Many commentators have inquired into what it is to be understood by the term ‘Being qua 
Being’. See, for instance, Alexander of Aphrodisias, IV, 239:5-240:30; Syrianus, IV, 54:16-55:16; 
Thomas Aquinas, p. 150, n. 530; p. 151, n. 532; Suárez, IV, 1, pp. 68-9; Grote (1872), p. 302; Marx 
(1954), pp. 22-9 (cf. p. 35); Jaeger (1962), pp. 215-23; Owens (1951), ch. VII; (2007), pp. 50-3; pp. 
66-9; Leszl (1975), p. 30ff.; p. 383 (cf. p. 386ff.); Reale (1980), p. xxvii; p. 117; pp. 143-146; p. 421; 
Cleary (1994), pp. 67-9; Irwin (2002), pp. 170-172.  
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one can attain knowledge of the peripheral instances as well. Such a structure 
necessarily requires that we regard the highest instance of Being as a primary 
term, since only this highest instance can realize the requirements of CDH in 
full. If we were to accept a secondary instance as the primary term of CDH of 
Being, however, the investigation could not spread through the peripheral 
elements that cannot be linked to such a secondary instance in three of the 
requirements of CDH, which would result in the exclusion of these parts from 
the realm of the study in question, which would not, in turn, yield a universal 
study of Being. Only in this way, that is through the primary instance of Being, 
would the universal inquiry into Beings qua Beings be possible. To study what 
it is for something to be, that is, to study Being qua Being, falls into the 
responsibility of a metaphysician who articulates the manner in which things 
are, as well as their ontological status. In this way, therefore, a metaphysician 
studies Being qua Being, that is, he commits his inquiry through the primary 
instance of Being by virtue of the structure provided by CDH. This seems to be 
exactly what Aristotle maintains in Book E:  
 
[A] One might indeed raise the question whether first philosophy [πρώτη 
φιλοσοφία] is universal [καθόλου], or deals with one genus [περί τι γένος], 
i.e., some one kind of being [φύσιν τινὰ µίαν]; for not even the mathematical 
sciences are all alike in this respect, – geometry and astronomy deal with a 
certain particular kind of thing [περί τινα φύσιν εἰσίν], while universal 
[καθόλου] mathematics applies alike to all. [B] We answer that if there is no 
substance other than those which are formed by nature [φύσει συνεστηκυίας], 
natural science [ἡ φυσικὴ] will be the first science [πρώτη ἐπιστήµη]; [C] but if 
there is an immovable substance [οὐσία ἀκίνητος], the science of this must be 
prior [προτέρα] and must be first philosophy [φιλοσοφία πρώτη], and 
universal in this way, because it is first [καθόλου οὕτως ὅτι πρώτη]. [D] And 
it will belong to this to consider being qua being – both what it is [τί ἐστι] and 
the attributes which belong to it qua being [τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ᾗ ὄν].165  
I find this passage extremely important on behalf of what I have been claiming 
so far in this chapter. What I want to draw attention to is that, having placed the 
puzzle concerning the science of Being in [A], the solution that Aristotle seem to 
espouse in [C] with concision remarkable even for him is quite similar to the 
one that I have suggested throughout this chapter. 
 
                                                
165 Met. E, 1, 1026a23-32. 
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Aristotle’s views can be unpacked as follows. To begin with, as Aristotle 
immediately points out in [A], one can indeed observe a puzzle concerning the 
scope of the science of Being. He encapsulates this puzzle by stating that one 
may be tempted to ask whether the science of Being is a universal study of all 
things that are, or should be considered as a science dealing with a particular 
nature (φύσιν τινὰ µίαν), in this case, the IS. He immediately refers to 
mathematical sciences in order to illustrate further the puzzle concerning the 
science of Being, stating that these too have different levels of universality. 
Geometry and astronomy, for instance, have different levels of universality: 
whereas the former deals solely with planes, which is one type of quantity 
among others, the latter deals additionally with space. Beyond these, there is 
universal mathematics (τὴν καθόλου µαθηµατικήν),166 which deals with the 
highest principles of mathematics, and therefore certainly has a greater scope 
than the aforementioned types of mathematical sciences. The case of 
mathematics can be associated with Being; just as the universal science of 
mathematics that studies the highest principles of mathematics is universal 
among the mathematical sciences, so the science of Being, through studying the 
highest principles of all things that are, is the most universal amongst all the 
other sciences. 
 
In [B] Aristotle states that if there were no substances other than non-eternal 
sensibles (NSS), physics would be the highest science. This is indeed true, 
because if in the scale of Being there were no eternal sensible substances (ESS) 
and IS, NSS would be the highest among all other Beings, and physics, by virtue 
of studying these highest instances, would be the highest among other sciences. 
In such a case, in other words, physics would correspond to the ‘universal 
science of mathematics’ in the analogy given in [A]. We have seen that NSS are 
capable of fulfilling the requirements of CDH on a very limited level, that is, the 
level of sensible substances, but such substances cannot be regarded as prior to 
                                                
166 Bonitz (1849, p. 285) believes that τὴν καθόλου µαθηµατικήν refers to arithmetic (just as 
Thomas Aquinas does; see p. 156, n. 563). Ross, however opposes him by accepting that the 
science meant here is a general one dealing with every possible quantity and so has even wider 
scope than arithmetic (1924, I, pp. 356-7). In terms of what I wish to maintain in this part, 
whether arithmetic or universal mathematics is meant does not matter.   
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ESS nor are they prior to IS, nor still can they be regarded as proper causes of 
higher substances (i.e., ESS and IS). What Aristotle states in [B], then, amounts 
to saying that if these ESS and IS were not to exist, NSS would fulfil the 
requirements of CDH in full and therefore the science that studies such 
substances would be the first (and universal through the necessary connections 
found in CDH) among others. Given that Aristotle’s system involves substances 
of necessity that are higher than NSS, what we have been told in [B] is not a 
probable result and, I think, Aristotle’s reason for pronouncing [B] is purely 
rhetorical, it might be spelled out just to emphasize his solution to the puzzle 
concerning the science of Being in [C]. 
 
Contrary to the view pronounced in [B], in [C], Aristotle claims with a special 
emphasis on IS (οὐσία ἀκίνητος) that there are indeed higher substances and, 
rather than physics, the science that deals with IS should be regarded as the first 
among other sciences. As I have mentioned, this is imperative when one 
considers the structure of CDH and the required relations between such 
structures upon which the science of Being is established. According to the 
schema provided by CDH, only the science dealing with the highest instance of 
Being, namely IS, can fulfil the requirements of CDH in full. Other possible 
instances, however, are conditioned to still a higher substance, which shows 
that study of these instances will not give any information about these higher 
instances but vice versa. All the possible instances of Being (whether NSS or 
ESS) are capable of being linked necessarily to IS, as I have shown. If, then, a 
science is to study Being as a whole, it should focus on IS, given that only such a 
substance is suitable to stand as the primary element in the CDH of Being. By 
way of this fulfilment, I mean, by the necessary connections, grounding the 
causal structure of CDH, the study propagates through the other instances as 
well. Therefore, by virtue of dealing with the primary instance of Being, which 
is capable of meeting the requirements needed to establish necessary 
connections between all instances of Being, the science of Being turns out to be a 
universal science. Were it not to deal with the highest instance of Being, it 
would not be universal either. That is what we can extract from Aristotle’s 
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statement that the science of the highest is universal, because it deals with the 
first instance of Being, namely, God. In [C], therefore, Aristotle seems to address 
what I have claimed through the course of this chapter, that once we have the 
types of substances, only one of them, the first, will prove to be the core item in 
the structure established in Book Γ, whereby the universal science of Being is 
established. Hence, a combination of the types of substances revealed in the 
Aristotelian corpus with the structure established in Book Γ with respect to the 
CDH of Being shows that nothing that we have been told in Book Γ is 
incompatible with the theological conception of the science of Being.  
 
In [D] Aristotle states that the aforementioned science of Being, which executes 
a universal study of Being through investigating the prime instance of Being, 
should be the one that studies Being qua Being. To study Being qua Being, that 
is, to study what it is for something to be, is possible only through the special 
kind of structure offered in Book Γ, which necessitates that this study can only 
be pursued through the study of a core item that is necessarily prior in every 
possible way. To study that item, in turn, will lead to knowledge about things 
in so far as they are Beings. This is indeed a universal study of things, but such 
a study can only be executed by way of a core that is prior in an absolute way. 
This study will inquire into things as far as they are Beings; it will study what it 
is for them to exist and hence, will involve an investigation of the level and the 
manner of existence of things in the Universe. It will determine the ontological 
statuses and mode of the existence of things through inquiring into the primary 
instance of Being, that is, Being par excellence. One may be tempted to subscribe 
to the view that we can indeed have some information about whether things 
exist and how they exist without, however, having any knowledge with respect 
to the primary instance of Being. This view is correct, for nothing prevents us 
gaining some kind of information about Being. However, if this information is 
to be turned into a unified scientific knowledge, one should trace the patterns 
offered in Book Γ. That pattern provides the possibility of a universal study 
through the necessary connections found between the core item and the non-
core instances of Being.  
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Studying the level of existence of things, the manner of their existence, their 
elements in so far as these elements are Beings, the status of their essences and 
the ultimate principles to which all these Beings are necessarily linked, is what 
it means to study Beings qua Beings, that is, to study what it is for these things 
to be, and such a study can only be executed by virtue of inquiring into the first 
instance of Being, which is constructed upon a special structure provided in the 
text of Book Γ, namely, CDH. Once one distinguishes several types of 
substances, one will see that nothing that is established in Book Γ is 
incompatible with the theological view that stands out in other treatises of 
Metaphysics rather, it seems upon reflection that the structure offered in Book Γ 
motivates strongly that we find a harmony between the several stages of 
Aristotle’s establishment of the science of Being.  
 
Finally, I want to point out that my claim can further be confirmed by a passage 
in Book Γ, which involves what I want to call the ‘parts of philosophy 
argument’. In order to understand this argument, let me first turn to an aporia 
stated in Book B against which this argument proceeds:   
 
In general, do all substances fall under one science or under more than one? If 
the latter, to what sort of substance is the present science to be assigned? On 
the other hand, it is not reasonable [οὐκ εὔλογον] that one science should deal 
with all [πασῶν]. For then there would be one demonstrative science 
[ἀποδεικτικὴ] dealing with all attributes [τῶν συµβεβηκότων].167  
The aporia is structured upon the question that it is difficult to decide whether 
the science of Being deals with all substances or with a single substance. If the 
former alternative is taken, we should be forced to accept a single giant science 
of Being covering all types of substances. This view, which is very similar to the 
one that Plato arrives at, as I have already mentioned, is what Aristotle wanted 
to distance himself from on the grounds of some epistemological reasons 
peculiar to his philosophy. If we accept the latter alternative, however, that the 
science of Being deals with a single substance, it will still be difficult to decide 
which of the several types of substances (NSS, ESS or IS) should be studied by 
                                                
167 Met. B, 2, 997a15-19. Cf. Met. B, 1, 995b10-13; K, 1, 1059a26-29. 
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the science in question. If the interpretation I suggest is right, then Aristotle 
should take this alternative and decide for IS as the basic focus of the science of 
Being. 
 
Indeed, Aristotle seems to provide an answer to this puzzle as he attempts to 
solve it in a passage from Book Γ by stating that ‘there are as many parts of 
philosophy (µέρη φιλοσοφίας) as there are kinds of substance (ὅσαι περ αἱ 
οὐσίαι), so that there must necessarily be among them a first philosophy 
(πρώτην) and one which follows this’.168 According to this line of thought, 
different kinds of substances fall under the umbrella of different sorts of 
philosophy. Among these philosophies, one of them is first (i.e., first 
philosophy) by virtue of dealing with the first type of substance, which, as we 
have seen, can be nothing but IS. The second philosophies follow it, as they deal 
with the other types of substances, e.g., astronomy, which deals with eternal 
sensible substances (ESS).169 The view that the science of Being investigates all 
types of substances is therefore ruled out, according to the textual evidence. 
Later, we shall see in Book E that a similar differentiation of philosophies into 
several types will be executed on the grounds that these philosophies deal with 
different types of substances.170  
 
This, therefore, seems to be the view Aristotle espouses in Book Γ, and nothing 
in this conception is incompatible with the theological conception of the science 
of Being that we encounter in later stages of his treatise. His explicit 
pronunciation of God as the prime focus of investigation for the science of 
Being in later parts of Metaphysics,171 and his initial affirmation in Book A that 
God should be regarded as the ultimate concern of the ‘science we seek’,172 is 
not thereby incompatible with what he establishes in Book Γ to provide a 
grounding structure for the science of Being, that is, the CDH. These remarks 
                                                
168 Met. Γ, 2, 1004a2-4. 
169 This is confirmed explicitly in Book Λ: ‘... mathematical sciences which is most akin 
[οἰκειοτάτης] to philosophy – viz. of astronomy; for this science speculates about substance 
which is perceptible [αἰσθητῆς] but eternal [ἀϊδίου]...’ Met. Λ, 8, 1073b4. 
170 Met. E, 1, 1026a10-19. I shall discuss this passage in close detail in the next chapter. 
171 See, for instance, Met. E, 1, 1026a9; Λ, 7. 
172 Met. A, 2, 982b10. 
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on Book Γ do not amount to a full explanation of Aristotle’s argument here, let 
alone a justification of the way Aristotle does argue. But it seems to me that this 
must be the direction Aristotle’s argument takes.  
 
Insisting on the view that Book Γ strictly supports a non-theological science and 
to provide explanations for Aristotle’s philosophical development on historical 
and philological grounds will produce more problems than it seeks to resolve. 
My interpretation, on the other hand, makes Book Γ fit with the rest of 
Metaphysics, including Book Λ without any peculiar philological or historical 
speculation. I will accordingly trace the science of Being in the other treatises of 
Metaphysics in the light of what I have so far proposed and will provide 
additional support for my theological approach to the science of Being, 
whereby I intend to prove my hypothesis in full with respect to IS being the 
primary element of the CDH of Being.   
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CHAPTER III  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The notable feature of Book E is Aristotle’s constant effort to differentiate first 
philosophy from the other sciences. As a consequence of this effort, Aristotle 
manages to draw the limits of three basic theoretical sciences by determining 
their relative place in the whole epistemological structure. His major aim, which 
is to determine the actual frontiers of the science of Being, is not an easy task. 
Given the background of Book Γ and Aristotle’s own criteria, which he uses to 
differentiate this science from the other theoretical sciences in Book E, it seems, 
at least in the first instance, that the content and subject matter of the science of 
Being are debatable. Indeed, one may be tempted to argue that in Book Γ 
Aristotle is inclined to think that metaphysics is general science of Being 
(metaphysica generalis). This inclination continues in the opening sentences of 
Book E, where Aristotle says that metaphysics does not study a particular 
restricted genus as the other sciences do. Although Aristotle seems to be clear in 
his tendency towards a general science of Being, in the later passages of Book E 
he informs us that this science deals with the highest instance of Being, and that 
the science of Being should be regarded as theology (metaphysica specialis). What 
is the connection, if any, between them? Aristotle does not say. 
 
Unsurprisingly, and for good reason, the relationship between Book Γ and Book 
E has long puzzled scholars. Often, scholars find these two texts irreconcilable; 
what Aristotle does in Book E, according to such a view, is to establish a special 
science dealing with a particular kind of Being, in this case, God, whereby it can 
rightly be called ‘theology’ whereas in Book Γ, Aristotle’s aim is to establish a 
universal science of Being dealing with all departments of Being without any 
limitation whatsoever. Jaeger, for instance, strongly emphasized the 
contradiction between the conceptions of the science of Being in these two 
treatises: 
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But now this determination of the nature of metaphysics purely by means of 
its subject-matter, namely unmoved and transcendent being, makes it one 
special science among others. Whereas elsewhere it is considered as the 
universal science of being as such, and sharply contrasted with the sciences 
that examine only a special kind of being (ὄν τι καὶ γένος τι), here it is itself 
merely the knowledge of the highest kind of being (περὶ τὸ τιµιώτατον 
γένος). Its object is said to be being of this kind (τοιαύτη φύσις), and it is to be 
looked for in a particular genus of reality, namely in the cosmic region of 
what is visible but imperishable. The contradiction is undeniable1  
According to Jaeger, Book E limits the subject matter of the science of Being into 
what is imperishable and unmoved. This however sharply contradicts the 
description of the science of Being that we encounter in Book Γ, according to 
which the science of Being deals with all departments of Being. The universal 
science of Being cannot be reconciled with the special theology of Book E.  
 
Other scholars have challenged this view and attempted show the 
reconcilability of the conceptions of the science of Being in Book E and Book Γ.2 
The proponents of the latter view have tried to show that in dealing with the 
first instance of Being, that is God, the science of Being turns out to be a 
universal inquiry into Being. Most recently, Frede has attempted to show the 
reconcilability of Book E and Book Γ. According to him, the science of Being 
studies ‘a way of Being’ of divine substances to which other ‘ways of Being’ 
depend so that in studying divine substances, the science of Being turns out to 
be a universal inquiry into Being.3  
 
The supporters of the latter view claiming that the conceptions of the science of 
Being in Book E and Book Γ are reconcilable, I think, do not offer satisfactory 
explanation for their stance, most significantly because they do not explain how 
it is that the criteria employed to establish the science of Being in Book Γ 
parallel exactly the criteria put forward in Book E. In Frede’s view, for instance, 
one might be puzzled as to how in fact one is to reconcile Aristotle’s explicit 
assignment of the study of ‘what it is’ and ‘if it is’ to the science of Being with 
                                                
1 Jaeger (1962), p. 217. 
2 See introduction for a discussion of the proponents of this view. 
3 Frede (1987b). 
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the previously held criteria of the science of Being that we encounter in Book Γ. 
The effect of the two tasks of the science of Being, namely, ‘what it is’ and ‘if it 
is’, on its subject matter, that is, ‘way of being’ of eternal substances is not clear 
in Frede’s proposal. Furthermore, it seems that Aristotle’s two further criteria 
put for forward in Book E, namely, separation and immovability, denote 
determinate substance, that is, God, rather than a ‘way of Being’ of divine 
substances. Hence, these two criteria that are introduced in Book E show that it 
is exactly with the God that the science of Being must concern itself rather than 
a ‘way of Being’ of divine substances. These gaps undermine Frede’s argument 
about the reconcilability of the conceptions of the science of Being in Book Γ 
and Book E and for this reason, they need to be filled up for a more satisfactory 
answer to the puzzle of reconcilability. In order to give a satisfactory answer to 
the question of reconcilability one must accordingly show the absolute 
parallelisms between the criteria upon which the science of Being established in 
Book Γ and the criteria assigned to the science of Being in Book E. 
 
Aristotle’s enterprise in Book Γ was focused on establishing a universal science 
of Being, which studies Being qua Being. The conception of Being as a core-
dependent homonym (CDH) prepares the ground for a unified study of Being 
even though Being is not a genus. The question that I shall be dealing with in 
this part is whether this conception of the science of Being that we encounter in 
Book Γ parallels what is espoused in Book E. In the latter, Aristotle proposes 
some further criteria upon which the science of Being is established. He assigns 
the study of ‘what it is’ and ‘if it is’ to the science of Being and determines the 
subject of this science as what is ‘immovable’ and ‘separate’ whereby he 
differentiates the science of Being from the other theoretical sciences (i.e. 
physics and mathematics). The question then arises whether we can find a 
relation between these criteria and the criteria that Aristotle has hitherto 
established in Book Γ. 
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3.2. ‘What it is’ (τί ἐστιν) and ‘If it is’ (εἰ ἔστιν): Differentiation of Metaphysics 
from the Other So-called Special Sciences 
 
In this part, I shall concentrate particularly on two tasks of the science of Being, 
both rather peculiar on the face of it, by way of which Aristotle constructs the 
basis of a possible differentiation of this science from the other so-called special 
sciences, and later relate these two tasks to the previously encountered 
conception of science of Being in Book Γ. The reconciliation between Book Γ 
and Book E is brought to the surface if one reads Book Γ in the way I suggest, 
that is, such that the science of Being is established upon three criteria, namely, 
ontological dependence, logical dependence and causal connectedness. This 
reading, as I shall show throughout this chapter paves the way for a clean 
reconciliation between the conceptions of the science of Being in Book Γ and 
Book E.  
 
To this end, we might wish to understand better the two tasks, namely, the 
study of ‘what it is’ and ‘if it is’, claimed to be attributed to the science of Being 
in Book E. Accordingly, I shall first offer an assessment, seeking to improve our 
understanding of these tasks. Later, after setting the backdrop against which an 
evaluation of whether these tasks are reconcilable to what has been previously 
established in Book Γ can be grasped, I will attempt to relate these tasks to the 
criteria upon which the CDH is established in Book Γ. 
 
According to what we have been told in Book E, no science deals with the ‘what 
it is’ and ‘if it is’, that is, the essence and existence, of the subject genus it 
studies. Instead, the special sciences assume the essences and existences of their 
subject genera by way of perception or hypothesis, for which reason they are 
not tasked with demonstrating the essence and existence of their subject matter. 
The idea that every science presupposes some previous knowledge has its roots 
in Posterior Analytics, and I will refer to this text frequently in my reading of this 
section of Metaphysics. Accordingly, my initial concern in this part will be to 
understand (1) what is implied by the terms ‘what it is’ and ‘if it is’; (2) why the 
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study of them is assigned only to the science of Being in Book E; and (3) how it 
is possible, in accordance with what we have been told in Book E, that the study 
of ‘whatness’ and ‘ifness’ belongs to the same intellection, as well as the 
implications of such a claim for the role of theology in Aristotle’s conception of 
the science of Being.  
      
In the opening lines of Book E, Aristotle carefully distinguishes the science of 
Being from the other sciences. The differentiation is made on the basis of the 
different scopes that these sciences focus on: 
  
[A] We are seeking the principles and the causes [αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰ αἴτια] of the 
things that are [τῶν ὄντα], and obviously of things qua being [δῆλον δὲ ὅτι ᾗ 
ὄντα]. For there is a cause of health and of good condition, and the object of 
mathematics have principles [ὰρχαὶ] and elements [στοιχεῖα] and causes 
[αἴτια], and in general every science which is ratiocinative [διανοητικὴ] or at 
all involves reasoning [µετέχουσά τι διανοίας] deals with causes and 
principles, exact [ἀκριβεστέρας] or indeterminate [ἁπλουστέρας]; [B] but all 
these sciences mark off some particular being [περὶ ὄν τι] –some genus, and 
inquire into this, but not into being simply [περὶ ὄντος ἁπλῶς] nor qua being, 
[C] nor do they offer any discussion of the essence [τί ἐστιν] of the things of 
which they treat; but starting from essence – some making it plain to the 
senses [αἰσθήσει ποιήσασαι], others assuming it as a hypothesis [ὑπόθεσειν 
λαβοῦσαι] – they then demonstrate [ἀποδεικνύουσιν], more or less cogently, 
the essential attributes of the genus [τὰ καθ’ αὑτὰ ὑπάρχοντα τῷ γένει] with 
which they deal. It is obvious, therefore, from such a review of the sciences, 
that there is no demonstration of substance [οὑκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις οὐσίας] or of 
the essence [τί ἐστιν], but some other way of revealing it [ἀλλά τις ἄλλος 
τρόπος τῆς δηλώσεως]. [D] And similarly the sciences omit the question 
whether the genus with which they deal exists [εἰ ἔστιν] or does not exist, [E] 
because it belongs to the same line of thought [τῆς αὐτῆς εἶναι διανοίας] to 
show what it is [τί ἐστιν] and that it is [εἰ ἔστιν].4  
This passage neatly encapsulates the essential differences between the science 
of Being and the other sciences. It starts [A] with an implicit reference to 
previous discussions in Book A and Book Γ; in Book A, Aristotle established 
‘Wisdom’ as the science of the ultimate principles and causes, while in Book Γ 
he has constructed CDH upon which the science of Being is established and 
added ‘Being qua Being’ into this conception. This conception continues, now 
with a more systematic enterprise of differentiating the science of Being from 
other sciences and establishing the frontiers of this science. [B] The 
‘universality’ of the science of Being in contrast to the ‘particularity’ of the other 
                                                
4 Met. E, 1, 1025b2-17. 
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sciences provides the basis for picturing the fundamental differentiation 
between this science and the so-called special sciences.  This conception, in turn, 
finds its basis in Aristotle’s assertion that no science deals with [C] the essence 
(i.e., ‘what it is’ [τί ἐστιν]) and [D] existence (i.e., ‘if it is’ [εἰ ἔστιν]) of its subject 
genus. Finally, [E] Aristotle informs us that the study of ‘what it is’ and ‘if it is’ 
belongs to the same type of intellection [τῆς αὐτῆς εἶναι διανοίας]. I investigate 
[A] in detail at the end of this chapter, where I also discuss [B] (i.e., the 
universality of the conception of the science of Being in Book E). This section is 
thus limited to [C], [D] and [E]. 
 
3.2.1. ‘What it is’ (τί ἐστιν) 
 
The basis of the idea that every science assumes the essence of its subject genus 
might be found in Aristotle’s famous assertion that ‘all teaching and all learning 
of an intellectual kind proceed from pre-existent knowledge’.5 Sciences, in other 
words, proceed from some principles that cannot be demonstrated by the very 
same science in question. In this conception, every science assumes some 
principles and establishes its body upon this pre-existing knowledge of 
principles. In Posterior Analytics, Aristotle explicates the basic features of these 
principles according to which they must be true (ἀληθῶν), primitive (πρώτων), 
immediate (ἀµέσων), more knowable (γνωριµωτέρων) and prior (πρωτέρων).6 
These features accentuate strongly enough that it is impossible to demonstrate 
at the same time the principles and the conclusions derived from these 
principles within the scope of the very same science. Hence, the study of 
principles and the conclusions relying on those principles belong to different 
kinds of intellection, but what are these principles? 
 
One might appeal to Posterior Analytics in order to find an answer to this 
question as well. In every science, there are at least three principles, without 
                                                
5 An. Post. I, 1, 71a1 (‘πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα µάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προυπαρχούσης γίνεται 
γνώσεως’). 
6 An. Post. I, 1, 71b20. Owing to space limitations, I cannot discuss these features here, even 
though they would probably produce intriguing results in terms of Aristotle’s overall 
conception of science. 
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which no science can operate:7 the definitions, the common axioms and the 
genera that are studied by the specific science in question. According to this 
conception, every science assumes some definitions of its basic subject matter 
and derives its conclusions from some common axioms that are also external to 
the scope of the very same science. Furthermore, these sciences are incapable of 
determining their subject genera; hence, they assume these pre-determined 
subject-genera, within the scope of which they carry out their study. What is 
interesting in this conception is that the particular sciences cannot define the 
basic terms of their subject matter. I deal with this rather peculiar characteristic 
of Aristotelian science later in the chapter. Besides this, this conception is 
particularly interesting for it implies that there should be at least one science 
investigating the definitions and the common axioms. It seems that this same 
science should also determine the basic genera of particular sciences, otherwise 
these principles remain unstudied and unknown, which is clearly an unhappy 
result for a conception of a science that is in every way based on principles such 
as definitions, common axioms and the genera. We might not, however, need to 
be troubled for such an upshot for, according to what we are told in Book Γ, the 
common axioms are studied by the science of Being and they do not remain 
unknown. In the very same book, however, namely, in Book Γ, there were no 
indications that the science of Being studies the definitions8 let alone any 
implications that it determines the basic genera of the other special sciences. 
Hence, given the background of Posterior Analytics, it is quite natural that one 
might expect Aristotle to say something about definitions of basic concepts and 
the determination of genera of sciences. With this expectation in mind, one may 
reasonably ask whether there is a connection between Aristotle’s assignment of 
‘what it is’ to first philosophy in Book E and the conception of science in 
Posterior Analytics that I have roughly described. The answer to this question 
requires a precise determination of what Aristotle means by ‘what it is’, and it is 
on this that I will now focus.  
                                                
7 An. Post. I, 2, 72a5-24; X, 76a31-77a4. 
8 Except in 1003b34, where Aristotle declares that the essence of species of unity and Being (e.g. 
concepts such as same and similar) should be studied by a single science. Here, however, he 
does not systematically establish that the definitions are to be included in the scope of first 
philosophy. 
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Even a rough examination of the meaning of ‘what it is’ in the Aristotelian 
corpus will show that Aristotle mostly uses it when he discusses definition.9 
This is supported in actual practice, since he always explicates and investigates 
the definition of something when he constructs questions of the form ‘what is 
...?’. This type of question always asks the technical definition of something.10 
Since a definition is constructed upon the necessary connections between the 
subject and predicate, Aristotle sometimes refers to ‘what it is’ as a necessary 
attribute of the subject defined. Accordingly, one might not be surprised when 
one says what is predicated of a subject in ‘what it is’ is a necessary attribute of 
that subject.11 The claim that ‘what it is’ as a necessary attribute is also justified 
when Aristotle contrasts this term with the accidental attributes of a subject.12  
 
In determining what these necessary attributes actually are, it would be useful 
to have a rough conception of how Aristotle establishes definitions.13 Aristotle’s 
discussions of this subject illustrate that every definition involves three 
constituents; a subject (i.e., species), a genus, and a differentia. For instance, in 
‘man is a rational animal’, ‘man’ refers to the subject (which also refers to the 
species), whereas ‘animal’ refers to the genus and ‘rational’ to the differentia. In 
every definition, the differentia divides genus into atomic species. These three 
constitute the ‘whatness’ of something by positioning a subject into the 
hierarchies of kinds under which every particular thing is placed. A multiplicity 
of individuals cannot be placed under an infinite number of kinds, or else it 
                                                
9 For the places where Aristotle uses ‘what it is’ as ‘definition’ see, for instance, An. Pr. I, 27, 
43b7; An. Post. I, 22, 82b37; 83b5; II, 3, 90b4; 90b31; 13, 97a24; Top. I, 5, 102a32; 8, 103b13; 18, 
108b22; VI, 1, 139a28, 29; Meteor. IV, 12, 390b17; De An. I, 1, 403a30; Met. B, 2, 996b20; Δ, 13, 
1020a19; 18, 1022a27; E, 1, 1025b31; 1026a4; Z, 7, 1033a2; 10, 1035a30; H, 2, 1043a15. 
10 Some examples of such usage are An. Post. II, 2, 90a15, where Aristotle investigates the 
definition of an eclipse; in De An. I, 1, 402a13 and 402a23 he queries the definition of the soul. In 
a similar way, in Phys. IV, 10, 218a31 Aristotle investigates the definition of time and in Rhet. I, 
5, 1360b7 he questions the definition and the nature of happiness by the same construction, i.e., 
‘what is happiness?’.    
11 For some examples of the sense of ‘what it is’ as a necessary attribute, see, for instance, An. 
Post. II, 13, 96a22; 96b2-36; De An. I, 1, 402b17-22; Met. Δ, 18, 1022a27.  
12 For which, see An. Post. I, 4, 73a34; 22, 83a21; Top. IV, 1, 120b21. 
13 I do not intend to investigate all the possible details of Aristotle’s conception of definition, for 
this is clearly beyond the aims of the present text. My sole aim is to portray the senses of ‘what 
it is’ in a general way rather than determining the intriguing details of the content and problems 
related to the term’s most basic sense, i.e., definition. 
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would be possible to construct an infinite number of predications between 
subject and a kind; rather, the individuals are always associated under a limited 
number of genera. Hence, there is always a stopping point, beyond which no 
further predication is possible. Aristotle is envisaging a closed system of species 
and genera; a conception whereby necessary attributes, i.e., what is predicated 
of another thing in ‘what it is’, cannot be infinite in number.14 The actual 
necessary attribute of a subject in this closed system of hierarchies of kinds is 
the highest possible genus for that particular subject. In our example, it is 
‘animal’ that is the highest genus for the species ‘man’. The genus (animal) that 
is predicated of a subject (man) is the proper necessary attribute of that subject 
(every man is necessarily an animal). The necessary connection in definition 
between the genus and the subject is emphasised strongly by Aristotle, since 
without this any definition is hardly possible. As a result, what is predicated of 
a subject in ‘what it is’ is a necessary attribute of that subject, which in turn 
shows itself as the highest genus under which that subject is placed. This brief 
exposition shows us that something predicated in ‘what it is’ can be used in two 
ways; generally it will refer to the necessary attributes and more specifically it 
can be used as meaning the genus of that subject. Accordingly, it would not be 
wrong to conclude that, beyond referring to definition and to necessary 
attributes, Aristotle specifies ‘what it is’ as referring to genus, as genus is 
always predicated of an underlying subject in ‘what it is’.15  
 
According to the above observations, then, every predication in ‘what it is’ has 
a necessary characteristic. This is not the sole feature designating ‘what it is’, 
since Aristotle specifies this type of predication as ‘universal’ as well.16 As we 
have seen, ‘what it is’ is not concerned with an unlimited number of particulars 
but is always directed to something that is always one and identical. The 
                                                
14 Cf. An. Post. I, 22, 82b37-39; 84a13, 25. 
15 For this sense of ‘what it is’ see Top. I, 9, 103b36; 18, 108b22; IV, 2, 122b16; 6, 128a24; V, 3, 
132a10-20; VI, 5, 142b27; VII, 3, 153a18; 5, 154a27; Met. Δ, 18, 1022a27; 28, 1024b5.  
16 Although I find it significant and helpful to explicate the relation between the ‘universal’ and 
the ‘necessary’ in Aristotle’s philosophy, I will skip this discussion on this occasion in order to 
avoid extending the subject beyond the necessary limits. It is somehow obvious that every 
necessary predication is universal but perhaps what is not obvious is that every universal is 
necessary.  
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particular instances are so associated that they can be taken as belonging to a 
class that is the relevant genus of these instances. We have also seen that ‘what 
it is’ is already systematically correlated with the genus under which the 
particular instances are associated. This already implies the universal character 
of ‘what it is’ as well, for every genus is universally predicated of the species 
positioned beneath it. Although it seems that the universality of ‘what it is’ is a 
natural result of correlation to genus, the universal character of ‘what it is’ is 
emphasised by Aristotle separately in a number of places.17 Hence, in the 
example, the genus ‘animal’ is not only the necessary attribute of all the 
subordinating species (e.g. ‘man’) but it is also universally attributed to all the 
instances that can be stated under itself. In this way, several species such as 
‘birds’, ‘tigers’ and ‘man’ are classified under the genus ‘animal’. ‘Animal’ is 
equally predicated of all these species and the particular instances of these 
species (e.g. Socrates is an animal) in a universal way. As a result, genus is 
predicated of all the subjects placed beneath itself without any exception, and 
this constitutes the universal aspect of ‘what it is’. 
 
All of the senses of ‘what it is’ enumerated so far can be grouped around the 
basic sense of the term, namely, definition. Since the meanings of ‘what it is’ 
enumerated so far are clustered around the notion of definition, one may 
reasonably tend to think that these meanings are solely related to linguistic 
notions, limited by grammatical usages. However, one can find passages where 
a metaphysical or ontological meaning of ‘what it is’ is involved. Indeed, 
Aristotle frequently makes use of this term as referring to substance.18 He also 
employs the term frequently in his discussions of the categories of Being. In 
these discussions, the term ‘what it is’ often refers to the first category of Being, 
namely, the substance.19 Hence, in his repeated enumerations of categories of 
                                                
17 See, for instance, An. Post. I, 14, 79a28; II, 3, 90b4; 4, 91a15; 13, 96b36. 
18 Cf. An. Post. I, 22, 83a21; II, 3, 90b30; 7, 92a35; 13, 96b5; Met. A, 8, 988b29; Z, 9, 1034a31. 
19 It is of interest to notice at least in general terms the difference between τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι (quod 
quid erat esse) and ‘what it is’ (τί ἐστιν). In the first instance, one may be tempted to argue that it 
is impossible to differentiate τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι from τί ἐστιν, as Aristotle himself sometimes uses 
these terms identically as referring to definitions (for such usages, see An. Post. II, 6, 92a7; 7, 
92b29 Top. VII, 3, 153a15; Met. Z, 4, 1030a29, b5). If we look closely, however, we may find some 
differences between the two: basically, the difference is the scope of these two terms; τί ἐστιν 
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Being, instead of substance, he uses the term ‘what it is’.20 Thus, beyond other 
senses of the term, ‘what it is’ in this way, is used frequently as referring to 
substance. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
has a wider scope that involves almost all the elements of the definition. Recall, for instance, the 
instances of such definitions that involve matter (as in the example of the snub nose where 
‘matter’ (i.e., nose) is involved in the definition). Now, in these examples, τί ἐστιν is generally 
correlated with the entire elements of definition, which means it involves the formal parts as 
well as the material parts of the definition. τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, on the other hand, has a narrower 
scope; Aristotle mostly uses this term to refer merely to ‘form’ (εἶδος) (Cf. Phys. II, 2, 194a21; 
Cael. I, 9, 278a3; GC II, 9, 335b35; De An. II, 1, 412a20; PA I, 1, 642a25; Met. Z, 4, 1029b27; 7, 
1032b2 ff.; 10, 1035b16 ff.; H, 3, 1043b1; Λ, 8, 1074a35.). This is supported in the passages where 
he discusses four causes; in these passages τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι is always correlated with the formal 
cause (Cf. Met. A, 3, 983a27; 7, 988a34; Δ, 2, 1013a27; b22; Z, 17, 1041a28; H, 4, 1044b1). In the 
wake of these passages, it is possible to arrive at a conclusion that the scope of τί ἐστιν and τὸ τί 
ἦν εἶναι differ in the sense that whereas τί ἐστιν is used to refer to almost everything to which a 
thing pertains (i.e., form as well as matter), τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι refers to the elements without which a 
thing cannot be itself (i.e., the formal elements that make a thing that thing). Hence, τὸ τί ἦν 
εἶναι more strictly signifies the particular nature (i.e., the essence in the proper sense; this is 
confirmed most clearly in Met. Δ, 18, 1022a26; cf. also MA 8, 708a12; Met. Z, 4, 1029b13; 11, 
1037a33; 13, 1038b14) of a thing by solely addressing its form, whereas τί ἐστιν refers to the sum 
of all elements that may be involved in describing that thing and thus involves not only the 
formal elements but also the material elements. Certainly, in the case of a substance whose 
nature consists of pure form, τί ἐστιν and τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι overlap. In such cases it is legitimate to 
use these two terms interchangeably. I will reflect on this topic later when I discuss the central 
books of Metaphysics, in the next chapter.  
20 For the enumerations of categories and the use of ‘what’ in these enumerations, see Met. Δ, 7, 
1017a25; 28, 1024b13; E, 2, 1026a36; Z, 1, 1028a11, 14; Θ, 1, 1045b33; I, 2, 1054a15; EN I, 6, 
1096a20. Before I conclude this discussion of ‘what it is’ I must touch upon two interconnected 
points. First, although initially it may seem not to represent an especially happy result on 
Aristotle’s part, he insists that there is no demonstration of these definitions (An. Pr. I, 31, 46a37; 
An. Post. II, 3, 90b30; 7, 92a35; De An. I, 1, 402b26; GA II, 6, 742b33; Met. B, 2, 997a31; K, 7, 
1064a7) and they will be revealed by -pğisome other method (τις ἄλλος τρόπος τῆς δηλώσεως), 
rather than demonstration (Met. E, 1, 102ğşi5b15) and, unfortunately, the details of the phrase 
‘some other method’ are not given in Book E. Second, in order to prevent any possible 
confusion, it is significant to mention that it is possible to find some definitions that can be 
regarded as an exception to this rule. For instance, in Posterior Analytics (An. Post. II, 93a29) 
Aristotle discusses the definition of an eclipse in which the elements of definition are loosely 
connected, in the sense that they do not immediately reveal the cause and the justification of the 
connections between them. In order to reveal the proper causes and conditions of these 
definitions one may appeal to demonstrations. The underlying idea of the possibility of 
demonstrating definitions lies in the conception that, beyond its being a simple signification of a 
thing, Aristotle envisages definition as a causal connection disclosing the proper principles of 
the thing it defines. If the causal connections between the elements of a definition are not 
immediately plain, then the defining conditions and the causal connections can be revealed by 
way of a demonstration. In these cases, it is possible to have a demonstration of a definition. 
The general upshot of this is that it is possible to find two types of ‘what it is’ in the sense of 
definition in Aristotle’s corpus. One of them is ‘what it is’ in the strict sense that cannot be 
demonstrated because the causal relation between the elements of the definition is immediate. 
The second type of ‘what it is’, which appears less frequently, is the one in which the elements 
of definition are loosely connected so that they require a demonstration in order to be ‘made 
clear’. This second type really should be regarded as an exception to the first and proper sense 
of definition, and to the basic idea that definitions cannot be demonstrated. 
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This rough analysis shows that ‘what it is’ is used in several ways that can be 
listed as follows: 
 a. definition 
 b. necessary and universal attributes of a thing   
 c. genus 
 d. substance  
       
This shows that the science of Being is primarily concerned with the definitions 
of things for, as it were, (b) and (c) can be regarded as a clarification of (a), 
simply because every definition is constructed by finding the necessary and 
universal relations connecting a species to a genus (I will deal with (d), namely 
the meaning of ‘substance’ and its relation with the subject of the science of 
Being, later in this chapter). 
 
The declaration in Posterior Analytics that no science can define its proper 
subject means that if there is no science of definitions then they remain 
unstudied. This is quite an unhappy result, particularly for Aristotle’s 
conception of science, in which the definitions are the proper principles of all 
sciences.21 My aim in determining the senses of ‘what it is’ in the Aristotelian 
corpus is to discover whether Aristotle gives clues for the avoidance of such a 
puzzling result, and to understand Aristotle’s actual intentions in attributing 
the study of definition to the science of Being. By virtue of this analysis, we are 
now to understand that the requirement of Posterior Analytics is fulfilled in Book 
E, where Aristotle explicitly states that the science of Being deals with the ‘what 
it is’ of things, given that the senses of ‘what it is’ have some relation with 
definition. The other sciences assume the ‘what’ of their subjects and construct 
loose or accurate demonstrations upon this assumption. Their scope is limited 
by that of the science of Being, and the boundaries between these sciences and 
the science of Being are described just after the definitions of things. In other 
words, the work of the science of Being starts exactly where the duties of the 
other sciences vanish, namely from the definitions of things. This can be seen as 
                                                
21 ‘The principles of demonstrations are definitions’: An. Post. II, 3, 90b24; Met. M, 4, 1078b24, 29. 
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the outline of Aristotle’s conception when he attributes the study of ‘what it is’ 
to first philosophy. A deeper understanding of this conception would be 
possible if one adds the other aspect, namely the ‘if it is’, to the picture, and this 
is what I will now do in this section. 
 
3.2.2. ‘If it is’ (εἰ ἔστιν)  
 
To determine what Aristotle means by ‘if it is’ (εἰ ἔστιν) is quite straightforward 
compared with ‘what it is’. When Aristotle uses the term ‘if it is’ he focuses on 
whether a thing exists. According to this conception, the business of the science 
of Being is to decide whether something is a Being or not. No science can deal 
with the existence of what it deals; rather, they assume this existence and 
inquire into that. The existence, on the other hand, is the task of a 
metaphysician. 
 
3.2.3. Connections: ‘what it is’ and ‘if it is’ 
 
Can we find a connection between these two tasks of the science of Being? It 
seems clear at once that it is impossible to know what something is without 
knowing if it is.22 In order to understand this relation further, we might note 
that one might find a close connection between the ‘why-ness’ of a thing and 
the definition of that thing. In this conception, an inquiry into ‘what it is’ is 
simply to find the causes of a thing and, correspondingly, to inquire, for 
instance, why something happens is nothing other than to give an account of 
that thing. Aristotle’s well-known example is the eclipse that can be defined as 
the screening of the Moon by the Earth.23 Now, if we were to ask why an eclipse 
happens, the answer would be the account of the eclipse itself, that is, because 
the Moon is screened by the Earth. In such cases, then, ‘what it is’ is reduced to 
                                                
22 ‘For it is impossible to know what a thing is if we are ignorant of whether it is’. An. Post. II, 8, 
93a20. Sometimes ‘if it is’ and ‘what it is’ are known simultaneously (for which case, see An. 
Post. II, 8, 93a30-36; cf. 9, 93b22; in these cases the elements of definition and the elements of 
demonstration are intimately connected so that there is no need for a further middle term, i.e., a 
cause standing as a medium between demonstration and definition) and sometimes ‘if it is’ is 
known before ‘what it is’ (cf. An. Post. II, 8, 93a33-37). 
23 An. Post. II, 8, 93a30-93b7. Cf. An. Post. II, 1, 89b25. 
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the ‘why’.24 It would not take much imagination to think that it is impossible to 
know ‘why’ something happens before admitting that it happens (i.e., exists), 
and in most cases knowing what happens simultaneously yields the knowledge 
that it happens. That is to say, an inquiry aiming to find the definition, i.e., 
aiming to find ‘what it is’, comes after or simultaneously with the knowledge of 
‘if it is’. This amounts to saying that the inquiry concerning the ‘whatness’ of a 
thing addresses a further and deeper investigation into the nature of that thing 
and requires an initial knowledge of the existence or ‘ifness’ of that thing.25   
 
Now it seems there is a closer relation between ‘what it is’ and ‘if it is’. For 
consider the following: the question ‘if it is’ asks whether a thing exists or not. 
This question, however, cannot be answered without placing that thing in the 
hierarchy of Beings. Thus, it seems impossible to affirm or deny an existence of 
a thing without determining the ontological status of that thing. If we cannot 
place it into the hierarchy of Beings, then we can conclude that it does not exist; 
if, on the other hand, we can place the thing into the hierarchy of Beings then 
we can affirm that it exists. Hence the deep insight is that one might find 
oneself trying to find out the ontological status of a thing, as one previously 
attempted to decide whether that thing exists. After all, if one is to show that 
something exists, it is necessary in one way or another to place it into the 
hierarchy of Beings. Now, on the other hand, determining the nature of that 
subject in answer to the question of  ‘what it is’ places it under the proper 
genus, which in turn is to place it under the hierarchies of Beings and thus to 
determine its ontological level. In other words, a proper definition of a thing, in 
this conception, requires a proper placement of that thing into the hierarchy of 
Being and determination of its ontological level. Therefore, determining the 
ontological status of a thing is assigned to both ‘what it is’ and ‘if it is’, which 
amounts to saying that there is a close relation between the terms ‘what it is’ 
                                                
24 For this reduction, see An. Post. II, 2, 90a15, 31; cf. An. Post. II, 8, 93a4; Phys. II, 7, 198a16. 
25 One may observe the systematic differentiation between existence and Being in the Middle 
Ages. Contrary to Aristotle, this conception allows one to attain some knowledge concerning 
the essence of a thing without attaining any knowledge about its existential status, as these two 
types of knowledge are attained by separate kinds of intellection. I shall, however, show that in 
Aristotelian philosophy the knowledge of essence and existence, or of the ‘what’ and ‘if’, are 
inseparable. Cf. Father Owens’s influential explanations on this subject (2007, pp. 22-37).    
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and ‘if it is’ and the relation is more intimate than it seems in the first instance. 
We shall soon see that this intimacy is important in understanding Aristotle’s 
assignment of the investigation of these two questions to the science of Being.   
 
3.2.4. The science of Being as the study of ‘whatness’ and ‘ifness’ of the subjects 
of the other so-called special sciences 
    
So far, the discussion has focused on the background to Aristotle’s assignment 
of the knowledge of ‘what it is’ and ‘if it is’ to the science of Being in the 
opening passage of Book E.26 In this conception, no science can study the 
essence and the existence of its proper subject-genus; rather, this work is 
assigned to the science of Being. What is not quite obvious in this conception, 
however, is that the science of Being studies the definitions of the things that 
are studied by the so-called special sciences. From the perspective of the special 
sciences, then, it seems problematic, at least in the first instance, that the 
definitions of their subject genera are studied by another, distinct science. Why, 
for instance, cannot a biologist study the definition of, say, life, rather than 
assuming or taking this knowledge from another science? 
 
I think my discussion concerning the link between ‘what it is’ and ‘if it is’ may 
provide an answer to this peculiar character of Aristotelian science. We may 
start with the less problematic part concerning the existence of things. 
According to Aristotle, the so-called special sciences do not deal with the 
existence of their proper subject matters; rather, this work is assigned to the 
science of Being. Now this does not seem to be the reason underlying the 
problem that I am now addressing; rather, the problem emerges if we want to 
introduce the other part, namely ‘what it is’, into the picture. As I have 
mentioned, the peculiar point in this conception is that the so-called special 
sciences cannot deal with the definitions of their proper subjects, since this is 
the work of a metaphysician. A probable explanation of this seemingly 
                                                
26 Met. E, 1, 1025b2-17. This corresponds to [C] and [D] in my classification of this passage in 
section 3.2. 
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puzzling structure comes from the nature of the intimacy between ‘what it is’ 
and ‘if it is’. My previous discussion shows that a necessary connection between 
‘what it is’ and ‘if it is’ exists, in which part of knowing the essence of a thing is 
related to determining the ontological status of that thing, which, in turn, is an 
issue, without which the question ‘if it is’ cannot be answered. It is these 
intersections between what Aristotle understands from ‘what it is’ and ‘if it is’ 
that make it impossible in Aristotle’s philosophy to know the definition of 
something without knowing the existence of that thing.27  
 
3.2.5. ‘What it is’ and ‘if it is’ as belonging to the same type of intellection 
  
Now, it would not take much imagination to see that the impossibility of 
differentiating ‘what it is’ and ‘if it is’ is what actually underlies Aristotle’s 
utterance that the knowledge of these two types of questions belongs to the 
same intellection (τῆς αὐτῆς εἶναι διανοίας).28 My discussion on the several 
senses of ‘what it is’ and ‘if it is’ confirms this position, since these terms, as I 
have argued, are necessarily linked to each other in the sense that no science 
can study one of them by excluding the other. The phrase ‘same type of 
intellection’ confirms that the study of essence and existence should be assigned 
to the same science.29 As a result, Aristotle’s utterances confirm that 
                                                
27 As I have mentioned, this is not necessarily the case in medieval philosophy. See note 26. 
28 This corresponds to [E] in my classification of this text on section 3.2. I do not see a justifiable 
reason for accepting Ross’s view (1924, I, 352) that favours a ‘methodological’ understanding of 
the passage confirming that the same type of intellection means ‘immediate apprehension, not 
demonstration’. Such an interpretation would be attractive if Aristotle were to use this utterance 
before affirming that ‘what it is’ and ‘if it is’ are involved in the scope of the science of Being 
(that is, before 1025b15). For there, he indeed engages in a rather methodological discussion 
(note that he says, ‘There is no demonstration of substance or of the essence, but some other 
way of revealing it’). The actual place of the utterance ‘same type of intellection’ shows, 
however, that Aristotle’s aim is not methodological; it rather concerns the subject matter of the 
science of Being. This is confirmed by Aristotle’s main concern in this part of the text to 
circumscribe the actual scope of the science of Being rather than to engage in a methodological 
discussion. Hence, in my view, the utterance ‘same type of intellection’ amounts to saying that 
the science of Being deals both with ‘what it is’ and ‘if it is’. 
29 From Aristotle’s presentation of these terms as separate questions in the Analytics, one might 
be tempted to derive that there may be a discord between Aristotle’s approach in Analytics and 
in Metaphysics. My analysis, however, shows the inseparability of ‘what it is’ and ‘if it is’ on the 
basis of the whole Aristotelian corpus. In the interpretation I suggest, then, Aristotle’s 
differentiation of ‘what it is’ and ‘if it is’ in the Analytics does not cover the whole analysis 
performed with respect to these terms. It cannot cover all the aspects of this topic either, for 
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metaphysics deals with ‘what it is’ and ‘if it is’, that is, with essence and 
existence, emphasising the fact that it is impossible to differentiate these two 
analyses.   
 
3.2.6. CDH of Book Γ and Two Tasks of Book E: ‘what it is’ and ‘if it is’ 
 
While discussing Book Γ, we have seen that Aristotle sets out certain criteria for 
the construction of CDH upon which the science of Being is established. 
Fundamentally, we have detected three criteria paving the way for a possible 
construction of such ordered homonyms. Recall that two of these criteria 
require that the core item in such homonyms should be both ontologically and 
logically prior to the peripheral terms. The general conception of ontological 
dependence means that the existence of the peripheral items in a CDH should 
depend on the existence of the core item. Logical priority, on the other hand, 
requires that the definitions of peripheral terms should be constructed by 
reference to the core item. 
 
Now, I believe, one might find a certain parallelism between the structure that 
we encounter in Book Γ and Aristotle’s assignment of ‘what it is’ and ‘if it is’ to 
the science of Being. The science of Being will study the essences of things that 
are. But how in fact would such a study be possible? We attain definitions of 
things by way of relating these things to genera under which they are situated. 
The definitions of the highest genera, namely the categories of Being,30 
however, can only be attained through the structure provided by the CDH of 
Being. Hence, what we need are the definitions of the highest genera through 
which other things are defined. At this point we need a doctrine that constructs 
                                                                                                                                          
such an analysis would require a full doctrine of substance as developed in Metaphysics. In any 
case, I do not think that there is a contradiction between Analytics and Metaphysics with respect 
to ‘what it is’ and ‘if it is’ for, in my view, none of the passages in Analytics declares the 
impossibility of a joint inquiry into these terms nor does Metaphysics reject the possibility of 
conceptual differentiation of these questions. It is worth noting that many scholars have rejected 
the existence of such controversy as well. Bonitz, for instance, finds no obstacle in reconciling 
the approach of Analytics with that of Metaphysics (1870, II, 281) and Ross agrees (1924, I, 352) 
that there is no contradiction between the two texts.     
30 Cf. An. Post. I, 22, 83b16; Top. I, 9, 103b20; De An. I, 1, 402a22. 
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the underlying structure for how the highest genera can be defined, since 
regular definitions that are established upon the kata hen structure of genera and 
species cannot be constructed in the case of the highest genera simply because 
there are no higher genera with which they can be linked and thereby defined.31 
Book E’s requirements with respect to essences of things should therefore be 
supported by an initial doctrine that sufficiently explains how we obtain the 
definitions of highest genera, since without them it is impossible to construct 
any definition at all. It is exactly at this point that Book Γ supplies the doctrine 
needed to construct proper definitions of the highest genera by introducing the 
notion of logical dependence. Hence, the essences of Beings can only be 
attained, according to the scheme provided by Book Γ, through their necessary 
references to the core. The possibility of their definition lies in the fact that these 
highest genera are all necessarily connected to a core item, on which they are 
logically dependent. Were there no underlying structure for one to attain the 
definitions of the highest genera, that is, if we were not to have logical 
dependence, Aristotle’s assignment of ‘what it is’ to the science of Being could 
not be justified. This task, in other words, can only be fulfilled by way of logical 
dependency relations between the different manifestations of Being, that is, 
between the so-called secondary categories and substance. This provides the 
underlying structure by way of which the definitions of highest genera can be 
attained, which in turn, paves the way for constructing definitions of the species 
situated beneath these highest genera. Hence, Book Γ establishes the grounds 
for Book E’s assignment of ‘what it is’ to the science of Being.  
 
Furthermore, we have seen that in order to attain ‘what it is’ one should place 
things under the hierarchy of kinds. As I have mentioned, one needs to do this 
if one is to answer the ‘if it is’ question as well. Hence, the existence of things, 
namely that placing things under the hierarchies of kinds by which one 
determines their ontological statuses, is also assigned to the science of Being. 
                                                
31 The term ‘Being’ in Aristotle is a mere name, ‘said in many ways’ (Cf. Phys. I, 2, 185a21; De 
An. I, 5, 410a13; Met. Γ, 2, 1003b5; Δ, 1017a22-27; E, 2, 1026a33-b2; Z, 1030a21; EN I, 6, 1096a24) 
and is not a genus (An. Post. II, 7, 92b14; Top. 5, 6, 127a26ff; 7, 144a31-b1; Soph. El. 11, 172a14; 
Met. B, 3, 998b22; H, 6, 1045b5; K, 1, 1059b31; EN I, 6, 1096a23; EE I, 8, 1217b35). 
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This, I believe, also finds its grounding structure in Book Γ as well for how, in 
reality, we are to determine the ontological statuses of things. Obviously, 
without referring to the Being par excellence, this would not be possible. Being, 
in other words, should first be observed in that which sufficiently fulfils the 
fullest sense of the term, that is, in that which most deserves to be called Being. 
The underlying structure for such a conception is established in Book Γ, where 
Aristotle implies the ontological dependency relations between the several 
Beings. This amounts to saying that we can only determine the ‘ifness’ of a 
certain Being by way of referring to the core item, which is ontologically prior. 
The ontological priority, in other words, paves the way for a scientific analysis 
of the ontological statuses of things that are, which in turn, is assigned to the 
science of Being in Book E. Obviously, one might have some knowledge of the 
ontological statuses of things; however, this knowledge would be akin to 
‘opinion’ rather than ‘truth’ were there no means by way of which we 
scientifically determine the statuses of things that are. In other words, if we did 
not have some knowledge with respect to the ontological dependencies 
between things that are in the way Book Γ has proposed, we would not be able 
to determine the ontological statuses of these things properly.  
 
Hence, there seems to be a certain parallelism between Book E’s assignment of 
‘what it is’ and ‘if it is’ to the science of Being with the conception of Being that 
we encounter in Book Γ. This parallelism, however, can only be brought to the 
fore if we read Book Γ and the structure it establishes, namely, the CDH of 
Being, in the way I suggest, that is, in the way that motivates us to find 
ontological and logical dependency relations in instances of the CDH of Being. 
 
3.3. Division of Sciences 
 
In the first section of Book E, one witnesses the division of sciences. One 
immediately notices that this division is established on the doctrine of Book Γ, 
where Aristotle established the grounds for separate sciences investigating 
several parts of Being. The conception developed in Book Γ is established 
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against the Platonic background, which favours a single gigantic science of 
Being leaving no room for the separate special sciences.32 Furthermore, it has 
been proved that although Being is not a genus, it can still be investigated by a 
separate science by virtue of ordered relations found in certain homonyms, 
namely, through CDH, without dissolving the other so-called special sciences in 
its vast comprehensiveness. Book Γ, therefore, establishes the necessary 
doctrinal background for Book E, without which it would be impossible to 
justify the differentiation of sciences in the way that Aristotle presents, since, if 
the puzzles concerning the scope of the science of Being were not to be averted, 
there would be no obstacle to thinking either that the science of Being 
investigates all parts of Being, leaving no room for the other so-called special 
sciences or – given that Being is not a genus – that the science of Being cannot 
unify its subject matter in such a way as to open up the possibility of a single 
investigation. These puzzles, then, are fully averted in Book Γ in order to pave 
the way for a further determination of the scope of the science of Being. The 
developments of Book Γ, therefore, are necessary but not sufficient, since 
although they establish the grounds for the possibility of a separate 
investigation of Being they do not describe the precise scope of the science that 
should be determined, now, in the light of the doctrine that resolves the puzzles 
surrounding the scope of the science of Being.  On the basis of this doctrine, in 
Book E Aristotle presents the division of sciences and attempts to determine the 
scope of the sciences with a special emphasis on what he calls ‘theoretical 
sciences’. 
 
                                                
32 See Republic VI, 510b-511d. In Epinomis, after presenting a kind of division of sciences (975b5-
976e2) Plato, however, states that none of them deserves to be called ‘Wisdom’ [σοφία] (976c4-
6). After that, he investigates the science that should be regarded as the highest and finds that 
arithmetic, without which all the other sciences would be eliminated (977e1-2: πάντα δ' 
ἀπολείπεται ὸ παράπαν, ὅταν ἀριθµητικήν τις ἀνέλῃ) is the most necessary science for attaining 
Wisdom. Again, in Philebus (55e1), Plato affirms that ‘if someone were to take away [χωρίζῃ] all 
counting [ἀριθµητικὴν], measuring [µετρητικὴν], and weighing [στατικήν] from the arts and 
crafts, the rest might be said to be worthless [φαῦλον]’ (this is followed by another division of 
sciences (56a2ff.)).  
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Aristotle’s presentation of the division of sciences has two levels.33 In the first 
level, he generally divides all knowledge into three parts; practical (ἐπιστήµη 
πρακτική), poetical (ἐπιστήµη ποιητική), and theoretical (ἐπιστήµη θεορητική). 
This grouping is made according to the principles and aims that these kinds of 
sciences have.34 Whereas the practical sciences have their origins in the moral 
agent,35 focusing on the action of the agent,36 the starting-point of the poetical 
sciences is in the artist,37 who produces an external product.38 The theoretical 
sciences aim to know; they neither aim to produce – as in the case of poetical 
sciences –, nor do they aim at an action – as in the case of practical sciences. 
Instead, such sciences have their origins in the things that they aim to grasp. 
The self-reflective character of theoretical sciences puts them in the highest 
degree among other types of sciences, a theme that can be encountered in 
several places in Aristotle’s corpus,39 and is also confirmed in Book A, where 
                                                
33 Met. E, 1, 1025b19 ff. For the other places where Aristotle presents the division of sciences, see 
Top. VI, 6, 145a15; VIII, 1, 157a10; Met. K, 7, 1064a10; EN VI, 2, 1139a27. 
34 See EN I, 1, 1094a1. 
35 Met. E, 1, 1025b23. 
36 Practical sciences’ aim is the action itself (See EN VI, 5, 1140b6). Aristotle contrasts such 
sciences with theoretical sciences in De An. III, 10, 433a14; Met. α, 1, 993b20; EN VI, 2, 1139a27. 
One may hesitate to regard practical knowledge as ‘science’; instead, it may be identified simply 
with the virtue ‘φρόνησις’. Indeed, contrary to Plato (see Protagoras, 357b4ff.), in many of the 
passages Aristotle hesitates to regard ‘φρόνησις’ as science, i.e. ἐπιστήµη, since, strictly 
speaking, the proper aim of a science should be the universal knowledge of things, whereas 
φρόνησις deals with matters of action: EN VI, 5, 1140b2; 7, 1141b16; VII, 10, 1152a8; MM I, 34, 
1197a1; 32; EE VII, 13, 1246b34. Though these passages confirm that Aristotle hesitates to regard 
practical disciplines that are identified by φρόνησις as a ‘science’, in some of the passages he 
still regards practical disciplines as sciences; see, for instance, SS 1, 437a3; cf. Pol. IV, 1, 1288b22; 
φρόνησις is the natural virtue and excellence of the rational faculty (Top. V, 6, 136b11; EN VI, 5, 
1140b20; 12, 1144a1; 13, 1144b28; MM II, 34, 1198a32-b8; VV 1, 1249b26; 2, 1250a3; Rhet. I, 9, 
1366b20) that can be regarded as the practical wisdom which desires the ultimate good (Rhet. I, 
7, 1363b14; cf. EN VI, 8, 1141b30) and which decides how to act in particular cases (EN VI, 5, 
1140b20; 7, 1141b14; 10, 1143a8; (cf. 1145a5) MM II, 3, 1199a20-b10; Rhet. I, 7, 1364b18) by way of 
deliberation (EN VI, 9, 1142b23-35; VV 4, 1250a30-39) as a result of which one attains happiness 
(VV 2, 1250a3).   
37 Met. E, 1, 1025b21. Rather than calling these disciplines ἐπιστήµη Aristotle prefers to call them 
‘τέχνη’ just like Plato, who doubts such disciplines are ἐπιστήµη. In Republic (VII, 533d6), he 
states that we call such disciplines ‘sciences’ by ‘force of habit’ (προσείποµεν διὰ τὸ ἔθος), and 
he also adds that these disciplines are ‘clearer than opinion, darker than knowledge 
[ἐναργεστέρου µὲν ἢ δόξης, ἀµυδροτέρου δὲ ἢ ἐπιστήµης]’.  
38 See EN VI, 4, 1140a9; where art is defined as ‘a state of capacity to make’. Correspondingly, 
the aim of such sciences lies in the production of an external product. Hence, these sciences can 
be contrasted with both practical sciences whose aim is to act (see EN VI, 4, 1140a6; MM I, 34, 
1197a12 cf. EN I, 7, 1097a16; VI, 5, 1140b22) and theoretical sciences whose aim is to know (see 
Cael. III, 7, 306a16; cf. Met. Θ, 2, 1046b2; Λ, 9, 1075a1). 
39 According to Aristotle it is a merit of any kind of knowledge to have reflexive character, 
which is associated with excellence (ἀρετή) and self-sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια) (EN X, 7, 1177a27). 
  
186 
Aristotle discusses the characteristics of Wisdom.40 In terms of the aims of this 
thesis, however, the second level in the division of sciences is more important, 
since in this level Aristotle presents a threefold division of theoretical sciences 
into physics, mathematics and theology. Let us turn to the passage where 
Aristotle presents this division: 
 
But if there is something which is eternal [ὰΐδιον] and immovable [ἀκίνητον] 
and separate [χωριστόν], clearly the knowledge of it belongs to a theoretical 
science [θεωπητικῆς] – not, however, to natural science [φυσικῆς] (for natural 
science deals with certain movable things [κινητῶν]) nor to mathematics, but 
to a science prior [προτέρας] to both. For natural science deals with things 
which are inseparable from matter [ἡ µὲν γὰρ φυσικὴ περὶ χωριστὰ]41 but not 
immovable [οὐκ ἀκίνητα], and some parts of mathematics deal with things 
which are immovable [ἀκίνητα], but probably not separate [οὐ χωριστὰ], but 
embodied in matter; while the first science [πρώτη] deals with things which 
are both separate [χωριστὰ] and immovable [ἀκίνητα].42 
Two significant points should be noted in this passage. First, the criteria used in 
the first level of Aristotle’s division of sciences into practical, poetical and 
theoretical sciences (i.e., the proper principles to which these sciences depend) 
are no longer used in the division of sciences in the second level, namely in the 
division of theoretical sciences: instead, two criteria have recently been 
introduced; the criterion of separation (χωριστά) and the criterion of 
immovability (ἀκίνητα). The theoretical sciences are divided into three major 
sciences based on these two criteria rather than the principles on which they 
depend. Second, there is a certain hierarchy between the aforementioned 
sciences and the first philosophy, that is, the science of Being is prior to both 
mathematics and physics. I will now turn to two criteria upon which the 
theoretical sciences are divided.  
 
3.3.1. First criterion: χωριστός	  
 
                                                                                                                                          
The reflexive character of these sciences is contrasted with practical sciences that are directed at 
action: EN I, 3, 1095a5; cf. Met. A, 2, 981a30; EN X, 9, 1179a35. 
40 Met. A, 2, 982a14.  
41 The translation would be more accurate if Ross had rendered this phrase as ‘but physics deals 
with things which are separate…’   
42 Met. E, 1, 1026a10-16. I have slightly modified the translation and rendered ‘χωριστόν’ as 
‘separate’ rather than ‘separable’ as Ross suggested for certain reasons that will be cited soon in 
this chapter. 
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According to a recent study, the term χωριστός originated in Aristotle and 
cannot be encountered in any of the Greek authors before him.43 On philological 
grounds it is possible to render the term in two ways; it can either be taken as 
expressing a settled state, in which case it should be translated as ‘separate’, or 
it can be rendered modally as ‘separable’.44 Since χωριστός establishes one of 
the criteria employed to divide theoretical sciences, one must determine which 
of these two renderings reflects what Aristotle intends to address in the text. 
This is significant not only for an understanding of what Aristotle means when 
he states, for instance, that ‘first science deals with things that are ‘χωριστά’ but 
also for some important doctrinal reasons that we shall see shortly. If we take 
this term modally as ‘separable’,45 I believe it may pave the way for a possible 
non-theological reading of the text; for in such a case, the utterance affirming 
that first philosophy deals with things that are ‘χωριστά’ may be interpreted 
ontologically so as to mean that this science deals with the ‘separable’ parts of 
all things.46 In fact, such a rendering will pave the way for an interpretation that 
favours an illegitimate inclusiveness for, as I will show shortly, ‘χωριστά’ in 
Book E can denote the things that are separate ‘in fact’ but not ‘in thought’.  If 
‘χωριστά’ is understood as ‘separable’ than it can denote the things that are 
separate ‘in thought’, which will undermine Aristotle’s fundamental aim in 
Book E, which is to differentiate theoretical sciences. On the other hand, if we 
choose to render the term as ‘separate’,47 this may offer a particular way of 
interpretation that may establish the grounds for a theological reading of the 
text by virtue of affirming that first philosophy deals with ‘separate Being’, 
which can ultimately be reflected in the nature of God, i.e., the Immobile 
Substance (IS).  
                                                
43 See Donald Morrison (1985), pp. 91-92, who has made a computer survey of this term in 
several Greek authors and cannot find any occurrences before Aristotle. 
44 See Donald Morrison (1985), pp. 89-91. 
45 This rendering of χωριστός is supported by John Cleary (1994, p. 38). 
46 I will not address here what is meant by ‘separable parts of all things’ even though it may 
seem, as it stands, to be quite obscure. Without determining what these parts may be, which 
would certainly take us far off the track, I admit that such parts may exist and that an 
ontological study of Being executes a universal study of these parts. My sole aim in this part of 
the text is to determine which of the two meanings of χωριστός is meant in Book E without 
exceeding the natural limits of the actual topic of the present discussion addressing Aristotle’s 
division of sciences.    
47 This rendering is supported by Joseph Owens (1951, pp. 383-385) and Morrison (1985).    
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I will now attempt to determine what exact rendering should be given to the 
term χωριστός in the context of Book E, by virtue of which I expect to reveal the 
actual scope of the science of Being envisaged in this part of Metaphysics. 
Against the arguments that the term should be taken modally as ‘separable’, I 
will argue on philosophical grounds that the other rendering, which paves the 
way for a possible theological reading of the text, is correct, and will attempt to 
confirm my findings by means of the general conception of the science of Being 
pictured in Book E.48   
 
I believe a passage from De Anima may establish the grounds for what I intend 
to support with respect to the term χωριστός: 
 
The natural philosopher’s [ὁ φυσικὸς] concern is with all the functions and 
affections of a given body, i.e., of matter in a given state; any attribute not of 
this kind is the business of another; in some subjects it is the business of the 
expert, the carpenter, it may be, or the physician; but inseparate in so far as 
they are not affections of the body in such a state [τῶν δὲ µὴ χωριστῶν µέν, ᾗ 
δὲ µὴ τοιούτου σώµατος πάθη], that is, in the abstract [ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως], are 
the province of the mathematician, and in so far as they are separate [ᾗ δὲ 
κεχωρισµένα] are the sphere of the First Philosopher [ὁ πρῶτος φιλόσοφος].49 
I think that this passage allows for a certain interpretation that reveals the 
correct usage of χωριστός in Book E. According to this passage, there can be 
two aspects of χωριστός. First, things can be χωριστά ‘in fact’, meaning that 
they have ‘separate’ ontological status allowing them to exist on their own 
behalf without any necessity for a subordinating substance for them to occur; or 
they can be χωριστά ‘in thought’, meaning that they are ‘separable’ through 
some effort of mind from the bodies in which they exist and do not have any 
separate existence.50 The former usage corresponds to the application of 
                                                
48 In this section, my aim is not to determine and fix the meaning of χωριστός in one of the two 
possible renderings in all of its occurrences in Aristotle’s corpus. My aim is rather to determine 
whether the term should be rendered as ‘separate’ or ‘separable’ when it occurs in the text of 
Book E. 
49 De An. I, 1, 403b11-16. I have used Hett’s (Loeb) translation with slight modifications for this 
passage.  
50 This implies, as suggested in my argument, that I do not accept a single way of rendering 
χωριστός; although it should be rendered as ‘separate’ in Book E, it should be rendered as 
‘separable’ in the passage that I will be citing soon from Physics. The ‘κεχωρισµένα’ used in the 
passage from De Anima (403b15-16) referring to the objects of first philosophy is a participle 
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χωριστός as referring to a certain state whereas the latter corresponds to the 
modal usage of the term. Now, in my view, the above passage acknowledges 
and implicitly articulates these two renderings of the term χωριστός. The 
passage informs us that the objects of mathematics are not separate ‘in fact’ 
though they are separable ‘in thought’ through abstraction, whereas the object 
of first philosophy is separate ‘in fact’. The objects of mathematics, accordingly, 
are not separate but they are separable through abstraction.  
 
Now, according to the division of sciences presented in Book E, physics deals 
with things that are ‘χωριστά’ but movable (κινητά), whereas mathematics deals 
with things that are ‘οὐ χωριστά’ but immovable (ἀκίνητα). The science of 
Being, like physics, deals with things that are ‘χωριστά’ but contrary to physics, 
whose subject matter consists of movable things, the science of Being deals with 
things that are immovable (ἀκίνητα). The scheme below shows Aristotle’s 
division of theoretical sciences according to his declarations in Book E:    
 
   Physics        χωριστά 
      κινητά 
   Mathematics  οὐ χωριστά 
      ἀκίνητα 
   Theology  χωριστά 
      ἀκίνητα 
 
What will be the possible outcomes if we accept the modal rendering in Book E, 
namely that χωριστός refers to modal ‘separable’?  
 
                                                                                                                                          
(perfect passive participle) expressing a certain state that these objects obtain and should 
accordingly be rendered as ‘separate’, whereas ‘τῶν δὲ µὴ χωριστῶν’, (403b14), which refers to 
the object of mathematics, expresses a possibility and therefore should be rendered as 
‘separable’ as translated in the text. 
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The above scheme tells us that mathematics deals with things that are not 
χωριστά.51 Now, according to Aristotle’s investigation of the ontological status 
of the objects of mathematics upon which he establishes his discussion of the 
science of mathematics, the subject matter of mathematical sciences consists of 
things that exist in a given material body.52 The mathematical objects, therefore, 
do not have any ontological status beyond the physical natures in which they 
occur. Now, if we were to render χωριστός modally as ‘separable’ in the 
passage of Book E, this would amount to saying that the objects of mathematics 
are not separable ‘in thought’ as well for in such a case the modal ‘separable’ 
will include the sense in which ‘χωριστά’ may both mean separate ‘in fact’ and 
separate ‘in thought’. This, however, will not do as it would immediately 
contradict what has been said in the above passage and in many places of the 
Aristotelian corpus to the effect that mathematics deals with the objects that are 
solely separable ‘in thought’ through abstraction. Correspondingly, the term 
χωριστός in Book E, where Aristotle confirms that mathematics deals with 
things οὐ χωριστά, should explain the actual state that a thing ‘in fact’ has and 
should be rendered as ‘separate’.   
 
Furthermore, if the modal rendering of the term χωριστός were to be accepted 
in Book E, this would amount to saying that the science of Being deals with 
things that are ‘separable’. According to the above passage, however, the 
objects of the science of Being are already separate ‘in fact’. Since these objects 
                                                
51 This is confirmed in many places in Aristotle’s corpus. In addition to the cited passage from 
Book E, see De An. I, 1, 403b15; III, 7, 431b15; Met. B, 2, 997b20; K, 1, 1059b12; 7, 1064a32; M, 2, 
1077a9; N 3, 1090a29.  
52 Space limitations mean I cannot now go into details of Aristotle’s discussion of mathematical 
objects. In his examination of mathematical objects Aristotle aims to resolve an aporia stated in 
Book B asking ‘whether numbers [ἀριθµοὶ] and lines [µήκη] and figures [σχήµατα] and points 
[στιγµαὶ] are a kind of substance or not, and if they are substances whether they are separate 
[κεχωρισµέναι] from sensible things [τῶν αἰσθητῶν] or present [ἐνυπάρχουσαι] in them’ (Met. B, 
1, 996a13-15). He has inquired into the proper object of the science of mathematics by resolving 
this aporia in three stages; first, he makes a series of analyses concerning the peculiar nature of 
mathematical objects (Met. M, 2, 1076a38-1076b11); later, he presents an examination of the 
ontological statuses of these objects (Met. M, 2, 1076b11 ff.); finally, he investigates the mode of 
Being of mathematical objects (Met. M, 3). As a result of these analyses, he states that the object 
of mathematics does not mean separate existence: ‘they [mathematical objects] cannot in any 
way exist separately [οὔτε κεχωρισµένα που εἶναι δυνατόν].’ (Met. M, 2, 1077b13-14) (note that 
the verb ‘κεχωρισµένα’ used in the passage (perfect passive) is the verb ‘χωρίζω’, which is the 
same verb that is used in the aporia of Book B (996a15)).  
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are ‘in fact’ separate, the mind has no obligation to engage in an effort of 
abstraction to separate them. That is why nowhere in the Aristotelian corpus 
can we find such an effort of abstraction that is to be employed by the 
metaphysician, though, as we have seen, he constantly affirms that 
mathematicians should engage in such an activity to ‘separate’ the object of 
inquiry.53 These remarks show that in the passage of Book E, χωριστός should 
not be rendered modally as this would cause inconsistencies with what has 
been stated in the Aristotelian corpus; rather, it should be rendered as 
‘separate’, addressing the actual state of a thing, that is, separate ‘in fact’ only.        
 
A passage from Physics may be employed for a further support, where Aristotle 
states:  
 
Now the mathematician, though he too treats of these things, nevertheless 
does not treat of them as the limits of a natural body [οὐχ ᾗ φυσικοῦ σώµατος 
πέρας ἕκαστον]; nor does he consider the attributes [συµβεβηκότα] indicated 
as the attributes of such bodies. That is why he separates them [διὸ καὶ 
χωρίζει]; for in thought [τῇ νοήσει] they are χωριστὰ from motion, and it 
makes no difference, nor does any falsity result, if they are separated 
[χωριζόντων].54 
The mathematician who deals with these natures, however, does not consider 
their physical natures qua their physical properties except from the perspective 
of magnitude, that is, qua quantity, disregarding the intrinsic condition of that 
in which they occur.55 Now, as we have seen, the possibility of such an 
investigation lies in the special type of action in which a mathematician engages 
when s/he inquires into mathematical objects, which Aristotle calls 
‘abstraction’. By means of abstraction, the mathematician deals with things that 
                                                
53 The mathematician deals with things that are abstracted (ἐξ ὰφαιρέσεως) from the substance 
in which these objects occur. Aristotle uses ‘abstraction’ as a technical term reserved solely for 
the science of mathematics. The mathematician strips off all the sensible qualities, leaving only 
the quantity, and considers this qua quantity (Met. K, 3, 1061a29; cf. Met. Z, 3, 1029a16). The 
term ‘abstraction’ can be contrasted with ‘addition’ (some of the passages where one can 
witness such a contrast are, for instance, An. Post. II, 5, 91b27; Phys. I, 7, 190b7; III, 6, 206a15; 
VIII, 10, 266b3; Met. B, 4, 1001b7; EN II, 6, 1106b10; V, 4, 1132a33-b7; 11, 1138a18) and thus be 
correlated with ‘subtraction’. Accordingly, when a mathematician ‘subtracts’, s/he subtracts the 
qualities that are not involved in the investigation, leaving only quantity for investigation.  
Physics, on the other hand, deals with concrete objects (Cael. III, 1, 299a16) for which reason, as 
Aristotle explicitly affirms, there is no place for abstraction in this science (PA I, 1, 641b11).  
54 Phys. II, 2, 193b31-35. 
55 Cf. Met. Z, 10, 1036a9; Phys. II, 2, 194a10-12. 
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do not have any separate existence from the bodies in which they occur. The 
mathematician abstracts, i.e., separates, the proper objects of his/her 
investigation from the material nature and considers them separately. 
 
The mathematical objects, therefore, are mere abstractions56 that are separable 
‘in thought’ whereas they do not have separate existence beyond the material 
body in which they exist. In other words, the proper objects of the 
mathematician are not separate (i.e., from matter) whereas they are separable 
through abstraction.57  
 
Now, if we were to accept the modal rendering in Aristotle’s division of 
theoretical sciences in Book E, this would produce adverse results, for such 
rendering, as we have seen, is not sensitive to the two aspects of χωριστός. 
Hence, such a rendering would impede Aristotle’s actual intentions in the 
passage, which is to differentiate the theoretical sciences, for in such a case it 
would be impossible to differentiate first philosophy from mathematics. If such 
a rendering were to be accepted, both mathematics and first philosophy would 
deal with things that are ‘separable’. We are informed in the passage of Book E 
that mathematics and the science of Being deal with immovable things. 
However, whereas the former deals with objects that are ‘οὐ χωριστά’, the latter 
deals with things that are ‘χωριστά’. We have seen that though the objects of 
mathematics are not separate ‘in fact’, they are separable ‘in thought’ through 
abstraction. If we rendered χωριστός as ‘separable’ then, since Aristotle states 
that first philosophy deals with χωριστά and since both of these sciences deal 
with immovable things, both mathematics and the science of Being would be 
dealing with things that are ‘separable’, in which case there would be no way to 
differentiate these two sciences from each other. This result would certainly 
contradict Aristotle’s aim in this passage, which is to differentiate the 
theoretical sciences.58  
                                                
56 See Cael. III, 1, 299a16; De An. I, 1, 403b15; Met. K, 3, 1061a29; EN VI, 8, 1142a18.  
57 See De An. III, 7, 431b14. 
58 This implies that Ross’s translation should be modified accordingly, that is, ‘χωριστά’ should 
not be rendered as ‘separable’ but as ‘separate’. 
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Having determined the correct rendering of the term χωριστός, we can now 
turn to the function it plays in the division of theoretical sciences. Accordingly, 
one may ask whether this term is capable of differentiating mathematics from 
physics. This question should certainly be answered in the positive, because 
although mathematics deals with the things that are not separate, physics deals 
with things that are separate. The primary focus of the science of physics is a 
primary category of substances that obtain separate existence. In many places, 
Aristotle confirms that physics deals with sensible substances59 in so far as they 
are movable, and mathematics, on the contrary, deals with quantity, which is a 
secondary category, ultimately conditioned to substance for its existence, and 
therefore cannot be regarded as having a separate existence. The criterion is 
thus capable of differentiating mathematics from physics.  
 
That the same criterion, i.e., χωριστός, is also capable of differentiating 
mathematics from the science of Being is clear, however, only if we accept the 
correct rendering of the term χωριστός. If χωριστός is to be rendered as 
‘separate’ rather than ‘separable’, it is capable of differentiating the science of 
Being from mathematics, since, as I have mentioned, mathematics deals with 
quantity, which has no separate existence beyond the substratum from which it 
is reflected, whereas theology deals with substance that is ultimately separate. 
On the other hand, physics and the science of Being cannot be differentiated on 
the basis of the term χωριστός, since they both deal with separate things. These 
two sciences can only be differentiated from each other by way of Aristotle’s 
second tool, which considers things in terms of whether they are movable or 
immovable. The criterion of χωριστός, therefore, is not sufficient to establish the 
ultimate distinctions between the three theoretical sciences. In order to explore 
Aristotle’s division of theoretical sciences further, I will now move to the 
                                                
59 See, for instance, Met. α, 995a18; Z, 11, 1037a14; K, 7, 1064a17-b5; Λ, 1, 1069a36. Because 
physics deals with such material natures, it is the responsibility of natural scientists to study 
even the parts of the soul that are not independent of matter (De An. I, 1, 403a28 (cf. 413b25); PA 
I, 1, 641a21; 29; Met. E, 1, 1026a5).  
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second criterion, analysis of which will help us to understand Aristotle’s actual 
intentions in putting forward the criterion χωριστός.             
 
3.3.2. Second Criterion: The science of Being as the Science of the Immovable 
 
In order to differentiate mathematics, physics, and the science of Being, we 
need more than the criterion of χωριστός, for, as we have seen, although it is 
capable of differentiating mathematics from the other two theoretical sciences, it 
is, as it stands, incapable of differentiating physics from the science of Being. 
Consequently, in the passage from Book E, Aristotle introduces another 
criterion, which addresses whether the object of a science is movable or 
immovable. According to this second criterion, mathematics and the science of 
Being deal with things that are immovable whereas physics deals with movable 
things.60 
 
According to a passage from Physics, the term ‘immovable’ can be applied to 
three types of things.61 First, it can be applied to things that are absolutely 
incapable of being moved; second, it can be applied to things that can hardly be 
moved; and finally, it can be applied to things at rest for some external 
reasons62 but naturally designed for and capable of motion. Of the three 
applications, only the first type can strictly be called ‘immovable’, as these types 
of objects are absolutely incapable of being moved; the other two types of 
things, however, cannot be called ‘immovable’ in the absolute sense, since they 
can actually be moved but not are moving at the moment for some reason. The 
passage in Book E therefore addresses the first type.  
 
What is the thing or things that are absolutely immovable and separate? This 
we can answer on the basis of Aristotle’s conception of the Universe. According 
to this conception anything that moves is moved by another thing, but the 
                                                
60 That physics, or the science of nature, deals with movable things is confirmed in much of the 
Aristotelian corpus. See, for instance, Phys. II, 7, 198a28; Cael. IV, 1, 308a1; Met. K, 1, 1059b16; 3, 
1061b6; b29; 7, 1064a31; Λ, 1, 1069a36.  
61 Phys. V, 2, 226b10. 
62 See Phys. VIII, 2, 253a11-21; 6, 259b1-16. 
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series cannot go on infinitely and there must be a first mover, which itself is 
unmoved.63 This Unmoved Mover can be regarded as the ultimate mover in the 
Universe.64 The movement originated by the unmoved mover, which Aristotle 
explicitly calls God,65 propagates through the subordinating things. The 
passage from Book Λ, where Aristotle differentiates three types of substances, 
may be of help in determining what is actually meant by the thing that is 
immovable. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Aristotle enumerates 
three types of substances;66 of these three types of substances, two of them, 
namely NSS and ESS, are dealt with by natural scientists since they engage in 
movement.67 However, the last type, i.e. IS, is dealt with by metaphysician. 
Hence, when Aristotle states that the science of Being deals with the 
immovable, we have good reasons to think that he is referring to IS.  
 
It has been stated that mathematics deals with things that are immovable as 
well. However, as we have seen, Immovable Substance is already said to be 
dealt with by a metaphysician. Since this substance is, as we are informed, to be 
investigated by a metaphysician, how are we to interpret Aristotle’s affirmation 
that mathematics deals with immovable things as well? What kinds of things, 
then, are addressed by ‘the immovable objects’ that are said to be dealt with by 
the mathematician? The objects of mathematics, as stated in several places, are 
indeed immovable.68  
 
One can appeal to the other criterion, namely the separation, in order to 
differentiate the objects of mathematics and the science of Being. Both the 
metaphysician and the mathematician deal with immovable things but, as I 
have argued, the latter deals with objects that do not have separate existence 
beyond the things in which they occur. Numbers, lines and other mathematical 
objects can thus be regarded as certain attributes of substances, separable ‘in 
                                                
63 See Phys. VIII, 5; 6, 260a11-20; Met. Γ, 5, 1010a34; 8, 1012b29. 
64 I will omit to discuss here how the unmoved mover can originate a movement and will deal 
with this topic, when I discuss Book Λ.   
65 EE II, 6, 1222b23.  
66 Met. Λ, 1, 1069a30ff. 
67 Cf. Republic 529b7, where Plato rejects the possibility of any knowledge concerning sensibles.  
68 See Phys. II, 7, 198a17; Cael. III, 6, 305a25; MA 1, 698a26; cf. Phys. II, 2, 194a4. 
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thought’ solely through abstraction. These abstract objects of mathematics are 
indeed immovable but they do not have any place in the order of the Universe 
that is established upon the hierarchies of substances.69 Hence, the fact that a 
metaphysician is tasked by the study of Immovable Substance does not prevent 
him stating that mathematics deals with immovable things as well because such 
objects of mathematics are not substances but abstractions of mind that cannot 
exist apart from the actual substances in which they occur. 
 
What, in fact, is meant by the things that are separate and that are supposed to 
be dealt by the metaphysician? Now, one might think that these should be 
substances on the basis of the fact that the other so-called secondary categories 
are dependent upon substances for their existence,70 as my argument has shown 
in the previous chapter while I was discussing Book Γ. Indeed, it seems obvious 
upon reflection that if there are substances, then there must be other categories 
as well. If, then, Callias exists, he must have such and such qualities (e.g. some 
colour or other), such and such quantities (e.g. he would have some length), 
location (he will be in some place, say, in Lyceum) and so on. The deep insight, 
however, is that this relation does not necessarily indicate an asymmetrical 
primacy. In a word, the existence of Callias requires the existence of other 
things no less than they require the existence of Callias. That seems to be 
suggesting that, so far, we have given no reason to treat primary substances as 
absolutely separate from the other secondary categories. These, therefore, 
cannot be regarded as absolutely separate from the other so-called secondary 
categories.  
 
Is there a way that we can reasonably argue for Aristotle’s rather attractive and 
apparently intuitive suggestion that primary substances are, well, primary? I 
think the possible answer to this question lies in further reflection on what is to 
be understood by substance at this point. Only in this way, I mean, only when 
we distinguish the types of substances and determine the exact kind that is in 
                                                
69 See Met. Λ, 8, 1073b4 (cf. Phys. IV, 1, 208b23). 
70 Cat. 2b5-6; Phys. I, 2, 185a29-32. 
  
197 
question, may the intuition become secure. We have already seen that there can 
be three types of substances in Aristotle’s system.71 According to this schema, 
the NSS and the ESS seem to involve this problem of asymmetry for they 
always appear as having some kind of categorical determination. Regarding the 
third type of substance, namely the IS, however, it seems to be that this problem 
of asymmetry vanishes from sight. For, certainly, IS cannot have a categorical 
determination, namely that, IS cannot be in place, cannot have magnitude etc. 
This sufficiently shows that only IS can in reality be regarded as separate, as 
this kind of substance does not need to have categorical determination, that is, it 
should not have to be affirmed that IS has some quantity, quality and so on.72 
This shows that what is absolutely be regarded as ‘separate’ should be the IS 
and that this type of substance is to be dealt by the metaphysician.   
 
The general upshot of this discussion is that, by virtue of the two criteria, 
namely, immovability and separation, Aristotle has sufficiently established the 
grounds for differentiating the three theoretical sciences from each other. Since 
the science of Being deals with IS, namely God, Aristotle does not hesitate to 
call this science ‘θεολογική’.73 Aristotle uses the term ‘θεολογική’ in Book E and 
Book K somewhat differently from his usual practice. In the Aristotelian corpus, 
the term and its correlative ‘θεόλογος’ frequently refer to the poets (e.g. 
Hesiod) and the mythologies they wrote.74 Over against this background, in 
Metaphysics, Aristotle introduces a new science that considers God as its prime 
subject matter and he rightfully renders this science as ‘θεολογική’, i.e., 
theological.75 Contrary to the ‘traditional theology’ of the ancient poets, this 
new ‘scientific theology’ is established upon the rational principles of Being 
rather than inspiration. The science of God will accordingly reveal the truths 
                                                
71 Phys. II, 7, 198a29-31; Met. Λ, 1, 1069a30-33. See my discussion of several types of substances 
in the second chapter. 
72 This last point can, of course, only be fully justified after we encounter Aristotle’s 
developments on the nature of IS in Book Λ. For this, see Λ, 7.  
73 Met. E, 2, 1026a19. Cf. Met. K, 7, 1064a33. 
74 See, for instance, Meteor. II, 1, 353a35; Met. B, 4, 1000a9; Λ, 6, 1071b27; 10, 1075b26; N, 4, 
1091a34. 
75 Note that the noun ‘θεολογία’, according to Bonitz occurs only in one place in Aristotle 
(Meteor. II, 1, 353a35); instead he uses the adjectival ‘θεολογική’ to refer to the science of the 
divine.  
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with respect to the highest principle of all Being, reflected in the nature that is 
ultimately separate, immovable and divine.76 The use of the term in Book E of 
Metaphysics is therefore different from its usual sense on justifiable grounds. 
Just like Plato, who defined theology as the true knowledge of God,77 Aristotle 
does not hesitate to refer to the science that deals with separate and immovable 
substance, which on the basis of his doctrine can be nothing but God, as 
‘θεολογική’. According to what Aristotle declares in Book E, the scope of 
theology is therefore fixed on the eternal, immovable and separate substance, 
namely God, and not based on the inspirational speculations of the ancient 
Greek poets. 
 
I have mentioned that, beyond differentiating theoretical sciences, the first 
section of Book E establishes a hierarchy in these sciences as well. This is 
confirmed if we take into account what Aristotle says just after his division of 
sciences: ‘And the highest [τὴν τιµιωτάτην] science must deal with the highest 
genus [τιµιώτατον γένος], so that the theoretical sciences [θεωρητικαὶ] are 
superior [αἱρετώταται] to the other sciences [τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστηµῶν],78 and this 
[theology] to the other theoretical sciences’.79 No justification has been given for 
this utterance in Book E; the fact that theology should be regarded as the most 
superior science is simply stated and Aristotle has left the details to be 
recovered by his readers.  
 
Is there really any possibility that we may find an answer for the superiority of 
the science of Being among the other theoretical sciences? What might be the 
underlying reason for Aristotle’s statement that theology is superior to the other 
sciences? 
 
                                                
76 Met. E, 1, 1026a20. Book E, therefore, is in perfect harmony with Book A, since both correlate 
the science of Being with the highest principles that can best be reflected in the ultimate 
substance, namely God.  
77 See Republic, 379A-D. 
78 I have already mentioned that the basic reason for regarding theoretical sciences as superior 
to others lies in their self-reflexive character (see 3.3). 
79 Met. E, 1, 1026a21-3. 
  
199 
Part of the answer, I believe, may be found in Aristotle’s previous discussion of 
Wisdom in Book A, where Wisdom is situated at the top of the hierarchy of 
sciences. My discussion of that section of Metaphysics has proved that it is 
primarily the subject matter of Wisdom that makes this science superior to the 
other sciences, since several excellences of Wisdom80 are justified on the basis of 
its proper subject matter, which, as my analyses have shown, should be nothing 
but God himself. I believe that in Book E Aristotle might well be maintaining 
the same line of thought81 when he states that theology is the highest among the 
other sciences. In Book A, we are told that the science dealing with higher 
causes should be regarded as superior because of its comprehensiveness.82 In 
Book E, Aristotle, by pronouncing that theology deals with the separate, eternal 
and immobile, articulates the several features of the highest principle in 
question. Accordingly, one might justifiably imagine that in Book E what 
Aristotle offers is an articulation of the highest principle and causes of Book A 
as being separate and immovable. Hence the conception of Wisdom as the 
science of the highest principles and causes seems to be entirely in harmony 
with the conception of theology in Book E, and together they show why this 
science should be regarded as the highest among others.  
 
The doctrine of Book Γ further supports my claim that the science of Being 
should deal with a core item that is prior in every way, namely that it should be 
both ontologically and logically prior to peripherals and that it should fulfil the 
requirements of causal connectedness if it is to fulfil the requirements of core-
dependent homonymy (CDH). We have seen that what is espoused by the core 
item in that part of the treatise was substance. My discussion has shown that 
none of the several types of substances other than IS are more suitable for 
meeting these priority requirements.83 In agreement with the doctrine of Book 
Γ, Aristotle now states that the subject matter of the science of Being is God and 
that it should be called theology. This amounts to saying that God, who is 
                                                
80 I have discussed these features of Wisdom in Chapter I.   
81 For which reason, also, he might not wish to be offering a justification of his claim that the 
science of Being should be regarded as superior to others. 
82 Met. A, 2, 982a21-23. 
83 See section 2.4. for the discussion of several types of substances in the CDH of Being. 
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absolutely prior to all other types of Beings, is the basic object of inquiry of the 
science of Being rather than any other substance that may be claimed to be the 
subject matter of the science of Being. Hence Book E confirms and to a degree 
articulates what has been stated in the previous sections of Metaphysics by 
virtue of affirming that the science of Being should deal with what is separate, 
eternal and immovable, that is to say, God – for which reason it is called 
theology – and that it should be regarded as the highest amongst others as it 
deals with what is ultimately prior.  
 
In all the books of Metaphysics, the distinctive feature of the science of Being 
with respect to the other theoretical sciences seems to lie in its study of the 
highest Being, that is, its inquiry into God. Book E confirms and emphasises this 
component of the science of Being and it places this science at the top of all 
sciences. Because theology deals with what is absolutely prior as opposed to the 
other sciences that deal with what is ontologically posterior, it should be 
regarded as superior to all the other sciences. In conformity with this 
conception, according to Book Γ, physics should be regarded as a ‘secondary 
philosophy’ because its subject matter is composed of things that have matter in 
their natures and are movable.84 Therefore the privilaged status of the object of 
theology puts this science in a superior position to the others since, by virtue of 
its subject matter, which according to the declarations of Book E is separate, 
eternal and immovable, theology now can fulfil what we have been told with 
respect to the features of Wisdom in Book A that by virtue of its subject matter 
it becomes the most universal,85 most exact,86 most instructive,87 most 
authoritative88 science amongst others and is desired for its own sake.89 
Furthermore, according to what we are told in Book Γ, the proper subject matter 
of this science should be prior to all other Beings if it is to fulfil the 
requirements of CDH. As mentioned, my analyses with respect to the core item 
                                                
84 Met. Γ, 3, 1005b1; Z, 11, 1037a14.  
85 Met. A, 2, 982a21-23. 
86 Met. A, 2, 982a25. 
87 Met. A, 2, 982a28. 
88 Met. A, 2, 982b5. 
89 Met. A, 2, 982a30. 
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in CDH of Being showed that IS is the best candidate for such a role. Book E 
confirms this by placing God as the proper subject matter of the science of 
Being. The subject matter of the other sciences is conditioned to the subject 
matter of theology logically or ontologically or principally; they are either 
perishable and movable, as in the case of physics, or mere abstractions having 
no separate existence on their own behalf, as in the case of mathematics. 
Theology, therefore, should properly be regarded as superior to the other 
sciences.  
 
3.4. Doctrinal Relations between Book Γ and Book E 
 
I believe upon reflection that one can find deeper doctrinal relations between 
Book E and Book Γ than I have hitherto attempted to show in this chapter. In 
this part, I shall be concentrating on the doctrines of Book Γ and Book E in order 
to show that they exactly parallel each other in view of the fact that we find 
wide agreement between the theological conception of the science of Being in 
Book E and Book Γ’s conception of CDH. I hope that after this assessment a 
further step will be taken in an avenue of approach that motivates a more 
unified conception of the science of Being that stands out in Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics.    
 
3.4.1. The Criteria for the Science of Being Developed in Book Γ and Book E 
 
In two of the major treatises of Metaphysics, where Aristotle establishes the 
science of Being, namely in Book E and Book Γ, several criteria are offered upon 
which the science of Being is constructed. Now, if one wants to show the unity 
between these two treatises, one must offer some arguments for the criteria 
suggested in several stages to show that they do indeed complement each other 
so as to pave the way for a unified conception of the science of Being. Now, if 
the suggestion I hold is right, the relations between the criteria that have been 
put forward for the science of Being in Book Γ and Book E should result in a 
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single harmonious doctrine in which these criteria not only complement each 
other but also yield to the same conception of the science of Being. 
 
What can be the underlying relation, then, between the criteria put forward in 
Book Γ and Book E that supposedly pave the way for a single doctrine of the 
science of Being? 
 
We have seen that one of the criteria suggested for the science of Being in Book 
E is that of having a separate existence. Taken as referring to a state of a Being, 
this criterion signifies a thing that is not dependent upon another thing for its 
existence. This is in accordance with what Aristotle declares in a passage from 
Physics: ‘For none of the others can exist independently [χωριστόν ἐστι] except 
substance [παρὰ τὴν οὐσίαν]; for everything is predicated of substance as 
subject [πάντα γὰρ καθ' ὑποκειµένου λέγεται τῆς οὐσίας].’90 According to what 
we are told in this passage, Beings that are predicated of a subject (i.e. the 
categories of Being other than substance) are not independent, i.e. separate 
(χωριστά). The objects of mathematics fall under the category of quantity that 
can only exist if they are predicated of an underlying subject, namely substance, 
for which reason they cannot be regarded as separate. Hence, if a Being is to be 
‘separate’ then it should not be predicated of an underlying subject and so it 
should be self-sufficient in the sense that it should not depend on an underlying 
subject for its existence. Book Z of Metaphysics confirms this: ‘For of the other 
categories none can exist independently [none is separate], but only 
substance.’91 Substance, then, is the only thing that can rightly be called 
‘separate’. The categories of Being other than substance, on the other hand, are 
not separate Beings since they are all predicated of substance as they owe their 
existence to some underlying subject, in this case, substance, which provides 
the support for their existence. According to this conception, only particular 
                                                
90 Phys. I, 2, 185a31-32. I suggest that the first part of this utterance would be better translated as: 
‘For none of the other things is separate except substance (...) [οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων χωριστόν 
ἐστι παρὰ τὴν οὐσίαν]’.  
91 ‘τῶν µὲν γὰρ ἄλλων κατηγορηµάτων οὐθὲν χωριστόν, αὕτη δὲ µόνη’ Met. Z, 1, 1028a33-34. 
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substances merit being called separate, as they do not depend on another thing 
for their existence.92  
 
I believe the criterion of having a separate existence fits very well with what has 
been stated in terms of one of the criteria in Book Γ with respect to the CDH of 
Being, namely, ontological dependence. For recall that ontological dependence 
requires that an instance, say x, can exist without another instance, say y, but 
not vice versa. Now, I believe that ontological dependence (OD) exactly reflects 
what has been suggested by the term ‘separate’ since, just like OD, separation 
requires an existence without dependence on another underlying subject. The 
objects of mathematics are not, therefore, ontologically prior, just as they are not 
separate, since in the absence of an underlying subject they cannot exist. 
Substances, on the other hand, are ontologically prior since they are not 
predicated of another subject by virtue of which they exist but are self-
sufficient; they are therefore separate. The separation terminology of Book E 
therefore is exactly parallel with the ontological dependence criterion of Book Γ.  
 
Whereas the separation criterion can be correlated with OD, it is not sufficient 
to meet the requirements of causal dependence (CD) that I have stated as thus:  
 
CD: y is ontologically dependent on x iff x is the cause of the existence of y but 
not vice versa. 
 
The criterion of separation implies solely that a thing cannot have separate 
existence if it cannot exist in the absence of an underlying subject, but it tells us 
nothing with respect to the existential causal relations between what is separate 
and what is not. If, therefore, the criterion of separation were the only one that 
had been introduced in Book E, the conceptions of the science of Being that one 
witnesses in the two treatises would not fully overlap. Now, however, we may 
affirm that with the second criterion that was introduced in Book E the 
                                                
92 ‘So if the primary substances did not exist it would be impossible for any other things to exist’ 
Cat. 2b5-6. 
  
204 
harmony between the proposed subject matter of the science of Being in Book Γ 
and in Book E is achieved.  
 
Book E states that the subject of the science of Being not only consists of things 
that are separate but also of those that are immovable (ἀκίνητα). Additionally, 
we have seen in previous discussions concerning Book Γ that the type of 
substance that is ultimately immobile is the best candidate to fulfil causal 
dependence (CD). Now, by introducing the criterion of being immovable, Book 
E complements the conception of Book Γ, whereby the criteria put forward to 
establish CDH of Being are satisfied. If Book E solely introduced the criterion of 
having a separate existence, this would not be sufficient to establish the 
grounds for the harmony between the conceptions of the science of Being in 
Book Γ and in Book E; now, with the introduction of the criterion of being 
immovable, this harmony is fully established.  
 
Book E, therefore, continues the same line of thought that was originated in 
Book A and systematised in Book Γ. The conceptions of the science of Being 
described by the criteria put forward for CDH are fully in accordance with the 
criteria introduced in Book E. Indeed, I believe that these criteria, three of which 
are originated in Book Γ and two in Book E, can only be fulfilled by the same 
type of Being, which is the IS. We have already seen that the best candidate for 
the role of the core item in CDH of Being is IS; Book E confirms this by 
articulating two further criteria for the subject of the science of Being and 
explicitly states that the IS, namely God, should be the basic topic of inquiry of 
the science of Being. In fact, the objects of mathematics cannot fulfil the 
requirements of CDH nor can the objects of physics meet these requirements. 
Hence, my supposition that only the IS can fulfil the requirements of CDH 
seems to be confirmed by what we have been told in Book E with respect to the 
subject matter of the science of Being.93  
                                                
93 In Book E, Aristotle excludes accidental Being (κατὰ συµβεβηκός) and Being in the sense of 
true (ὰληθές) from the realm of the science of Being. These two, as we have seen in the previous 
chapter, are included in what I have called ‘broader manifestations of Being’ (see my discussion 
in 2.3.1. The broader manifestations of Being appear in several places of Aristotelian corpus. For 
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these senses see, Met. Δ, 7, 1017a8-b9; E, 2, 1026a33; Θ, 1, 1045b28; 10, 1051a34-b6.). Aristotle had 
already exposed accidental Being in his treatment of concepts in Book Δ (Met. Δ, 30). In Book E, 
he excludes this manifestation of Being not only from the scope of the science of Being but also 
from all scientific treatments (Met. E, 2, 1026b3ff. Cf. Met. K, 8, 1064b17-1065a6). Now, he gives 
several reasons for this exclusion. Accidental Being cannot be the object of any scientific inquiry 
(Aristotle usually gives two examples in his expositions of the accidental Being: the example of 
‘white’ (λευκόν) and ‘musical’ (µουσικόν) whereby these attributes are combined in a subject, 
say Socrates, accidentally. For several occurrences of these examples, see An. Post. I, 19, 81b24; 
22, 83a16; Top. V, 4, 133b15-134a4; Phys. I, 4, 188a34; II, 3, 195b1; Met. Γ, 4, 1007b3; Δ, 2, 1014a4; 6, 
1015b16; 7, 1017a7; 1017a19-22; 9, 1018a1; Z, 6, 1031b22) as it is not necessary (see Met. E, 2, 
1026b27-33; cf. K, 8, 1064b17-1065a6), nor can it be regarded as prior (Phys. II, 6, 198a7; Met. Γ, 4, 
1007a35; K, 8, 1065b2; EN I, 6, 1096a22). Accidental Being involves exceptions (Met. E, 2, 
1026b29-31) that cannot even be said to happen ‘for the most part’ (Met. E, 2, 1026b32-33; 
1027a20-21) or that can be regarded as a mere name (Met. E, 2, 1026b13), akin to non-Being (Met. 
E, 2, 1026b21). It is indeed quite reasonable for Aristotle to exclude accidental Being from the 
realm of sciences. When Aristotle’s conception of science and his understanding of accident are 
considered, this exclusion seems imperative. Accident refers to a relative and temporary 
property of a thing (Top. I, 5, 102b21) that may or may not be connected to the subject that it 
happens to accompany (An. Post. I, 6, 75a20; Top. IV, 1, 120b34). The nature of accident, 
therefore, is not suitable for a science. Indeed, Aristotle frequently contrasts accidental Being 
with necessary Being (see, for instance, An. Post. I, 4, 73b4; 11; 6, 74b12; 75a19; 19, 81b24; Phys. II, 
1, 192b23; VIII, 5, 256b10; Met. Δ , 30, 1025a14; E, 2, 1026b27-33 [cf. Met. I, 1, 1052a19; K, 8, 
1064b17-1065a6; EN VIII, 3, 1156b11, 8, 1159a18]). His conception of science, however, requires 
that all sciences should deal with what is necessary (An. Post. I, 6, 75a30). They therefore cannot 
treat accidental Being. Accidental Being should therefore be the first thing that is to be excluded 
from the realm of sciences for it cannot be the object of a scientific inquiry (An. Post. I, 6, 75a19; 
75a31; Met. E, 2, 1027a20; K, 8, 1064b17). Furthermore, Aristotle’s conception of science 
necessitates that any inquiry, if it is to be regarded as scientific, should focus on the causes (An. 
Post. I, 2; Phys. I, 1, 184a10 [cf. II, 3, 195b22]; Met. A, 3, 983a25 [cf. H, 4, 1044a32]). The causes of 
the accidents, however, are accidents themselves (Met. Δ, 30, 1025a25; E, 2, 1027a7 [cf. Int. 9; 
1065a6]). Since sciences inquire into the necessary causes of things, accidents should be 
excluded from the scope of any scientific inquiry. Sciences not only deal with what is necessary 
but also with what is universal (Met. E, 1027a20. See An. Post. I, 4, 73b25ff. and Met. Δ, 9, 
1017b35 for how Aristotle correlates universal with necessary). Accidents cannot, however, be 
regarded as universal properties of things and therefore cannot generate the focus of inquiry of 
any science. Hence, because of their indeterminate nature, and because they are innumerable 
and indefinite (Phys. II, 5, 196b26; Met. K, 8, 1065a25), accidents cannot be involved in the scope 
of any science. Even though they should be regarded as Beings (Met. E, 2, 1027a16) they do not 
merit being involved in the scope of the science of Being. Hence, the case of one of the 
manifestations of Being enumerated in the broader list of several manifestations of Being is 
settled. 
Just like accidental Being, ‘Being in the sense of true’ is also excluded from the scope of the 
science of Being. The reason for this exclusion is plainly stated by Aristotle: ‘for falsity and truth 
are not in things [ἐν τοῖς πράγµασιν] (...) but in thought [ἀλλ' ἐν διανοίᾳ]’ (Met. E, 4, 1027b25). 
True and false are solely concerned with the combination or separation of concepts in 
understanding and therefore they have no existence outside the mind. For Aristotle, the real 
Being that exists outside the mind has absolute priority over the judgements that address these 
factual Beings: ‘It is not because we think [ἡµᾶς οἴεσθαι] that you are white [σε λευκὸν] that you 
are white, but because you are white [ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σὲ εἶναι λευκὸν]... we who say this have the 
truth [ἡµεῖς οἱ φάντες τοῦτο ἀληθεύοµεν]’ (Met. Θ, 10, 1051b7). Hence, the factual Being 
outside the mind is the simple fact that decides whether our judgement is true or false. If in 
actuality contradictory attributes are combined, we always reach non-Being in the sense of false. 
Hence, if we try to combine what is always separate, or if we try to separate what is always 
combined, our judgement will always be false (Met. Θ, 10, 1051b9). The judgements concerning 
accidentals, on the other hand, may sometimes be true and sometimes false (Met. Θ, 10, 
1051b12). Indeed, it is possible that an accidental attribute may cease to be combined with what 
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3.5. Conclusion 
 
Aristotle has already shown in Book Γ that the basic focus of inquiry of the 
science of Being is what he calls Being qua Being. In the same treatise, we have 
seen that studying Being qua Being, that is, studying what it means for 
something to be, is only possible through a special kind of structure that allows 
Aristotle to unify the science of Being, namely, CDH. Hence, the study of Being 
qua Being can only be conducted through the necessary relations found 
between the core item and the peripheral instances of Being. This structure 
prompts us to think that the core item should be prior in several ways. In Book 
E, what Aristotle has been saying is in line with what we have previously been 
told in Book Γ. The requirements of CDH, especially ontological and logical 
dependence, seem to be in perfect harmony with the further requirements that 
have been brought to the fore in Book E, namely separation and immovability. 
Furthermore, as we have seen, Aristotle’s appointment of ‘what it is’ and ‘if it 
is’ to the science of Being is also in harmony with two of the criteria of CDH, 
namely ontological and logical dependence. These, I think, sufficiently show 
that Book Γ and Book E are in alignment with each other in terms of the 
doctrine of the science of Being.  
 
I have mentioned that in Book Γ, although Aristotle hinted what might be the 
proper referent of the core item in the CDH of Being by virtue of stating that it 
should be ‘substance’, this nevertheless was quite ambiguous in the sense that it 
was not clear which among the several types of substances is the best candidate 
                                                                                                                                          
it is initially combined with or may be combined with what it is initially separated from. Since 
accidents may change, the judgements concerning these accidents will accordingly be true at 
one time and false at another time. The case of necessary Beings, however, is different. What is 
free from all potentiality and matter and therefore unchanging is always true (Met. Θ, 10, 
1051b15; 1052a4). Since these things are eternal and do not change, the truths about them do not 
change either. Hence, as Aristotle states, there can be no falsity concerning these objects but 
only ignorance (ἀγνοεῖν; see Met. Θ, 10, 1051b25). Therefore, what Aristotle calls ‘Being as true’ 
can merely be regarded as a judgement of the mind that pertains to Being only in thought, 
however, is incapable of existing outside in things. For this reason it should be excluded from 
the scope of the science of Being. The metaphysician deals with real things, namely, with ‘ὄν 
κυρίως’. Being in the sense of true, however, is merely dependent on ‘ὄν κυρίως’ that has no 
existence on its own and falls outside the interest of the metaphysician. 
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for standing as the core item in the CDH of Being. Given the doctrinal harmony 
between Book Γ and Book E we can safely argue that some progress has been 
achieved through Aristotle’s enterprise in Book E. Since these books are in line 
with each other in terms of the approach to criteria upon which the science of 
Being is established, one might reasonably claim that Book E makes important 
progress by detecting IS as the basic subject matter of the science of Being. This 
may well amount to saying that the core item in the CDH of Being established 
hitherto in Book Γ is determined as IS in Book E. This is also in line with what I 
suggested in the previous chapter, i.e. that the most suitable candidate amongst 
the types of substances for the role of being the core item in the CDH of Being is 
IS. Hence, after the progress attained in Book E, we have sufficiently 
understood that the universal science of Being that Book Γ has been espousing 
can be reached through the core item that is ‘first’ and immobile and separate: 
 
One might indeed raise the question whether first philosophy [πρώτη 
φιλοσοφία] is universal [καθόλου], or deals with one genus [περί τι γένος], i.e. 
some one kind of being [φύσιν τινὰ µίαν]; for not even the mathematical 
sciences are all alike in this respect; geometry and astronomy deal with a 
certain kind of thing [περί τινα φύσιν εἰσίν], while universal [καθόλου] 
mathematics applies alike to all. We answer that if there is no substance other 
than those which are formed by nature [φύσει συνεστηκυίνας], natural 
science [ἡ φυσικὴ] will be the first science [πρώτη ἐπιστήµη]; but if there is an 
immovable substance [οὐσία ἀκίνητος], the science of this must be prior 
[προτέρα] and must be first philosophy [φιλοσοφία πρώτη], and universal in 
this way, because it is first [καθόλου οὕτως ὅτι πρώτη]. And it will belong to 
this to consider being qua being – both what it is [τί ἐστι] and the attributes 
which belong to it qua being [τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ᾗ ὄν].94 
According to what we have been told in this passage, if the science of Being 
were not to be theological, that is, if it were not to deal with the highest kind of 
substance, it would not be universal either. We have already seen that this is 
what one might derive from Aristotle’s discussion of CDH of Being. Now, in 
Book E the most significant constituent of this structure, namely IS, is included 
in the picture. Both treatises are perfectly in line with each other in their 
conception of the science of Being. The harmony between the two treatises of 
Metaphysics, that is, between Book Γ and Book E, shows how, to Aristotle’s 
mind, the problem of the unity of general and special metaphysics is averted. 
                                                
94 Met. E, 1, 1026a23-32.  
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The universality of the science of Being is attained through the homonymous 
structure of Being in which the study of the primary instance paves the way for 
the study of the secondary instances through the necessary connections found 
between these items of CDH. Book E agrees with this conception; what is 
absolutely prior now explicitly presents itself as God, so all the requirements 
assigned to the science of Being are fulfilled. The basic structure is supplied by 
Book Γ, and the scope is further developed by Book E. Aristotle, then, is right 
when he states that the science of Being is universal because it is first, which 
amounts to saying that through the study of the highest instance of Being that is 
absolutely prior, the investigation spreads to all departments of Being. The 
ordered homonymous structure of Being and the nature of the object of the 
science of Being determined as eternal, separate and immovable allow for such 
a conception. The science of Being, therefore, can be regarded as universal only 
by virtue of the fact that it is a theological science, and studies the highest 
instance of Being, that is, God. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The doctrine that has been shaped in the previous treatises of Metaphysics has 
shown sufficiently that the main task of a metaphysician is to study substance. The 
analysis of core dependent homonymy (CDH) upon which the science of Being is 
established in Book Γ has proved that the best candidate among the several types 
of substances to be assigned for the interest of the metaphysician is Immobile 
Substance (IS), namely God. This conception is confirmed and further developed in 
Book E, which articulates the kind of substance in question by introducing two 
additional criteria for the subject of the science of Being, namely that it should deal 
with what is separate and immovable. This metaphysical outlook, having been 
established in Book Γ and Book E, provides the backdrop against which the import 
of Aristotle’s investigations in the central books of Metaphysics (i.e. Z, H, Θ) will be 
gauged in the present chapter.1 Hence, in this chapter, I shall be dealing with the 
central books of Metaphysics, whereby I aim to show that the evidence to be found 
in these treatises supports my previous argument with respect to God as the core 
of CDH of Being. I will present three arguments in support of this claim. The first 
one employs Aristotle’s discussion of the priority of actuality over potentiality, 
whereby I aim to show that the ontological dependency requirement of the CDH of 
Being can only be fully met by God, for which reason, among the other types of 
substances that I have discussed in chapter II (i.e. non-eternal sensible substances 
(NSS) and eternal sensible substances (ESS)) only God (i.e. the Immobile Substance 
(IS)) is to be regarded as the core of the CDH of Being. Second, I will examine the 
criteria put forward in the central books for substance-hood. I will show that these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I do not mean to, in this part, to embark on a full discussion of Aristotle’s theory of substance as it 
emerges in the central books of Metaphysics. Rather, I am content to glance at these treatises in the 
light of what has been stated in the previous sections of Metaphysics and inquire into the elements of 
Aristotle’s discussion that may be put forward in order to support my ongoing argument with 
respect to the scope of the science of Being. 
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criteria, together with Aristotle’s general conception of substance affirm that the 
main talk of a metaphysician is to study the pure form, namely, God. This, in turn, 
will prove that the conception of the science of Being in Aristotle’s mind while he 
writes the central books is eminently theological and is in line with the previously 
held conception of the science of Being that we encounter in Book Γ and Book E. 
Finally, I will turn my attention to the discussion of essence in the central books, 
whereby I aim to show that what Aristotle maintains in the central books with 
respect to definition proves that among the other types of substances (i.e. NSS and 
ESS) only God can fulfil the requirements of the logical dependence, for which 
reason He is to be regarded as the core item of the CDH of Being.    
 
My reading of the central books, therefore, primarily concentrates on the harmony 
between the conception of the science of Being that stands out in the previous 
treatises of Metaphysics and the statements that are encountered in the central 
books. 
 
4.2. Substance in Priority 
 
While commenting on Book Γ in chapter II, I have mentioned that several 
dependency relations between the core item and the peripherals must be observed 
in the core-dependent homonymy (CDH) of Being. One of these dependency 
relations was the ontological dependence. I think by virtue of the analysis of the 
priority of substance – and for that matter the priority of form over matter 
presented in the central books of Metaphysics – Aristotle has achieved a 
considerable development with respect to his previous enterprise encountered in 
Book Γ. The analyses that we come across in the central books, once read together 
with the previous analysis that we encounter in Book Γ, might lead one to find 
further evidence with respect to the first and more importantly the second level 
intra-categorical ontological dependency relations in the CDH of Being. For that 
matter, also, as one proceeds through the lines of the central books of Metaphysics, 
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one might find some evidence with respect to what might be the actual referent of 
the ‘substance’ quite ambiguously stated as the core item in the CDH of Being in 
Book Γ. 
 
In this part, I aim to reveal the implications of Aristotle’s enterprise with respect to 
the ontological priority of substance that we encounter in the central books on 
what has been previously stated with respect to the CDH of Being in Book Γ. An 
assessment of how Aristotle establishes the ontological priority of substance – and 
for that matter the priority of form over matter in the central books – will most 
importantly reveal the basic structure of the second level of ontological 
dependency relations that can be encountered in intra-categorical relations, that is, 
between substances, the analysis of which in turn shows that Immobile Substance 
(IS), the pure form, should be regarded as ontologically prior in the absolute sense 
to all other substances that one might encounter in the Aristotelian universe.  
 
In Book Z, one can find Aristotle reflecting on ontological dependence at the first 
level, that is, between inter-categorical relations. Among several manifestations of 
Being, namely the so-called secondary categories, substance is taken to be the 
primary, for none of the secondary categories can exist without the initial existence 
of substance: 
 
… for none of them is either self-subsistent [καθ' αὑτὸ πεφυκὸς] or capable of 
being separated from substance [χωρίζεσθαι δυνατὸν τῆς οὐσίας], but rather, if 
anything, it is that which walks [τὸ βαδίζον] or is seated [τὸ καθήµενον] or is 
healthy [τὸ ὑγιαῖνον] that is an existent thing [τῶν ὄντων]. Now these are seen to 
be more real [µᾶλλον φαίνεται ὄντα] because there is something definite which 
underlies [ὑποκείµενον] them; and this is the substance [οὐσία] or the individual 
[τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον], which is implied in such a predicate [ἐν τῇ κατηγορίᾳ]; for 
‘good’ [τὸ ἀγαθὸν] or ‘sitting’ [τὸ καθήµενον] are not used without this [οὐκ ἄνευ 
τούτου λέγεται]. Clearly then it is in virtue of this category that each of the others 
is [διὰ ταύτην κἀκείνων ἕκαστον ἔστιν]. Therefore that which is primarily [τὸ 
πρώτως ὂν] and is simply [ὂν ἁπλῶς] (not is something) must be substance [ἡ 
οὐσία].2 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Met. Z, 1028a22-31.	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The passage tells us that none of the other categories can exist without the 
existence of substance; rather, they exist ‘in virtue of substance’, which is, 
therefore, ontologically prior to all those that are said to have no separate existence 
from the primary category. Substance, however, can exist separately and therefore 
it should be regarded as ontologically prior.  
 
One might reasonably think that the example in Aristotle’s mind employed to 
assist him in explaining ontological priority of substances is a particular man, like 
Callias or Socrates, to whom several qualities are linked and who is a non-eternal 
sensible substance (NSS). On the basis of this example, one might reasonably 
conclude that my thesis favouring IS as the best candidate to fulfil the 
requirements of ontological dependence is not correct for, as observed in the 
passage, NSS rather than IS are used to exemplify the point. The examples given in 
the above passage (i.e., what ‘walks’ or is ‘seated’ or ‘healthy’), in other words, 
show that the type of substance at stake is one of the NSS rather than IS. If Aristotle 
has in mind the IS, as I suggest, why then does he employ NSS to clarify the 
ontological dependence that is found between the secondary categories and the 
category of substance? 
 
I will address this question and use it as a stepping stone to explicate further my 
thesis defending IS as the best candidate among other substances for standing as 
the core item in CDH of Being by virtue of meeting the requirements of ontological 
dependence far better than the other candidates that may be said to be 
ontologically prior. I should note at the outset that there is nothing contradictory to 
my thesis in this example, which favours NSS as the core item in the CDH of Being 
when the first level in ontological dependence is considered. I have already put 
forward to the view that NSS are indeed proper candidates for standing as the core 
item if the analysis is made between secondary categories and substance. 
However, this will not show that NSS are the proper candidates for standing as the 
core item in the CDH of Being in the absolute sense for there is another level, that is 
	  	  
213 
the second level in ontological dependence, working in between substances that 
can only be fulfilled through the highest substance, as I have explained in chapter 
II. The science of Being thereby cannot be unified through NSS, for not all Beings in 
the universe are connected to these by means of ontological dependence, which 
thereby shows that the study of NSS cannot propagate through all the instances of 
Being, which in turn would not lead to the universal science of Being that we are 
advocating.  
 
Furthermore, I it is natural that Aristotle employs NSS to demonstrate the 
ontological dependence between secondary categories and substance, for this is in 
line with Aristotle’s general procedure in presenting a theory according to which 
we should proceed from ‘what is knowable by us’ to ‘what is knowable in nature’.3 
Aristotle’s intention in this passage is to explain that substance is ontologically 
prior to other categories, rather than to articulate which of the several types of 
substances is the best candidate for fulfilling the requirements of ontological 
dependence in the CDH of Being, which is supposed to pave the way for a single 
investigation of the several manifestations of Being. It is one thing to explain what 
ontological dependence is and another to use it as a tool to establish the CDH of 
Being. In accordance with his general procedure, Aristotle starts from ‘what is 
knowable by us’, namely, from NSS, and we expect that he will proceed to ‘what is 
knowable in nature’. This expectation will most certainly be fulfilled in the course 
of the central books, as we shall see soon. The above passage, therefore, can be seen 
as an introduction for the reader or the listener to the subject by starting from what 
he/she knows best; this will be followed by more detailed discussions that further 
explicate the nature of ontological dependence by virtue of which Aristotle will 
take his listeners or readers to what is not familiar and knowable to them in the 
first stages of the argument. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For some of the passages in which Aristotle presents this distinction, see: An. Pr. II, 23, 68b35; An. 
Post. I, 2, 72a3; Top. VI, 4, 141b4; 141b25; Phys. I, 1, 184a16–21; 5, 188b32–189a5; II, 1, 193a5; Met. Z, 3, 
1029b8; EN I, 4, 1095b2–3; 7, 1098b3–8.	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Having stated that substance is ontologically prior to other categories, Aristotle 
turns his attention to other priorities of substance: 
 
Now there are several senses in which a thing is said to be primary [τὸ πρῶτον]; 
but substance is primary in every sense [πάντως ἡ οὐσία πρῶτον] – [A] in 
formula [λόγῳ], [B] in order of knowledge [γνώσει], [C] in time [χρόνῳ]. For [C] 
of the other categories none can exist independently [οὐθὲν χωριστόν], but only 
substance [αὕτη δὲ µόνη]. And [A] in formula [τῷ λόγῳ] also this is primary; for 
in the formula of each term [ἐν τῷ ἑκάστου λόγῳ] the formula of its substance 
[τὸν τῆς οὐσίας] must be present [ἐνυπάρχειν]. And [B] we think we know each 
thing most fully, when we know what it is [τί ἐστιν], e.g. what man is or what fire 
is, rather than when we know its quality, its quantity, or where it is; since we 
know each of these things also, only when we know what the quantity or quality 
is [ὅταν τί ἐστι τὸ ποσὸν ἢ τὸ ποιὸν γνῶµεν].4 
 
This is densely packed reasoning and has to be treated in context. It is not 
immediately clear why Aristotle asserts that substance is prior in time [C] because 
it is separate. If we take into account what Aristotle asserts just before this passage 
with regard to the ontological dependency of other categories over substance, one 
can infer that the term ‘separate’ [χωριστόν] addresses a distinction between the 
secondary categories and substance, namely that the secondary categories are not 
‘separate from substance’. If we admit that the secondary categories cannot have 
any existence without the initial existence of substance, then this may shed light on 
what Aristotle tries to maintain by stating that substance is prior in time. The fact 
that the other so-called secondary categories can exist only if we assert in advance 
that there is something that underlies these instances – as maintained in the 
previous lines of Book Z – substance should indeed be prior in time. Without first 
asserting that substance exists, we cannot affirm that the other so-called secondary 
categories exist, for, as we are told in the previous lines, these secondary categories 
are said to exist ‘by virtue of substance’ [διὰ ταύτην κἀκείνων ἕκαστον ἔστιν-
1028a29-30].  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Met. Z, 1, 1028a31-1028b2.	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The other two priorities – namely, the priority in [A] definition and [B] knowledge 
– are closely related to each other. They may even be regarded as almost identical; 
for recall that, in Book A, Aristotle asserted that to know something is to know the 
‘why’, i.e., the reason of that thing.5 Recall also that Aristotle’s conception of 
definition is causal in the sense that to give an account of something is to give the 
reason why that thing happens. The definitions in Aristotelian doctrine are causal 
in this way, for they address the reason why something happens while giving the 
account of the very same thing. Now if to know a thing requires that we know the 
cause of that thing, then this amounts to saying that knowing is nothing but 
knowing the account of the thing in question, simply because in constructing 
definitions we give the reason of the thing that is being defined.6 If, therefore, 
something is definitionally prior, then this means that it is prior in knowledge as 
well.  
 
What it is to be prior in definition, according to the above passage, corresponds to 
what I have previously explained as logical priority. If the definition of x requires 
the definition of y in the sense that the definition of the former is produced by 
referring or including the definition of the latter, then the former can be said to be 
logically prior to the latter. To construct a definition of x, therefore, one should 
construct initially the definition of y. In such a case y is both logically (i.e., 
definitionally) prior to x and prior in knowledge. These two priorities, therefore, 
go hand in hand. This is exactly what we observe between the secondary 
categories and the first category of substance, for whenever we attempt to define a 
secondary category we must refer to substance. Qualities, therefore, are the 
qualities of substance and similarly with all the other categories. A quality is 
nothing but a quality-in-a-substance. Substance, in this way, is prior both in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Met. A, 1, 981a29. See also, An. Post. I, 13.	  
6 ‘For there is knowledge of each thing only when we know its essence.’ (Met. Z, 6, 1031b6-7) The 
‘essence’ in this passage corresponds to τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, which is not exactly the same as τί ἐστιν. I 
will consider later the differences between these two terms and whether it is possible to identify 
them with each other.	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definition and in knowledge, that is, self-subsistent in the sense that, unlike the 
other categories, it is not in need of reference to any other category to be defined, to 
exist and to be known. 
 
The priorities, as explained in this part, are systematically connected to each other; 
all of them spring from the claim that substance is separate. The knowledge, the 
definition and the existence of other categories depend on substance. If secondary 
categories could exist, be defined and be known without substance, this would 
amount to saying that they are separate Beings. Aristotle’s doctrine of Being, 
however, does not allow for such a conception. The necessary reference between 
these secondary categories by way of which they exist, are defined and known 
underlies the claim that the study of substance leads to the study of the other 
categories through CDH. I will now attempt to deepen my investigation further in 
order to justify this claim by placing the proposed priorities of substance over 
other categories into CDH, upon which the science of Being is constructed.    
 
In order to grasp the way in which the central books complement each other in the 
discussion of CDH and the developments attained in this part of Metaphysics with 
respect to the subject matter of the science of Being, it is important to link what 
Aristotle maintains in the opening chapter of Book Z to his discussions in Book ϑ 
with respect to the priority of actuality over potentiality and for that matter the 
priority of form over matter. The focus of discussion in Book Z is centred upon the 
first level relations in ontological dependence between substance and the other so-
called secondary categories. The focus of discussion shifts in Book ϑ when 
Aristotle turns his attention from inter-categorical relations to intra-categorical 
relations. By way of his discussion in Book ϑ, as he explains the priority of 
actuality over potentiality, Aristotle articulates the second level relations in 
ontological dependence. This shift in focus of the discussion with respect to 
priority of substance carries the investigation from NSS to IS as we shall soon see. 
Hence, I believe, the discussion that we encounter in Book ϑ may be employed to 
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assemble clues among the several types of substances as to which one is the most 
suitable candidate to be placed at the centre of the CDH of Being. In what follows, 
accordingly, I will first briefly investigate Aristotle’s argument in which he 
maintains that actuality is prior to potentiality. I will then discuss by what means 
this discussion might be employed to determine the type of substance that stands 
at the centre of interest of a metaphysician.  
 
As substance is prior to the other secondary categories in knowledge and 
definition, so actuality is prior to potentiality in definition and knowledge:  
 
Clearly it [actuality] is prior [προτέρα] in formula [τῷ λόγῳ]; for that which is in 
the primary sense potential is potential because it is possible for it to become 
actual [τῷ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἐνεργῆσαι δυνατόν ἐστι τὸ πρώτως δυνατόν], e.g. I 
mean by ‘capable of building’ [οἰκοδοµικὸν] that which can build [τὸ δυνάµενον 
οἰκοδοµεῖν], and ‘by capable of seeing’ [ὁρατικὸν] that which can see [τὸ ὁρᾶν], 
and by ‘visible’ [ὁρατὸν] that which can be seen [τὸ δυνατὸν ὁρᾶσθαι]. And the 
same account applies to all other cases, so that the formula [τὸν λόγον] and the 
knowledge [τὴν γνῶσιν] of the one must precede [προϋπάρχειν] the knowledge of 
the other.7 
We are informed that what is potential can be defined and known by the 
consequent actuality to which that potentiality is linked. The knowledge of the act, 
e.g. building, seeing or being seen, precedes the knowledge of the potential, e.g. 
capable of building, capable of seeing, or being visible. Had there been no act we 
could not know the potentialities. If, in other words, there were no actual building, 
no actual seeing or nothing that is visible, we could not know whether there exists 
some potentiality to build, to see or being seen. Similarly, what is potential is 
defined by the corresponding act simply because all potentialities are potentialities 
of acts. The fact that ‘being capable of building’ cannot be defined without the act 
of ‘building’ is plain. Actuality therefore precedes potentiality in definition and 
knowledge. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Met. ϑ, 8, 1049b12-17.	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The eighth chapter of Book ϑ also gives two arguments for the priority of actuality 
over potentiality in time. What Aristotle maintains in the first of these arguments is 
quite uncomplicated and it goes as such: 
 
In time [τῷ δὲ χρόνῳ] it [actuality] is prior [πρότερον] in this sense: the actual 
member of a species is prior to the potential member of the same species, though 
the individual is potential before it is actual. I mean that the matter [ἡ ὕλη] and 
the seed [τὸ σπέρµα] and that which is capable of seeing [τὸ ὁρατικόν], which are 
potentially a man [δυνάµει µέν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος] and corn [σῖτος] and seeing 
[ὁρῶν], but not yet actually so [ἐνεργείᾳ δ' οὔπω], are prior in time to this 
particular man who now exists actually, and to the corn and to the seeing subject; 
but they are posterior in time to other actually existing things [ἕτερα ὄντα 
ἐνεργείᾳ], from which they were produced [ἐξ ὧν ταῦτα ἐγένετο]. For from the 
potential [ἐκ τοῦ δυνάµει ὄντος] the actual is always produced [γίγνεται] by an 
actual thing [ὑπὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος], e.g. man by man [ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου], 
musician by musician [µουσικὸς ὑπὸ µουσικοῦ]; there is always a first mover 
[κινοῦντός], and the mover already exists actually [τὸ δὲ κινοῦν ἐνεργείᾳ ἤδη 
ἔστιν].8 
Aristotle accepts that that which is generated comes from its potentiality, but this 
fact does not prevent him insisting that actuality is prior to potentiality in time, for 
everything that is generated requires an actual thing that exists before the 
generated thing. Man, therefore, comes from what is potentially man. However, 
before what is potentially man, Aristotle believes, one should postulate an actual 
man simply because man is produced from man. If there were no actual man, there 
would be no potential man either. Hence, what actually exists comes before what is 
potential and actuality is prior to potentiality in time.  
 
Aristotle gives a further argument in which he applies the learning process to 
support his point: 
 
This is why it is thought impossible to be a builder [οἰκοδόµον] if one has built 
nothing [µὴ οἰκοδοµήσαντα µηθὲν] or a harpist [ἢ κιθαριστὴν] if one has never 
played the harp [µηθὲν κιθαρίσαντα]; for he who learns to play the harp 
[µανθάνων κιθαρίζειν] learns to play it by playing it [κιθαρίζειν], and all other 
learners do similarly.9 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Met. ϑ, 8, 1049b17-27.	  
9 Met. ϑ, 8, 1049b29-32.	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Without an initial actual playing of the harp, one cannot learn to play the harp. In 
general, every generation requires an initial generated actual thing from which it 
originates. That is why actuality is always prior to potentiality in time. 
 
Having shown that actuality is prior in time Aristotle turns his attention to priority 
in substance. This amounts to saying that actuality is to be regarded as more real 
[µᾶλλον φαίνεται ὄντα] and more substantial. It also amounts to saying that the 
nature of substance is better reflected in actuality than in potentiality. The 
background against which Aristotle’s assertion that actuality is prior to potentiality 
in substance is the well known inclination towards ‘Being’ against ‘becoming’ that 
stands out in almost all Greek philosophers. Aristotle makes his point by way of 
several arguments, and these are particularly significant in terms of the aims of my 
discussion of priorities. His first argument proceeds as such:  
 
But it [actuality] is also prior in substance [οὐσίᾳ]; firstly, because the things that 
are posterior [ὕστερα] in becoming [τῇ γενέσει] are prior [πρότερα] in form [τῷ 
εἴδει] and in substance [τῇ οὐσίᾳ], e.g. man [ἀνὴρ] is prior to boy [παιδὸς] and 
human being [ἄνθρωπος] to seed [σπέρµατος]; for the one already has its form 
[ἔχει τὸ εἶδος], and the other has not [τὸ δ' οὔ].10  
What has already been generated, that is, what already has a form, should be 
regarded as prior to what will be realized as form. The human being, in this way, 
should be regarded as prior to seed although, in the process of becoming, seed 
comes first. The human being in this way has been realized, for the sake of which it 
is generated and has a form. Seed, on the contrary, comes first in the process of 
generation but it has yet to have achieved form. Contrary to the human, the seed in 
its nature reflects ‘becoming’ rather than Being. This is closely linked to what 
Aristotle presents as a second argument to show that actuality is prior to 
potentiality in substance, which is stated as follows: 
 
Secondly, because everything that comes to be moves towards a principle 
[ἀρχὴν], i.e. an end [τέλος]. For that for the sake of which [τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα] a thing is, 
is its principle [ἀρχὴ], and the becoming [γένεσις] is for the sake of the end [τοῦ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Met. ϑ, 8, 1050a4-7. 	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τέλους δὲ ἕνεκα]; and the actuality is the end [τέλος δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια], and it is for 
the sake of this that the potentiality [ἡ δύναµις] is acquired.11 
It is important to note two things in order to understand better what Aristotle 
maintains in this argument. The first is that Aristotle’s world is teleological; 
everything that can be found in the Universe12 tends towards an end [τέλος], 
which is prior to everything that is inclined towards it. The second is that it is 
possible to identify form with actuality and matter with potentiality. The latter 
point is explicitly affirmed immediately after this argument: ‘Further, matter exists 
in a potential state [ἡ ὕλη ἔστι δυνάµει], just because it may attain to its form; and 
when it exists actually [ἐνεργείᾳ], then it is in its form [εἴδει]’.13 What has attained 
form is an actualized thing that should be regarded as prior to what is potential. 
The one that has not achieved its goal, i.e., its matter, is not yet actualized and is in 
the process of becoming. The actual thing, on the other hand, has achieved that for 
the sake of which it is generated. Potentiality exists, therefore, for the sake of 
actuality and inclines towards that actuality to attain its end.14 The final cause, in 
this argument, is reduced to the formal cause; the one that achieves its goal is 
regarded as the one that has the form.15 Hence, form, actuality and the final cause 
are identified with each other, and all are prior to matter and potentiality.16  
 
Most significant of all, however, is Aristotle’s argument in which he employs his 
conception of the universe in order to show that actuality is prior to potentiality in 
substance: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Met. ϑ, 8, 1050a7-10.	  
12 With the exception of God, who is the goal and end for everything else. I shall deal later with this 
point. 	  
13 Met. ϑ, 8, 1050a15-16.	  
14 ‘The truth is that what desires the form is matter, as the female desires the male and the ugly the 
beautiful…’ Phys. I, 9, 192a22.	  
15 I will later deal the details of the possibility of reduction of the final cause to formal cause in 
chapter V. 
16 This sketch of the priority of actuality over potentiality and the identification of formal and final 
causes with each other does not do the issue justice. However, the present aim is simply to provide 
a general background for the discussion about what might be attained through the course of the 
central books with respect to CDH.	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But actuality is prior in a higher sense [κυριωτέρως] also; for eternal things are 
prior in substance to perishable things [ἀΐδια πρότερα τῇ οὐσίᾳ τῶν φθαρτῶν], 
and no eternal thing exists potentially [οὐθὲν δυνάµει ἀΐδιον]. The reason is this. 
Every potentiality is at one and the same time a potentiality of the opposite 
[ἀντιφάσεώς]; for, while that which is not capable of being present in a subject 
cannot be present, everything that is capable of being present may possibly not be 
actual. That, then, which is capable of being [δυνατὸν εἶναι] may either be or not 
be [εἶναι καὶ µὴ εἶναι]; the same thing, then, is capable both of being and not 
being. (…) 1050b18: Nor can anything which is of necessity [ἐξ ἀνάγκης] be 
potential; yet these things are primary [πρῶτα]; for if these did not exist, nothing 
would exist [εἰ γὰρ ταῦτα µὴ ἦν, οὐθὲν ἂν ἦν].17 
The basic idea employed in this passage is that eternal and necessary substances 
(these include ESS and IS) should be regarded as prior in substance to perishable 
substances (NSS) that exist potentially. 18  Unlike perishable substances (NSS), 
eternal substances are not subject to generation and corruption. The latter, 
therefore, should be regarded as eternal actualities. Since potentiality is at the same 
time the potentiality of the opposite, the natures of non-eternal substances (NSS) 
pave the way for a certain possibility for them to exist and not to exist. The ESS 
and IS, on the other hand, are the ones that exist eternally and therefore are always 
in actuality. Hence, while NSS are contingent, the eternal substances are necessary. 
There can be no possibility for them not to exist at a given time, which is a 
possibility for NSS, as they are merely potential Beings capable of Being and not 
Being. Hence, eternal substances merit being called Being more than NSS, for they 
are eternally real. On the other hand, ‘becoming’ rather than ‘to be’ is reflected in 
the nature of NSS as they are subject to generation and corruption. Actuality, 
therefore, is prior to potentiality in substance simply because it is better reflected in 
the eternal natures of ESS and IS that are prior to NSS. Aristotle tellingly adds that 
if there were no eternal actualities, there would be no Being at all, for Beings other 
than these eternal actualities are mere potentialities of Being that cannot guarantee 
the eternal existence of the universe. The details of this argument will be given 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Met. ϑ, 8, 1050b6-19.	  
18 Cf. Met. B, 4, 999b5; Z, 7, 1032b30; Λ, 6-7. 	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further in Book Λ but this much is enough to show that actuality is prior to 
potentiality in substance.19 
 
At this stage, we can adapt the discussion regarding the priority of actuality over 
potentiality to the CDH of Being so as to pave the way for a further step towards a 
better understanding of the actual subject matter of the science of Being. It is at 
once clear that substance should be the core element that is to be employed to 
establish the science of Being through CDH in the level of Book Γ and Book Z. 
What is not clear in the level of these treatises, however, is which of the several 
types of substances can fulfil the requirements for the role of being the core item in 
the CDH of Being, for this requires a further hylomorphic analysis into the nature 
of substance. This amounts to saying that, without an inquiry into the second level 
in ontological dependence that works in between several types of substances, we 
would not be able to determine which of the several types of substances should be 
placed at the core of the CDH of Being. The discussion of the priority of actuality 
over potentiality represents such a shift in the scale of the investigation, whereby 
one has to trace the clues as to which of the several types of substances is 
envisaged as the primary term in CDH of Being.  
 
What is now most certainly established in the level of Book ϑ is that, within 
substance, some elements are prior to others and should be regarded as reflecting 
most truly the nature of substance. The science of Being will study substance for it 
is prior to all the other categories. It does not study every kind of substance that 
can be found in the Universe on its own behalf, however; but rather that which is 
absolutely prior not only to the other secondary categories but also to all other 
kinds of substances. For that matter, it will study the actual substance, for just as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The priority of actuality over potentiality is demonstrated in the ninth chapter of Book ϑ as well. 
This argument shows that actuality tends only to the good while potentiality can be good or bad 
(Met. ϑ, 9, 1051a4-21), for which reason the former should be regarded as prior to the latter. As a 
final step, Aristotle gives a geometrical demonstration of the priority of actuality over potentiality 
(Met. ϑ, 9, 1051a21-33). I will not, however, inquire into these arguments due to limitations of space. 	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substance is prior to the other categories, the actual substance is prior to potential 
substances. By virtue of establishing the grounds for the priority of actual 
substance over what is potential, Aristotle’s investigation in Book ϑ shows 
sufficiently that the substance that is in the state of actuality par excellence should be 
regarded as prior to all other types of substances in the absolute sense. The 
discussion of the priority of actuality over potentiality, therefore, gives certain 
clues concerning the kind of substance that Aristotle has in mind while he 
establishes the science of Being. The fact that actual substances (including, 
according to Aristotle’s discussion, the ESS and IS)20 are prior to the non-eternal 
sensible substances whose nature involves potentiality yields the result that the 
science of Being studies these actualities. For, in virtue of these actual substances, 
as we are informed, all the other potential substances exist. Need one be surprised, 
then, by the fact that Aristotle emphasizes the priority of eternal substances while 
he discusses the priority of actuality over potentiality? I believe Aristotle has a 
deliberate purpose when he places the eternal substance at the centre of his 
discussion of priorities of act. The inclination in the central books is always 
towards what is actual.21 In my interpretation, then, the central books can be 
regarded as a bridge that carries the listeners or readers from what is sensible to 
what is not, from NSS to ESS and IS. The investigation is in perfect harmony with 
the Aristotelian dictum that we should proceed from what is knowable by us 
towards what is knowable in nature. The whole picture, however, is not yet 
established before the developments achieved in Book Λ.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 According to Aristotle’s declarations in Book ϑ, these include not only the IS but also the ESS. 
Aristotle’s discussions of the priority of act certainly give clues that we should regard IS, among the 
actual substances, as the proper subject of the science of Being simply because it has no potential 
elements in whatsoever manner. This step, however, is not taken in the central books and is left for 
further reflections on this subject that are found in Book Λ. Nevertheless, I believe the fact that 
Aristotle’s discussions fit and complement my previous claim that IS should be regarded as the core 
item in CDH of Being supports the view that the central books themselves can be regarded as a 
further step that systematically establishes the way for the final elucidation of the subject in Book Λ.	  
21 One may observe this inclination in Book Z as well, where Aristotle states: ‘Therefore if the form 
[τὸ εἶδος] is prior [πρότερον] to the matter [τῆς ὕλης] and more real [µᾶλλον ὄν], it will be prior to 
the compound also for the same reason.’ (1029a5-7). 	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The nature of substance, according to this discussion, is reflected pre-eminently in 
what is in the state of actuality. This conclusion is in perfect harmony with what 
we have been told in Book E that the science of Being studies the separate and 
immovable substance. The conception that thereby stands out in Book E 
necessitates that IS, namely God, should be the primary object of inquiry of the 
science of Being. Aristotle’s investigation into the priority of actuality over 
potentiality further confirms this. Since actuality is prior to potentiality in time, 
knowledge, definition and existence, and since the science of Being should deal 
with what is prior in the absolute sense, and again, since God should be regarded 
as the utmost prior object that can be found in the universe simply because He is 
absolutely actual in the sense that no potentiality is found in His nature, the 
science of Being should be dealing primarily with God. This last point, as we shall 
see, will only be established fully after the developments that will be achieved in 
Book Λ. Therefore, since every science deals with that which is primary, the science 
of Being will deal with the kind of Being that is ultimately prior,22 which in turn, 
according to Aristotle’s declarations in Book ϑ, is the actual Being.  
 
Hence, if what has been said in the first chapter of Book Z is read in combination 
with the eighth and ninth chapters of Book ϑ, we come to understand what kind of 
substance is indeed prior to other Beings. Therefore, the discussions found in the 
central books with respect to priority of substance, if combined and read in 
context, give us certain clues with regard to which type of substance should be 
considered as the primary item in the CDH of Being. If there exists a substance 
which is in the state of pure actuality, then in the light of the discussions 
concerning the priority of act in Book ϑ, it follows at once that such a substance 
merits being called the first amongst others and therefore, should be regarded as 
the primary item of CDH of Being. This final step, which will determine whether 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 ‘But everywhere science deals chiefly [κυρίως] with that which is primary [τοῦ πρώτου], and on 
which other things depend [ἤρτηται], and in virtue of which they get their names [λέγονται].’ (Met. 
Γ, 2, 1003b16-18).	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there exists a purely actual substance, is left for Book Λ. This, however, does not 
present any obstacle to us concluding that the doctrine of priority of act results in a 
theological conception of the science of Being.  
 
4.3. Being and Substance 
 
We have already been informed in Book Γ that the science of Being investigates 
substance and this allows the study to be a universal inquiry into Being. My aim in 
this part is to show how Aristotle justifies the possibility of such a study of the 
several manifestations of Being through the study of substance by reducing23 Being 
into substance in central books. Accordingly, I will first examine Aristotle’s 
reduction of Being into substance. Having shown this reduction I will turn to 
another reduction, that is the reduction of substance into form. I will show that the 
criteria put forward in the central books for substance-hood, together with 
Aristotle’s general conception of substance affirm that the main burden of a 
metaphysician is to study the pure form, namely, God. This, in turn, will prove 
that the conception of the science of Being in Aristotle’s mind while he writes the 
central books is eminently theological and this conception is in line with the 
previously held conception of the science of Being that we encounter in Book Γ and 
Book E. 
 
Aristotle’s investigation of substance is crucial in the establishment of the science 
of Being for at least two interrelated reasons. First, he has already declared that 
substance stands at the nexus of the investigation of Being as it is prior to other 
manifestations of Being and the science of Being – like all the other sciences – 
should deal with what is most prior in the realm it investigates. Second, substance 
is the instance of Being, which is capable of reflecting the nature of Being in full. In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Certainly, one might call this reduction an ‘epistemological reduction’ rather than an ‘ontological 
reduction’. As I have mentioned for several times that Being in Aristotle has several manifestations 
and cannot be reduced to one. 
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the light of this background, against which the discussions in the central books 
took place, the need was felt to give a rational explanation and justification of 
substance, without which the construction of the science of Being and the overall 
picture of reality can hardly be attained. 
 
4.3.1. Reduction of Being into Substance 
 
In accord with his intentions to show that the study of Being can only be possible 
through the study of substance, Aristotle reduces Being into substance in the 
central books. This discussion proceeds against the backdrop presented in Book Γ. 
Recall that in Book Γ Aristotle established core-dependent homonymy (CDH) 
upon the priority of substance and that in Book E he has determined the subject-
matter of the science of Being as separate and immovable substance. The science of 
Being, according to this line of thought, is primarily concerned with substance. The 
investigation of Being, as the preceding argument implies, consists of investigation 
into substance. Although Aristotle’s previous discussions imply this as a fact, the 
doctrinal basis for such a view is not fully established. The investigation of 
substance in the central books provides the systematic basis for the reduction of 
the study of Being to the study of substance. Accordingly, in the first chapter of 
Book Z, one immediately witnesses the reduction of Being into substance: 
 
And indeed the question which, both now and of old, has always been raised, 
and always been the subject of doubt, viz. what being is [τί τὸ ὄν], is just the 
question, what is substance [τίς ἡ οὐσία]? For it is this that some assert to be one 
[ἓν], others more than one, and that some assert to be limited [πεπερασµένα] in 
number, others unlimited [ἄπειρα]. And so we also must consider chiefly 
[µάλιστα] and primarily [πρῶτον] and almost exclusively [µόνον] what that is 
which is in this sense.24 
Against the background provided by Book Γ, Aristotle’s assertion that the study of 
Being should primarily be a study of substance is not surprising. Since various 
manifestations of Being, namely, the categories, are understood with reference to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Met. Z, 1, 1028b2-7. 
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substance, the primary task of the science of Being should be to examine substance. 
All the other manifestations of Being (i.e. categories) can be studied through the 
study of substance, which is ontologically, logically and causally prior to all the 
other non-substance categories.  
 
Since the study of Being is reduced to the study of substance, we may expect that 
Aristotle will develop a detailed examination of substance in the course of the 
central books. Indeed, this expectation will be fulfilled to the letter. Aristotle’s 
discussions on substance, if these discussions are to enlighten what substance is, 
should, therefore, initially introduce some criteria for substance-hood. These 
criteria, in turn, will be added to the previously held criteria emerging from 
Aristotle’s ongoing discussion on the primary term in the CDH of Being in Book Γ 
and Book E. 
 
4.3.2. Criteria for Substance-hood: Reduction of Substance into Form 
 
Throughout the course of the central books, especially through the third chapter of 
Book Z, three major interconnected criteria can be observed for substance-hood, 
according to which Aristotle characterises substance as:25 
 
1. a subject [ὑποκείµενον]; 
2. a this [τόδε τι]; 
3. separate [χωριστός]. 
 
One may wonder why my list of the characteristics of substance excludes 
‘universal’ (καθόλου) and ‘genus’ although they are included in the characteristics 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 The following sketch concerning the conditions of substance in central books does not do the 
issue justice. I will content myself, however, with presenting a very brief discussion of them in view 
of the fact that a full discussion of these criteria would exceed the natural limits of this essay. 
Although my presentation is necessarily brief and dogmatic, the interpretations I suggest are not 
idiosyncratic.  
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of substance in the third chapter of Book Z. I exclude these characteristics because 
Aristotle himself rules them out in the thirteenth and fourteenth chapters of Book 
Z. Aristotle does not investigate whether genus can be regarded as substance in the 
course of the central books. One may, however, admit that it is already ruled out 
from Aristotle’s investigation of universal. Since genus is a universal, Aristotle 
does not need to commit a separate discussion of genus inquiring whether it merits 
to be regarded as substance. Universal, according to Aristotle’s investigations, 
cannot be regarded as substance. Contrary to substance, which is ἑκάστου ἡ ἴδιος 
ἑκάστῳ, i.e. ‘peculiar to an individual’ and which ‘does not belong to anything 
else’ (οὐχ ὑπάρχει ἄλλῳ),26 a universal is something that is shared by many things, 
i.e. common to many things.27 A second reason why one should rule out universal 
as substance is stated plainly by Aristotle: ‘Further, substance means that which is 
not predicable [λέγεται] of a subject [καθ' ὑποκειµένου], but the universal is 
predicable of some subject always [τὸ δὲ καθόλου καθ' ὑποκειµένου τινὸς λέγεται 
ἀεί]’.28 Another reason is that universal acts as a quality (τὸ ποιὸν) of a subject and 
if we regard universal as substance then ‘that which is not substance [µὴ οὐσία], i.e. 
quality [τὸ ποιὸν], will then be prior [πρότερον] to substance [οὐσία] and to the 
‘this’ [τοῦ τόδε]’.29 This is not acceptable ‘for neither in formula [λόγῳ] nor in time 
[χρόνῳ] nor in coming to be [γενέσει] can the affections [τὰ πάθη] be prior to 
substance [τῆς οὐσίας εἶναι πρότερα]; for then they must be separable [χωριστά] 
from it’.30 Aristotle gives further arguments31 to support his thesis that universal 
cannot be regarded as substance. Underlying these reasons is the fact that 
universal does not satisfactorily meet the three characteristics I have listed for 
substance. The universal, for instance, is not ‘separate’ [χωριστός], which is a 
necessary requirement if something is to be called substance: ‘Further, that which 
is one [τὸ ἓν] cannot be in many things at the same time [πολλαχῇ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἅµα], 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Met. Z, 13, 1038b10 
27 Met. Z, 13, 1038b11. Cf. Int. 7, 17a39; PA I, 4, 644a27 
28 Met. Z, 13, 1038b15-16, cf. Cat. 5, 2a11; Met. Δ, 8, 1017b13 
29 Met. Z, 13, 1038b26-27 
30 Met. Z, 13, 1038b27-29 
31 See Met. Z, 13, 1039a 4ff. and Z, 14 
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but that which is common [κοινὸν] is present in [ὑπάρχει] many things at the same 
time; so that clearly no universal [οὐδὲν τῶν καθόλου] exists [ὑπάρχει] apart from 
the individuals [παρὰ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα χωρίς]’,32 neither it is a ‘this’ (τόδε τι): ‘no 
common predicate [τῶν κοινῇ κατηγορουµένων] indicates [σηµαίνει] a ‘this’ [τόδε 
τι], but rather a ‘such’ [τοιόνδε]’.33 
 
Although I have presented three characteristics as separate features of substance, 
they are not in actuality ultimately separate from each other. In his analysis in the 
third chapter of Book Z, Aristotle first introduces the first characteristic and finds it 
insufficient in reflecting fully what merits being called substance. Aristotle tellingly 
notes the simple reason for this as follows: ‘The statement itself is obscure [ἄδηλον] 
and further, on this view, matter becomes substance [ἡ ὕλη οὐσία γίγνεται].’34 The 
insufficiency of the criterion of subject-hood lies in the fact that it is obscure and it 
directly leads one to conclude that matter is substance. I have previously argued 
that what the argument found in central books tends towards is, however, the 
formal/actual substances. These merit being called genuine substances. Although 
Aristotle does not totally reject the substantial nature of matter,35 his tendency 
throughout his investigation in central books is towards a formal nature. The 
simple reason is that matter itself leads the investigation into a blind alley whereas 
the form leads the analysis to what Aristotle calls ‘actual substances’ and therefore 
paves the way for the investigation to proceed towards the higher realities, the 
substances of heaven, and ultimately to God, who constitutes, as my argument 
suggests, the ultimate end of Aristotle’s examination of substance and Being.36 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Met. Z, 16, 1040b25-27 
33 Met. Z, 13, 1038b35-1039a2 
34 Met. Z, 3, 1029a9-10. This is followed by what scholars usually call ‘the striptease argument’ in 
which the substance is stripped [περιαιρουµένων] so as to pave the way for reaching the ultimate 
material nature at the bottom of all non-eternal sensible substances (NSS). For an excellent 
discussion of this argument see Mary Louise Gill, p. 19 ff.  
35 ‘But clearly matter also is substance [ἐστὶν οὐσία καὶ ἡ ὕλη]; for in all the opposite changes 
[ἀντικειµέναις µεταβολαῖς] that occur there is something which underlies [ἐστί τι τὸ ὑποκείµενον] 
the changes…’ Met. H, 1, 1042a32-34. 
36 Even in the beginning of his analysis of substance in the third chapter of Book Z, Aristotle limits 
his ultimate subject by virtue of excluding matter and composite from the realm of his 
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Aristotle’s investigation of Being, in other words, can only find its way if the form, 
rather than the unintelligible matter that can only be known by an analogy,37 is 
brought to the fore.  
 
It is indeed true that matter cannot reflect the nature of substance in the absolute 
sense. In this way, also, matter can in no way be regarded as the primary term in 
core-dependent homonymy (CDH) of Being for the reason that matter is, by itself, 
unknowable, indeterminate and indefinable.38 On the other hand, the conditions of 
substance, namely, ‘thisness’ and ‘separation’,39 are reflected in form and it is by 
virtue of this latter element of substance that matter becomes a definite thing40 and 
defined.41 It is the formal element in substance that is fully intelligible. Neither can 
matter be regarded as ontologically prior, since it is the form that is responsible for 
the existence of matter.42 
 
Since Aristotle’s actual aim in the central books is to illuminate the nature of 
substance, he must, one way or another, reach the nature, in which ‘substance-
hood’ is perfectly reflected.43 We have already seen that form, rather than matter 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
investigation: ‘the substance compounded of both, i.e. of matter [τῆς ὕλης] and shape [τῆς 
µορφῆς], may be dismissed; for it is posterior [ὑστέρα] and its nature [πως] is obvious [φανερὰ]. 
And matter also is in a sense manifest. But we must inquire into the third kind of substance; for this 
is the most difficult [ἀπορωτάτη]’ (1029a30-33). Many of the discussions in the central books are 
developed against the Platonic background and aim to determine whether forms can exist 
separately, as Plato suggests. 
37 Phys. I, 7, 191a7. 
38 Cf. Met. Z, 3, 1029a20ff.; 11, 1037a27. 
39 Matter always presents itself as endowed with form, hence, cannot be absolutely separate. See 
Phys. III, 5, 204b32. Cf. GC I, 5, 320b12ff.; II, 1, 329a8; 26. 
40 Met. Z, 1041b4-9. 
41 Met. Z, 10, 1035a7ff. Matter can only be known through the analogous reasoning defined in 
Physics (I, 7, 191a8-12). 
42 Met. Z, 1041b26; 28. 
43 The reason underlying the exclusive examination of NSS in the central books (although, as my 
argument suggests, Aristotle’s aim is to reach the pure form) is given as: ‘It is agreed 
[ὁµολογοῦνται] that there are some substances among sensible things, so that we must look first 
among these. For it is an advantage to advance to that which is more intelligible [εἰς τὸ 
γνωριµώτερον]. For learning proceeds for all in this way -through that which is less intelligible by 
nature [τῶν ἧττον γνωρίµων φύσει] to that which is more intelligible [τὰ γνώριµα µᾶλλον]…’ (Met. 
Z, 3, 1029a33-1029b5). The following lines, I believe, strongly support my claim that the basic 
motive in the central books is to reach what merits being called substance in an ultimate sense: ‘and 
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reflects the nature of substance in the absolute sense. That means, while Aristotle 
reduces Being into substance, his intention inclines towards a reduction of Being 
into form. I will now show that the two further criteria, namely, ‘thisness’ and 
‘separation’ rule out matter to be regarded as a genuine substance. These two 
criteria (i.e. ‘thisness’ and ‘separation’), as we shall see, lead the investigation to 
proceed towards the form. This, as I have mentioned, has implications for the 
science of Being and we shall see soon why this is so. 
 
Aristotle has already stated in Book E that the subject of the science of Being 
should be what is separate and immovable.44 The criterion of separation, therefore, 
is not unfamiliar to Aristotle’s listeners or readers, but caution must be urged at 
this point. What Aristotle aimed at in Book E was to determine what kind of 
substance the metaphysician should precisely deal with. In Book Z, however, 
Aristotle’s primary goal is to determine the nature of substance. Hence, even 
though the discussions in these two treatises relate to each other, the aims are 
separate and the inquiry is constituted on different levels. The level of analysis in 
the third chapter of Book Z is concerned mostly with differentiating substance 
from the so-called secondary categories, whereas in Book E the analysis is on a 
more specific level that inquires into which of the several types of substances are 
attributed for the interest of the metaphysician. For this reason, the criterion of 
separation put forward to distinguish the subject matter of the science of Being in 
Book E is associated with the criterion of immobility. In Book Z, however, we do 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
just in conduct [ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι] our work is to start from what is good for each [ἑκάστῳ ἀγαθῶν] 
and make what is good in itself good for each [ἀγαθὰ ἑκάστῳ ἀγαθά], so it is our work to start from 
what is more intelligible to oneself [τῶν αὐτῷ γνωριµωτέρων] and make what is intelligible by 
nature intelligible to oneself [τὰ τῇ φύσει γνώριµα αὐτῷ γνώριµα]. Now what is intelligible and 
primary for particular sets of people is often intelligible to a very small extent, and has little or 
nothing of reality [τοῦ ὄντος]. But yet one must start from that which is barely [φαύλως] intelligible 
but intelligible to oneself, and try to understand [γνῶναι πειρατέον] what is intelligible in itself [τὰ 
ὅλως γνωστὰ], passing, as has been said, by way of those very things which one understands’ (Met. 
Z, 3, 1029b5-12). See my discussion in the first chapter (pp. 19-21) on ‘what is knowable by us’ and 
‘what is knowable in nature’, where I showed that the latter should be identified by ultimate 
substance, namely, the God. 
44 Met. E, 1, 1026a16. 
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not encounter such a direct association of separation with immovable substance; 
rather, on the level of analysis executed in Book Z, Aristotle seems to affirm that 
composites also, i.e. non-eternal sensible substances (NSS) and eternal sensible 
substances (ESS), are respected as separate substances.45 The contrast, at this level, 
is made between the secondary categories, which cannot be regarded as separate 
for the fact that they owe their existence and their definition to substance, and that 
of substance, which is not dependent on anything else for its existence and for its 
intelligibility. The criterion of separation, therefore, is closely connected with self-
sufficiency in the sense that a thing can be regarded as separate only if it can exist 
on its own and be known without the aid of anything else. The categories and the 
accidents, in this sense, are not separate, since they cannot exist and be known 
without an initial reference to substance. What merits being called substance, then, 
should be separate. 
 
The analyses encountered in the entirety of the central books, however, are not 
constructed in a way that limits the usage of the criterion of separation for the 
above-mentioned purposes of the third chapter of Book Z. In the central books, 
Aristotle aims to determine the nature of substance by virtue of revealing and 
analysing the elements that constitute substances, namely, matter and form. The 
criterion of separation allows Aristotle to differentiate these two elements as well. 
Matter (and potentiality), accordingly, cannot be regarded as ultimately separate 
for it cannot be known beyond the form in which it manifests itself.46 In other 
words, Aristotelian conception of matter and potentiality does not allow for pure 
matter and potentialities to be separate whereas these elements are always found 
and are known by their association with form. Contrary to form, therefore, matter 
is not self-sufficient and not separate.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Cf. Met. Z, 3, 1029a29. 
46 See Met. Z, 10, 11, 1037a26; 17. 
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With regard to the discussion concerning what merits being called substance, the 
criterion of separation therefore implies that Aristotle definitely inclines towards 
identifying substance with form rather than matter. The criterion of separation, 
however, can be manifested best in the Supreme Being, which consists of pure 
form. There is no substratum needed to underlie the existence of such a Being. If, 
therefore, separation is a criterion of substance-hood, and if this implies that form 
merits being called substance rather than matter, then pure form, which has no 
matter in its existence, merits being called substance par excellence. Although this 
further step is not taken in the course of the central books, the discussions found in 
these books definitely pave the way for such an approach. 
 
The impact of this investigation on the subject matter of the science of Being can be 
stated as thus: Since the science of Being must primarily study Being, it should 
study substance, for Being, as we have been told in the central books, is reduced to 
substance. Now, substancehood in the absolute sense can only be reflected in form 
rather than matter. For this reason the science of Being must primarily deal with 
form rather than matter. One may insist, at this point, that the main task of a 
metaphysician is to consider the forms of everything that exists rather than the 
pure form as my argument suggests. Aristotle indeed affirms that form can be 
taken separately and be known (and therefore be investigated) without any 
reference to matter as he admits that the forms of composites can be separated 
from the substratum in which they are manifested. Sensible substances, therefore, 
are ‘complex of matter and form, which alone is generated and destroyed [γένεσις 
µόνου καὶ φθορά ἐστι], and is, without qualification [ἁπλῶς], capable of separate 
[χωριστὸν] existence’.47 As I have shown in the previous chapter, however, the 
forms of composites cannot constitute the ultimate subject matter of the science of 
Being. These forms (i.e. the forms that manifest themselves in an underlying 
substratum- the forms of composites) are already attributed to the interest of 
physician: ‘the student of nature is concerned only with things whose forms are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Met. H, 1, 1042a30-31 
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separable [ἐστι χωριστὰ] indeed, but do not exist apart from matter [ἐν ὕλῃ]’.48 In 
sensible things, Aristotle inclines towards an approach that does not allow a strict 
differentiation between matter and form. The matter, therefore, can be regarded as 
the form – potentially: ‘But, as has been said, the proximate matter [ἡ ἐσχάτη ὕλη] 
and the form [ἡ µορφὴ] are one and the same thing [ταὐτὸ καὶ ἕν], the one 
potentially [δυνάµει], the other actually [τὸ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ]’.49 This shows how 
intimacy of form and matter in the composite sensibles. Hence, the forms of 
sensible substances are not entirely independent of matter. For this reason, the 
form of these sensible things cannot be studied in separation from matter, which 
amounts to saying that such substances cannot be the subject of the science of 
Being, which studies what is absolutely separate. This can be nothing other than 
the pure form, namely, God.50 The discussion of separation as a criterion of 
substance-hood in the central books therefore shows that the main burden of a 
metaphysician must be pure form, namely, God.   
 
Separation, however, is not the only criterion for substance-hood; there is also the 
criterion of ‘thisness’. The usage of this term in the Aristotelian corpus shows that 
it mostly designates the form that is separated from matter.51  This criterion 
requires that substance, if it is to be called a ‘this’ (τόδε τι), should be definite. In 
the text of the third chapter of Book Z, Aristotle aims to employ this term in order 
to show that the substance-hood can be reflected better in form than in matter. The 
criterion of ‘thisness’ serves this goal in the fullest sense for the reason that it 
requires definiteness, since we know from a number of passages that one of the 
major characteristics of matter is that it is indefinite.52 Hence, according to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Phys. II, 2, 194b12ff. 
49 Met. H, 6, 1045b18-19 
50 Michael Frede tellingly notes: ‘the forms of sensible substances are not pure actualities; they in 
part are constituted by unrealized possibilities and in that sense are not fully real. The form that is 
the unmoved mover, on the other hand, is pure actuality’ (Frede, 1987, p. 90). 
51 See De An. II, 1, 412a8-9; Met. Δ, 8, 1017b25; H, 1, 1042a29; ϑ, 7, 1049a35, where Aristotle explicitly 
identifies a ‘this’ (τόδε τι) with shape and form. See, however, Met. Z, 11, 1037a1-2, where a ‘this’ is 
contrasted with pure form. Cf. Met. Λ, 3, 1070a11-12.  
52 See, for instance, Phys. III, 6, 207a25; Met. Z, 10, 1036a8; 11, 1037a27. 
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condition of ‘thisness’, the substance should be identified with form rather than 
matter or, at least, matter itself is not fully capable of reflecting substance-hood 
because of its indefinite nature. 
 
Hence, the conditions of substance, enumerated in the third chapter of Book Z, are 
not independent of each other.53 Together, these criteria, namely, separation and 
thisness, show that substance-hood is reflected best in form, rather than in matter.  
 
What do all these discussions say about the subject matter of the science of Being? 
What can be derived from these discussions in terms of the basic task of a 
metaphysician? First and most significantly, they imply that, instead of matter, the 
form constitutes the point of interest for the metaphysician, because they show that 
the nature of substance is best reflected in form. Since all sciences should deal with 
what is prior and what reflects best the nature that they seek to investigate, the 
science of Being should primarily focus on formal substance, as in such a substance 
the nature of substance-hood is manifested in the fullest sense. 
 
The cumulative result of the developments encountered in the central books, then, 
will be as follows: Book Γ has already established the fact that the science of Being 
should deal with what is: 
 
1. ontologically prior, 
2. logically prior, and 
3. causally prior. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 The fact that these conditions are presented separately in Book Δ (8, 1017b23-25) does not show 
that they are not in fact closely interconnected. They are taken as closely connected conditions in H, 
1, 1042a26-31, where subject-hood is explained in terms of separation and thisness.   
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These considerations have proved that substance should be the primary focus of 
attention in the science of Being. Book E articulated this substance by presenting 
two further criteria according to which the science of Being should deal with 
 
4. separate, and, 
5.  immovable substance. 
 
Having determined what kind of substance is to be dealt with by the science of 
Being, Book Z takes up the investigation and, by virtue of articulating the features 
of substance (i.e. ‘subject-hood’, ‘thisness’ and ‘separation’), illuminates the subject 
matter of the science of Being, according to which the investigation concerning 
Being should deal with  
 
6. concrete substances with 
7. formal/actual nature(s) (as opposed to material natures). 
 
This metaphysical outlook is further supported by Book ϑ, which establishes the 
absolute priority of form and actuality over matter and potentiality. The 
inclination, as we have seen, is towards pure actuality, which should be regarded 
as prior in every way to all the other types of substances as well as the other so-
called secondary categories.  
 
The discussion concerning the conditions of substance in the central books 
therefore shows that form merits being called a substance rather than matter. Since 
the basic subject matter of a metaphysician is substance, normally one would 
expect her/him to study the thing in which substance-hood is best reflected. The 
discussion with respect to conditions of substance shows that the form alone can 
best reflect the nature of substance. The less a substance is endowed with matter, 
the more its nature reflects substance-hood. If there exists a substance, then, which 
does not contain any material part at all and which consists of pure actuality, this 
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will reflect substance-hood best in its nature. Such a substance, therefore, will 
constitute the basic interest of the one who inquires into the nature of substance. 
Indeed, such a substance exists in the Aristotelian doctrine of Being, namely, God, 
who stands at the top of the hierarchy of Being and is immobile and eternal, 
constituting a perfect unity in His nature without any material/potential parts. The 
conception of substance that we encounter in the course of the central books 
therefore supports the theological conception of the science of Being by virtue of 
showing that the form, which is eternal, unchangeable and ungenerated, is always 
prior to matter, and reflects the nature of substance better than matter.  
 
Aristotle’s investigation of substance-hood in the central books, therefore, shows 
us that the pure form should be regarded as the ultimate subject matter of the 
science of Being. The conception, therefore, is eminently theological and is 
perfectly in line with the previously held conceptions of the science of Being we 
encounter in Book Γ and Book E.      
 
4.4. Essence and Substance 
 
I have previously stated that the focus of Aristotle’s investigations in the central 
books is his inquiry into essence. One of his goals is to avert the problems with 
respect to definitions of composites originating from his peculiar theory of Being, 
which he establishes by the hylomorphic analysis of substance. Many of the 
discussions in the central books are aporematic and often it is extremely difficult to 
picture what the full appearance of the doctrine might look like. As regards the 
final details of the doctrine that appears in these texts, the confession of ignorance 
seems to be the only safe policy. Hence, while staying in safe limits as much as 
Aristotle’s discussions on essence and substance allow, my aim is to examine these 
texts in order to extract as much evidence as I can with respect to the major subject 
matter of the science of Being. 
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What I shall do in this section is to examine in general terms what has been stated 
in the course of the central books with respect to essence and substance and try to 
decide on some issues concerning the subject matter of the science of Being that 
have not been settled in previous discussions of the present text.  
 
Recall that I stated while I was discussing Book Γ and the peculiar structure it uses 
as the basis for the science of Being, namely, core-dependent homonymy (CDH), 
that the primary term of CDH should be prior to the peripheral terms in a number 
of ways if such a structure is to function properly. One of these priorities was 
logical priority, which requires that the primary term should definitionally be prior 
to the peripheral terms in the sense that the latter should be defined by a necessary 
reference to the former. Hence, the possibility of constructing a valid definition for 
the primary term is extremely significant in establishing the CDH by virtue of 
which the unity of the science of Being is established. I have also shown that 
another priority required for the construction of CDH is that the central term must 
be prior in knowledge to the other peripheral instances. This, as I have shown, is 
closely linked to logical priority as well, simply because in Aristotle's conception of 
knowledge a thing is known primarily by the definition to which it appertains. 
Hence, if logical priority fails, then priority of knowledge will also be endangered. 
In such a case, it would no longer be possible for CDH to be established and the 
overall unity of the science of Being would be endangered. The discussions with 
respect to essences and definitions of substances in the central books are quite 
significant, since if they fail to show the possibility of the central term in CDH of 
Being being defined, then all the structure that has been established for the unity of 
the science of Being will break down. 
 
My analysis of CDH has proven that the most suitable candidate for standing as 
the central term in CDH of Being was Immobile Substance (IS). Unfortunately, 
none of the discussion in the course of the central books addresses directly the 
possibility of constructing a valid definition for such a substance; instead, these 
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discussions are limited to the possible definitions of sensible composites (whether 
non-eternal sensible substances (NSS) or eternal sensible substances (ESS)). This, 
however, does not impede at least an indirect investigation of the possibility of 
constructing a definition for IS. What I shall do, accordingly, is examine Aristotle’s 
discussions on the definitions of sensible composites and try to extract results for 
IS. 
 
4.4.1. Elements of Definition 
 
One of the main concerns of Aristotle in the course of his discussions of essence is 
to determine the elements that should be included in the essence of things. One of 
his fundamental aims is therefore to determine the precise scope of essence (τὸ τί 
ἦν εἶναι). Aristotle first excludes what is accidental (συµβεβηκός) from the realm of 
essence. The essence, according to this line of thought, should reflect what is per se 
(καθ' αὑτό), i.e. necessary, rather than what is accidental. Aristotle’s method of 
excluding the accidental from the realm of essential Being is notoriously terse:   
 
The essence [τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι] of each thing is what it is said to be in virtue of itself 
[καθ' αὑτό]. For being you is not being musical; for you are not musical in virtue 
of yourself [οὐ γὰρ κατὰ σαυτὸν εἶ µουσικός]. What, then, you are in virtue of 
yourself [κατὰ σαυτόν] is your essence.54 
What Aristotle is getting at in this passage is the identification of essence with per 
se attributes of things. Since one can by definition contrast per se attributes with 
accidental attributes,55 and since essence should reflect the per se attributes of a 
thing, accidental attributes should be excluded from the realm of essence. In other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Met. Z, 4, 1029b13-16. 
55 This, however, is not as simple as it may seem in the first instance, as, in Topics, Aristotle 
explicitly distinguishes two types of accidentals and calls one of those accidentals τὰ καθ᾿ αὑτὰ 
συµβεβηκότα, that is, ‘in itself accidental’ (I, 22, 83b18). In other passages, Aristotle uses accidental 
combined with per se as well (for such uses, see, for instance, An. Post. I, 7, 75b1; 83b22; Top. II, 3, 
110b22; Phys. II, 2, 193b27; III, 4, 203b33; PA I, 3, 643a27; Met. B, 1, 995b20,25; 2, 997a20, 21, Δ, 30, 
1025a30). Now, one may be tempted to ask whether it is appropriate to combine accidental and 
necessary when these terms can well be contrasted with each other. The combination seems 
contradictory in the first instance. Richard Tierney, in his ‘On the Senses of “Symbebekos” in 
Aristotle’ suggested an excellent solution to this problem, in which he argues that ‘in itself 
accidental’ refers to one of the senses of what is necessary.   
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words, unless the attributes of a thing do not pertain to that thing by virtue of itself 
(in which case these attributes should be regarded as accidental), they cannot be 
involved in the essence of that thing. This, however, requires a further 
investigation of per se attributes of things: should all of the attributes of a thing that 
are said to be per se be included in the essence of things? Aristotle's answer is in the 
negative.56 According to what we are told in Book Z, not every sense of per se is to 
be included in the essence of things.57  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Met. Z, 4, 1029b17.	  
57 At this point one should consult the Aristotelian corpus in order to understand exactly which of 
the per se attributes should be included in the essence of things. Aristotle exclusively examined per 
se attributes in Posterior Analytics, I, 4 and in Metaphysics, Δ, 18. According to these investigations, 
the term per se is πολλαχῶς λεγόµενον, that is,  ‘said in many ways’. Two of these senses are 
significant for an understanding of Aristotle’s discussion of essence. I will accordingly call these 
two senses per se-1 and per se-2. Aristotle describes per se-1 as follows: ‘One thing belongs to another 
in itself [καθ' αὑτὰ] both if it belongs to it in what it is [ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν]- e.g. line to triangle and point 
to line (for their substance [οὐσία] depends on these and they belong in the account [ἐν τῷ λόγῳ] 
which says what they are [τί ἐστιν])’ (An. Post. I, 4, 73a34). These attributes, according to Book Δ, 
should be included in the definitions of things: therefore ‘in virtue of itself’ [καθ' αὑτὸ] must have 
several meanings [πολλαχῶς ἀνάγκη λέγεσθαι]. It applies to (...) whatever is present in the ‘what’ 
[τί ἐστιν], e.g. Callias is in virtue of himself an animal [ζῷον ὁ Καλλίας καθ' αὑτόν]. For ‘animal’ is 
present in the formula [ἐν τῷ λόγῳ] that defines him; Callias is a particular animal [ζῷον γάρ τι ὁ 
Καλλίας]’ (Met. Δ, 18, 1022a25). Per se-1 attributes of a thing are inseparable from that thing and they 
pertain to the very nature of the thing in question. They, therefore, should be included in the 
definition of the thing in question. The genus and the differentia, according to this line of thought, 
should be regarded as per se-1 attributes. These attributes are the basic constituents of the definition 
of a subject. On the other hand, per se-2 attributes are not to be involved in the essence of things. 
Aristotle describes this sense of per se thus: ‘If the things it belongs to themselves belong in the 
account which makes clear what it is [ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ λέγοντι τί ἐστιν ἐνυπάρχει]- e.g. straight 
belongs to the line and so does curved, and odd and even to number, and prime and composite, 
and equilateral and oblong: and for all these there belongs in the account  which says what they are 
[ἐν τῷλόγῳ τῷ τί ἐστι λέγοντι] in the one case line, and in the others number’ (An. Post. I, 4, 73a36-
73b3). In per se-2 one should focus on the definition of the attribute connected to the subject rather 
than the definition of the subject. In this case, the necessary reference to the subject makes it 
possible for the attributes to be defined. In other words, the attribute is no longer involved in the 
description of the subject; rather, the subject itself is involved in the definition of the attribute. 
Hence, a per se-2 attribute of a subject can only be defined by the subject it belongs to. ‘Straight and 
curved’ are per se-2 attributes of ‘line’ since their definition necessarily involves the utterance of 
‘line’ (see De An. I, 1, 402b20). The most frequent example given by Aristotle to illustrate this sense 
of per se is a triangle whose interior angles are equal to two right angles (some of the passages in 
which one can find this example are: Top. II, 3, 110b22; De An. I, 1, 402b20; PA I, 3, 643a30; Met. Δ, 
30, 1025a30). Some of the other examples describing such per se attributes are follows: in Topics (I, 5, 
102a20) Aristotle states that ‘capable of learning grammar [τὸ γραµµατικῆς εἶναι δεκτικόν]’ is a per 
se-2 attribute of man; according to a passage from On Sleep (2, 455a13) every sense has some per se-2 
attributes such as ‘seeing’ and the ‘sense of sight’ and ‘hearing’ and the ‘auditory sense’:  in Parts of 
Animals, I, 1, 639a29 ‘flying’, ‘swimming’, ‘creeping’ are given as per se-2 attributes of an ‘animal’; 
similarly, in the same work, II, 16, 658b35, Aristotle states that it is a per se-2 attribute of an elephant 
to use its nose as a hand; in Metaphysics (M, 3, 1078a5) Aristotle uses ‘maleness or femaleness’ as per 
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Having stated that accidents and some of the per se attributes of a subject are not to 
be involved in the definition, Aristotle proceeds to investigate whether it is 
possible to construct definitions of things that are constituted from a substance and 
a secondary category.58 He gives the example of ‘white man’ (λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος) in 
order to illustrate the things that are constituted of substance and a secondary 
category. He anticipates an objection to the construction of the definitions of such 
substances. ‘White’ is an accident and qua accident it should be excluded from the 
realm of essence. Aristotle meets this objection by stating that there is no problem 
in constructing the definitions of such substances unless a quality like ‘white’ is 
inappropriately connected to the subject. Even though he affirms that it is possible 
to construct definitions for such things, however, these definitions should not be 
regarded as genuine definitions. 59  The genuine definitions should be of the 
primary category only rather than of combinations of substances with secondary 
categories.60 Essence, therefore, pertains to the primary category61 rather than to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
se-2 attributes of an ‘animal’. These examples illustrate that it is possible to observe a counter 
predication [ἀντικατηγορεῖται] between per se-2 attributes and the subject to which they pertain. 
Although the only possibility of defining ‘maleness and femaleness’ is by the reference they make 
to their proper subject ‘animal’, it is impossible to conceive an animal that is neither male nor 
female. With this counter predication found in between per se-2 attributes and the subjects they 
belong to, one can identify per se-2 with the term ‘property’ (ἴδιον), which is described in Topics as 
follows: ‘A property [ἴδιον] is something which does not indicate the essence of a thing [τὸ τί ἦν 
εἶναι], but yet belongs to [ὑπάρχει] that thing alone [µόνῳ], and is predicated convertively 
[ἀντικατηγορεῖται] of it. Thus it is a property of man to be capable of learning grammar [τὸ 
γραµµατικῆς εἶναι δεκτικόν], and if he is capable of learning grammar, he is a man. For no one calls 
anything a property which may possibly belong to something else [ἄλλῳ ὑπάρχειν], e.g. sleep in the 
case of man, even though at a certain time it may happen to belong to him alone’ (Top. I, 5, 102a18-
24). Properties of a subject signify the peculiar attributes to which that subject pertains. These, 
therefore, can be contrasted with ‘common’ [κοινός] attributes that can be shared by many subjects 
(for some of the passages where Aristotle explicitly uses property as opposed to ‘common,’ see: 
Phys. III, 1, 200b24; De An. II, 3, 414b24; SS 1, 436a4; OS 2, 455a13; OD 1, 458b6; HA IV, 8, 532b32; EN 
III, 11, 1118b9; Pol. III, 4, 1276b24; Econ. II, 1, 1345b18). These properties (per se-2 attributes) are not 
involved in the essence of things. Per se-1 and per se-2 attributes play a crucial role in Aristotle’s 
conception of science. They constitute the subject of scientific demonstration (cf. An. Post. I, 6, 
75a29).   
58 Met. Z, 4, 1029b23-1030a27. 
59 Met. Z, 4, 1030a2. 
60 The secondary categories themselves are definable ‘by addition’ (ἐκ προσθέσεως, Met. Z, 5, 
1031a1). Aristotle explains what he means by the phrase ‘by addition’ thus: ‘When I say “by 
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the so-called secondary categories.62  We shall shortly see in close detail the way in 
which the definitions should be of substance only. 
 
Let us roughly sum up what has been affirmed with respect to essence up to this 
point. Aristotle’s discussions have confirmed that the essence is genuinely reflected 
in the first category, namely, the substance. He additionally affirms that there are 
definitions of things that are composed of substance and a secondary category, 
although these should not be regarded as genuine definitions.  
 
Besides these possibilities, there are the things that are composed of a subject and a 
per se quality. This Aristotle investigates in the fifth chapter of Book Z. Such are the 
composite natures (συνδεδυασµένων) as opposed to simple (ἁπλῶς) natures; ‘snub 
nose’ (ἡ σιµότης) is a perfect example of such natures, where concavity (ἡ 
κοιλότης) is said to be a per se attribute of a nose (ῥὶς). Such natures are extremely 
significant for physics, for Aristotle has already declared in Book E that physics 
deals with forms that are not separable from matter.63 If the definitions of such 
composite natures cannot be constructed, the science of physics will be endangered 
altogether. Similarly to what he affirms for the things that are combined from 
substance and a secondary category, Aristotle declares that the composite natures 
such as snub nose have definitions; however, these definitions will not be genuine 
but rather they are secondary definitions. Aristotle encapsulates his discussion at 
the end of chapter five: 
 
Therefore in one sense nothing will have a definition [ὁρισµὸς] and nothing will 
have an essence [τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι], except substances [πλὴν ταῖς οὐσίαις], but in 
another sense other things will have them [ὡδὶ δ' ἔσται]. Clearly, then, definition 
is the formula of essence [ὁ ὁρισµὸς ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι λόγος], and essence [τὸ τί ἦν 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
addition” I mean the expressions in which we have to say the same thing twice, as in these 
instances’ (Met. Z, 5, 1031a4-5). 
61 Cf. Top. I, 9, 103b27-39; Met. Z, 1, 1028b1. 
62 This explains Aristotle’s identical usage of essence with substance in some of the passages (see, 
for example, Met. A, 8, 989b12; H, 1, 1045b32). 
63 Met. E, 1, 1025b34. 
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εἶναι] must belong to substances either alone [µόνων] or chiefly [ἢ µάλιστα] and 
primarily [πρώτως] and in the unqualified sense [ἁπλῶς].64 
Essence and definition belong chiefly to substances and secondarily to 
combinations of substances with either accidental (e.g. white man) or per se 
attributes (e.g. snub nose).  
 
4.4.2. Essence and Existence 
 
Having shown which items have proper definitions, Aristotle proceeds to argue 
against the Platonic theory of ideas by virtue of employing his conception of 
essence and Being in the sixth chapter of Book Z. His aim in this part is to 
demonstrate the superfluity of postulating separate ideas as the basic constituents 
of Being. Aristotle supports his position by showing the inseparability of essence 
and Being. If we differentiate essence from Being and postulate separate essences 
as in the theory of ideas, we will end up with two impossible results:65 (a) in such a 
structure, since essence is differentiated from Being and since these two are 
postulated as separate realms, even though we know the essence we would no 
longer know Being. In such a case, our overall knowledge with respect to sensible 
substances will diminish simply because the knowledge of their essence would not 
lead to the knowledge of their Beings;66 (b) if we were to differentiate essences 
from Beings, the essences of ideas would not be Beings. If the essence were to be 
differentiated from Being (if, in other words, the essence of Being were not to exist) 
the essences of things that are separate from ideas would not exist as well. By 
virtue of these unacceptable results, Aristotle shows the impossibility of 
differentiating essences from Beings. Only by affirming the absolute identity of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Met. Z, 5, 1031a10-15. 
65 My exposition of Aristotle’s affirmation that the essence and existence should be one and the 
same per se is necessarily brief and dogmatic. The present aim is simply to provide a general 
background for the discussion about the definability of God, which will be examined in a moment.   
66 It is worth noting that this will not cause a genuine problem with respect to Plato’s doctrine of 
Being and knowledge qua itself, as he has already lowered the ontological and epistemological 
status of sensible things as far as possible.  
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essence and Being will the scientific knowledge of things – that depend 
fundamentally on the definitions of things – become possible: 
 
Each thing then and its essence [ἕκαστον καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι] are one and the same 
[ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸ] in no merely accidental way [οὐ κατὰ συµβεβηκὸς], as is evident 
both from the preceding arguments and because to know each thing [τὸ 
ἐπίστασθαι ἕκαστον] at least is to know its essence [τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἐπίστασθαι] so 
that even by the exhibition [κατὰ τὴν ἔκθεσιν] of instances it becomes clear that 
both must be one [ἕν].67 
Essence cannot be predicated of the thing in an accidental way (κατὰ συµβεβηκὸς); 
rather, the relation between a thing and its essence is a per se (καθ' αὑτό) type. This 
result can be linked with Aristotle’s previous discussion of whether it is possible to 
construct definitions of composites that are constituted of an accident and a 
subject. In such composite structures, the Being and the essence do not completely 
overlap,68 for which reason it is not possible to postulate the genuine definitions of 
such structures. In other words, in such composite structures the essence would 
not reflect the Being in the absolute sense; correspondingly, the definition would 
not be the definition of Being in an unqualified sense (ἁπλῶς).69  
 
The problems I have enumerated so far do not cover all the puzzles that can be 
postulated with respect to the discussion of essence. There is the further problem 
of the unity of the thing that is defined, which is thoroughly discussed in the 
twelfth chapter of Book Z and the sixth chapter of Book H. Aristotle states this 
problem thus: 
 
I mean this problem: wherein consists the unity [ἕν] of that, the formula [τὸν 
λόγον] of which we call a definition [ὁρισµὸν], as for instance in the case of man, 
two-footed animal; for let this be the formula of man. Why, then, is this one [ἕν], 
and not many [οὐ πολλά], viz. animal and two-footed [ζῷον καὶ δίπουν]?70 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Met. Z, 6, 1031b18-22. 
68 Met. Z, 6, 1031b22ff. 
69 By virtue of this discussion, Aristotle additionally meets some of the sophistical objections that 
are mostly based on a fundamental confusion between the accidental and the substantial. See Met. 
Z, 6, 1032a6. 
70 Met. Z, 12, 1037b10-14. 
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Aristotle simply asks how it is possible that a definition composed of a genus and a 
differentia constitutes a unity rather than a mere combination of genus and 
differentia. Why, in other words, do two-footed (δίπουν-differentia) and animal 
(ζῷον-genus) constitute a unity? Aristotle has a powerful answer to this problem, 
in which he correlates genus with matter and final differentia71 with form.72  The 
relation between genus and differentia, therefore, is correlated with the relation 
between matter and form. Just as the proximate matter is potentially what the form 
is actually, the genus is potentially what the differentia actually is.73 Finally, the 
status of differentia, in accordance with Aristotle’s general doctrine of actuality, is 
higher than the genus: ‘If then this is so, clearly the last differentia [ἡ τελευταία 
διαφορὰ] will be the substance [ἡ οὐσία] of the thing and its definition [ὁ 
ὁρισµός]…’.74 
 
It is significant in this discussion that the things that have no matter, according to 
Aristotle’s declarations, constitute absolute unities. The problem of the unity of the 
thing defined, therefore, is not applicable to such things as have no matter: ‘And all 
things which have no matter [µὴ ἔχει ὕλην] are without qualification [ἁπλῶς] 
essentially unities [ἕν].’ 75  Things such as the categories of Being other than 
substance, the mathematical objects and God can be enumerated as the ones that 
have no matter.76  Such things, therefore, are perfect unities and the problem of the 
unity of the thing defined is not applicable to them. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Caution must be urged here inasmuch as only the final differentia merits being called the 
substance and essence of the thing in question: ‘If then a differentia of a differentia be taken at each 
step [διαφορᾶς διαφορὰ γίγνηται], one differentia, the last [ἡ τελευταία], will be the form [τὸ εἶδος] 
and the substance [ἡ οὐσία]…’ (Met. Z, 12, 1038a25-26). The final differentia covers the other 
differentiae that may be employed while one is constructing a definition of a thing. Therefore, there 
is no need to repeat the other differentiae in the definition. 
72 Met. Z, 12, 1038a5; 1038a25. Cf. An. Post. II, 13, 96b12; Met. H, 6, 1045a35  
73 For the proximate matter and the form are one and the same thing, one potentially and the other 
actually. Cf. Met. H, 6, 1045a22-33; 1045b17.  
74 Met. Z, 12, 1038a18-20. 
75 Met. H, 6, 1045b23. 
76 Cf. Met. H, 6, 1045a36. 
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4.4.3. Essence and God 
 
If one were to refine these problems, one would immediately notice that all of them 
emerge from Aristotle’s hylomorphic analysis of sensible substances. In other 
words, the problems of essence are encountered because the sensible object has 
matter. Matter has nothing in itself to provide the determination and knowability 
of the sensible thing in question. 77  Matter, in other words, is absolutely 
undetermined (ἀόριστος) and unknowable (ἄγνωστος).78 Since all sensible things 
contain matter in their nature,79 when one attempts to define them one inevitably 
involves matter in the expression of the thing in question.80 When matter is 
involved in the definition, however, as we have seen, the definition can no longer 
be regarded as a genuine one. This is because matter is not definite, nor ‘a this’, 
and therefore it undermines the definition in question.  
 
From the perspective of form, however, the problems with respect to essence 
vanish. Contrary to matter, form is determinate and completely knowable. Hence, 
the definition, if it is to be a genuine one, must express the form rather than the 
matter. This is reflected to a degree in Aristotle’s peculiar technical language as 
well. The differences between secondary definitions that involve the expression of 
matter are basically referred to by the term τί ἐστιν, whereas the genuine 
definitions that are constructed solely upon the form are called τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι.81 The 
latter, therefore, is correlated solely with form, excluding all the possible accidental 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Phys. III, 6, 207a25; Met. Z, 10, 1036a8-9. 
78 ‘But matter is unknowable [ἄγνωστος] in itself [καθ' αὑτήν]’ (Met. Z, 10, 1036a8-9). Matter in this 
respect resembles accidentals; neither is definite, i.e. determined: ‘And it is only right that the “of” 
something locution [τὸ ἐκείνινον λέγεσθαι] should be used with reference both to the matter and to 
the accidents [κατὰ τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὰ πάθη]; for both are indeterminates [ἀόριστα]’ Met. ϑ, 7, 
1049a36-1049b2.  
79 Met. Z, 8, 1033b17-19; cf. Phys. I, 7, 190b22-23. 
80 Met. Z, 7, 1033a1-5; 8, 1033b24-26. 
81 This, however, should not be taken as a strict rule. In many of the passages, these terms are used 
identically. See, for instance, An. Post. II, 6, 92a7; 7, 92b29; Top. VII, 3, 153a15; Met. Z, 4, 1030a29, b5. 
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elements82 as well as matter and for this reason reflects the genuine definitions as 
opposed to the former that refer to definitions expressing the formal as well as the 
material nature of the thing defined.83 Hence, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι more strictly signifies 
the particular nature84 of a thing by solely addressing its form whereas τί ἐστιν 
refers to the sum of all elements that may be involved in describing that thing. The 
essence, therefore, should be identified with form, which Aristotle frequently 
does,85 since the definition, if it is to be genuine, should be of form; only in this 
way will it reflect the unchangeable, consistent and eternal nature of the thing in 
question. As we have seen, however, this is not entirely possible in the case of 
sensible substances, since in such substances form is realised in some particular 
matter.86 Though this is the case, Aristotle affirms that form can be defined without 
reference to matter.87 In such cases, however, the essence will not reflect the thing 
in the absolute sense because there will be elements in the nature of the thing defined 
that are not covered by the definition of the thing in question, namely, the material 
parts that are excluded from the realm of essence. That is exactly the reason that 
underlies Aristotle’s rejection of the possibility of the definitions of concrete 
sensible things: 
 
But when we come to the concrete thing [συνόλου], e.g. this circle [κύκλου τουδὶ], 
i.e. one of the individual [καθ' ἕκαστά] circles, whether sensible [αἰσθητοῦ] or 
intelligible [νοητοῦ] (I mean by intelligible circles the mathematical, and by 
sensible circles those of bronze and of wood), of these there is no definition [οὐκ 
ἔστιν ὁρισµός], but they are known by the aid of thought or perception [µετὰ 
νοήσεως ἢ αἰσθήσεως]; and when they go out [ἀπελθόντες] of our actual 
consciousness [ἐκ τῆς ἐντελεχείας] it is not clear whether they exist or not [εἰσὶν ἢ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 ‘The essence [τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι] of each thing is what it is said to be in virtue of itself [καθ' αὑτό]. For 
being you is not being musical; for you are not musical in virtue of yourself [οὐ γὰρ κατὰ σαυτὸν 
εἶ µουσικός]. What, then, you are in virtue of yourself is your essence’ Met. Z, 4, 1029b13-16.	  	  
83 For the passages where τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, i.e. the essence, refers to form (εἶδος), see Phys. II, 2, 194a21; 
Cael. I, 9, 278a3; GC II, 9, 335b35; De An. II, 1, 412a20; Met. Z, 4, 1029b27; 7, 1032b2 ff.; 10, 1035b16 ff.; 
H, 3, 1043b1; Λ, 8, 1074a35. This is supported in the passages where Aristotle discusses four causes 
as well; in these passages τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι is always correlated with the formal cause: Met. A, 3, 983a27; 
7, 988a34; Δ, 2, 1013a27; b22; Z, 17, 1041a28; H, 4, 1044b1. 
84 i.e. the essence in the proper sense; this is confirmed most clearly in Met. Δ, 18, 1022a26; cf. also 
MA 8, 708a12; Met. Z, 4, 1029b13ff.; 11, 1037a33; 13, 1038b14. 
85 See Met. Z, 7, 1032b1-2; 1032b13-14; 10, 1035b14-16; 1035b32; 11, 1037a28-b4; H, 4, 1044a36. 
86 Met. Z, 10, 1035a4-5; 11, 1036b3-4; 1036a31-32.  
87 Met. Z, 11, 1036a26-b7. 
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οὐκ εἰσίν]; but they are always stated [λέγονται] and cognised [γνωρίζονται] by 
means of the universal formula [τῷ καθόλου λόγῳ].88 
Such concrete individuals are known through their form, which is capable of 
reflecting the universal essence (τῷ καθόλου λόγῳ). The definitions of concrete 
sensible things that are composed of matter and form is not possible; only by 
virtue of form can they be defined.89 
 
Since, therefore, the concrete sensible substance, such as this table, involves matter 
in its nature, it cannot be definable in the absolute sense. Matter, on the other hand, 
affects the nature of a sensible thing in a necessary way. Matter is the principle of 
change; the things that have matter correspondingly are subject to generation and 
corruption. It is this that underlies the unintelligibility of such objects. Matter is 
subject to change, undermining any attempt to construct definitions in the absolute 
sense.90 The contingent nature of matter undermines our construction of proper 
definitions of sensible individuals. All scientific knowledge, on the other hand, 
depends on necessary and universal truths. These are alien to the nature of matter, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Met. Z, 10, 1036a2-8. 
89 ‘…we have stated that in the formula of the substance [ἐν µὲν τῷ τῆς οὐσίας λόγῳ] the material 
parts [τὰ οὕτω µόρια ὡς ὕλη] will not be present [οὐκ ἐνέσται] (for they are not even parts of 
substance [µόρια τῆς οὐσίας] in that sense, but of the concrete substance [τῆς συνόλου]; but of this 
there is in a sense formula, in a sense there is not [ταύτης δέ γ' ἔστι πως λόγος καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν]; for 
there is no formula of it with its matter [µετὰ µὲν γὰρ τῆς ὕλης], for this is indefinite [ἀόριστον], 
but there is formula of it with reference to its primary substance [κατὰ τὴν πρώτην δ' οὐσίαν]- e.g. 
in the case of man the formula of the soul [ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς λόγος]-, for the substance is the indwelling 
form [ἡ γὰρ οὐσία ἐστὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐνόν], from which along with the matter the so-called concrete 
substance is derived [λέγεται οὐσία]; e.g. concavity [ἡ κοιλότης] is a form of this sort, for from this 
and the nose [τῆς ῥινὸς] arise snub nose [σιµὴ ῥὶς] and snubness [ἡ σιµότης];  [’nose’ will be found 
to be involved twice [δὶς] in these terms] [Excised by Ross]; but in the concrete substance [ἐν δὲ τῇ 
συνόλῳ οὐσίᾳ], e.g. a snub nose or Callias, the matter also will be present [ἐνέσται καὶ ἡ ὕλη]’ (Met. 
Z, 11, 1037a24-33). 
90 Aristotle neatly encapsulates this fact as follows: ‘For this reason, also, there is neither definition 
nor demonstration [οὔτε ὁρισµὸς οὔτε ἀπόδειξις] of sensible individual substances [τῶν οὐσιῶν 
τῶν αἰσθητῶν τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα], because they have matter [ἔχουσιν ὕλην] whose nature is such that 
they are capable both of being and of not being [καὶ εἶναι καὶ µή]; for which reason all the individual 
instances of them are destructible [φθαρτὰ]. If then demonstration is of necessary truths [τῶν 
ἀναγκαίων] and definition involves knowledge [ἐπιστηµονικόν], and if, just as knowledge 
[ἐπιστήµην] cannot be sometimes knowledge and sometimes ignorance, but the state which varies 
thus is opinion, so too demonstration and definition cannot vary thus, but it is opinion [δόξα] that 
deals with that which can be otherwise than as it is; clearly there can neither be definition [ὁρισµὸς] 
nor demonstration [ἀπόδειξις] of sensible individuals’ (Met. Z, 15, 1039b27-1040a2).  
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which is regarded as contingent.91 It is opinion, rather than truth, to which the 
knowledge of matter leads. Only form can satisfy the requirements of necessity 
and universality of scientific knowledge, since such knowledge depends on 
definitions of things, which in turn are linked primarily and necessarily to form.92 
 
This discussion concerning the possibility of constructing definitions of individual 
concrete sensible substances has shown sufficiently that such substances are not 
definable in the absolute sense. Their nature cannot be covered fully by their 
essences, simply because matter cannot be reflected in the definition. Although a 
definition can be constructed for them, this cannot be regarded as a genuine 
definition simply because it will involve matter whose contingent nature 
undermines the requirements of essence. Now, when one looks at discussion in the 
central books that show it is not possible to construct genuine definitions for 
sensible substances and compares them with the discussion in Book Γ with respect 
to core-dependent homonymy (CDH), the obvious result is that such substances 
cannot be regarded as the proper candidates for standing as the primary terms in 
CDH of Being. Since these substances cannot be defined in the absolute sense, they 
cannot be regarded as logically prior, which is one of the necessary requirements 
of CDH, revealed in Book Γ in order to construct the universal science of Being. If, 
therefore, such substances are not logically prior, they cannot be regarded as the 
primary terms in the CDH of Being. This confirms my argument that non-eternal 
sensible substances (NSS) and eternal sensible substances (ESS) cannot be regarded 
as proper candidates to be the ultimate subjects of the science of Being.93 The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 See An. Post. I, 8, where Aristotle shows that there can be no demonstration of the perishable 
things because of their contingent nature. 
92 The issue is not as simple as reflected in this discussion; however, this is sufficient for my purpose 
in this part, which aims solely to derive conclusions with respect to the definability of God.  
93 One may be tempted to ask whether ESS are to be regarded as indefinable objects on the basis of 
the different nature of the matter to which these substances pertain. Aristotle answers: ‘As has been 
said, then, people do not realise that it is impossible to define [ἀδύνατον ὁρίσασθαι] in the case of 
eternal things [ἐν τοῖς ἀϊδίοις], especially those which are unique [µοναχά], like the sun or the 
moon. For they err not only by adding [προστιθέναι] attributes after whose removal 
[ἀφαιρουµένων] the sun would still exist, e.g. “going round the earth” or “night-hidden” (for from 
their view it follows that if it stands still or visible, it will no longer be the sun; but it is strange if 
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requirements of logical dependence, therefore, cannot be fulfilled by concrete 
sensible substances. We should therefore look for a candidate other than concrete 
sensible substances that can fulfil the requirements of CDH. Before this, however, I 
will now emphasise another outcome of the examination made so far with respect 
to the essence of concrete sensible substances, which brings us to the point of my 
discussion.  
 
All these discussions with respect to the essence of individual concrete substances 
tell us quite clearly that the definition of a sensible individual cannot completely 
overlap with what it is as a whole, since the definition of their Being, if it is to be a 
genuine one, must address their form only, excluding the material part that, 
nevertheless, is one of the two genuine constituent elements of such substances. 
This amounts to saying that with respect to individual sensible substances τί ἐστιν 
and τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι do not entirely overlap, simply because the essence reflected by 
their formal nature does not cover the overall ‘whatness’ of such substances, which 
includes the material as well as the formal constituents of their nature. It is for 
exactly this reason that these substances can only be known from the perspective 
of their forms, which covers all that can be expressed about them rather than all 
that they are. The material constituents of sensible individuals undermine the 
possibility of absolute knowledge of such substances. This shows that besides their 
insufficiency in fulfilling the requirements of logical dependency, such sensible 
individuals cannot be regarded as prior in knowledge as well. This doubly 
confirms that such substances cannot be regarded as the primary elements in the 
CDH of Being, which requires that the primary element should absolutely be prior 
in knowledge.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
this is so; for “the sun” means a certain substance [ὁ γὰρ ἥλιος οὐσίαν τινὰ σηµαίνει]); but also by 
the mention of attributes which can belong to another subject; e.g. if another thing with the stated 
attributes comes into existence, clearly it will be a sun; the formula therefore is general [κοινὸς ἄρα 
ὁ λόγος]. But the sun was supposed to be an individual [ἀλλ' ἦν τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα ὁ ἥλιος], like 
Cleon or Socrates’ (Met. Z, 15, 1040a27-1040b3). 
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In the previous parts of this chapter, I have argued that the general tendency that 
one can encounter throughout the central books of Metaphysics is towards separate 
substance, whose nature consists of a pure form. I believe the discussions so far 
with respect to the essences of sensible individuals confirms this, since the doctrine 
that emerges from these discussions leads to an expectation that there should at 
least be some substances for which we can construct genuine definitions. Such 
substances, as the argument necessitates, should consist of pure form, in which 
matter has no role in undermining the construction of a genuine definition for 
them. These will thereby be fully intelligible as the essence and the existence will 
entirely overlap in their nature. Indeed, Aristotle explicitly addresses this question: 
‘But in the case of so-called self-subsistent things [τῶν καθ' αὑτὰ λεγοµένων], is a 
thing necessarily the same as its essence [ἆρ' ἀνάγκη ταὐτὸ εἶναι]?’94 His general 
doctrine necessitates that he gives a positive answer to this question, because in 
‘self-subsistent things’ whose nature consists solely of form and which are 
absolutely separate from matter the τί ἐστιν and τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι will overlap. This 
Aristotle explicitly confirms at the end of the sixth chapter of Book Z: ‘Clearly, 
then, each primary [τῶν πρώτων] and self-subsistent [καθ' αὑτὰ] thing is one and 
the same as its essence.’95 This, however, is not the case with sensible substances, 
whose nature is composed of matter and form. 
 
Aristotle’s discussion of essence has so far shown that NSS and ESS are not proper 
candidates for CDH because it is impossible to construct genuine definitions for 
such substances. But we know that there is a third kind of substance, namely, God, 
whose nature consists purely of form. I have previously implied that this substance 
is the best candidate for standing as the primary term in CDH of Being. Do the 
discussions so far about essence confirm this thesis?  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Met. Z, 6, 1031a28-29. 
95 Met. Z, 1032a4. 
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Almost all of the questions raised so far address sensible composite substances to 
which Aristotle applies his hylomorphic analysis. Hylomorphic analysis, however, 
yields some inevitable results with respect to the essence and existence of sensible 
substances. Since Aristotle insists on identifying essence with form, the Being of 
the sensible composites does not completely overlap with their essence, which in 
turn removes the possibility of constructing genuine definitions of such substances. 
Furthermore, hylomorphic analysis requires additional explanations with respect 
to the unity of sensible substances. Sufficient justification must be provided for the 
possibility of the unity of the twofold nature of these substances. 
 
On the other hand, if we can postulate a substance whose nature consists of pure 
form, will the problems raised in the central books remain as challenging as they 
are for sensible composites? The answer should certainly be in the negative. Such a 
substance will reflect in its nature an absolute unity; a unity that needs no further 
demonstration. There will be no matter involved in the nature of such substances 
that can undermine any attempt to construct a definition. That definition will 
reflect all that is and all that can be expressed concerning that substance 
simultaneously since there will be no difference between the Being and the essence 
of such substance. This substance will be eternal and unchanging; what this 
substance is, therefore, is all that it is per se. Hence, it will be possible to construct a 
genuine definition of such substance.  
 
The third type of substance that I have regarded as the best candidate for standing 
as the primary term in CDH, namely God, perfectly suits this description, because 
He is absolutely necessary and has no material parts that can undermine His 
definition and His unity. From what has been said with respect to essence and 
Being in the central books, one can infer that God is fully definable and thereby 
absolutely intelligible. This amounts to saying that among the other candidates (i.e. 
ESS and NSS) only God merits being regarded as logically prior in the absolute 
sense. For this reason also, He is absolutely prior in knowledge. 
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In the fifteenth chapter of Book Z, Aristotle has sufficiently shown the 
impossibility of constructing genuine definitions of individuals. Now, one may be 
tempted to doubt that God is definable, because He is an individual. This doubt, 
however, is not justifiable, since an individual is not indefinable qua individual, but 
in so far as it has matter that is contingent in nature. If this contingency can be 
averted, there will be no obstacle to defining an individual. As a matter of fact, 
what happens in the case of God is exactly this, since God has no matter and thus 
no contingent parts. The fact that He consists of pure form implies that His is an 
absolutely per se Being, whose nature is fully sufficient in establishing the basis for 
a possible definition despite the fact that He is an individual.   
 
Although the central books do not investigate God on behalf of Himself, they 
sufficiently establish the step for that examination. They construct the doctrinal 
basis for further inquiry into the nature of God by virtue of preliminary 
examination of the sensible composites that are more knowable by us. The 
arguments found in these books proceed towards the separate self-subsistent 
substance, which is knowable in nature, namely God, who, as the arguments found 
in these books suggest, is perfectly definable and intelligible.96  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Aristotle himself seems to recognize this plan that constitutes a gradual examination of Being 
starting from the sensible substance, which is more knowable by us, and proceeding towards 
separate substance, whose nature consists of form and which is knowable in nature:  ‘Regarding 
these matters, then, we must inquire which of the common statements are right and which are not 
right, and what things are substances, and whether there are or are not any besides sensible 
substances [παρὰ τὰς αἰσθητὰς], and how sensible substances exist, and whether there is separable 
substance [χωριστὴ οὐσία] (and if so why and how) or there is no substance separable from sensible 
substances [παρὰ τὰς αἰσθητάς]; and we must first sketch [ὑποτυπωσαµένοις] the nature of [τί 
ἐστιν] substance’ (Met. Z, 2, 1028b27-32). Aristotle surely recognises the eternal substances in the 
central books, although he does not undertake a discussion of them: ‘Yet even if we had not seen 
the stars, nonetheless, I suppose [οἶµαι], would there be eternal substances [οὐσίαι ἀΐδιοι] besides 
those which we knew [παρ' ἃς ἡµεῖς ᾔδειµεν]; so that now also if we do not know what eternal 
substances there are, yet it is doubtless necessary that some should exist [ἀλλ' εἶναί γέ τινας ἴσως 
ἀναγκαῖον]’ (Met. Z, 16, 1040b34-1041a3). 
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Hence, inquiries found in the central books should be regarded as an integral part 
of the doctrine that proceeds gradually in the several treatises of Metaphysics. The 
discussions found in these books sometimes support, as in the case of their 
investigation of several manifestations of Being, whereas in other cases they 
articulate and develop (in their discussions with respect to priorities of substance 
and priority of actuality over potentiality) the ongoing discussions originated in 
the previous treatises of Metaphysics. Most significant of all, however, is the 
discussion of essence found in these books, showing that only formal substance 
can fulfil the requirements of logical priority in full, which has not yet been proved 
in the previous treatises of Metaphysics and which is one of the necessary 
conditions of CDH established in Book Γ to construct the basis of the universal 
science of Being. Seen in this perspective, despite the fact that these books concern 
themselves mostly with composite substances, they fully support the theological 
conception of the science of Being. The inquiries found in these books support the 
view that only separate, self-subsistent formal substance can fulfil the 
requirements of CDH by virtue of indirect means, leaving aside the examination of 
the nature of such a substance for another treatise. The three central books, 
therefore, support the view that the science of Being should be a theological 
ontology, which concerns itself primarily with the self-subsistent, formal 
substance, namely, the God.  
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CHAPTER V  
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
Perhaps more than any other treatise of Metaphysics it is Book Λ that has give 
rise to the most controversies among scholars down the ages. Most 
significantly, Aristotle’s examination of God as the ultimate principle of the 
Universe, who is characterized as self-thinking thought and as pure form, 
deeply nourished late classical, Arab and medieval philosophy. Modern 
scholarship gradually added new disputes to the ongoing debates with respect 
to Book Λ. My fundamental purpose in this part is to determine the exact role 
played by Book Λ in Aristotle’s doctrine of the science of Being, which he 
developed through the treatises of Metaphysics. Hence I will not go into the 
details of every possible dispute that has emerged from Aristotle’s enterprise in 
Book Λ; rather, I am content to deal with matters that have immediate impact 
on what I aim to support in this part of my thesis. 
 
Modern scholars have debated whether Book Λ is an early work of Aristotle. 
Jaeger suggested that Book Λ must be accepted as an early work fundamentally 
because of its theological standpoint. Since, according to Jaeger, this theological 
standpoint is a sign of Platonism, it is probable that Book Λ was an early work 
of Aristotle, when he was still under the influence of Plato.1 Certainly, such 
reflection tends to equate what is theological with what is Platonic. Aristotle, as 
defended by Jaeger, abandons this theological standpoint in further stages of 
his philosophical development as he moves away from Platonism.  
 
One may not wish to subscribe to this view so readily, however. Employing the 
criteria espoused by Jaeger, namely, Platonism and the theological appearance 
of Book Λ, it is not a given that Book Λ is an early work. Admittedly, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Jaeger states: ‘Joining all these observations together, we may say that Book Λ represents the 
stage that we have discovered to come before the traditional metaphysics, a stage that was still 
purely Platonic and did not recognize the doctrine of sensible substance as an integral part of 
first philosophy’ (1962, p. 221). See the critiques of H. von Arnim, Nuyens and Oggioni against 
Jaeger’s views in Owens (1951), pp. 95-104 and in Reale (1980) pp. 312-320.  
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doctrine that we encounter in Book Λ may seem to be somewhat sketchy and 
undeveloped, for which reason it can indeed be regarded as an early work of 
Aristotle. One might also be inclined to reject this argument by claiming, 
alternatively, that Book Λ was written somewhat hastily by Aristotle, which is 
the reason for its sketchy character, at the later stages of his philosophical 
development in order to close a certain lacuna in his doctrine of the science of 
Being, namely, the doctrine of God, which had not been examined in previous 
treatises of his Metaphysics.2  
 
I believe that, on the basis of the limited evidence we have, it is almost 
impossible to decide conclusively whether Book Λ must be regarded as an early 
work of Aristotle or else a treatise written in the mature stages of Aristotle’s 
philosophical development. I do not think, however, that this has any 
immediate adverse effect on our examination of Book Λ, for I think it is the 
harmony of the doctrine that we encounter in Book Λ with the other treatises of 
Metaphysics, rather than some speculative disputes on the chronology of the text 
of Book Λ, that, as it were, must be the focus of our attention. It seems upon 
reflection, then, that the importance of Jaeger’s claim is that he espouses a view 
that grounds itself on the idea that the doctrine with respect to the science of 
Being we encounter in Book Λ is incompatible with the general outlook of the 
science of Being that we encounter in other treatises of Metaphysics, especially in 
Book Γ. In this chapter, I will challenge this view and show that not only is 
there close harmony between Book Λ and other treatises of Metaphysics – and 
for that matter Book Γ–, but also that they can be regarded as complementary 
parts of the same doctrine. To this end, I will not only present an assessment of 
a possible reconciliation between the grounding structure of the science of 
Being introduced in Book Γ, namely, core-dependent homonymy (CDH) and 
what Aristotle has been claiming in Book Λ with respect to the science of Being 
and, for that matter, in terms of Immobile Substance (IS), namely the God, but 
also I will attempt to show that Book Λ is a necessary part of the whole doctrine 
of the science of Being. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Cf. Frede (2000), pp. 48ff. for the details of such a claim. 
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5.2. The Scope of Book Λ 
 
Commentators have long been puzzled with respect to the scope of Book Λ. At 
the outset, it is possible to observe two standpoints with respect to this puzzle; 
on the one hand, Book Λ may be claimed to be Aristotle’s only systematic essay 
on theology and focuses solely on God; on the other hand, it can be regarded as 
a general treatise on substance. Aristotle’s dominant concern in Book Λ, 
according to the former view, would be to set down the elements of his 
theology. The proponents of this approach include Ross3 and, more recently, 
Graham.4 On the other hand, Lang5 and Frede6 have challenged this view and 
attempted to show that assuming Book Λ to be just a theological treatise is 
misleading and that it should be regarded as a general treatise on substance.  
 
For a possible decision on this puzzle, one needs to clarify what it means for a 
treatise to be theological. On the first view, being theological seems to rule out 
Book Λ being a general treatise on substance. It is important to appreciate at the 
outset that this suggestion, as it stands, is utterly misleading, as it hardly 
explains Aristotle’s investigations on sensible substances in the first six chapters 
of Book Λ. Furthermore, from the very beginning of Book Λ one has the feeling 
that Aristotle’s discussion will be about substance as he differentiates three 
types of substances and begins his investigation from non-eternal sensible 
substances (NSS).7 Certainly, to say that Book Λ is primarily concerned with 
substance does not amount to saying that it excludes a theological conception of 
the science of Being from the discussion. It is indeed possible, on the other 
hand, to affirm that Book Λ reflects Aristotle’s enterprise in establishing his 
theology, albeit with an interpretative reservation, which would sufficiently 
show the necessary connections between the study of all substances as far as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Ross (I, 1924), p. CXXX. 
4 Graham (1987), p. 266. 
5 Lang (1993), p. 258. 
6 Frede (2000), p. 5.  
7 For more on the possible adverse outcomes of considering Book Λ as a treatise that concerns 
itself solely with God, see Helen Lang (1993), p. 268, 274-275.  
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they are Beings through the study of IS in the scheme provided in Book Γ. It is 
this point that is missing in the first interpretation, for what this approach 
claims rules out Aristotle’s general examination of substance in Book Λ. Being a 
treatise on God, therefore, does not impede Book Λ’s being a treatise on other 
substances if one is to take into consideration the general core-dependent 
homonymous structure of Being. 
 
Perhaps the proponents of the second interpretation that supports Book Λ’s 
being a general treatise on substance would also subscribe to my view that 
Book Λ’s being theological does not impede its being at the same time a general 
treatise on substance. However, I do not still think that this approach comes to 
grips with what is really going on in Book Λ. On Frede’s view, for instance, 
Book Λ, in its enterprise to enlighten the nature of IS, presents a study of a 
general ‘kind’ of substance, which is not strictly and necessarily focused on a 
first Unmoved Mover:  
 
The phrase ‘of this kind’ should warn us that the characterization of the first 
unmoved mover given so far might not be specific to the first unmoved 
mover, but characterize any unmoved mover, any mover which is supposed 
to account for the eternal circular motion of any object.8 
Again Frede states: 
 
(…) this second main part of Λ is not primarily about God, but about the 
separate unchanging substances which turn out to be the unmoved movers.9 
It seems, then, according to Frede, given that the enterprise in Book Λ focuses 
on a general kind of substance, God’s role in this treatise seems not to be 
necessary. I think that this stance is misleading, however. What Aristotle 
needed was to clarify the characteristics of God in the way he has done in Book 
Λ if his conception of the science of Being that is based upon the structure 
provided in Book Γ is to operate accurately. The description of God in Book Λ, 
as I shall show in this chapter, fits exactly the properties Aristotle called for to 
place God at the core of the CDH of Being, whereby the inquiry into God, i.e. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Frede (2000), p. 36. 
9 Ibid. p. 37. 
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theology, can become a universal study of Beings as far as they are Beings. It is 
not, I think, a ‘kind of substance’ but specifically the God, with its attributes, 
that makes CDH work accurately. One of the aims of this chapter, therefore, is 
to support this claim by way of going through the attributes of God and testing 
them against the requirements of CDH explained hitherto. Thus, I claim that 
Aristotle’s main concern in Book Λ is not limited to God but rather spreads 
through all types of substances. The underlying structure that supposedly 
justifies Aristotle’s enterprise, as I claim, is provided by CDH.  
 
5.3. Book Λ and Metaphysics 
 
Recall that in Book A Aristotle has sufficiently emphasized that Wisdom, which 
is the correlate of the science of Being, should be regarded as a divine science 
since it deals with the highest principles and causes. In Book Γ, Aristotle has 
established the grounds for a universal science of Being through the study of a 
core item, namely, ‘substance’. Nevertheless, although he gives some clues, he 
does not articulate which type of substance is most suitable for fulfilling the 
role of core item in the CDH of Being. Thereafter Book E took up the 
investigation and determined the ambiguously stated ‘substance’ of Book Γ, 
which was espoused as the ‘first’ among things, which should be regarded as 
God. The central books articulately investigated the sensible substances, 
thereby establishing grounds for the study of the ‘first’ substance.  
 
Now, what might be the role played by Book Λ, if any, among these treatises? 
Should we affirm that it is a separate treatise having no effect on the ongoing 
discussion with respect to the science of Being as if it were an appendix, or 
should we affirm that it is a necessary part of the whole? If the latter is the case, 
what exactly is the role of Book Λ in the treatises of Metaphysics?  
 
Among scholars, it seems that the orthodox view is to regard Book Λ as a 
separate treatise. Bonitz observed in his Commentary that Book Λ is in no way 
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connected with the other treatises of Metaphysics.10 Jaeger states that ‘the style 
and the choice of ideas show that it is an isolated lecture’.11 Ross, similarly, 
claimed that Book Λ ‘presents all the appearances of a separate work’.12 
Owens13 and Leszl14 also reflected similar thoughts. 
 
More recently, Frede has reflected on this subject as he notes:  
 
Λ originally seems to have constituted a treatise of its own which only later 
was inserted into Metaphysics. Suppose that, due to some accident, the whole 
of Metaphysics except for book Λ had been lost at a very early stage of its 
transmission, and that only Λ had survived, but under the title On Substance. 
We would have no reason to think that Λ was just a fragment, or only a 
chapter of a book, of an originally much larger work, which, but for this part, 
unfortunately had been lost. For Λ, for instance, does not refer to earlier or to 
later sections of a larger work which it presents itself as only a part of. It, both 
in form and in content, is a self-contained work. Suppose, instead, that Λ, due 
to some accident at a very early stage, had been separated from the 
Metaphysics, and that it and the rest of the Metaphysics had been transmitted 
separately, the former again under the title On Substance. In this event we 
would have two treatises traditionally attributed to Aristotle, a Metaphysics 
and an On Substance. Even with this Metaphysics available to us, we would 
have little reason to suppose that the treatise we had come to call On 
Substance originally was a book of the Metaphysics. One would not be able to 
identify a clear gap or lacuna in this Metaphysics, either in form or in content, 
such that Λ precisely fitted into this gap.15 
Frede, like the other scholars I have cited, thinks that Book Λ is a self-contained 
work. He most certainly states that we do not have good reasons to connect it 
with the other treatises of Metaphysics. In expounding his thoughts he seems to 
have two possibilities in mind, to which I will shortly add a third. Let me begin 
with the first possibility that Frede has in mind. According to this possibility, 
we have only Book Λ and not the rest of Metaphysics. Under such circumstances, 
do we still have good reasons to think that it is a part of a larger work such as 
Metaphysics?  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 ‘Deinde libro Λ de integro, quasi nihildum disputatum sit, orditur philosophus quarere de 
summis principiis, et ea quidem pertractare, quae quum ad concludendam universam 
doctrinam praecipue sint necessaria, tamen reliqua cum disputatione nullo modo connectuntur’ 
(Bonitz (1849), p. 9). 
11 Jaeger (1962), p. 219. 
12 Ross (1924), I, p. xxviii. Ross stated that ‘Λ must be considered an entirely independent 
treatise, with one principal aim, that of establishing the existence of an eternal unmoved mover 
of the world’ (p. xxix).  
13 Owens (1951), p. 90. 
14 Leszl (1975), p.493. 
15 Frede (2000), p.1. 
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One might observe, at the outset, that Metaphysics, as we have it today, seems 
not to be designed and written as a single treatise by Aristotle, instead, one 
might rightfully conjecture that this work is composed of several treatises all of 
which address more or less similar issues about the nature of reality. Some of 
the treatises (e.g. Z, H, ϑ) seem to be more closely related while others (e.g. 
Book Δ) seem to be more independent. However that may be, despite the fact 
that these treatises appear to have some level of independency, we can still 
affirm that all of them are clustered around similar problems and Book Λ is not 
an exception in this regard. As with the others, it has certain independence, and 
it looks as if one might take it as a complete literary text. Despite the fact that it 
can indeed be regarded as a complete literary text, can we also simply affirm 
that it reflects a complete philosophical doctrine? In other words, can we say 
that Book Λ is complete without the rest of Metaphysics in terms of its doctrinal 
positions? What might be missing, in case we do not have the rest of 
Metaphysics, in the doctrine that we encounter in Book Λ? 
 
The scale of Aristotle’s enterprise in Book Λ is the whole Universe. It is true that 
in this treatise Aristotle presents an account of the nature of substance. 
Differently from the account he has given in the central books, in which his 
enterprise is concerned more with sensible substances, the scale of Aristotle’s 
examination of substances in Book Λ covers all of the substances in the 
Universe. The treatise, in this way, has a holistic approach to the Universe. One 
of the objectives of this chapter is to justify that Aristotle most explicitly 
envisages some kind of an order (τάξις)16 in this holistic outlook. Now, that 
strongly emphasized order, I believe, could not be established and justified to 
the full if we did not have the framework presented in Book Γ, namely, CDH.  
 
In the course of Book Λ, we are most explicitly told that all things in the 
Universe are ordered together to one end.17 I maintain that this order can only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 I will discuss this subject in detail in 5.5.1. 
17 Met. Λ, 10, 1075a19. 
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be justified by virtue of the CDH, details of which are given in Book Γ. 
Although Aristotle does not make explicit the details of such a relation whereby 
we attain an order in the Universe, his argument relies upon the relations found 
between the instances of Being, which is explained in Book Γ. Perhaps one 
might subscribe to the view that Aristotle wrote Book Λ before he sharpened up 
his theory of CDH, that is before Book Γ. In such a case, Book Γ justifies the 
positions maintained by Aristotle in Book Λ by virtue of supplying the 
underlying structure of the order that Aristotle has explained in Λ. 
Alternatively, one might claim that Book Λ was written after Book Γ with some 
confidence that this order is already justified so that there is no need to go into 
the details of the underlying structure, i.e., the CDH of Being, once more in 
Book Λ. Any conclusive pronouncement on this matter seems to be almost 
impossible. Whatever it may be it still looks as if Book Λ depends on CDH, 
without which it cannot show the unity and order of the Universe in the way 
one might expect. Although it places a strong emphasis on the unity and the 
order of the Universe, it does not, as it were, make explicit the details of how in 
actuality such an order might be attained. The kata hen relation, as we have 
observed in the previous chapters of this thesis, is not capable of supplying 
sufficient grounds to unify Being in the manner Aristotle would like, that is, as 
the manner in which it paves the way for a unified science of Being, for, as 
mentioned, kata hen requires Being to be regarded as a genus. This, as we have 
seen, would most certainly be rejected by Aristotle. Hence, the order that is 
emphasized in Book Λ, upon which the science of Being is supposed to be 
established, can only be found by way of CDH and, in this way, Book Λ 
depends on the doctrine that is developed in Book Γ. It seems, then, that what 
Aristotle maintains in Book Λ needs an explicit treatment of CDH within the 
system of Being, without which Book Λ would be incomplete. In this way, 
therefore, if we had Book Λ without the rest of Metaphysics, we would think that 
it requires a kind of treatment that we face in the treatises of Metaphysics, 
especially in Book Γ. Hence, although one might take Λ as a complete literary 
text, it will still not be philosophically complete without what is provided in 
Book Γ, namely, the CDH of Being. 
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On the second possibility that Frede has in mind, that is, if we had both Book Λ 
and Metaphysics, if they had been transmitted separately, we might ask whether 
we would have good reasons to suppose that Book Λ was still a book of the 
Metaphysics. I maintain that there is a sense in which we can accept that the 
treatises of Metaphysics, as they come down to us, are separate treatises more or 
less concerned with same kind of questions. Thus we may readily agree that 
Book Λ is not part of the same book, however, we may still insist, for good 
reasons, that the treatises of Metaphysics, and for that matter Book Λ, reflect 
parts of the same doctrine, that is, they are parts of the same philosophy. So the 
sense in which Book Λ belongs in the Metaphysics is the sense in which it is a 
treatise along with several treatises of Metaphysics all more or less inquiring into 
the same subject, namely the problem of Being, and with the same positions. 
Therefore, the question of Being belonging to the Metaphysics is not a matter of 
it belonging to the single literary whole; rather, belonging to the Metaphysics 
must be, in a way, to be philosophically integral part of the system reflected in 
the Metaphysics as a whole. Hence, whilst we may abandon our claims of 
literary inclusiveness for Metaphysics, we may still claim a kind of philosophical 
inclusiveness of Book Λ to the Metaphysics. So, then, the question is whether 
there would be any reason to put Book Λ along with the other treatises of 
Metaphysics. The answer to this question, I think, is in the affirmative, for what 
Book Λ is concerned with is exactly the same doctrine with which the other 
treatises of Metaphysics are concerned. Hence, as much as the other treatises of 
Metaphysics belong to the opus of Metaphysics, so Book Λ may be involved in the 
Metaphysics as well. 
 
One might, however, consider another possibility, a fairly obvious one, which is 
not considered by Frede, and which can be stated thus: suppose we have the 
rest of Metaphysics and we do not have Book Λ. In such circumstances, would 
Metaphysics then seem to be incomplete? My answer, for which I argue in what 
follows in this chapter, is that in such circumstances the doctrine of the science 
of Being that we encounter throughout the treatises of Metaphysics would be 
	  	  
264 
incomplete if we did not have Book Λ. Hence, I think Book Λ fills an important 
gap in the doctrine of the science of Being, without which we would not have 
an operating system of Being that can pave the way for a unified universal 
study of things that are. This claim, however, depends upon a particular 
reading of the Metaphysics, especially of Book Γ, in the way I suggest. 
 
We have already seen that Book Γ presented a science of Being that studies 
what it is for things to be, namely the Being qua Being, and formulates the 
underlying structure for such a science while it establishes CDH. This amounts 
to saying that only in the structure provided by the CDH of Being can the 
science of Being operate. This structure, as we have seen, necessitates a core 
item that is absolutely prior in several ways. This is also supported by Book E, 
where the study of the highest substance, namely God, is attributed to the 
science of Being. Now, in Book Λ, we encounter the division of substances into 
three types and, in accordance with the general doctrine arising from Book Γ 
and Book E, the first two types of these substances, namely NSS and ESS, are 
attributed to physics, whereas the third type, which is the highest amongst 
these types of substances, namely IS, is stated as the proper subject of the 
science of Being.18 In the later stages of Book Λ, one eventually finds an 
investigation of the nature of the IS, that is, God, and thereby meets a plain 
requirement that naturally derives from the previous discussion of the science 
of Being as it presents God, namely the most suitable candidate for standing as 
the CDH of Being.  
 
Now, this amounts to saying that Book Λ fills an important gap that must be 
filled if we are to have a complete doctrine of the science of Being. As we have 
seen, in order that the CDH of Being can operate properly one must be able to 
articulate a substance that is absolutely prior to the other Beings. If this was not 
possible, then the science of Being would not reach the required universality by 
excluding some substances that are not connected to the primary instance, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 ‘The former two kinds of substance are the subject of natural science [φυσικῆς] (for they 
imply movement); but the third kind belongs to another science…’ (Met. Λ, 1, 1069a36-b1). 
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namely the core item, in a pros hen way. The investigation of this absolutely 
prior substance, however, would be missing if we did not have Book Λ, 
especially the second part, that is, chapters six to ten. Hence, by virtue of 
introducing and to some extent articulating what Book Γ has envisaged as the 
core item in the CDH of Being, Book Λ fills an important gap in the doctrine, 
without which the investigation of the science of Being could not be completed. 
 
We might, then, reasonably conclude that since none of the treatises of 
Metaphysics other than Book Λ inquires into the highest substance, namely, God, 
we would not have a complete picture of the science of Being without the 
treatment found in this treatise simply because, in such a case, we would not 
have the ‘core’ item in the CDH of Being, that is the ‘first substance’, which can 
rightly be regarded as the basic subject matter of the science of Being through 
which the investigation turns out to be a study of all things as far as they are 
Beings.  
 
In order to justify what I have claimed so far, I need to move beyond this 
general discussion of the role of Book Λ in the treatises of Metaphysics to 
examine the arguments that we encounter in this treatise. To this end, in the 
next section, I will first inquire into whether we can find traces of CDH in Book 
Λ, which will allow me to demonstrate better the connections between Book Λ 
and the other treatises of Metaphysics, especially Book Γ. Later, I will examine 
the characteristics of God stated in Book Λ and attempt to determine whether 
these characteristics are capable of supporting what I claim with respect to 
God’s role in the CDH of Being. 
 
5.4. Book Λ and the CDH of Being 
 
I have already claimed that Book Λ fills an important gap in the doctrine of the 
science of Being. I claim that the way in which Book Λ fills this gap is through 
supplying the most necessary element of the CDH of Being, that is the core 
element. This, I claim, can be observed in Aristotle’s enterprise in Book Λ to set 
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out the characteristics of God. Now, it would be rather annoying for proponents 
of such a view if no traces of the doctrine of CDH were to be found in Book Λ. 
If, after all, we cannot find traces of CDH in Book Λ, how can we legitimately 
argue that Aristotle’s enterprise in this treatise so explicitly fills a gap in the 
doctrine of CDH of Being, accept by accident? The basic question is, then: Can 
we find traces of the CDH of Being that is explained in Book Γ in Book Λ? This 
question has received significant attention from scholars. The proponents of the 
idea that Book Λ is a separate treatise quite naturally tend to deny the existence 
of CDH in Book Λ, for this would certainly open a lacuna in their argument in 
that it would show a clear connection between Book Λ and the other treatises of 
Metaphysics, especially Book Γ. One of the proponents of this view, as I have 
mentioned, is Michael Frede who denies the existence of CDH in Book Λ. Frede 
states:  
 
A fortiori there is no indication that he [Aristotle] conceives of his enterprise 
as an attempt to set out what can be said about beings quite generally, about 
beings in so far as they are beings. What is conspicuously missing from Λ is a 
doctrine concerning the systematic ambiguity of the term ‘being’, let alone the 
conception of focal meaning which would allow Aristotle to give a unified 
account of substancehood or of being as such. Λ, in comparison to Γ, E, or Z, 
H, ϑ seems to be remarkably vague in its conception of the metaphysical 
enterprise. It fits the enterprise envisaged by A, but it does not seem to go 
much beyond A in its conception of this enterprise. On balance it seems to me 
to reflect a less developed approach to metaphysics than either E or Z, H, and 
ϑ.19 
According to this conception, Book Λ neither recognizes the approach to the 
science of Being that is marked by the term ‘Being qua Being’, nor involves the 
doctrine of CDH. Book Λ is a premature outline of the doctrine of Being. It does 
not include Aristotle’s more developed account of the science of Being, such as 
the CDH in Book Γ.  
 
It can indeed be argued that the doctrine of the CDH of Being in its most 
mature appearance does not exist in Book Λ. I have already stated that the 
reason for this might be that Book Λ is an early work. However that may be, it 
seems unacceptable for me to subscribe to the view that there is no recognition 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Frede (2000), p. 50. 
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of CDH in Book Λ. I think, on the contrary, that not only is there a close 
harmony between Aristotle’s enterprise in Book Λ and Book Γ but also that 
Aristotle clearly recognizes the CDH of Being in Book Λ even though he does 
not make it explicit in the way he does in Book Γ. It is not clear that CDH is 
explicitly mentioned in Book Λ but this does not stop it is being true that it is 
recognized in Book Λ and that Aristotle’s enterprise in this treatise fills a gap in 
the doctrine of the science of Being. In what follows, I will attempt to go 
through the traces of the CDH of Being in Book Λ in order to show that 
Aristotle recognized it at the time he wrote Book Λ.  
 
5.4.1. Ontological Dependence: Inter-Categorical Relations in Book Λ 
 
We have already seen in regard to Book Γ that there are inter-categorical and 
intra-categorical levels in the CDH of Being and that these can only be worked 
out to produce the universal science of Being by investigating a primary core 
item, that is, the highest substance. Ontological dependence, as we have seen in 
the previous chapters of this thesis, works in both of these levels whereby we 
attain a unified science of Being through the CDH of Being. Now, if Frede is 
right, we may expect to find no traces of the recognition of such a dependence 
relation in both levels in Book Λ. After all, to say that CDH does not exist in 
Book Λ may well amount to saying that its constituents are not recognized and 
traced in Aristotle’s enterprise in Book Λ. If, on the other hand, we can find 
traces of the constituents of CDH in Book Λ, we may argue that they indeed 
serve for a certain doctrine – the doctrine that is explicated in Book Γ – without 
which, in turn, one might not make sense of their existence in Book Λ.  
 
At the first level, an inter-categorical dependence between substance and 
secondary categories can be observed. Can we find traces of such a dependence 
whereby one can affirm that Aristotle recognizes them in Book Λ? I believe we 
can indeed find some evidence towards this avenue of approach, for instance, 
in the first chapter of Book Λ, where Aristotle discusses the priority of 
substance over the other categories:  
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[A] Substance is the subject of our inquiry [ἡ θεωρία]; for the principles [αἱ 
ἀρχαὶ] and the causes [τὰ αἴτια] we are seeking [ζητοῦνται] are those of 
substances [τῶν γὰρ οὐσιῶν]. [B] For if the universe is of the nature of a 
whole, substance is its first part [ἡ οὐσία πρῶτον µέρος]; and if it coheres by 
virtue of succession [καὶ εἰ τῷ ἐφεξῆς], on this view also substance is first, 
and is succeeded by quality [τὸ ποιόν], and then by quantity [τὸ ποσόν]. [C] 
At the same time these latter are not even beings [οὐδ' ὄντα] in the 
unqualified sense [ἁπλῶς], but are quantities [ποιότητες]20 and movements 
[κινήσεις] – or else even the not-white [οὐ λευκὸν] and the not-straight [τὸ 
οὐκ εὐθύ] would be; at least we say even these are [λέγοµεν γοῦν εἶναι], e.g. 
‘there is a not-white’ [ἔστιν οὐ λευκόν]. [D] Further, none of the others can 
exist apart [ἔτι οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων χωριστόν].21 
In [A] Aristotle seems to be taking for granted the idea that the inquiry of the 
science of Being is marked by an examination of substance. The mention of the 
‘causes’ and ‘principles’ that are supposed to be dealt with by the 
metaphysician seems to echo Book A, where ‘the science we seek’; namely, 
Wisdom, is stated as the science of the ultimate principles and causes.22 There, 
however, Aristotle does not sufficiently expand upon what ‘the ultimate 
principles and causes’ are about. In Book Γ it is argued that the science of Being 
must focus on substance without, however, a description of the type of 
substance that is supposed to be dealt with by the metaphysician, whereby we 
understand that the ‘principles and causes’ mentioned in Book A pertain to 
substances. In this passage, Aristotle seems to be combining what we have 
learned from Book A and Book Γ by stating that the object of inquiry should 
focus on the principles and causes of substances. It might be argued that the 
‘ultimate principles and causes’ are the causes of substances. Though this is the 
natural outcome of what has been said in Book A and Book Γ, Aristotle does not 
clarify it until the above passage of Book Λ. This passage, therefore, 
encapsulates what has been said with respect to the science of Being in Book A 
and Book Γ.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 It would be more accurate if ‘ποιότητες’ were rendered as ‘qualities’. Ross’s translation 
would be better if Aristotle had used the term ‘ποσότητες’. See 1028a19, where Ross rendered 
the same term as ‘qualities’. See, Elders (1972, pp. 76-77) for how ποιότητες in this context can 
denote qualities. 
21 Met. Λ, 1, 1069a18-24. 
22 Met. A, 1, 982a1-2. 
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[B] presents an approach to the Universe as a whole. Aristotle does not present 
the structure of Being in its entirety elsewhere as he does in this part of 
Metaphysics, i.e., in Book Λ. What I want to discuss now, however, is the line of 
thought that we encounter in [C] and [D]. These involve interconnected ideas 
about the primacy of substance. There is a strong parallelism between the 
opening lines of Book Λ and the opening lines of Book Z, where Aristotle points 
to the primacy of substance: 
 
While ‘being’ has all these senses, obviously that which is primarily is the 
‘what’ [πρῶτον ὂν τὸ τί ἐστιν], which indicates [σηµαίνει] the substance [τὴν 
οὐσίαν] of the thing. For when we say of what quality a thing is [ποῖόν τι 
τόδε], we say that it is good or beautiful [ἢ ἀγαθὸν λέγοµεν ἢ κακόν],23 but 
not that it is three cubits long or that it is a man; but when we say what it is, 
we do not say ‘white’ [λευκὸν] or ‘hot’ [θερµὸν] or ‘three cubits long’ 
[τρίπηχυ], but ‘man’ [ἄνθρωπον] or ‘God’ [θεόν]. And all other things are said 
to be [τὰ δ' ἄλλα λέγεται ὄντα] because they are, some of them, quantities 
[ποσότητες] of that which is in the primary sense, others qualities 
[ποιότητες]24 of it, others affections [πάθη] of it, and others some other 
determination of it [ἄλλο τι]. And so one might raise the question whether ‘to 
walk’ and ‘to be healthy’ and ‘to sit’ signify in each case something that is, 
and similarly in any other case of this sort; for none of them is either self-
subsistent [καθ' αὑτὸ] or capable of being separated from substance 
[χωρίζεσθαι δυνατὸν τῆς οὐσίας], but rather, if anything, it is that which 
walks or seated or is healthy that is an existent thing [τῶν ὄντων].25 
Again, in Book Γ, there is a similar line of thought: 
 
So, too, there are many senses in which a thing is said to be, but all refer to 
one starting-point [πρὸς µίαν ἀρχήν]; some things are said to be [ὄντα 
λέγεται] because they are substances [οὐσίαι], others because they are 
affections of substance [πάθη οὐσίας], others because they are process 
towards substance [ὁδὸς εἰς οὐσίαν], or destructions [φθοραὶ] or privations 
[στερήσεις] or qualities [ποιότητες] of substance, or productive [ποιητικὰ] or 
generative [γεννητικὰ] of substance, or of things which are relative to 
substance, or negations [ἀποφάσεις] of some of these things or of substance 
itself. It is for this reason that we say even of non-being that it is non-being 
[διὸ καὶ ὂν εἶναι µὴ ὂν φαµεν].26 
These two passages lay emphasis on exactly the same point; namely, the 
primacy of substance. Aristotle refers to the secondary categories and affirms 
that these depend upon substance for their existence, as he maintains that only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 ‘ἢ ἀγαθὸν λέγοµεν ἢ κακόν’ is incorrectly rendered by Ross as ‘we say that it is good or 
beautiful’, translating ‘κακόν’ as ‘beautiful’ while it should be ‘bad’. The translation should be 
as follows: ‘we say that it is good or bad’.  
24 See note 20. 
25 Met. Z, 1, 1028a13-25. 
26 Met. Γ, 2, 1003b5-10.  
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substance is ‘self subsistent’ (καθ' αὑτὸ) and ‘separate’; namely that substance is 
capable of existing without the aid of secondary categories, not vice versa. In 
the passage from Book Λ, Aristotle argues that we say even of non-Being that it 
is non-Being, which is exactly in line with what he argues in the above passage 
from Book Γ. When one imagines how substance would in fact be prior to the 
other categories, one must apply to Book Γ, where Aristotle articulates 
ontological dependence relations in CDH. Now, it would not take much 
imagination to see that this dependency is also reflected in the passages I have 
cited from Book Z and Book Λ. In those passages, then, the primacy of 
substance over the other so-called secondary categories is established primarily 
and sufficiently on ontological dependence relations between substance and the 
other categories. 
 
The strong parallelism of thought in these passages shows that Book Λ is not to 
be separated from the basic doctrine of the science of Being encountered in the 
treatises of Metaphysics. Book Λ clearly recognizes the first level in the 
ontological dependence relations in the system of Being as it states most 
explicitly that the categories other than substance depend for their existence on 
the first category of substance. After all, what might be the reason for Aristotle’s 
discussion of inter-categorical relations in Book Λ except that he makes a 
reference to CDH? Given that such a relation exists in Book Λ, one might find 
oneself strongly motivated to find the other constituents of the CDH of Being in 
Book Λ. After all, besides CDH, it makes no sense for Aristotle to discuss the 
ontological dependency of secondary categories of substance. This, I think, is 
naturally understood from the close textual parallelisms I have shown between 
the passages from Book Z, Book Γ and Book Λ, all of which discuss exactly the 
same point, namely the ontological priority of substance over the other 
categories.  
 
5.4.2. Ontological Dependence: Intra-categorical Relations in Book Λ 
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We have seen that inter-categorical ontological dependence relations are 
recognized by Book Λ. But what can be said with respect to the intra-categorical 
level ontological dependencies? Can we say that such relations are also 
recognized by Book Λ? I think the answer is in the positive. If one is to consider 
the passages where Aristotle reflects on the necessity of God in the Universe, 
for instance, one may find some clues with respect to such relations.27 In the 
sixth chapter of Book Λ, for instance, Aristotle states: 
 
[A] Since there were three kinds of substance [Ἐπεὶ δ' ἦσαν τρεῖς οὐσίαι], two 
of them natural [αἱ φυσικαὶ] and one unmovable [ἡ ἀκίνητος], regarding the 
latter we must assert that it is necessary that there should be an eternal 
unmovable substance [ἀΐδιόν τινα οὐσίαν ἀκίνητον]. [B] For substances are 
the first of existing things [αἵ τε γὰρ οὐσίαι πρῶται τῶν ὄντων], and if they are 
all destructible [εἰ πᾶσαι φθαρταί], all things are destructible [πάντα φθαρτά]. 
[C] But it is impossible that movement [κίνησιν] should either come into being 
[γενέσθαι] or cease to be [φθαρῆναι]; for it must always have existed [ἀεὶ γὰρ 
ἦν]. Nor can time [χρόνον] come into being or cease to be; for there could not 
be a before [τὸ πρότερον] and an after [ὕστερον] if time did not exist [µὴ 
ὄντος χρόνοὐ]. Movement [ἡ κίνησις] also is continuous [συνεχὴς], then, in 
the sense in which time is; for time is either the same thing [τὸ αὐτὸ] as 
movement or an attribute of [τι πάθος] movement.28 
The reasoning here is tightly packed and has to be considered in context. In [A] 
Aristotle refers to the distinction, made in the first chapter of Book Λ, between 
three types of substances; namely, the non-eternal sensible substances (NSS), 
the eternal sensible substances (ESS) and the Immobile Substance (IS).29 He 
states his aim is to show the necessity of IS. The backdrop against which 
Aristotle felt it necessary to give an account of such a type of substance is 
already established in Book Γ when his account necessitated an absolutely prior 
substance as the core item in the CDH of Being. In relation to that, I have 
mentioned that IS should be regarded as the most suitable candidate for this 
role. However, it should be noted that if this captures the direction of his 
thought in Book Γ Aristotle leaves it to his readers to supply the details. In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 I will deal with the characteristics of God in close detail later in the present chapter. My sole 
aim in this part is to see whether intra-categorical dependency relations exist in Book Λ, 
whereby we have good reasons to think that CDH is recognized by Book Λ. 
28 Met. Λ, 6, 1071b3-11. 
29 Met. Λ, 1, 1069a30. Elders, however, suggests that this may not necessarily refer to the first 
chapter of Book Λ (1972, p. 138) on the grounds that the imperfect ἦσαν may not necessarily 
mark a previous discussion in the text but may signify a generally acknowledged law of Being 
(cf. Theaetetus, 156a; De Cael. 278b34 for usages of the imperfect tense). This does not, however, 
have an immediate adverse impact on what I am arguing here. 
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general, in any case, it does seem to fall to Aristotle’s readers to reflect upon the 
most defensible mooring of his doctrine of the science of Being: he himself 
offered none. However that may be, in [A] Aristotle seems to reflect his 
intention to cover this gap by opening up a discussion of the necessity of IS. 
 
In [B], Aristotle, in full confidence that he has sufficiently shown the primacy of 
substance over the other categories, moves swiftly to intra-categorical relations. 
He carries the investigation to the range of the whole Universe while he 
attempts to establish a hierarchy between several types of substances 
previously mentioned in the first chapter of Book Λ. [B] captures ontological 
dependence in intra-categorical relations in the fullest sense: destructible things 
are dependent upon things that are eternal; if the latter did not exist, all things 
would be destructible, in which case the Universe might come to an end.30  
 
The justification for [B] is given in [C], where Aristotle turns to movement and 
time.31 [1] Time is eternal, for before and after cannot be conceived without 
appealing to time. This amounts to saying that there is no before or after 
external to time. Time has never been started and will never end. If it were, it 
would be possible to conceive a time before time and a time after time.32 
 
[2] In Physics, Aristotle has defined time as the number of movements according 
to before and after.33 Like time, therefore, movement is also eternal since time 
that is already said to be eternal [1] is either identical with movement or it is a 
certain mode of time.  
 
Now, time and movement have their foundations in substance, for movement is 
in the one that moves. Hence, since movement and time are eternal, it must be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Note that this claim is not limited to IS, rather it aims to put forward the necessity of eternal 
things, whether ESS or IS. 
31 The argument here, in Book Λ, seems to be the shortened version of Phys. VIII, 1. 
32 See also, Phys. VIII, 1, 251b19-26. 
33 ‘For time is just this-number of motion in respect of “before” and “after” [ἀριθµὸς κινήσεως 
κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον]’ (Phys. IV, 11, 219b1-2). The sense in which movement is used 
here, is very close to ‘change’ (µεταβολή). Note, however, that Aristotle justifies the existence of 
eternal movement in a different way in Phys. VIII, 1, 250b23-251b13.  
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affirmed that there should also be an eternal substance that provides the basic 
foundation for this eternal motion and time.34  
 
This argument, by means of which Aristotle shows the necessity of an eternal 
mover, sufficiently shows his interest in establishing intra-categorical 
dependency relations in Book Λ, which, in turn, illustrates that the intra-
categorical relations in ontological dependence may be recognized by Book Λ. 
Recall that these relations are one of the constituent features that provide the 
basis for building up CDH.35 It would not be perverse to think, therefore, that 
Aristotle has at least some idea, here in Book Λ, of the structure provided by 
CDH in Book Γ.  
 
Although Aristotle’s enterprise in Book Λ in this way shows his interest in 
establishing intra-categorical ontological dependence, this enterprise, as far as 
reflected up to now, does not show that Aristotle seeks to establish an order in 
the Universe by the relations found between substances. I suggest that if we can 
find an effort towards establishing an order by virtue of such relations, 
however, this will strongly motivate us to take a further step in our endeavour 
to find CDH in Book Λ. 
 
Such an attempt can indeed be observed explicitly in the tenth chapter of Book 
Λ, where Aristotle states:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Note this argument does not show the necessity of a single unmoved mover. In other words, it 
only shows that there must be at least one unmoved mover. One might as well claim that this 
argument does not show the necessity of God as it presupposes that ‘timelessness’ is 
impossible. 
35 The fact that Aristotle establishes hierarchical structures in Book Λ does not show that 
ordinary kata hen structures are what we have in hand in this part of Metaphysics. I have noted 
in chapter II that it is also possible to build up hierarchies by means of ontological dependency 
relations between items (see, ch. II, section 2.2.3). Furthermore, if we were to accept that the 
relation between God and the other substances fits the scheme provided by kata hen relations, 
we would be able to postulate a genus to which several species are connected. The conception, 
however, does not allow for such a postulation for neither can God be postulated as a genus nor 
can the other substances be regarded as species of God. It would, therefore, be perverse to think 
that what Aristotle says in Book Λ and the hierarchies he establishes tacitly allow for a 
construction that favours ordinary kata hen relations. What we have are, on the contrary, 
hierarchies established upon ontologically dependent entities. As I have claimed, this schema is 
consistent with pros hen relations.   
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And all things are ordered [συντέτακταί] together somehow, but not all alike, 
– both fishes and fowls and plants; and the world is not such that one thing 
has nothing to do with another [οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει ὥστε µὴ εἶναι θατέρῳ πρὸς 
θάτερον µηδέν], but they are connected [ἀλλ' ἔστι τι]. For all are ordered 
together to one end [πρὸς µὲν γὰρ ἓν ἅπαντα συντέτακται].36 
It may be very interesting for the readers of Aristotle, especially to those who 
are so reluctant to find a connection between Book Λ and Book Γ, to see that 
Aristotle uses the term pros hen in this passage. This, however, itself is not 
sufficient, at least without reflection, to show that pros hen, i.e., CDH, is 
explicitly recognized by Aristotle in Book Λ. After all, one might reasonably 
claim that the use of pros hen in this passage does not necessarily refer to the 
technical usage of the term encountered in Book Γ. Based on such an objection, 
one might prefer to affirm that the usage we encounter here in Book Λ is the 
result of a mere accident and this usage by no means shows that Book Λ 
recognizes CDH of Book Γ.  
 
The passage involves a strong sense of unity and ordering in the Universe, 
which depends on some connection to one thing, as far as this thing is the 
common end of all things in the Universe. Things in the Universe, in other 
words, connected towards one, i.e. towards the end. Hence, in terms of what this 
passage suggests, the ordering of the Universe depends on its having a 
common final cause. The ‘towards one’ relation in this passage, therefore, is 
eminently teleological. 
 
We, however, already know that pros hen is used in other places of the 
Aristotelian corpus, for instance, in Book Γ, which is not so obviously 
teleological. But, in all of its usages, the pros hen is employed by Aristotle for 
exactly the same reason, that is, to establish a kind of unity through the 
ordering of several instances. Such stress on the order of the Universe by virtue 
of its having a determined end can be observed in other places of Book Λ as 
well. For instance, in the first chapter of Book Λ Aristotle states: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Met. Λ, 10, 1075a16-19. 
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For if the universe is of the nature of a whole [εἰ ὡς ὅλον τι τὸ πᾶν], substance 
is its first part [ἡ οὐσία πρῶτον µέρος]; and if it coheres by virtue of 
succession [τῷ ἐφεξῆς], on this view also substance is first, and is succeeded 
by quality [τὸ ποιόν], and then by quantity [τὸ ποσόν].37 
Note that instead of ‘κόσµος’, Aristotle uses the term ‘τὸ πᾶν’ to designate the 
Universe in this passage. The reason for this might be to emphasize the high 
degree of unity, order and completeness that the Universe enjoys.38 If the 
Universe is a ’whole’ (ὅλον), then, as he argues in Physics, what Aristotle has in 
mind here is the completeness of the Universe through its end: 
 
Whole [ὅλον] and complete [τέλειον] are either quite identical or closely akin. 
Nothing is complete [τέλειον] which has no end [τέλος] and the end [τέλος] 
is limit [πέρας].39 
The question, therefore, underlying Aristotle’s use of pros hen is always the 
question that asks whether it is possible to arrive at unification through some 
order, such as causal connectedness, ontological dependence and logical 
dependence. Aristotle’s answer is that these things that are to be unified are not 
all the same, in which case we would have a kata hen relation, but they are all 
‘towards one’, that is, they depend on one single thing, whereby they can 
indeed be unified despite their multiplicity. Hence, whether we understand pros 
hen as merely teleological or some other way, it is clear that the term always 
serves for a certain unity despite multiplicity.  
 
Qua its aim, therefore, the term pros hen that we encounter in the passage of 
Book Λ is very similar to that we encounter in Book Γ although the two usages 
have different degrees of clarity. In Book Γ, we have seen that the causal 
connectedness – and, for that matter, the teleological connectedness – 
constitutes merely one aspect of the pros hen relation. Whereas in Book Λ we 
find the term serving for an order by means of merely teleological causal 
relation, in Book Γ, along with the teleological causal connectedness, we have 
seen that the usage is loaded with further connections better articulated than 
those we find in Book Λ. In other words, the two usages are perfectly in line 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Met. Λ, 1, 1069a19-21. 
38 Cf. Timaeaus, 30b-c; 37d 
39 Phys. III, 6, 207a13-15; cf. Philebus, 30b. 
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with each other in their construction, although the appearance of pros hen in 
Book Γ clearly is a more developed version of this relation compared with Book 
Λ. But this does not necessarily rule out the suggestion that Book Λ involves a 
version of pros hen. There may be several reasons for this unarticulated outlook 
of pros hen in Book Λ, such as the book being written in an early stage of 
Aristotle’s philosophical development. However that may be, the usages have 
exactly the same aim, namely to establish a certain unity through ordering. In 
this way, despite the fact that this usage is not as articulated as we encounter in 
Book Γ, we can to some degree claim that the usage of the term in Book Λ is also 
technical and not merely accidental. 
 
5.5. God and the Science of Being 
 
I have argued that Book Λ is to be considered as filling an important gap in the 
doctrine of the science of Being. It does this by picturing the characteristics of 
God, without which, as I have claimed, the CDH of Being cannot operate so as 
to pave the way for a unified universal science of Being. In order to support my 
view, I will now turn to investigate the characteristics that are attributed to God 
in Book Λ. Throughout this section what I will attempt to show is that God is 
given the very characteristics He would need to be given if He were to be the 
core of CDH of Being. In other words, Aristotle’s enterprise in Book Λ with 
respect to the characteristics of God is exactly the enterprise he needs if he is to 
have an operating CDH of Being. This will not only show that Book Γ and Book 
Λ belong to the same philosophical enterprise, but also that the discussion in 
Book Λ with respect to the attributes of God proceeds against the backdrop 
established in Book Γ, without which his enterprise in Book Λ would be 
unmotivated and otiose.  
 
5.5.1. Ontological Dependence and the Conception of God in Book Λ 
 
If one is to investigate the discussion of the characteristics of God in Book Λ 
against the doctrine that we encounter in Book Γ, namely the CDH of Being, 
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one notices that Aristotle’s way of characterizing God provides exactly what is 
necessary in order to fulfil the requirements of ontological dependence in CDH. 
It is possible to observe the traces of this if one is appeal to Aristotle’s 
conception of the Universe as outlined in Book Λ. This conception is established 
upon an insight that things in the Universe have a certain taxonomical 
structure, that is, they are ‘ordered’ (τάξις)40 and that this order can be observed 
at every level of the structure of the Universe. A certain order is envisaged in 
the structure of organisms41 and in all the natural phenomena encountered in 
the world, for example, in the succession of the seasons,42 in drying and 
moistening of some parts of earth,43 in precipitation and the formation of 
clouds44 and so on. This leads Aristotle even to identify what is ‘natural’ with 
what is ‘ordered’.45 This taxonomical structure can best be reflected in the 
Universe, which is strictly ordered in its entirety.46  
 
Aristotle outlines how he envisages the order in the Universe in this passage 
from Book Λ:  
 
We must consider also in which of two ways the nature of the universe [ἡ τοῦ 
ὅλου φύσις] contains the good [τὸ ἀγαθὸν] or the highest good [τὸ ἄριστον], 
whether as something separate [κεχωρισµένον τι] and by itself [καθ' αὑτό], or 
as the order of the parts [τὴν τάξιν]. Probably in both ways, as an army 
[στράτευµα] does. For the good is found both in the order [ἐν τῇ τάξει] and in 
the leader [ὁ στρατηγός], and more in the latter; for he does not depend on 
the order [τὴν τάξιν] but it depends on him. And all things are ordered 
together somehow [πάντα δὲ συντέτακταί πως], but not all alike [ἀλλ' οὐχ 
ὁµοίως],  – both fishes and fowls and plants; and the world is not such that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 In general terms, the word τάξις might be used in two contexts in Aristotle. It can be used in a 
political context in correlation with constitution and law (see, for instance, Pol. III, 6, 1278b9; II, 
5, 1263a23; 6, 1264b31; 8, 1268a15; 9, 1269a32; 10, 1272a4; IV, 1, 1289a15; 3, 1290a8; V, 7, 1307b18) 
or else it can refer to the natural order and structure of the Universe and earthly phenomena as 
will be shown below. 
41 Cf. GA IV, 8, 776b5. 
42 Meteor. I, 9, 347a5. 
43 Meteor. I, 14, 351a25. 
44 Meteor. II, 3, 358a25. 
45 ‘And since what is according to nature [κατὰ φύσιν] is always in due order [ἔχει τάξιν]…’ GA 
III, 10, 760a31; ‘But that which holds by nature and is natural can never be anything disorderly; 
for nature is everywhere the cause of order [ἡ γὰρ φύσις αἰτία πᾶσιν τάξεως]’ (Phys. VIII, 1, 
252a11-12). Cf. Cael. III, 2, 301a5. 
46 Cf. Cael. III, 2, 300b20 ff. This order is eternal: ‘But the order of the universe is eternal [ἡ δέ γε 
τοῦ κόσµου τάξις ἀΐδιος]’ (Cael. II, 14, 296a33-34). 
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one thing has nothing to do with another, but they are connected. For all are 
ordered together to one end [πρὸς µὲν γὰρ ἓν ἅπαντα συντέτακται].47 
Although Aristotle’s intention in this passage is to investigate whether the good 
or the highest good is to be regarded as implicit in the parts of the Universe or 
should be postulated as a separate principle, one might yet proceed along these 
lines so as to gain some definite clues about how the structure of the Universe 
that stands at the back of Aristotle’s mind might look. Aristotle envisages the 
Universe as extremely taxonomical, similar to that of an army that is ordered 
according to everything which it is directed towards; namely, the ultimate 
terminus – the God –, analogous to a commander (ὁ στρατηγός) in an army, 
who is still ultimately responsible for its order.48 Plants, animals and other 
substances have different rankings and are all connected to each other in a 
successive order (ἐφεξῆς),49 according to the composition of their material and 
formal nature. In this structure, whereas the higher substances are the 
principles of lower substances, these latter, in turn, stand as the substrata of 
higher substances. Every substantial form, in this structure, finds its condition 
of realization in a material/potential nature50 just as a man finds his possibility 
to exist in a mature body. As one climbs through the successive levels of the 
Universe, by virtue of gradual exclusion of matter and contingency, one reaches 
the terminus of all things; this level marks off the point according to which 
everything is organized.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Met. Λ, 9, 1075a11-19. 
48 A similar claim, which places God as the ultimate reason for the order of the Universe, can be 
found in Plato in Timaeus 30a. 
49 Aristotle explains the term ‘ἐφεξῆς’ in the fifth book of Physics thus: ‘A thing is in succession 
[ἐφεξῆς] when it is after the beginning in position or in form or in some other respect in which 
it is definitely so regarded, and when further there is nothing of the same kind as itself between 
it [µηδὲν µεταξύ ἐστι τῶν ἐν ταὐτῷ γένει] and that to which it is in succession, e.g. a line or 
lines if it is a line, a unit or units if it is a unit, a house if it is a house (there is nothing to prevent 
something of a different kind being between). For that which is in succession is in succession to a 
particular thing, and is something posterior [τὸ γὰρ ἐφεξῆς τινὶ ἐφεξῆς καὶ ὕστερόν τι]…’ Phys. 
V, 3, 226b34-227a4 (see Met. K, 12, 1068b31 for a similar exposition of ἐφεξῆς). Correspondingly, 
the conception of the Universe that Aristotle has in mind in Book Λ (see Met. Λ, 1, 1069a19-21) is 
established upon priority relations, in which some substances stand ‘in succession’ to each 
other. God, who is ultimately prior to all the other substances, marks off the summit of the 
chains of succession in the Universe. (Succession does not necessitate continuity (συνεχής), 
Phys. VIII, 6, 259a15ff.); the continuous regular motion of the first heaven cannot thereby be 
justified by merely successive structure of the Universe. For the latter point, see Phys. V, 4, 
288a20ff. Cf. GC II, 10, 337a16ff.)  
50 Cf. GA II, 5, 740b28ff.; 741b14; Met. Λ, 1, 1069b16. 
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God, who has no need for a material substratum for His existence, defines the 
summit of the hierarchy that is constructed between two poles of existence; 
namely, matter and pure form. This strictly taxonomical structure might 
reasonably prompt one to attribute several characteristics to the ultimate end of 
the hierarchy of substances; namely, God. Since God stands at the top of the 
hierarchies of substances, and guarantees and maintains the eternal order of the 
Universe, it is reasonable to say that God has no contingency, thereby no matter 
and is simple in His nature. This amounts to saying that God may reasonably 
be thought to be necessary (ἀνάγκη), simple (ἡ ἁπλῆ) and purely actual 
(ἐνέργεια). What Aristotle explicitly attributes to God in the seventh chapter of 
Book Λ is in line with this backdrop: ‘Substance is first, and in substance, that 
which is simple and exists actually’.51 These attributes can be seen as the natural 
outcome of a strictly organized Universe in which substances are ranked 
according to the composition of their natures in a hierarchical way, analogous 
to an army. 
 
Now, one might reasonably be tempted to ask what is the connection between 
God’s attributes in Aristotle’s taxonomical conception of the Universe. One 
might wonder also how these attributes together could show the ontological 
priority of God. 
 
Aristotle presents some arguments in Book Λ that God’s nature is pure 
actuality.52 He appeals to eternal motion to justify his position on the nature of 
God, according to which God cannot merely be something capable of causing the 
motion, but must actively do so.53 If, according to Aristotle’s point of view, this 
were not the case – that is, if God were not to be pure actuality – then that 
would conflict with Aristotle’s dictum that there must be an eternal motion in 
the Universe.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 ‘καὶ ταύτης ἡ οὐσία πρώτη, καὶ ταύτης ἡ ἁπλῆ καὶ κατ' ἐνέργειαν’ Met. Λ, 7, 1072a31-32. See, 
also, 1072b10, where Aristotle says: ‘The first mover, then, of necessity [ἐξ ἀνάγκης] exists’. 
52 Met. Λ, 7, 1071b12-21; 1073a4-13. 
53 Met. Λ, 7, 1071b17. 
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Furthermore, to originate an eternal motion requires infinite power.54 God, 
however, who is responsible for the eternal motion in the Universe, has no 
magnitude;55 for infinite power cannot dwell in a finite magnitude.56 For this 
reason, also, God is pure actuality.57 
 
Now while discussing the priority of imperishable things over perishable things 
in Book ϑ, Aristotle himself states that what is of necessity, namely the second 
of the attributes of God that I have enumerated hitherto, must always be actual 
as he gives the answer to our initial question that asked whether there is any 
connection between the attributes of God and His being ontologically 
independent: ‘Nor can anything which is of necessity [ἐξ ἀνάγκης] be potential; 
yet these things are primary [καίτοι ταῦτα πρῶτα]; for if these did not exist, 
nothing would exist [εἰ γὰρ ταῦτα µὴ ἦν, οὐθὲν ἂν ἦν]’.58 Hence, the attributes 
of God being pure actuality and necessary are closely linked to each other and 
together they imply that He should be regarded as ontologically prior. Hence, if 
anything is to exist, it is necessary that we should postulate something actual 
beforehand59 and the existence of the Universe is guaranteed by what is always 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Met. Λ, 7, 1073a7-8. 
55 Met. Λ, 7, 1073a10. 
56 Met. Λ, 7, 1073a10-11. This claim reasonably assumes that there cannot be infinite magnitude: 
See, Met. Λ, 7, 1073a5-11. 
57 The activity of God should not be confused with the activity of mobility. Although Aristotle, 
in several places, identifies activity with motion (see, De An. II, 5, 417a16; Met. ϑ, 3, 1047a30-32; 
Rhet. III, 11, 1412a9; cf. EN IX, 7, 1168a6), an activity that is still correlated to motion is imperfect 
(Phys. III, 2, 201b31; De An. III, 7, 431a6; Met. K, 9, 1066a20). On the other hand, the activity of 
God is an activity of immobility (ἐνέργεια ἀκινησίας, EN VIII, 14, 1154b26), which is perfect and 
marked by contemplation (EN X, 8, 1178b23) and happiness (EN VIII, 14, 1154b27: for passages 
where Aristotle links activity (ἐνέργεια) with happiness (εὐδαιµονία), see, EN IX, 9, 1169b29; X, 
6, 1177a5; MM II, 10, 1208a36; Pol. VII, 8, 1328a39; 13, 1332a9). Therefore, actuality can rightly be 
regarded as the most desirable end, i.e. τέλος (Met. ϑ, 8, 1050a9; 1050a22; Λ, 7, 1072b16; EN VII, 
12, 1153a10; X, 4, 1174b23-1175a17; cf. MM II, 12, 1211b27). 
58 Met. ϑ, 8, 1050b18-19. This is echoed in De Interpretatione as well where Aristotle links 
necessity with actuality: ‘It is evident from what has been said that what is of necessity [τὸ ἐξ 
ἀνάγκης ὂν] is in actuality [κατ' ἐνέργειάν ἐστιν]; so that, if the things which are eternal [τὰ 
ἀίδια] are prior [πρότερα], then also actuality is prior to capability [ἐνέργεια δυνάµεως 
προτέρα]’ (13, 23a21-23: for the priority of actuality over potentiality see Met. ϑ, 7-8 and my 
discussion in ch. 4). Cf. Met. ϑ, 8, 1050b17ff. Aristotle attempts to show that imperishable things 
exist actually; he concludes by stating that: ‘for if these did not exist, nothing would exist [εἰ 
γὰρ ταῦτα µὴ ἦν, οὐθὲν ἂν ἦν]’ (1050b9). 
59 Along with the passages cited in the previous note see, also, De Caelo where Aristotle states: 
‘That which is potentially [ἐκ δυνάµει] a certain kind of body [τινὸς ὄντος σώµατος] may, it is 
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in actuality; namely, the God. The fact that God is pure actuality shows that He 
does not have contingent parts, which in turn makes Him entirely necessary 
and makes Him ontologically prior to everything else that involve potentiality 
in their natures.60 This conception meets exactly the requirements of ontological 
dependence in the CDH of Being. Being pure actuality, God can ultimately be 
regarded as prior to every other substance in the Universe. This strongly 
motivates us to affirm that the study of God can be applied to other levels of 
Being through the CDH of Being by virtue of the dependency relations 
explained hitherto in Book Γ.  
 
The characteristics of God, His being pure actuality and necessity, are closely 
linked to another of God’s characteristics that I have previously mentioned. In 
Book Λ Aristotle claims that God is simple (ἁπλοῦς).61 The primary sense of 
necessary, according to Aristotle’s declarations in Book Δ, overlaps with what is 
simple:  
  
Now some things owe their necessity [ἀναγκαῖα] to something other than 
themselves [ἕτερον]; others do not, while they are the source of necessity in 
other things. Therefore the necessary [ἀναγκαῖον] in the primary [τὸ πρῶτον] 
and strict sense [κυρίως] is the simple [τὸ ἁπλοῦν]; for this does not admit of 
[ἐνδέχεται] more states than one, so that it does not admit even of one state 
and another; for it would thereby admit of more than one. If, then, there are 
certain eternal [ἀΐδια] and unmovable things [ἀκίνητα], nothing compulsory 
[βίαιον] or against their nature [παρὰ φύσιν] attaches them.62 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
true, become such in actuality [ἐνεργείᾳ γένοιτ' ἂν σῶµα]. But if the potential body was not 
already in actuality some other kind of body, the existence of separate void [κενὸν ἔσται 
κεχωριςµένον] must be admitted’ (III, 2, 302a5), which, according to Aristotle, is impossible. For 
a similar line of thought, see GA II, 6, 743a23. 
60 Cf. Met. Λ, 6, 1071b23ff. See also, On the Universe: ‘I think also that God and nothing else is 
meant when we speak of necessity…’ (7, 401b8-9). What is of necessity, according to Aristotle, 
should be eternal (ἀΐδιος) (see GC II, 11, 338a1-2; cf. Met. Δ, 5, 1015b14). 
61 ‘Substance is first, and in substance, that which is simple and exists actually [καὶ ταύτης ἡ 
οὐσία πρώτη, καὶ ταύτης ἡ ἁπλῆ καὶ κατ' ἐνέργειαν]’ (Met. Λ, 7, 1072a31-32). Plato expresses a 
similar line of thought in the Republic: ‘A god [ὁ θεὸς], then, is simple [ἁπλοῦν] and true 
[ἀληθὲς] in word and deed [ἔν τε ἔργῳ καὶ λόγῳ]’ (II, 382e8-9; cf. II, 380d).  
62 Met. Δ, 5, 1015b9-15. This is confirmed by Aristotle’s statement in Λ 7: ‘For the necessary has 
all these senses that which is necessary perforce [βίᾳ] because it is contrary to impulse [παρὰ 
τὴν ὁρµήν], that without which the good is impossible, and that which cannot be otherwise but 
is absolutely [ἁπλῶς] necessary’ (Met. Λ, 7, 1072b11-13). 
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Elsewhere Aristotle claims that being simpliciter applies only to substance.63 
Substance, according to Aristotle, can be matter, the composition of matter and 
form or pure form. Not all of these types of substance can be simple. In several 
places of the corpus, Aristotle speaks of the nature of substances as being 
marked by pure matter; namely, fire, air, water and earth, as simple elements.64 
Not only these substances are simple, however. God, whose nature is pure 
actuality and therefore pure form,65 is also simple. The latter, however, should 
be understood as genuinely simple because Aristotle claims that what is simple 
in the strict sense is prior to what is complex,66 for which reason God should be 
regarded as prior to the aforementioned material elements. God can 
unequivocally be observed to be the ultimate principle of the Universe.67 Hence, 
that which is simple in the strict sense can rightly be regarded as that which is 
necessary in the strict sense68 and this attaches to God more than any other 
substance in the Universe. God cannot be other than what He is, that is, He 
cannot undergo any change for He has no potentiality, for which reason, again, 
He is who He is69 and strictly simple and necessary. 
 
It can be concluded that God’s being pure actuality and His being necessary are 
closely interconnected and together they show that God is simple. The fact that 
God is simple, that He has no material and potential nature, also shows that 
Aristotle is correct when he claims that God is separate (χωριστός). Since God is 
not in need of any material substratum for His existence, we need not be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Met. Z, 1, 1028a30-31. 
64 Phys. II, 1, 192b10; Cael. I, 2, 268b28; III, 1, 298a29; 8, 306b3; De An. III, 1, 424b30; Met. A, 8, 
988b30; Δ, 8, 1017b10; H, 1, 1042a8; K, 10, 1067a1;  cf. Phys. III, 5, 204b33; GC I, 1, 314a28. 
65 ‘Further, matter [ἡ ὕλη] exists in a potential [δυνάµει] state, just because it may attain to its 
form; and when it exists actually [ἐνεργείᾳ], then it is in its form [ἐν τῷ εἴδει]’ (Met. ϑ, 8, 
1050a15-16). See  also Met. H, 1, 1042b9; Λ, 5, 1071a8. 
66 Cael. II, 4, 286b17. 
67 ‘The first mover, then, of necessity exists; and in so far as it is necessary, it is good [καλῶς], 
and in this sense a first principle [ἀρχή]’ (Met. Λ, 7, 1072b10-11). See Met. K, 1, 1059b35, where 
Aristotle states ‘…the simpler is more of a principle than the less simple…’. Because God is 
simply good, He is ultimately desirable: EN, VIII, 2, 1155b24; 5, 1157b27. 
68 Along with the passage I have cited, Aristotle links that which is necessary to simple in 
several places of his corpus. See, for example, An. Pr. I, 24, 41b30; An. Post. I, 2, 71b9; Phys. II, 5, 
197a31; Met. Δ, 9, 1018a2; E, 2, 1027a5 (cf. Met. K, 5, 1062a2).  
69 ‘But since there is something which moves while itself unmoved [κινοῦν αὐτὸ ἀκίνητον ὄν], 
existing actually [ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν], this can in no way be otherwise than as it is [τοῦτο οὐκ 
ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν οὐδαµῶς]’ Met. Λ, 7, 1072b7-8. 
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surprised by Aristotle’s explicit statement in the seventh chapter of Book Λ, 
where he firmly claims that God is separate: ‘It is clear then from what has been 
said that there is substance which is eternal [ἀΐδιος] and unmovable [ἀκίνητος] 
and separate [κεχωρισµένη] from sensible things [τῶν αἰσθητῶν].’70 The fact 
that God is separate shows not only that the conception of God is reconcilable 
with what Aristotle says in Book E but also that God is to be regarded as 
ontologically independent, and that is exactly what Aristotle needs in order to 
place God at the core of the CDH of Being, whereby a unified universal science 
of Being can be achieved. I have discussed the former point in close detail in 
Book E,71 where I have claimed that that which is absolutely separate should be 
regarded as ontologically independent in the absolute sense and that this 
should be marked by the highest instance of Being only. Hence, as one might 
plainly observe, the conception of God in Book Λ squares well with this 
conception that stands out in Book E and, together with this harmony, one 
might plainly observe that the characteristics of God detailed in Book Λ are 
exactly the properties Aristotle needs to have attributed to God, thereby one 
can place God at the core of the CDH of Being. For the requirements of 
ontological dependence, as I observed in Book Γ, must be fulfilled if one is to 
establish the CDH of Being upon which the science of Being is established.72 
 
The upshot of this discussion is that the basic three interconnected 
characteristics of God detailed in Book Λ are exactly the characteristics that 
Aristotle needed if He were to place God at the core of the CDH of Being. If 
what I have suggested in Book Γ in terms of the CDH of Being is right, then the 
characteristics of God that we encounter in Book Λ are just pictured in the way 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Met. Λ, 7, 1073a3-5. 
71 See my discussion on χωριστός in ch. III, 3.3.1. 
72 It has been declared in Book Λ that God is not only χωριστός but also ἀκίνητος (immovable, 
see Met. Λ, 7, 1072a21-26; a more elaborated version of Aristotle’s justification of the immobility 
of God can be found in Physics VIII; see, also GC I, 7, 324a33-34; GA IV, 3, 768b19-21, where the 
first principle is said to be immovable. Unlike Aristotle, Plato thought that the first principle can 
be nothing except ‘the change effected by self-generated motion [ἡ τῆς αὐτῆς αὑτὴν κινησάσης 
µεταβολή]’ (Laws, X, 895a2-3)). The characteristic of immovability, as I have argued in chapter 
III, is another requirement implied by Aristotle’s discussion of the subject matter of the science 
of Being in Book E (see my discussion in ch. III, 3.3.2.). On these grounds, then, one might 
hesitate to attend to the idea that Book Λ was written before Book E (as, for instance, suggested 
by Frede (2000, p. 50)).  
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that God can fulfil the requirement of ontological dependence. We should, 
however, expect to observe similar results with respect to other requirements of 
the CDH of Being as well, namely, logical dependence and causal 
connectedness, if we are to bring the claim fully to a close. I will now turn my 
attention to these latter requirements and investigate whether the conception of 
God in Book Λ is consistent with these requirements.  
 
5.5.2. Logical Dependence and Priority in Knowledge 
 
It is also possible to affirm that the description of God we encounter in Book Λ 
gives exactly the properties Aristotle needs God to have in order that God 
fulfils the requirements of logical dependence and priority in knowledge, 
whereby He can be placed at the core of the CDH of Being.  
 
When I discussed the central books in chapter IV of this thesis, I implied that 
the problems with respect to the essences of things emerge from Aristotle’s 
hylomorphic analysis of sensible substances.73 In other words, the intelligibility 
of a sensible substance is undermined by the constituent matter implanted in its 
nature. Matter has nothing in itself to provide the determination and 
intelligibility of the sensible thing in question.74 Matter in sensible things is 
absolutely undetermined (ἀόριστα) and unknowable (ἄγνωστος).75 Since all 
sensible things contain matter in their nature,76 when one attempts to define 
them this would inevitably involve matter in the expression of the definition of 
the thing in question.77 However, the problems with respect to the intelligibility 
of a thing are averted from the perspective of form, which, as we have been told 
in the central books, is perfectly determinate and intelligible. The definition, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 See ch. IV, section 5.1. for details of this claim. 
74 Phys. III, 6, 207a25; Met. Z, 10, 1036a8-9. 
75 ‘But matter is unknowable [ἄγνωστος] in itself [καθ' αὑτήν]’ (Met. Z, 10, 1036a8-9). Matter in 
this respect resembles accidentals; neither are definite, i.e. determined: ‘And it is only right that 
the “of” something locution [τὸ ἐκείνινον λέγεσθαι] should be used with reference both to the 
matter and to the accidents [κατὰ τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὰ πάθη]; for both are indeterminates [ἀόριστα]’ 
(Met. ϑ, 7, 1049a36-1049b2).  
76 Met. Z, 8, 1033b17-19; cf. Phys. I, 7, 190b22-23. 
77 Met. Z, 7, 1033a1-5; 8, 1033b24-26. 
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according to this approach, must express the form rather than the matter.78 The 
essence, therefore, should be identified with form, which Aristotle frequently 
does,79 since the definition, if it is to be genuine, should be of form; only in this 
way will it reflect the unchangeable, consistent and eternal nature of the thing 
in question. We have also seen that sensibles, because they involve matter in 
their nature, are not intelligible in the absolute sense.80 The contingent nature of 
matter undermines our construction of proper definitions of sensible 
individuals. All scientific knowledge, on the other hand, depends on necessary 
and universal truths.81 These are alien to the nature of matter, which is regarded 
as contingent.82 
 
Thus, if we could postulate a substance with a nature that consists of pure form, 
the problems raised in the central books with respect to the intelligibility of 
substance would disappear. There would be no matter involved in the nature of 
such a substance that can undermine any attempt to construct a definition, 
which would reasonably reflect all that is and all that can be expressed 
concerning that substance simultaneously since there would be no difference 
between the Being and the essence of such a substance.83 This substance would 
be eternal and unchanging; what this substance would be, therefore, overlaps 
with all that it is per se. Hence, it would be perfectly possible to construct a 
genuine definition of such a substance. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 For the passages where τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, i.e. the essence, refers to form (εἶδος), see Phys. II, 2, 
194a21; Cael. I, 9, 278a3; GC II, 9, 335b35; De An. II, 1, 412a20; Met. Z, 4, 1029b27; 7, 1032b2 ff.; 10, 
1035b16 ff.; H, 3, 1043b1; Λ, 8, 1074a35. This is supported in passages where Aristotle discusses 
four causes as well; in these passages τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι is always correlated with the formal cause: 
Met. A, 3, 983a27; 7, 988a34; Δ, 2, 1013a27; b22; Z, 17, 1041a28; H, 4, 1044b1. 
79 See Met. Z, 7, 1032b1-2; 1032b13-14; 10, 1035b14-16; 1035b32; 11, 1037a28-b4; H, 1044a36. 
80 See last section of ch. IV. 
81 Met. K, 8, 1064b30; NE VI, 3, 1139b23; 6, 1140b32; EE II, 6, 1223a1. The reason for this is that 
scientific knowledge proceeds through demonstrations and demonstrations can only be 
established by what is necessary: see, An. Pr. I, 8; 12-14; 27; An. Post. I, 6, 74b5; 75a13; Rhet. I, 2, 
1357a29; 22, 1396a2-3. 
82 See An. Post. I, 8, where Aristotle claims that there can be no demonstration of perishable 
things because of their contingent nature. 
83 ‘Clearly, then, each primary [τῶν πρώτων] and self-subsistent [καθ' αὑτὰ] thing is one and the 
same as its essence’ (Met. Z, 6, 1032a4). 
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Approaching Book Λ with this in mind would demonstrate that Aristotle’s 
determination of God, as pure actuality, is naturally understood as the 
continuation of the evidence we have in the central books with respect to 
absolute intelligibility.84 Having no unintelligible matter in His nature, God can 
rightly be regarded as the most intelligible thing in the Universe. The problems 
that emerge from the hylomorphic analysis of sensible substances are removed 
when it comes to God, for He has no material nature. Thus, with what I have 
said with respect to essence and Being in the central books, and with respect to 
the nature of God in Book Λ, it is reasonable to affirm that God is fully definable 
and thereby absolutely intelligible. This amounts to saying that God indeed 
merits being regarded as prior in knowledge and for this reason, also, He is 
logically prior in the absolute sense. 
 
From all these we may infer that, according to what Aristotle has claimed 
throughout his Metaphysics, a first and necessary substance must exist that 
secures the certitude of human knowledge. Such a substance is logically 
independent, in the absolute sense, based upon the fact that this substance does 
not undergo any change.85 Nowhere in Metaphysics can we find any evidence 
that God is above human reason; on the contrary, it seems that Aristotle holds 
just the opposite view – that God is the source of all certitude of man’s 
knowledge. He is eminently knowable because He is necessary, pure actuality 
and simple. The problems with respect to sensible substances (whether they be 
NSS or ESS) are not applicable in the case of the Supreme Being, whose simple, 
necessary and eternal nature guarantees the certitude of knowledge of the 
Universe.  
 
These remarks show that the conception of God in Book Λ is described so as to 
pave the way for God to be logically prior in the absolute sense. Hence, when 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 This was already envisaged in the central books: ‘But in the case of so-called self-subsistent 
things [τῶν καθ' αὑτὰ λεγοµένω], is a thing necessarily the same as its essence [ἆρ' ἀνάγκη 
ταὐτὸ εἶναι]?’ (Met. Z, 6, 1031a28-29). 
85 This substance is what makes the principle of non-contradiction evident, without which we 
would be left with only the material world, which in turn, however, would not be sufficient to 
make the principle of non-contradiction evident (see Met. Γ, 5).  
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read against the backdrop of Book Γ, it seems not to be a mere accident that 
Aristotle gives to God the attribute of being the absolute intelligible thing in the 
Universe. On the contrary, the close harmony between the doctrines of the two 
treatises seems to suggest that they are parts of the same enterprise with respect 
to the science of Being. While Book Γ provides the background against which 
the science of Being can simultaneously be a science that is universal and 
unified, Book Λ, in turn, provides the most basic constituent element of the 
structure of Being, namely the core item, God, described in such a way that He 
can fulfil the dependency relations needed for the CDH of Being to operate 
adequately.  
  
This claim, however, further requires that we detect similar results for the final 
feature of the CDH of Being stated in Book Γ, namely, the causal connectedness. 
I will now inquire into this feature and see if this also is in line with what I 
claim in this part of my thesis.  
 
5.5.3. Causal Connectedness 
 
If I am right then, along with the qualities that satisfy ontological dependence 
and logical dependence, God should be given the very characteristics that He 
needs to have to be capable of fulfilling the requirements of causal 
connectedness as well. Recall that, according to causal connectedness, the 
peripheral elements in the CDH of Being are supposed to be connected to the 
core item in at least one of the four standard modes of causation. What can be 
said, then, with respect to Aristotle’s description of God and the requirement of 
causal connectedness? 
 
In Book Λ Aristotle envisages God as a principle (ἀρχή) on whom ‘depend 
[ἤρτηται] the heavens [ὁ οὐρανὸς] and the world of nature [ἡ φύσις]’.86  
Aristotle, accordingly, envisages God as the ultimate telos of the Universe, the 
ultimate aim to which everything strives and for the sake of which everything 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Met. Λ, 7, 1072b14. 
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moves. In this way, God can rightly be regarded as the final principle to which 
everything else in the Universe is connected.87 The teleological conception of 
the Universe,88 according to which everything seeks what is best and 
excellent,89 is consistent with God’s being the ultimate aim, which rules not by 
issuing commands but by His being an end for everything in the Universe.90 
The immanent nature of things,91 striving for what is ‘good’92 and ‘complete’,93 
allow such an end to operate in the Universe in the way it does. God, in this 
way, can rightly be regarded as the ultimate final cause of everything in the 
Universe.94 
 
Furthermore, according to Book Λ, beyond standing as a final cause, God is 
additionally seen as an efficient cause: 
 
Therefore the first heavens [ὁ πρῶτος οὐρανός] must be eternal [ἀΐδιος]. 
There is therefore also something which moves [κινεῖ] them. And since that 
which is moved [τὸ κινούµενον] and moves [κινοῦν] is intermediate [µέσον], 
there is a mover which moves without being moved [ὃ οὐ κινούµενον κινεῖ], 
being eternal [ἀΐδιον], substance [οὐσία], and actuality [ἐνέργεια]. And the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 ‘Further, the final cause [τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα] is an end [τέλος], and that sort of end which is not for 
the sake of something else, but for whose sake everything else is’ (Met. α, 2, 994b9-10); ‘But the 
object aimed at [οὗ ἕνεκα] as end [τέλος] is best [ἄριστον], and the cause [αἴτιον] of all that 
comes under it, and first of all goods [πρῶτον πάντων]’ (EE, II, 8, 1218b9-11). For the passages, 
where telos, the end, is regarded as a principle, see Phys. II, 3, 194b32; 9, 200a22; GA, IV, 3, 
767b14; Met. Δ, 2, 1013a33; Pol. I, 1, 1252b34 (cf. GA II, 6, 742a28). 
88 For the teleological conception of the Universe, see, for instance: Phys. II, 8, 199a8; De An. III, 
9, 432b21; GA I, 1, 715b15-16; V, 1, 778b10; Met. Λ, 10, 1075a15; Pol. I, 2, 1252b34.  
89 The telos, therefore, marks what is best; see, for instance: Top. VI, 8, 146b10; OS 2, 455b24; Met. 
Δ, 2, 1013b26; NE VI, 12, 1144a32; EE II, 8, 1218b10; II, 1, 1219a10; Pol. I, 1, 1252b34. 	  
90 EE VII, 14, 1249b14.  
91 For telos may even be regarded as the ultimate nature of things: ‘But the nature [ἡ δὲ φύσις] is 
the end [τέλος] or that for the sake of which [οὗ ἕνεκα]’ (Phys. II, 2, 194a28-29); ‘the nature of a 
thing is its end [ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστίν]’ (Pol. I, 2, 1252b32). See, also, MM II, 12, 1211b27-33, 
where telos is identified with actuality (ἐνέργεια). 
92 Telos can rightly be regarded as the good (ἀγαθός) (see, NE I, 1, 1094a3; EE II, 8, 1218b10; Rhet. 
I, 7, 1363b16), which can ultimately be identified by God (cf. Met. Λ, 10). 
93 ‘Things which have attained a good end [τέλος] are called complete [τέλεια]; for things are 
complete in virtue of having attained their end’ (Met. Δ, 16, 1021b23-25); ‘Nothing is complete 
[τέλειον] which has no end [τέλος]’ (Phys. III, 6, 207a14). 
94 Certainly, though, from what has been said in this section, it should not be understood that 
God is the proximate cause of every particular instance of Being. Beings have their own 
proximate causes, however, it can still be legitimately and generically affirmed that God is also 
their principle when one speaks in analogical terms. Aristotle elucidates the point in Λ, 5.  
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object of desire [τὸ ὀρεκτὸν] and the object of thought [τὸ νοητόν] move in 
this way; they move without being moved [κινεῖ οὐ κινούµενα].95  
According to Aristotle’s conception in this passage, the Prime Mover, which 
does not itself move, is responsible for the movement of the eternal circular 
motion of the outer sphere of the fixed stars. Since the motions of the inner 
spheres are conditioned to the motion of the outer sphere, the Prime Mover is 
also responsible for the motion of the planets and the Sun, which in turn is 
responsible for the transformation of the seasons causing generation and 
corruption of things on Earth. The movement originated from the Prime Mover 
thereby propagates through the Universe by intermediate spheres. One may 
reasonably think, therefore, that movement originated by the Prime Mover 
thereby ultimately conditions the changes and generation of entities on Earth. 
The Prime Mover, namely God, may well be regarded in this way as the 
ultimate efficient cause in the Universe.96 
 
But how, in reality, does the Prime Mover originate the supposed perfect 
circular motion in the outer sphere and the motion in the Universe? It is 
important to note that the doctrine of the generation of movement in the 
Universe depends on Aristotle’s technical use of the term ‘desire’ (ὄρεξις). We 
may articulate two ways in which Aristotle understands ‘desire’: first, the 
desire can be rational, in which case it is called ‘βούλησις’, second, it can be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Met. Λ, 7, 1072a23-27. See also Phys. VIII; Meteor. I, 2, 339a24; MA 6, 701a1; Met. Λ, 10, where 
Aristotle envisages God as efficient cause. 
96 It has long been a puzzle to scholars whether Aristotle is espousing a single unmoved mover 
or a plurality of deities in Book Λ. In more anachronistic terms, whether he is a polytheist or a 
monotheist (for several views on this subject see, for instance, Guthrie (1934), pp. 90-97; Elders 
(1972), pp. 57-68, Lang (1993), Frede (2000)). In chapters six, seven and nine of Book Λ, Aristotle 
seems to be espousing a single immaterial Being. In the eighth chapter, however, he affirms that 
there are as many movers as there are revolving celestial bodies. This issue does not require 
immediate attention for the purposes of my investigation. In terms of what I have been arguing 
there should be an Unmoved Mover, namely, God, who is envisaged as meeting the 
requirements of the CDH of Being revealed in Book Γ. The text of Book Λ does not allow for an 
unequivocal interpretation in this matter; namely, that there is at least one Unmoved Mover, 
identified by God, who has such and such attributes that meet the requirements of the CDH of 
Being as I have explained hitherto. In terms of the other question, whether Aristotle is 
espousing a view that allows for more than one unmoved mover, I will note that such an 
approach should not be accepted without scrutiny. The texts yield such an unsatisfactory and 
complex picture that the resulting portrait seems to be extremely ambiguous and complex, 
which raises further questions that are extremely difficult to answer with the evidence in hand. 
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non-rational desire, namely, ‘ἐπιθυµία’.97 It is the first kind of desire that is in 
question in Book Λ as it has its origins in thought, since the object of thought, 
according to Aristotle’s view of his endeavour to explain the movement in the 
Universe, is what motivates one to move by virtue of being an attractive goal to 
be admired.98 Envisaging what is desirable as an efficient cause may seem to be 
a little hard to fathom at first, particularly for modern readers, who expect a 
direct perceptional effect in which some pulling or pushing is involved in order 
to make an object move.99 However, Aristotle’s meaning may look fairly clear if 
one takes into account what Aristotle claims throughout his corpus together 
with his affirmation with respect to God as pure actuality and form concerning 
desire and movement. Correspondingly, in several different places Aristotle 
argues that ‘desire’ is the origin of movement.100 That which is desired, 
according to Aristotle, is good101 and God, as we have already seen is the 
ultimate good in the Universe. The first motion in the outer sphere is originated 
by God’s being the object of thought,102 and together with the motion that is 
originated in living Beings that strive for what is absolutely good, i.e. God, as 
their ultimate end, who stands as an object of desire, one can picture the 
direction Aristotle’s argument that envisages God as the efficient cause seems 
to take. God, in this way, functions as an efficient cause; He is the cause of the 
movement in the Universe and so of movement in us.103 I will close this 
discussion by noting that in view of the doctrine of desire, upon which the 
claim concerning God’s being the efficient cause of the Universe stands, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 For the distinction see De An. II, 3, 414b1ff.; III, 10, 433a23ff.; MA 6, 700b19-22; EE VII, 14, 
1247b18; Rhet. I, 10, 1369a1. 
98 Apart from Book Λ, 9, where Aristotle discusses the divine thought, see also MA 6, 700b21ff. 
For some recent discussions on the divine thought and how it originates movement in Aristotle, 
see Norman (1969); Menn (1992); Lang (1993), pp. 270-275; Caston (1999); Frede (2000), pp. 42-
45; Bradshaw (2001) and Burnyeat (2008). 
99 For the operation of efficient cause by way of a direct contact, see Phys. III, 2, 202a3ff. This will 
not, however, do in the case of God for certain reasons that are cited in Book Λ, 7, 1072b1ff. For 
originating a movement by way of indirect means see: GC II, 6, 323a25; De An. II, 4, 415b2; 20. 
100 See: De An. III, 10, 433a23-25; MA 6, 700b19-22; 7, 701a35; MM 12, 1187b37 (cf. NE VI, 2, 
1139b2).  
101 NE I, 2, 1094a18ff.; VI, 2, 1139b4; VIII, 8, 1159b20; Rhet. I, 10, 1369a2.  
102 One might be tempted to ask why the outer sphere makes a perfect circular motion instead 
of thinking and staying at rest. Aristotle does not give a plain answer to this question although 
it may be possible to find a suggested solution in the special kind of matter that the outer 
sphere has. 
103 Cf. De An. II, 4, 415a26-b7. 
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force that God imposes on us and on the Universe functions upon wise desires 
rather than despotic enforcements: ‘for god is not an imperative [ἐπιτακτικῶς] 
ruler, but is an end [οὗ ἕνεκα] with a view to which wisdom [ἡ φρόνησις] 
issues its commands’.104  
 
Finally, at this point it might be tempting to question how, in reality, Aristotle 
might succeed with his argument in considering God as the efficient, the final 
and the formal cause simultaneously. Does Aristotle give any hints whereby the 
claim that reduces three causes into one might be sufficiently justified? After all, 
if this captures the line of thought that Aristotle is espousing in Book Λ, there 
must be evidence elsewhere in the corpus that can establish the grounds for his 
claims.  
 
Hopefully, evidence can be found that Aristotle thinks the three principles can 
be reduced to one. For instance, in Physics, Aristotle states that the three causes 
can be identical: 
 
Now, the causes [αἱ αἰτίαι] being four, it is the business of the student of 
nature [τοῦ φυσικοῦ] to know [εἰδέναι] about them all, and if he refers his 
problems back to all of them, he will assign the ‘why’ [τὸ διὰ τί] in the way 
proper to his science – the matter [τὴν ὕλην], the form [τὸ εἶδος], the mover 
[τὸ κινῆσαν], that for the sake of which [τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα]. The last three often 
coincide [ἔρχεται δὲ τὰ τρία εἰς [τὸ] ἓν πολλάκις]; for the what [τί ἐστι] and 
that for the sake of which [τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα] are one [ἕν ἐστι], while the primary 
source of motion [ἡ κίνησις πρῶτον] is the same [ταὐτὸ] in species as these.105 
Though a justification for the proposal that three causes often coincide is 
missing, this passage is encouraging, for it reflects at least an inclination 
towards an approach that yields the identification of the formal, final and 
efficient causes. To be conclusive, any remark on this point requires far more 
than that which is found in this passage.  
 
It might be more straightforward to show one part of the claim that it is 
possible to identify the formal and the final cause. A passage from Physics may 
of help in understanding this point: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 EE VII, 15, 1249b13-14. 
105 Phys. II, 7, 198a22-26. 
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If then it is both by nature [φύσει] and for an end [ἕνεκά] that the swallow 
makes its nest and the spider its web, and plants grow leaves for the sake of 
[ἕνεκα] the fruit and send their roots down (not up) for the sake of 
nourishment, it is plain that this kind of cause [ἡ αἰτία] is operative in things 
which come to be and are by nature. And since nature is twofold [ἐπεὶ ἡ 
φύσις	  διττή], the matter [ὕλη] and the form [µορφή], of which the latter is the 
end [τέλος], and since all the rest is for the sake of the end [τοῦ τέλους δὲ 
ἕνεκα τἆλλα], the form must be the cause in the sense of that for the sake of 
which [αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἡ αἰτία, ἡ οὗ ἕνεκα].106   
In this passage Aristotle neatly encapsulates the idea that because nature 
always inclines towards the attainment of some form, which can be marked by 
telos, the final cause and the formal cause may well be identified with each 
other. The form, which is immanent to natural things, operates just as the final 
cause. Leaves grow for the sake of the production of the fruit, which amounts to 
saying that the aim in growing leaves is to produce the fruit. Obviously, fruit do 
not operate on a plant as an external cause, on the contrary, the growing of the 
leaves and the becoming of the fruit occurs by virtue of the immanent nature, the 
organization and the structure of the plant itself, which is conceived as an 
immanent form, which, in turn, enables the plant to produce the fruit. Again, 
plants send their roots down for the sake of some end; namely, nourishment. The 
growing of the roots downwards is not generated by an external cause, but by 
the help of the immanent form of the plant. Hence, the final cause is reduced to 
formal cause. The nature of things involves form and matter and the former 
operates as an immanent final cause.	   The teleological conception of the 
Universe, together with the hylomorphic analysis, therefore, allow for the 
identification of the formal and the final cause. According to this line of 
thought, things in the Universe strive for some end so as to attain the form 
which is immanent to their nature and is functioning, as it were, as the final 
cause in the processes of actualization.107  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Phys. II, 8, 199a26-32. 
107 See, also, Generation of Animals (I, 1, 175a5), where after enumerating the four causes Aristotle 
states: ‘We have already discussed the other three causes, for the definition and the final cause 
are the same’. Similarly in Metaphysics, Book H (4, 1044a32) Aristotle states: ‘When one inquires 
what is the cause [τὸ αἴτιον], one should, as causes are spoken of in several senses [ἐπεὶ 
πλεοναχῶς τὰ αἴτια λέγεται], state all the possible causes. E.g. what is the material cause [ὕλη] 
of man? The menstrual fluid. What is the moving cause [κινοῦν]? The semen. The formal cause 
[τὸ εἶδος]? His essence [τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι]. The final cause [οὗ ἕνεκα]? His end [τὸ τέλος]. But 
perhaps the latter two are the same [ἴσως δὲ ταῦτα ἄµφω τὸ αὐτό].’ Concerning the explicit 
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It is also possible to find passages that show what Aristotle thinks about 
identifying the efficient and the formal cause. A passage from Book Z may be of 
help in showing that this is just about where Aristotle seems to be treading: 
 
… health is the formula [λόγος] and the knowledge [ἐπιστήµη] in the soul [ἐν 
τῇ ψυχῇ]. The healthy subject, then, is produced as the result of the following 
train of thought; since this is health [τοδὶ ὑγίεια], if the subject is to be healthy 
this must first be present, e.g. a uniform state of body, and if this is to be 
present, there must be heat; and the physician goes on thinking [ἀεὶ νοεῖ] thus 
until he brings the matter to a final step which he himself can take. Then from 
this point onward, i.e. the process towards health, is called a ‘making’ 
[ποίησις]. Therefore it follows that in a sense health comes from health [τὴν 
ὑγίειαν ἐξ ὑγιείας γίγνεσθαι] and house from house [τὴν οἰκίαν ἐξ οἰκίας], 
that with matter from that without matter [τῆς ἄνευ ὕλης τὴν ἔχουσαν ὕλην]; 
for the medical art and the building art are the form [τὸ εἶδος] of health and 
of the house; and I call the essence [τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι] substance without matter 
[ἄνευ ὕλης]. Of productions [γενέσεων] and movements [κινήσεων] one part 
is called thinking [ἡ µὲν νόησις] and the other making [ἡ δὲ ποίησις], – that 
which proceeds from the starting-point and the form is thinking, and that 
which proceeds from the final step of the thinking is making. And each of the 
intermediate steps is taken in the same way.108  
The making of the artificial products, as explained in this passage, may be of 
some help in showing how the efficient cause might be reduced to the formal 
cause in reality. Aristotle differentiates two stages in the productions and 
movements; he denominates the first stage as ‘thinking’ and the second as 
‘making’. ‘Thinking’ comes out of form and is associated with it, while 
‘making’, which is the second stage of the productions and movements, comes 
out of ‘thinking’.109 The former step cannot be taken without the latter one, 
which may well amount to saying that ‘making’ is entirely dependent on 
‘thinking’. The efficient cause, which is necessarily linked to ‘making’, is 
connected asymmetrically to the actual principle; the form. The origin of 
movements and the whole process of production depend ultimately on the 
formal principle. Hence, the form functions as if it were a primary principle, 
which covers efficient cause in its definitive scope. The actual cause, which lies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
identification of formal and final principles one might also see: Phys. II, 7, 198b4; II, 9, 200a14; 
GC, I, 7, 324b18; II, 9, 335b6; Meteor. IV, 2, 379b25; GA I, 1, 715a5; Met. Δ, 4, 1015a11 (cf. Econ. I, 1, 
1343a13).   
108 Met. Z, 7, 1032b5-18. 
109 See De An. III, 10, 433a16: ‘and that which is last in the process of thinking is the beginning of 
the action.’   
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behind physicians’ healing, is the form of health in the physician’s soul. The 
form of health, which initiates the production of health, is the real reason upon 
which all the processes of the production of health depend. The actual role of 
the physician is to transfer this form to a patient. The art of healing in the 
physician’s soul, which is the formal cause of the process of healing, taken 
strictly, functions as the efficient cause simply because it not only starts the 
movement of production of health but also governs it through the process of 
healing. In short, healing can be regarded as a process in which health is 
transferred to a patient by virtue of the knowledge of the medical art in the 
physician’s soul. Hence, the art of healing can be regarded as both the formal 
cause and the efficient cause in the strict sense. It is on the basis of this approach 
that Aristotle declares, ‘in a sense health comes from health’.  
 
Similarly, in the art of building, an architect transfers the form of the house 
from his soul to some receptive matter. The process of building originates from 
and is carried by the form – and for that matter, the telos – in the architect’s soul. 
The architect first conceives the house and then applies this concept to a 
receptive matter. Both of the stages, ‘thinking’ and ‘making’, are determined 
and governed through the form, that is, the art of building. The form of the 
actual house is nothing more than the initial form in the architect’s soul. Hence, 
in a sense, it can rightly be affirmed that house comes from house and health 
from health. As a result, efficient cause is reduced to the formal cause.110 
 
It seems, upon reflection, that Aristotle’s own corpus allows for a possible 
identification of the formal, final and efficient causes and this is exactly what 
happens in the case of God. Aristotle conceives God as a pure actuality, who 
moves by being an object of desire and thus as an end. To put the matter, 
admittedly prejudicially, in other terms, by virtue of being the final cause and 
telos of the Universe, and by His admirable nature, who convenes every 
possible good in His nature and to whom the natures of things in the Universe 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 For other texts where the efficient causality of the formal cause is justified, see: Phys. II, 3, 
195a6-8; III, 2, 202a9; GC I, 5, 320b18-22; 7, 324a30-b6; De An. III, 5, 430a12; Met. Δ, 2, 1013b6-9; Z, 
9, 1034a23-24; ϑ, 2, 1046b15-24; Λ, 4, 1070b29; 6, 1071b30. 
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are, as it were, intimately connected,111 God governs the Universe and thereby 
functions as an efficient cause. 
 
The result of my investigation with respect to causal connectedness, then, is that 
it can be affirmed that Aristotle’s description of God in Book Λ takes such an 
approach that the conception of God can fulfil the requirements of the CDH of 
Being, upon which the science of Being is established in Book Γ. Aristotle 
envisages God as a principle to which the things in the Universe are ultimately, 
and for that matter analogically, connected. That is obviously enough the point 
that Aristotle is driving home. Having approached the question in this way, I 
find no impediment to thinking that what Aristotle says with respect to God in 
Book Λ in terms of the requirement of causal connectedness is so pictured that 
the science of Being Aristotle envisages in Book Γ can be established through 
CDH.  
 
5.6. Conclusion 
 
We have seen that the description of God in Book Λ fits exactly the 
requirements of the CDH of Being upon which the science of Being is 
established. In Book Λ God is attributed the very properties He needs to be the 
core of the CDH of Being. God, in Book Λ is described as fulfilling the 
requirements of ontological dependence, logical dependence and causal 
connectedness. The close harmony between the texts of Book Γ and Book Λ 
shows that they can indeed be regarded as parts of the same doctrine that 
comes from the whole corpus of treatises of Metaphysics. These two works 
complement each other; while Book Γ provides the basic structure, Book Λ 
completes the doctrine by introducing the most important constituent of the 
system in just the way it is required by the CDH encountered in Book Γ. In such 
a structure, if we did not have Book Γ, Aristotle’s enterprise into the 
characteristics of God would seem sketchy and unmotivated. If, on the other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 God being the final cause of things in the Universe should be thought of, as it were, as an 
analogical cause. The proximate causes, on the other hand, differ from one thing to another. See 
Met. Λ, 5.  
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hand, we did not have Book Λ, then the science of Being could not operate as 
one might expect for, in such a case, the most important element of the CDH of 
Being, that is the highest instance of Being, namely God, would be missing in 
the system. Having filled such an important gap in the doctrine of the science of 
Being, I find it implausible that Book Λ is to be regarded as an appendix or a 
treatise on its own. 
 
Now we know that all the other substances in the Universe are necessarily 
linked to God, by way of whom they find their basis of existence whilst they 
become intelligible. This amounts to saying that all the other substances are 
both ontologically and logically dependent upon God, the study of whom 
thereby might propagate through the whole Being by virtue of the necessary 
dependency relations according to the structure supplied in Book Γ. 
Furthermore, Aristotle envisages God as the ultimate efficient, final and formal 
principle of the Universe, whereby we attain the basic explanatory pattern that 
needs to be established for the operation of the science of Being. In such a 
structure, because of the very characteristics He has, only God merits to be the 
core item of the CDH of Being.  
 
The underlying framework offered in Book Γ paves the way for a unified 
universal science of Being through God. God stands at the nexus of all the 
possible manifestations of Being, the study of whom would lead to a universal 
knowledge of Being, that is, a study of Being in the unqualified way or Being 
qua Being. I find this proposal overwhelmingly plausible, especially in the face 
of the evidence that can be found not only in Book Γ and Book Λ but also in the 
whole Aristotelian corpus, not only because any successful development in this 
direction would provide the most complete and forceful picture of the science 
of Being so far attempted, while distancing us from the unsatisfactorily complex 
picture of developmentalist doctrines about the unity of the conception of the 
science of Being, but also make the text of Metaphysics highly readable. Hence, 
given the evidence that can be found in the two major treatises of Metaphysics, 
together with the whole Aristotelian corpus, it would be perverse, if 
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understandable, to say that Aristotle’s conception of the science of Being in 
Book Γ widely contradicts that of Book Λ, and it would be similarly perverse, 
and hardly understandable, to say that the reason for this distinctness must rest 
on the basis that Aristotle espoused different views at different stages of his 
philosophical development. Hence, I think much can be said in favour of the 
proposal, some appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, as for instance, 
stated by Frede and others, that Aristotle’s doctrine of the science of Being in 
Book Γ and with what he says with respect to God, in Book Λ are 
complementary parts of the same doctrine, though at times extremely 
ambiguous and highly speculative, merits serious consideration in the face of 
far more speculative doctrines of chronology of the text of Metaphysics. 
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